scholarly journals SIGNIFICANCE OF METAPHYSICS’ CRITICISM IN M. HEIDEGGER'S CREATIVITY

Metaphysics ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 38-46
Author(s):  
Sergei Anatol'evich Nizhnikov ◽  
Argen Ishenbekovich Kadyrov
Keyword(s):  
Being And Time ◽  
Primary Sources ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Fundamental Ontology ◽  
Main Work ◽  
European Philosophy ◽  
Metaphysical Tradition

Despite various interpretations of Heidegger's philosophy, he is undeniably a deep critic of the metaphysical tradition in European philosophy. His task of overcoming metaphysics once again aroused interest in the fundamental issues of life in the era of the total dominance of private sciences. In the article, the authors explore the concept of metaphysics and its criticism in the work of M. Heidegger, as well as subsequent interpretations, in particular by O. Peggeler (“New Ways with Heidegger”, 1992). Criticism of metaphysics was a necessary condition for overcoming it to build a fundamental ontology. Having experienced the influence of Nietzsche, Heidegger does not remain a Nietzschean, because he considers him the last metaphysician to be overcome. In this regard, Peggeler recognizes Heidegger's main work not as “Being and Time”, but as “Reports to Philosophy” (1936), where he sought to reveal the primary sources of the concept of metaphysics. Heidegger's views regarding the interpretation of the development of metaphysics in different historical eras are specially considered.

scholarly journals Heidegger's concept of 'Being-There' and fundamental concepts of traditional ontology

2008 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 273-291
Author(s):  
Milotka Molnar-Sivc
Keyword(s):  
Decisive Role ◽  
The Other ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Strict Sense ◽  
Fundamental Ontology ◽  
Basic Concepts ◽  
Being There ◽  
The One ◽  
The Relationship

Although the question of relationship between basic concepts of traditional ontology and central concepts of fundamental ontology is not a topic which is systematically dealt with in Being and Time, it is obvious that some of the theses which are crucial not only for Heidegger's interpretation of philosophical tradition, but also for the whole project of fundamental ontology, concern this 'conceptual scheme'. In fact, the backbone of Heidegger's critical confrontation with dominant philosophical conceptions is the question of relationship between the concept of 'substance' and the concept of 'Being', i.e. the discussion of philosophical doctrines in which 'Being' is reduced to 'substance'. Besides this context, which concerns the ontological problematics in the strict sense, it is possible to show that the refutation of the basic categories of traditional ontology is an issue which has a decisive role in more concrete phases of the realization of the project of fundamental ontology. This is especially confirmed in Heidegger's discussion of the concept of 'Being-There'. The interpretation of Heidegger's treatment of the relationship between the concepts of 'Being-there', 'existence' and 'existentials' on the one hand, and the concepts of 'substance', 'essence' and 'categories' on the other, shows that one of Heidegger's basic theses is that a transformation of concepts of traditional ontology is necessary for an appropriate understanding of human being.

The Presuppositions of Being and Time

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 235-243
Author(s):  
Lucas Fain ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Fundamental Ontology ◽  
Lecture Courses

It is often remarked that Heidegger’s Being and Time was originally proposed as a book on Aristotle, and that formative work for this initial expression of Heidegger’s existential ontology was developed through the early 1920s in a series of lecture courses and seminars on Aristotle’s practical philosophy. This paper examines select details from Heidegger’s 1924 summer course in order to question the presuppositions of Heidegger’s decision to found the project of fundamental ontology on a purely philological reading of Aristotle. At stake is the method of investigation which permitted Heidegger to think politics through ontology in his most controversial writings from the 1930s—and ultimately the meaning of philosophy itself.

Thinking Transcendence: Heidegger’s Ontological Concept of Freedom

2019 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 247-260
Author(s):  
Stefan Schmidt ◽  
Keyword(s):  
World View ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Philosophical Theology ◽  
Main Subject ◽  
Fundamental Ontology ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Actual Use ◽  
Ontological Concept ◽  
Positive Concept

According to Hans Ruin, there are two ways to approach the examination of freedom in Heidegger’s writings: One can use the notion of freedom as a heuristic concept to interpret the entirety of Heidegger’s work as a philosophy of freedom, which was famously done by Günter Figal, or one can reconstruct Heidegger’s actual use of the notion of freedom. In my paper I’ll focus on the second approach and show that although “freedom” or, rather, “being-free” can already be found in Being and Time, his more elaborate concept of freedom as transcendence is developed in the years 1928-1930. These years are part of a time period in which Heidegger tried to develop his own positive concept of metaphysics. The main texts which show this development are the lecture course The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic and the essay On the Essence of Ground. Based on Aristotle’s twofold metaphysics—consisting of ontology and philosophical theology—Heidegger sketches his own concept of metaphysics. The fundamental ontology which plays the role of ontology is complemented by his cosmological interpretation of theology: metontology. Together, they form Heidegger’s novel notion of metaphysics: the metaphysics of Dasein. Whereas fundamental ontology is concerned with the question of Being, the main subject of metontology is world as beings as a whole. Heidegger develops his concept of transcendence, i.e., metontological freedom, which describes the connection between freedom and world, on the basis of the terms world-projection (Weltentwurf), world-view (Weltanschauung), and world-formation (Weltbildung), each describing an aspect of transcendence.

Heidegger

2021 ◽  
pp. 241-296
Author(s):  
Guy Elgat
Keyword(s):  
Martin Heidegger ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Transcendental Argument

This chapter argues that Martin Heidegger can be read as providing a synthesis of sorts of the views considered in the previous chapters. Specifically, it focuses on Heidegger’s analysis of Being-guilty in his Being and Time and argues that while for Heidegger we are indeed not causa sui, as the naturalists hold, we are nevertheless guilty as such or are characterized by ontological guilt, as the metaphysicians hold, and this is because for Heidegger, not being causa sui is a condition of our ontological guilt. Moreover, it is our Being-guilty that makes our factical or empirical guilt possible. After introducing some of the main concepts and themes of Heidegger’s discussion, the chapter turns to reconstruct Heidegger’s transcendental argument to the effect that our Being-guilty is a necessary condition of the possibility of factical guilt. It then turns to discuss Heidegger’s concepts of the call of conscience and of wanting-to-have-a-conscience.

scholarly journals FREEDOM AS THE MAIN PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY GÜNTHER NEUMANN DER FREIHEITSBEGRIFF BEI GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ UND MARTIN HEIDEGGER. PHILOSOPHISCHE SCHRIFTEN, BAND 9. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2019 ISBN 978-3-428-15537-8 HEIDEGGER UND LEIBNIZ. MIT EINEM GELEITWORT VON FRIEDRICH-WILHELM VON HERRMANN (DAS DENKEN MARTIN HEIDEGGERS II 2 HRSG. VON HANS-CHRISTIAN GÜNTHER). Traugott Bautz Verlag, Nordhausen, 2020 ISBN 978-3-95948-493-0

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 305-311
Author(s):  
◽  
VALTERS ZARIŅŠ ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Martin Heidegger ◽  
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz ◽  
The Other ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Close Reading ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Fundamental Ontology ◽  
Freedom Of Will ◽  
History Of

Book review focuses on two books by Gunther Neumann, dedicated to the thought of Heidegger and Leibniz. If one of the books deals specifically with the understanding of freedom in both of the two philosophers, then the other one deals more with Heidegger’s three approaches to Leibniz’s thought: (1) Interpretation of Leibniz in the context of the making of fundamental ontology and in Being and Time, as well as the reading of Leibniz after Being and Time; (2) Interpretation of Leibniz during the transition to Ereignis thought; (3) Interpetation of Leibniz in the framework of Ereignis thought. Author’s scrupulous close reading approach allows to show the changes in Heidegger’s approach to Leibniz’s philosophy, as well as sketch out the placement of Leibniz’s great themes on the horizon of Heidegger’s history of the truth of being. Author also shows that from metaphysics there stems a certain view in the modern philosophical discussions oriented on neurosciences—a certain view on the human being and on the freedom of will. On this background Heidegger appears as a thinker who has looked beyond the alloy of metaphysics and sciences, in which the concept of freedom has been greatly restricted. Heidegger manages (thanks to the radical questioning of Being) to turn the view on the problem of freedom, which appears in G. Neumann’s books as the main problem of philosophy—through the contact of Leibniz’s thought and Heidegger’s.

scholarly journals Otherwise than Identity, or Beyond Difference

1970 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-137
Author(s):  
Jack Pappas
Keyword(s):  
Human Existence ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Fundamental Ontology ◽  
Historical Reality ◽  
Maximus The Confessor ◽  
Divine Personhood

This paper locates in the philosophy of Maximus the Confessor a remarkable concern for the temporality, finitude, and historicity of the human soul, that at once anticipates Heidegger’s “fundamental ontology,” but which is also capable of overcoming the limitations of philosophical nihilism. In taking up Heidegger’s claim that the recovery of ontology (and philosophy itself) depends upon the understanding of Being always in relation to its self-revelation in the finite and historical reality of human existence, it becomes clear that contemporary philosophical expression requires a “turning away” from the conceptual unity of finite beings and eternal Being, and a movement toward a radically subjective negativity. In contrast to his Neoplatonic forebears, Maximus presents a mode of thinking which is capable of surpassing Heideggerian negation, not through a denial of human particularity or finitude, but rather through a transformation of the very categories of Being and non-being themselves through his understanding of divine personhood. For Maximus such personhood is conceived of as transcending both Being and time, and yet without any loss of transcendence comes also to partake fully of both through the mystery of the Incarnation. According to Maximus, this radical event of be-coming forever transfigures the sphere of beings, bringing the historical into the transcendent, non-Being into Being, and death into life.

scholarly journals Analysis of Oleksandr Kulchytskyi’s Anthropological Research in the Context of European Philosophy

2021 ◽  
pp. 138-149
Author(s):  
A. S Synytsia
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Anthropology ◽  
Social Factor ◽  
Primary Sources ◽  
Special Importance ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Psychological Issues ◽  
Cultural Conditions ◽  
The Social ◽  
European Philosophy ◽  
Philosophical Doctrine

Purpose. The paper is aimed at studying the peculiarities of the Oleksandr Kulchytskyi’s doctrine of human, taking into account the context of European philosophy and especially in comparison with the paradigm of philosophizing in the Lviv-Warsaw school. The theoretical basis of the study is determined by Kulchytskyi’s scholarly works in the field of philosophy and philosophical anthropology, as well as the latest researches that reinterpret the influence of Twardowski’s theoretico-methodological ideas on the formation of the philosophical worldview of the Ukrainian thinker. Originality. Based on the appeal to primary sources, Kulchytskyi’s philosophical doctrine of human in the unity of its basic principles and theoretico-practical results is reconstructed. The ways of forming the key ideas of his philosophical anthropology are determined, their originality is substantiated, despite the cooperation with Twardowski’s school, as well as despite numerous discussions and researches of Western European philosophico-anthropological, existentio-ideological and socio-psychological issues. Conclusions. It is found out how the philosophical worldview of Oleksandr Kulchytskyi was formed and how he gradually came from the research of the human psyche within the framework of anthropological structural psychology to the realization of the need to study philosophical anthropology. The personalistic features of his philosophical doctrine of human are characterized; in particular, attention is paid to the distinction between the concepts of person and personality, determining the importance of the social factor for the formation of human worldview, didactic aims of anthropological studies. It is shown how in Kulchytskyi’s philosophical anthropology the analysis of the existentio-worldview dimension of human existence, manifested in different spiritual situations and socio-cultural conditions that influence the specifics of thinking and the nature of the personality mentality, acquires special importance. The originality of Kulchytskyi’s arguments about human in the context of both Ukrainian philosophy and in general European philosophical thought is stated.

Subjectivité et projet. La critique patočkienne du concept heideggérien de "projet de possibilités"

Labyrinth ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Ovidiu Stanciu
Keyword(s):  
Being And Time ◽  
Final Part ◽  
Critical Reading ◽  
Fundamental Ontology ◽  
Phenomenal Field ◽  
The One ◽  
The Way

Subjectivity and Project. Patočka's critique of Heidegger's concept "project of possibilities" The purpose of this article is to lay out the way the main aspects of Patočka's critical reading of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. More precisely, I intend to restate the central arguments Patočka raised against Heidegger's characterization of "understanding" (Verstehen) as a "project". In the first part, I will single out Patočka's project of an "asubjective phenomenology" by distinguishing it from another asubjective project (that of Aristotle) and from the subjective phenomenology. In the second part, I will examine some central theses Heidegger puts forth in §31 of Being and Time in order to show the inescapable difficulties they bring about. In the final part, I will describe the tenets around which Patočka's critical reading of Heidegger revolves. I will explore the two directions of this critique that correspond to the double orientation of asubjective phenomenology: a) on the one hand, the priority of the phenomenal field with regard to any subjective sense-bestowal; b) the importance of the phenomenon of corporeity for an accurate apprehension of subjectivity.

“What Is the Human Being?”

2020 ◽  
pp. 143-171
Author(s):  
Mikko Immanen
Keyword(s):  
Vienna Circle ◽  
Being And Time ◽  
Husserlian Phenomenology ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Philosophical Theory ◽  
Inaugural Address ◽  
Popular Opinion ◽  
The Real ◽  
Fundamental Ontology

This chapter talks about Theodor W. Adorno's inaugural address that scrutinized the dominant philosophical trends from scientifically minded positivism of the Vienna Circle and various schools of neo-Kantianism. It examines Adorno's declaration that it is mandatory to reject the illusion that the power of thought is sufficient to grasp the totality of the real. It also details how Adorno challenged the popular opinion that Martin Heidegger's Being and Time marked the beginning of a new concrete philosophy, declaring that Heidegger too aims at ahistorical truth. The chapter discusses Heidegger's rejection of Hegelianism, neo-Kantianism, and Husserlian phenomenology and his turn toward a worldly Dasein. It cites Adorno's concession that the critique of his habilitation study by the representatives of fundamental ontology forced him to articulate better the philosophical theory that had guided his study.

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