scholarly journals A Vulnerabilidade do Direito à Intimidade no Espaço das Ferramentas Tecnológicas: Mandados Constitucionais de Proteção do Direito Fundamental à Intimidade por Intermédio do Direito Penal

Author(s):  
George Sarmento ◽  
Lean Antônio Ferreira de Araújo

A VULNERABILIDADE DO DIREITO À INTIMIDADE NO ESPAÇO DAS FERRAMENTAS TECNOLÓGICAS: MANDADOS CONSTITUCIONAIS DE PROTEÇÃO DO DIREITO FUNDAMENTAL À INTIMIDADE POR INTERMÉDIO DO DIREITO PENAL  THE VULNERABILITY OF THE RIGHT TO INTIMACY IN THE SPACE OF TECHNOLOGICAL INSTRUMENTS: CONSTITUCIONAL WARRANTS FOR PROTECTION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO INTIMACY THROUGH CRIMINAL LAW  George Sarmento*Lean Araújo**  RESUMO: O direito à intimidade integra o catálogo dos direitos fundamentais de proteção descrito no art. 5º, X, da Carta Constitucional, cuja essência é limitar a ação invasiva do Estado e dos demais indivíduos. No processo evolutivo do Estado é de se destacar a contribuição de Hobbes na formulação do Estado como ente responsável pela preservação dos indivíduos. Este momento instituiu a ruptura do indivíduo como ser que se realiza no outro para o ser empreendedor de seu próprio plano de vida, mas submetidas as ações as regras de condutas. A partir desta concepção absolutista evoluiu-se para a formulação de um Estado com delimitação de tarefas por intermédio de Órgãos autônomos e independentes visando à concretude de direitos de proteção ou defesa, direitos prestacionais e direitos de participação. A existência desse Estado Democrático de Direito e Social, constituído a partir da vontade dos seus indivíduos, exige a proteção dos direitos instituídos, dentre eles, à intimidade, e, para tanto, a própria ordem constitucional fixa mandados constitucionais de criminalização, para excepcionalmente coibir os abusos operados no espaço físico e no espaço das ferramentas tecnológicas, em razão da vulnerabilidade existente. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Direito à Intimidade. Ferramentas Tecnológicas. Vulnerabilidade. Proteção pelo Direito Penal. ABSTRACT: The right to intimacy integrates the catalog of privacy fundamental rights depicted in article 5 section X of the constitutional charter. Its essence is to limit the invasive action of the State and other individuals. Hobbes had an important role in State evolutionary process concerning the formulation of the State as responsible for individuals preservation. This moment established the rupture of the individual as a being that realizes itself on another, to an entrepreneur of its own life plan, but submitted to actions and rules of conduct. This absolutistic conception evolved to the formulation of a State with tasks bounded by autonomous and independent agencies aiming to concretize the protection or defense rights, benefit rights and social participation. The existence of this Democratic State and social rights established by the will of the individuals, demands the protection of the established rights, such as intimacy, and therefore the constitutional order itself provides criminal warrants to exceptionally restrain misconducts operated in the physical and technological  space, due to existing vulnerability. KEYWORDS: Right to Intimacy. Technological Tools. Vulnerability. Protection through Criminal Law. SUMÁRIO: Introdução 1 A Evolução do Estado no Pensamento Político. 2 A Unidade da Constituição. 3 A Classificação dos Direitos Fundamentais. 3.1 Os Direitos Fundamentais de Proteção. 3.2 Os Direitos Fundamentais Prestacionais. 3.3 Os Direitos Fundamentais de Participação. 4 O Agir Moral em Contexto. 5 O Espaço das Ferramentas Tecnológicas como meio de Ofensa ao Direito à Intimidade. 6 Mandados Constitucionais de Criminalização. 7 Alterações da Legislação Penal. Considerações Finais. Referências.* Pós-doutor pela Université Daix-Marseille, França. Doutor em Direito pela Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE). Professor do Mestrado do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito da Universidade Federal de Alagoas (PPGD/UFAL). Promotor de Justiça.** Acadêmico de Direito da Universidade Federal de Mato Grosso (UFMT). Pesquisador bolsista de Iniciação Científica da Universidade Federal do Mato Grosso do Sul (UFMT) e do Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPQ).

2021 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Antonio Gómez García

Based on the assumption that the fundamental rights of people in most democratic states are governed by the personalist principle and that, of course, the religious freedom of the individual is an indisputable fundamental right, this paper reflects on the implications of these premises in the institutional field. The article consists of four chapters: the first two chapters are of a more general nature, and the next two chapters apply the general principles to the Spanish context. The first part discusses the personalist foundation that forms the basis of laws in democratic states. The author highlights the fact that the ethical value of the dignity of every human person provides an axiological foundation for the rules and fundamental laws enacted in the democratic constitutional order. The second part of the paper is devoted to the principle of subsidiarity, which – in a way – constitutes a bridge that makes it possible to transpose the dignity of the person to the functioning of the institutions that operate within a democratic state. Subsidiarity is an essential complement to personalism as it prioritizes the activity of the person that should be supported by the institutions of the State. The application of these general principles to the situation in Spain exemplifies them in the context of the understanding and enforcement of the right to religious freedom. By presenting specific legal solutions implemented in Spain in recent years, the author illustrates the challenges that the right to religious freedom is facing in modern democracies. The paper offers a compelling study of the joint effect of the principle of secularism in a democratic State and the principle of cooperation between the State and religious institutions (a concept referred to in the Spanish model as “positive secularism”) as they act upon social life to guarantee the implementation of a fundamental right of human persons: the right to religious freedom.


Author(s):  
I. Mytrofanov

The article states that today the issues of the role (purpose) of criminal law, the structure of criminal law knowledge remain debatable. And at this time, questions arise: whose interests are protected by criminal law, is it able to ensure social justice, including the proportionality of the responsibility of the individual and the state for criminally illegal actions? The purpose of the article is to comprehend the problems of criminal law knowledge about the phenomena that shape the purpose of criminal law as a fair regulator of public relations, aimed primarily at restoring social justice for the victim, suspect (accused), society and the state, the proportionality of punishment and states for criminally illegal acts. The concepts of “crime” and “punishment” are discussed in science. As a result, there is no increase in knowledge, but an increase in its volume due to new definitions of existing criminal law phenomena. It is stated that the science of criminal law has not been able to explain the need for the concept of criminal law, as the role and name of this area is leveled to the framework terminology, which currently contains the categories of crime and punishment. Sometimes it is not even unreasonable to think that criminal law as an independent and meaningful concept does not exist or has not yet appeared. There was a custom to characterize this right as something derived from the main and most important branches of law, the criminal law of the rules of subsidiary and ancillary nature. Scholars do not consider criminal law, for example, as the right to self-defense. Although the right to self-defense is paramount and must first be guaranteed to a person who is almost always left alone with the offender, it is the least represented in law, developed in practice and available to criminal law subjects. Today, for example, there are no clear rules for the necessary protection of property rights or human freedoms. It is concluded that the science of criminal law should develop knowledge that will reveal not only the content of the subject of this branch of law, but will focus it on new properties to determine the illegality of acts and their consequences, exclude the possibility of using its means by legal entities against each other.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 48-56
Author(s):  
T. V. Klenova

The article is devoted to the institution of criminal liability for attacks on the honor and dignity of the individual. The article, using the historical method, examines the stages of development of this institution and the features of protecting the honor and dignity of the individual from the point of view of the values of a modern democratic state. The author analyses the impact of explicit and implicit criminal policy objectives on the ways to protect the honor and dignity of the individual. Particular attention is paid to the criminalization and decriminalization of libel and slander. The research is aimed at identifying the problems of targeting in changes in the institution of criminal liability for attacks on honor and dignity, when the relevant criminal law norms are replaced by administrative law norms. The author seeks to depoliticize the protection of the personal right to honor and dignity on the basis of the principle of equality of citizens before the law. The current Russian criminal legislation is mainly aimed at protecting the honor and dignity of persons in connection with their social accessories. Within the protective concept of criminal law, the author of the article justifies the conclusion that the right of anyone who has suffered from slander or insult to achieve the truth and state censure of the perpetrator is guaranteed. Such a view will also be interesting to researchers of the criminal process.


Lex Russica ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 62-70
Author(s):  
A. V. Savinskiy

The paper is devoted to an actual problem of the legal theory and practice, namely: the institution of circumstances excluding criminal nature (criminality) of an act (Chapter 8 of the Russian Criminal Code). As a manifestation of criminal and legal compromise steadily strengthening its position in domestic criminal legislation, this legal phenomenon is intended to encourage citizens to commit actions that contribute to localization or minimization of threats to the interests of the individual, society and the state protected by the law. At the same time, despite seemingly clear legislative enactment, the institution of circumstances precluding the criminal nature of an act evokes hot scientific debates. Among forensic scientists there is no uniform opinion concerning the legal nature of the criminal law institution as a whole and some of the individual types of circumstances constituting the institution under consideration, in particular. The legal literature substantiates the idea of the need to expand the legislative list of such circumstances. Investigators and judges often face difficulties in practical application of the rules enshrined in articles of Chapter 8 of the Criminal Code (especially provisions concerning necessary defense, extreme necessity, reasonable risk). The reasons for theoretical and practical problems related to the circumstances excluding the criminal nature of the act are largely preconditioned by the insufficient research of the institution under consideration in the general theory of law. This fundamental theoretical legal science lacks general legal equivalents of the criminal law concepts “criminality of the act”, “circumstances excluding criminality of the act.” It is proposed to introduce into scientific circulation the general legal equivalent of the concept “criminality of the act” — “delinquency of the act”, representing the set of such features of the offense as public harm, wrongfulness, culpability and punishability. This new legal design will allow us to investigate the phenomenon of circumstances excluding criminality of the act in the light of a general theory of law, to determine the possibility and limits of their subsidiary application in various branches of law. Thus, categories of circumstances excluding criminal, administrative, civil. disciplinary delinquency of acts will acquire the right to exist in differnt legal sciences and relevant branches of law. This, in turn, will contribute to improving the effectiveness of protection of rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of the individual, ensuring the interests of the society and the state.


Author(s):  
David Harris ◽  
Michael O’Boyle ◽  
Ed Bates ◽  
Carla Buckley

This chapter discusses Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects the ‘right to liberty and security of person’. The notion of ‘liberty’ here covers the physical liberty of the person, which the Court views alongside Articles 2, 3, and 4 as ‘in the first rank of the fundamental rights that protect the physical security of an individual’. All kinds of detention by the state are controlled by Article 5, including detention in the criminal process, detention of the mentally disabled and detention prior to extradition or deportation.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Barnert ◽  
Natascha Doll

On January 15th 1958, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court - FCC) pronounced a judgement deemed to be a prime example for the Court's early jurisprudence concerning the scope of fundamental rights in Germany: The Court's famous “Lüth”-decision resulted from a constitutional complaint brought by Erich Lüth, former member of the Hamburg senate.* In the early 1950s, Lüth had called upon film distributors and the public to boycott Veit Harlan's tearjerker movie Unsterbliche Geliebte (Immortal Beloved). Cause for his appeal was Harlan's prominent role in the Nazi propaganda machinery as Goebbels' protégé and director of the movie Jud Süss in 1940, which counts as one of the worst anti-semitic films released during the Nazi regime. After having lost several civil lawsuits, Lüth asserted the violation of constitutional rights. Over six years later, he was to be proved correct: The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that Lüth's complaint was covered by the right to freedom of speech guaranteed in Art. 5 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The Court stated that the fundamental rights as laid down in the Grundgesetz are not only of importance as subjective rights protecting the individual against state intrusions on the private sphere. As a whole they also unfold an objective dimension in representing society's crucial values. Therefore, they govern the entire legal order - including civil law and private law relations! This was indeed understood as a staggering conclusion with which the Court went far beyond the issue at stake. Since Lüth, German legal discourse characterizes this phenomenon as the third-party or horizontal effect of basic rights (Drittwirkung).


Author(s):  
Cleide Fermentão ◽  
Pedro Henrique Sanches Aguera

AUSÊNCIA DE EFICÁCIA DO DIREITO FUNDAMENTAL À SAÚDE E A VULNERABILIDADE DAS PESSOAS QUE DEPENDEM DA SAÚDE PÚBLICA: ONDE ESTÁ A INVIOLABILIDADE DA DIGNIDADE HUMANA?  THE LACK OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO HEALTH AND THE VULNERABILITY OF PEOPLE WHO DEPEND ON PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES: WHERE IS THE INVIOLABILITY OF HUMAN DIGNITY?   Cleide Fermentão*Pedro Henrique Sanches Aguera**  Resumo: Neste ensaio, inicialmente aborda-se o desenvolvimento de conceitos de pessoa e de indivíduo que aqui são utilizados. Dessa forma, é correto afirmar a dignidade da pessoa humana e não a dignidade do indivíduo. Também se fundamenta que a finalidade principal do Direito é a proteção dos valores humanos, porque a pessoa humana é centro do Direito, e, portanto, deve ser respeitada a sua dignidade. Depois, afirma-se que a segunda geração de direitos fundamentais corresponde aos direitos sociais, econômicos e culturais, estando ligada diretamente a direitos prestacionais sociais do Estado perante o indivíduo. A segunda geração difere das demais gerações pelo fato de o Estado passar a ter a obrigação de possibilitar à pessoa humana o seu desenvolvimento. A Constituição Federal brasileira de 1988 regulamentou os direitos de segunda geração, incluindo o direito à saúde como um direito social. É a saúde um direito fundamental de segunda geração e, ao mencionar o dispositivo que ele é um direito de todos, é ele tanto um direito individual como coletivo. Há o dever fundamental de prestação de saúde por parte do Estado, inclusive com  a formulação de políticas públicas, devendo o Estado criar meios para que todos possam usufruir do mesmo. Na medida em que ficou determinado pelo constituinte um sistema universal de acesso aos serviços públicos de saúde, foi reforçada a ideia de responsabilidade solidária entre os entes da federação. Surge o problema aqui apontado das questões ligadas à implementação e à manutenção das políticas públicas de saúde já existentes. Estando a dignidade da pessoa humana ligada aos direitos fundamentais de segunda geração e sendo ela o princípio norteador do ordenamento jurídico, poderia-se imaginar que qualquer pessoa teria sua dignidade garantida, se tivesse seus direitos sociais assegurados, incluído o direito à saúde. Palavras-chave: Direito à Saúde. Dignidade da Pessoa Humana. Direto fundamental de 2º Geração. Dever do Estado. Políticas Públicas. Abstract: In this essay, initially it is addressed the development of the concepts of person and individual that are used here. Thus, it is correct to affirm the dignity of the human person and not the dignity of the individual. Also, it is justified that the main purpose of the Law is the protection of human values, because the human person is the center of the Law, and therefore its dignity must be respected. Then it is said that the second generation of fundamental rights corresponds to the social, economic, and cultural rights, being bound directly to social rights to State positive actions to the individual. The second generation differs from other generations by the fact the State go on to have a duty to enable the human person to develop. The Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988 regulates the rights of second generation, including the right to health as a social right. The right to health is a fundamental right of second generation, and, by stating a constitutional clause that it is a right for everyone, it is both an individual and collective right. There is the fundamental duty of providing health care by the State, including the elaboration of public policies, and the State must provide for everyone to avail themselves of it. In the extent that the constituent determined a universal system of access to public health services, the idea of joint liability between the federal entities has been reinforced. The problem here pointed of the issues associated with implementation and maintenance of existing public health policies arises. Being human dignity bound to the fundamental rights of second generation, and being it the guiding principle of the legal system, one would imagine that anyone would have guaranteed their dignity if they had their social rights, including the right to health, ensured. Palavras-chave: Direito à Saúde. Dignidade da Pessoa Humana. Direto fundamental de 2º Geração. Dever do Estado. Políticas Pública. Sumário: Introdução. 1. Indivíduo e Pessoa Detentores do Direito à Saúde. 1.1. Indivíduo. 1.2 Pessoa. 2. Direito à Saúde como Direito Fundamental Social de 2º Geração. 3. Proteção Constitucional do Direito à Saúde. 4. Dignidade da Pessoa Humana, Direito da Personalidade e o Direito à Saúde. Considerações Finais. Referências.*  Doutora em Direitos Sociais pela Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR). Mestre em Direito Civil pela Universidade Estadual de Maringá, Paraná (UEM). Professora do Programa de Mestrado, Especialização e Graduação do Centro Universitário de Maringá, Paraná (Unicesumar), e da Faculdade Metropolitana de Maringá, Paraná (Famma).**  Mestrando do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Jurídicas (PPGCJ) do Centro Universitário de Maringá, Paraná (Unicesumar), com bolsa CAPES. Pós-Graduado em Direito Processual Civil pela Faculdade de Direito Damásio de Jesus.  Pós-Graduado em Direito Empresarial pelo Centro Universitário de Maringá, Paraná (Unicesumar).


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (15) ◽  
pp. 111-125
Author(s):  
Yuriivna Timofeyeva

The article considers some issues of interpretation of the right to privacy in the practice of the ECtHR and its impact on the criminal law of Ukraine. Numerous violations of the articles of the Convention require systematic response of the state and appropriate changes in both legislation and changes in law enforcement practices. The violations relate in particular to problems of interpretation of the provisions of the Convention. Provisions of Art. 8 of the Convention are related to other provisions of the Convention and the development of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights on certain issues. It is noted that the Convention is dynamic, it changes under the influence of society, its provisions change in the process of development and acquire new meanings. In particular, the ECtHR recognizes a violation of Art. 8 (right to respect for private life) in those contexts in which he has not previously recognized. In particular, interpretation of Art. 8 of the Convention in the context of the right to environmental safety in case significant harm to the persons health (cases Dubetska and others v. Ukraine, Grymkivska v. Ukraine), the right to beg in the context of the right to freedom of expression (Lakatush v. Switzerland). It is established that the development of these provisions requires analysis and consideration in the development of a new Criminal Code. At the same time, care must be taken to maintain a balance between freedoms and human rights and the security of society and the state. It is important that the rights enshrined in the Convention remain fundamental and do not go beyond the interests and needs of the individual. In addition, it is also necessary to take into account the national characteristics of the state.


2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 167-175
Author(s):  
B. A. Molchanov ◽  
M. V. Novikov

The paper discusses formation and development of criminal legislation on the subject and subjective signs of the crime in the countries of medieval Europe within the comparative jurisprudence. The authors note that the level of culture and statehood in any society and its government bodies as a whole depends on the attitude of the society and the state to those who committed unlawful, criminally punishable acts. On the materials of criminal law in the Ancient World and the Middle Ages (Ancient Rome, Ancient Greece, etc.) a strict liability was in law-enforcement practice. New states were formed during the Middle Ages. That led to the need of strengthening their authority of state power and statehood. Consequently, the state got the right to protect the interests of the individual and society, and the right to creation a new criminal legislation and its institutions. The church survived after liquidation of many public and state institutions. On the one hand, it contributed to the preservation of scientific achievements of the Ancient World. On the other hand, the church deprived science of free critical attitude to the issues under study. Philosophy and jurisprudence were based on theology. Criminal-legal institutions could be developed only in the direction, which had been approved by the church. Clearly, the idea of protecting the rights of the individual, strict liability and conditions of sanity could not be widely applied. As soon as the states were originated, strict liability was necessary to stop the blood feud and delegation of the judiciary from the society to the state. The obtained knowledge about the world and deeper understanding of the causality of what is happening facilitated the process. From the political point of view, theology (a Christian doctrine) influenced the criminal law policy in Medieval Time. The legislator regulated a range of subjects of the crime. In X - XI centuries, ancient ideas of strict liability were accepted in Europe. Crimes were divided into willful and not deliberate. The principle of the personal guilty is directly related to the subject of the crime. Murderers, rapists, thieves, swindlers and others were declared criminals. Judicial practice of many times and peoples gives us numerous examples confirming the existence of views on the animal as a subject of crime. Age limits of legal responsibility were defined as the minority, which is different from the social maturity, and sometimes old age, were considered the reason for the undisputed crime blamed of a crime to a subject. People under 14 years old could not be subjected to the death penalty, except when "malice can make up for the lack of age". The authors pay attention to the fact that the interests of healthy individuals guided medieval jurisprudence and medicine. They also regulated peculiarities of the healthy individuals’ legal capacity, presence of dementia and mental illnesses, etc. The mitigation of punishment in some cases when the fault of the subject of the crime was absent, fixing the criminal-legal significance of the motive of the crime, intent and some other subjective features in the legislation were a progress. Studies of the Medieval European States shows that the legislator at that time did not formulate general signs of the subject of the crime and did not know the criminal legal concept of strict liability. However, there was a need to solve the problem. Thus, the paper discusses the essence of the criminal legal significance of the сorpus delicti, its place in the criminal law and law enforcement practiceю. The authors used scientific literature of both foreign and Russian


Author(s):  
Rowan Cruft

The first half of Chapter 10 addresses criticisms of the conception of human rights developed in Chapter 9: that it overlooks how human rights law protects collective goods rather than the individual, and that it overlooks the centrality of the state as duty-bearer in human rights law. The author’s response includes noting that state-focused human rights law is only one way in which ‘natural’ human rights are institutionalized: criminal law and non-law policy also play human rights roles. The chapter’s second half argues that human rights not only exist ‘for the right-holder’s sake’ (as in Chapters 7–9) but are also rights whose protection is distinctively ‘everyone’s business’: rights with which any human anywhere can show solidarity by demanding their fulfilment. This does not imply that human rights violations in one state are equally every state’s business. The chapter ends by summarizing Part II (Chapters 7–10) as vindicating the idea of human rights.


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