scholarly journals Kuhn’s philosophy of science of early and transitional period: Paradigms and incommensurability

2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 69-103
Author(s):  
Nebojsa Lukic
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Formal Education ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Transitional Period ◽  
Original Definition ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
History Of ◽  
Conceptual Network ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Definition Of

Even though Thomas Kuhn was a physicist by formal education, he is better known for his achievements in philosophy of science than in science itself. He was primarily concerned with history of science and subjects such as development of science, growth of scientific knowledge, changes in science and others. In that sense Kuhn was focused on giving the correct description of scientific reality in human history, that is, on giving the description of the most relevant elements of scientific research. Kuhn claims that scientists base their research on paradigms which are the key factor in scientific practice overall. All other concepts of Kuhn?s philosophy - such as, for instance, normal science, revolutionary science, incommensurability of paradigms - gain their meaning in relation to the concept of a paradigm. However, the concept of a paradigm in its original definition was very problematic, which, later on, led Kuhn to make its meaning more precise. Hence, the task of this paper is to illuminate the nature of that central concept i.e. to determine the essential features of a paradigm in relation to the rest of the conceptual network of Kuhn?s theory, and therefore its role in science and in that conceptual network. At the same time, the meaning of all those elements of Kuhnian science which are in direct relation to the paradigm will be illuminated. I will restrict my research on early and transitional period of Kuhn?s creatorship, and I base this distinction on Sankey?s analysis. The difference between these two periods is determined by Kuhn?s thinking about the formulation of the thesis of incommensurability of paradigms. Accordingly, it is necessary to deal with definition of incommensurability, its division to types and Kuhn?s view on implications of incommensurability for science and its progress.

scholarly journals On the History of the Divide between Analytic and Continental Philosophies: The Case of Epistemology in France

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (8) ◽  
pp. 22-33
Author(s):  
Tatiana D. Sokolova
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Theoretical Approach ◽  
Continental Philosophy ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Historical Epistemology ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Difference ◽  
French Tradition ◽  
Definition Of

The article analyzes the conflict between the “analytic” and “continental” approaches in philosophy on the example of the development of historical epistemology, which can be considered as “French style” in the philosophy of science. The French tradition is especially interesting due to the specificity of the reception of analytic philosophy that took place in it, where analytic philosophy did not receive an institutional form. The phrase “analytic philosophy” was problematized in the French academy in the 1950s and indicates the existence of a number of differences between the two types of philosophizing, as well as the absence of any stable connection between the French and Anglo-Saxon philosophical communities. One of the main reasons of this divide is that the philosophers interested in logical positivism and seeking to acquaint the French philosophical public with its ideas have suddenly passed away. The author’s argumentation is based on the material of historical epistemology in France, which was traditionally associated with the philosophy of science much more than epistemology in other countries. The article considers two approaches to defining the difference between analytic and continental philosophy: theoretical approach (distinctions between these traditions that are based on the subject of research, methodological techniques, key ideas, style) and institutional (based on geographical division – a particular philosopher belongs to a country or an academy – or based on the choice of his predecessors by the philosopher himself). The author demonstrates the inconsistency of the theoretical approach to the definition of analytic and continental philosophical traditions.

Allusions to the Victim and Sacrifice in the Andrey Kurbsky’s History and Reception of the 17th — Early 18th Centuries

2021 ◽  
pp. 186-207
Author(s):  
Alexey I. Popovich ◽  
Keyword(s):  
18Th Century ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Transitional Period ◽  
Literary Context ◽  
History Of ◽  
Interpretation Process ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Ivan The Terrible ◽  
Definition Of

The literary topoi and allusions to the victim and sacrifice in the biblical and historical context at the same time played a great role for Andrey Kurbsky as a traditionalist and innovator writer in the embodiment of the complex author’s intention of the History of the Grand Prince of Moscow (the second half of the 16th century). The article notes that the writer distinguishes, as opposites, the axiology of sacrificial feat for power doer and persecuted heroes. The article reveals the diverse reception of the author’s interpretation by readers and scribes of History. Kurbsky’s contemporaries and readers of the late 17th — early 18th century had different attitudes toward Kurbsky’s definition of the personality of Ivan the Terrible who makes unrighteous victims and the characterization of people affected by him as new martyrs. The rich handwritten tradition of History, including as part of the Kurbsky Collections, contributed to the emergence of new reader’s interpretations based on literary topoi and allusions used by Kurbsky. The intellectuals of the ‘transitional’ period A.S. Matveev, Evfimy Chudovsky, A.I. Lyzlov, V.V. Golitsyn and others were involved in this process. Textological and typological comparisons of certain monuments and Kurbsky’s History contributed to a deeper understanding of the literary context of the time when the prince’s writings spread. The study also helped to determine which Kurbsky’s ideas about the victim and sacrifice remained relevant for members of different class groups, and which were leveled out and outdated in the text interpretation process.

How To Make Pure Mathematical Ideas Clear

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peng Xu
Keyword(s):  
Turn Of The Century ◽  
Main Difficulty ◽  
Mathematical Ideas ◽  
Johns Hopkins University ◽  
Pure Mathematics ◽  
Original Definition ◽  
Logic Of Science ◽  
History Of ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Pragmatic Maxim

AbstractPeirce expressed his pragmatic maxim in the 1870s. If, as Peirce maintained, this original definition is a maxim of logic, it is mainly a maxim of the logic of science, as the title “Illustrations of the Logic of Science” indicates. Pure mathematical conceptions, and the logic of mathematics, if not totally excluded, have at least not been emphasized. During his years at Johns Hopkins University, pure mathematics became his subject of most concern, while logic was also conceived as semiotics during this time. So around the turn of the century, when the popular movement of pragmatism began with James’ “Berkeley Address”, Peirce found that the main difficulty with his original definition of the pragmatic maxim was how to make pure mathematical conceptions clear. He mentioned this problem repeatedly but only gave a tentative solution admitting that, at least according to his original definition, some meanings of pure mathematical conceptions cannot be clarified. This, I believe, is the most important reason for Peirce’s renaming and redefining the pragmatic maxim in semiotic terms. If other pragmatists, and scholars of pragmatism, had noticed this, then most criticisms of pragmatism could have been avoided and the history of pragmatism may have taken a different direction.

History of Air Maps and Charts

1998 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Steele
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Ordnance Survey ◽  
History Of ◽  
Minor Significance ◽  
Aerial Navigation ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Straight Lines ◽  
The Hill

There is no generally accepted definition of the difference between a map and a chart. A widespread feeling probably exists favouring the old saying that maps are to look at and charts to work on. It is true that the term ‘aeronautical chart’ gained a general currency over alternative terms as contact flying gave way to aerial navigation. But, in this paper, the terms ‘map’ and ‘chart’ will be used as seems appropriate to each occasion, without attempt to conform to any particular definition.We can get an idea of what was available to the earliest aviators by looking at an Ordnance Survey reprint of one of their nineteenth century maps (Fig. 1). They are printed in one colour only, black on white. By far the predominant feature is the hill shading. Quite gentle hills are hachured with a heaviness which tends to obscure both natural features like rivers, lakes and woodlands and man-made constructions such as towns and villages, roads, canals and railways. Hills are, of course, very important features to those on the ground, since they limit the extent to which other features can be seen. To the soldier, the significance of high ground is self-evident, and it was principally for the ordnance requirements of soldiers that these maps had been developed. But when men began to view the ground from the air, the perspective changed. Hills appeared flattened out and, provided that you knew the height of the tallest in the area and were sure none would impede your take-off or landing, were of minor significance. Lakes and woods, though, were spread out before you in their distinctive shapes, while railway lines and canals presented bold straight lines and curves, and rivers their unique courses, to your view. The need was for new kinds of maps which would give due prominence to such features.

scholarly journals Fossils with Feathers and Philosophy of Science

2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (5) ◽  
pp. 840-851 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joyce C Havstad ◽  
N Adam Smith
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Evolutionary History ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Scientific Evidence ◽  
Thomas Kuhn ◽  
Karl Popper ◽  
Scientific Debate ◽  
Evolutionary Origins ◽  
Research Programmes ◽  
History Of

AbstractThe last half century of paleornithological research has transformed the way that biologists perceive the evolutionary history of birds. This transformation has been driven, since 1969, by a series of exciting fossil discoveries combined with intense scientific debate over how best to interpret these discoveries. Ideally, as evidence accrues and results accumulate, interpretive scientific agreement forms. But this has not entirely happened in the debate over avian origins: the accumulation of scientific evidence and analyses has had some effect, but not a conclusive one, in terms of resolving the question of avian origins. Although the majority of biologists have come to accept that birds are dinosaurs, there is lingering and, in some quarters, strident opposition to this view. In order to both understand the ongoing disagreement about avian origins and generate a prediction about the future of the debate, here we use a revised model of scientific practice to assess the current and historical state of play surrounding the topic of bird evolutionary origins. Many scientists are familiar with the metascientific scholars Sir Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, and these are the primary figures that have been appealed to so far, in prior attempts to assess the dispute. But we demonstrate that a variation of Imre Lakatos’s model of progressive versus degenerative research programmes provides a novel and productive assessment of the debate. We establish that a refurbished Lakatosian account both explains the intractability of the dispute and predicts a likely outcome for the debate about avian origins. In short, here, we offer a metascientific tool for rationally assessing competing theories—one that allows researchers involved in seemingly intractable scientific disputes to advance their debates.

scholarly journals AL-FARABI’S PHILOSOPHY OF MUSIC

Al-Farabi ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-17
Author(s):  
Nurysheva Gulzhikhan ◽  
◽  
Tercan Nurfer ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Method ◽  
Multidisciplinary Approach ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Holistic Approach ◽  
Emotional Reactions ◽  
Philosophy Of Music ◽  
History Of ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
Intellectual Climate

Scientists propose to understand the effect of music on the human psyche, knowledge about the soul, science, metaphysics, and spheres. At the center of all these discussions, we assume researchers are not focusing on how music triggers emotions. In this century we live in, most writers agree that this is the most crucial issue. Today’s researchers want to know why music creates strong emotional reactions in people with scientific explanations. Our study aims to find answers to today’s questions between the 9th and 10th centuries, indicated as the golden age of Islamic culture. We aimed to shed light on the answers to the questions of today’s researchers about the effect of music on the human soul. This article focuses on the second teacher’s approach to cosmology and how the various sciences contribute to the study of the heavens. After a survey of the sources available to Al Farabi, which helps to contextualise his work in light of the Greek legacy and the Arabic intellectual climate of his day, authors define his conception of the scientific method and to show the relation between scientific practice and theory. With a multidisciplinary approach to the history of philosophy and astronomy, Al Farabi’s philosophy of music contributes to physics, metaphysics and astronomy. As a result, our article contains the formulation of innovative, philosophical musical ideas. It is an effort that emerged in the formulation of Al Farabi’s Ptolemaic astronomy. The guiding subject of our research provided a holistic approach to the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic theories that complement each other. Adopting this perspective allows for a broader study of music within a particular culture or situation. The article examines ‘Kitab Al Musiqa’ research in the light of a definition of music that embraces the diversity of music using universal methods. Music is a significant and integral dimension of human improvement.

Scientific Revolutions

Philosophy ◽  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Nickles
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Practice ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Scientific Change ◽  
Scientific Development ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Structure Of Scientific Revolutions ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Scientific Decision

Scientific revolutions and the problem of understanding deep scientific change became central topics in philosophy of science with Thomas S. Kuhn’s publication in 1962 of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (see Kuhn 1970, cited under General Overviews). Kuhn attacked the received view of the logical empiricists and Popperians that scientific change is cumulative. He claimed that there have been several revolutions since the so-called scientific revolution, including dramatic overturnings in the most mature sciences—with more to be expected in the future. Kuhn’s more dynamic model of scientific development postulated the existence of occasional crises that sometimes trigger full-scale revolutions that overthrow the old “paradigm” and replace it with a new one discontinuous or “incommensurable” with the old one. He rejected the received views of scientific rationality and denied that even the most successful sciences are progressing toward a final, representational truth about the world. By focusing on finished, “textbook” science, defenders of the received view, he argued, presented an inadequate account of how scientific research is done, leaving unexplained the marked difference between the mature natural sciences and the social sciences as well as the difference within a mature science itself between “normal science” and the extraordinary research context of science in crisis. Kuhn and an entire generation of historically oriented philosophers of science believed that philosophical models of science should be more naturalistic (not based on a priori normative claims), more reflective of scientific practice, and thus testable against the history of science. Unlike the logicians of science, Kuhn highlighted cognitive and social psychological factors and the importance of rhetoric in scientific decision making. In reaction, critics questioned whether there have been any genuinely Kuhnian revolutions, accusing Kuhn of debunking modern science by portraying science as subjective, irrational, and relativistic. Kuhn replied that he was not a relativist, that he was attempting to develop a new account of scientific cognition and rationality, and that he was in effect trying to instigate a revolution of his own at the level of metascience and even general epistemology. Virtually no expert fully accepts Kuhn’s model of science, but there is general agreement that he posed some serious problems, including the problem of new theories: How can it be rational for scientists to reject a highly developed and accomplished theory or research program in favor of a radical and undeveloped new approach? Kuhn’s work stimulated a number of later developments in philosophy and in social studies of science more generally.

scholarly journals Iconoclasm and Imagination: Gaston Bachelard’s Philosophy of Technoscience

Human Studies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hub Zwart
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Gaston Bachelard ◽  
Unique Position ◽  
Contemporary Science ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
History Of ◽  
Epistemological Obstacle ◽  
Mother Earth

Abstract Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962) occupies a unique position in the history of European thinking. As a philosopher of science, he developed a profound interest in genres of the imagination, notably poetry and novels. While emphatically acknowledging the strength, precision and reliability of scientific knowledge compared to every-day experience, he saw literary phantasies as important supplementary sources of insight. Although he significantly influenced authors such as Lacan, Althusser, Foucault and others, while some of his key concepts (“epistemological rupture,” “epistemological obstacle,” “technoscience”) are still widely used, his oeuvre tends to be overlooked. And yet, as I will argue, Bachelard’s extended series of books opens up an intriguing perspective on contemporary science. First, I will point to a remarkable duality that runs through Bachelard’s oeuvre. His philosophy of science consists of two sub-oeuvres: a psychoanalysis of technoscience, complemented by a poetics of elementary imagination. I will point out how these two branches deal with complementary themes: technoscientific artefacts and literary fictions, two realms of human experience separated by an epistemological rupture. Whereas Bachelard’s work initially entails a panegyric in praise of scientific practice, he becomes increasingly intrigued by the imaginary and its basic images (“archetypes”), such as the Mother Earth archetype.

A Priori in the Philosophy of Science

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 60-74
Author(s):  
Tatiana D. Sokolova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Technical Difficulty ◽  
Scientific Thought ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Model Approach

The article is devoted to the analysis of research approaches and attitudes to the study of the a priori in the philosophy of science. In the first part, I outline the basic premises of this study: (a) scientific knowledge as the highest manifestation of rationality; (b) the normative nature of scientific knowledge. In the second part, I turn to the difference in the subject of philosophical research on the history of science – the history of science as a “history of facts” vs the history of science as a history of scientific thought. The third part discusses the main theoretical and technical difficulty associated with changing the subject of research – the possibility of a transition from historical fact to “scientific thought at the time of its birth” (in Helene Metzger terminology). The forth part is devoted to the analysis of the “model approach” (Arianna Betti, Hein van den Berg) in philosophy as a possible way to overcome this difficulty and includes both theoretical and technical aspects of the future direction of research. In conclusion, consequences are drawn about the possibility of using the “model approach” for reconstruction a priori in the history of science as “constitutive elements of scientific knowledge” (David Stump).

scholarly journals Lost in Transduction: Transductive Transfer Learning in Text Classification

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Alejandro Moreo ◽  
Andrea Esuli ◽  
Fabrizio Sebastiani
Keyword(s):  
Transfer Learning ◽  
Text Classification ◽  
Target Domain ◽  
Learning Methods ◽  
Training Time ◽  
Inductive Transfer ◽  
Original Definition ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Inductive Transfer Learning ◽  
Definition Of

Obtaining high-quality labelled data for training a classifier in a new application domain is often costly. Transfer Learning (a.k.a. “Inductive Transfer”) tries to alleviate these costs by transferring, to the “target” domain of interest, knowledge available from a different “source” domain. In transfer learning the lack of labelled information from the target domain is compensated by the availability at training time of a set of unlabelled examples from the target distribution. Transductive Transfer Learning denotes the transfer learning setting in which the only set of target documents that we are interested in classifying is known and available at training time. Although this definition is indeed in line with Vapnik’s original definition of “transduction”, current terminology in the field is confused. In this article, we discuss how the term “transduction” has been misused in the transfer learning literature, and propose a clarification consistent with the original characterization of this term given by Vapnik. We go on to observe that the above terminology misuse has brought about misleading experimental comparisons, with inductive transfer learning methods that have been incorrectly compared with transductive transfer learning methods. We then, give empirical evidence that the difference in performance between the inductive version and the transductive version of a transfer learning method can indeed be statistically significant (i.e., that knowing at training time the only data one needs to classify indeed gives an advantage). Our clarification allows a reassessment of the field, and of the relative merits of the major, state-of-the-art algorithms for transfer learning in text classification.

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