Deodoro da Fonseca, Fate's Dictator

1963 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-52
Author(s):  
Charles Willis Simmons
Keyword(s):  
Military Leaders ◽  
Abuse Of Power ◽  
Republican Revolution ◽  
Benjamin Constant ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Revolution

The November 15, 1889, republican revolution in Brazil was led by a man who was a monarchist and an ardent admirer of the emperor whom he deprived of throne and country. This man, Deodoro da Fonseca, believed in constitutionalism and was forced by fate to become Brazil's first dictator. It is unfortunate that Marshal Deodoro's last few years of life made his name synonomous with the arbitrary use and abuse of power. This study seeks to explain fate's part in creating this dictator image and to modify and to mitigate that word when it is used to describe the man who became Brazil's first president.The revolution which made Deodoro provisional president was engineered by republican agitators who manipulated the military leaders in such a manner that they administered the coup de grace to the magnanimous reign of Dom Pedro II. Military leaders had been convinced by a series of incidents dating back two decades that the políticos who controlled the government sought to restrict their prestige and authority. By 1889, these leaders were convinced that further concessions would lead to dishonor. Benjamin Constant and Aristides Lobo with difficulty convinced a reluctant Deodoro that he must act if the honor of the military class was to be saved.

Military Rule in South Korea Revisited: Different Survival Strategies and Different Pathways

2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 409-429
Author(s):  
Bon Sang Koo
Keyword(s):  
Financial Liberalization ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Survival Strategies ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Potential Threat ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Legislative Branch ◽  
Economic Elites ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military

This paper revisits the military rule in Korea by paying attention, like Korean specialists, to the disconnection in dictatorship but like comparativists, using the tools in comparative studies of modern authoritarian regimes. This paper argues that the differences in the military leaders’ orientations (personalist vs. party-based type) and survival strategies to deal with potential threat sources (key insiders, political opponents, and economic elites) entailed different regime pathways. Examining (a) how to form a ruling group in terms of unity (competing factions vs. a single dominant faction), (b) how to control the legislative branch (directly controlled organization vs. opposition parties indirectly supported by the government), and (c) how to manage capital owners (tight constraints vs. financial liberalization with occasional punishments), this paper provides an explanation as to why only the second military regime was able to open the door to democratization instead of giving way to authoritarian replacement in Korea.

The Price of Violence

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 537-569
Author(s):  
Jerome Greenfield
Keyword(s):  
Decisive Role ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Fiscal System ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military

Abstract Much of the nature of French imperialism in Algeria can be explained through an analysis of its financial underpinnings, a subject generally neglected by historians. This article recounts the creation of a colonial fiscal system during the period of the French conquest of Algeria from the 1830s to the 1850s. It argues that money played a decisive role in shaping relations between metropolitan officials and the military leaders who comprised the “men on the spot.” While the French presence in Algeria was to an extent rationalized in terms of imparting “civilization,” the need for money exacerbated the army's tendency to rule through violence. This brutality alienated metropolitan elites, pushing the government to exert greater control over Algerian affairs. Here, money provided crucial leverage, given Algeria's financial dependence on the metropole. In this manner, finance decisively shaped the formation of the French state in Algeria. Souvent négligée par les historiens, l'étude des finances est essentielle pour comprendre l'impérialisme français en Algérie. Cet article traite de l'essor du système fiscal colonial pendant la conquête de l'Algérie. Il souligne le rôle que l'argent a joué dans les relations entre les fonctionnaires métropolitains et les commandants de l'armée en Afrique, « les hommes sur place ». Alors que la présence française en Algérie était en partie justifiée par le projet de « civilisation », les besoins financiers ont exacerbé la disposition de l'armée à gouverner par la violence. Cette brutalité a désenchanté les élites métropolitaines, encourageant le gouvernement à exercer plus de contrôle en Algérie, et pour cela l'argent était indispensable, compte tenu de la dépendance financière de la colonie sur la métropole. Les finances ont donc exercé une influence décisive sur le développement de l'Etat français en Algérie.

scholarly journals The Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly as a Left-Democratic Alternative to the Communists and the Whites in the Civil War

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Shubin
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
World War I ◽  
Private Property ◽  
State Regulation ◽  
Social Rights ◽  
Constituent Assembly ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Revolution

The Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly (Komuch) was an option in the Civil War that was essentially distinct from both the Soviet and the White alternatives. Komuch differed from the Soviet and the White authorities, as it was characterised by a combination of advanced socioeconomic policy and a dogmatically principled commitment to parliamentary democracy. In the event of the military victory of such a power, the success of the social democratic model was not guaranteed (as the history of Europe during the interwar period demonstrated), but Russia’s chances of moving along a path that combined a social state and democratic institutions would have increased markedly. While criticising, and in many respects rightly so, the military policy of the Bolsheviks, the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks had to partially restore market capitalist relations. Their successful development was possible with the cooperation of the government and the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie demanded the dismantlement of “socialist conquests”, which Komuch was not going to do – both for ideological reasons and because the capitalist economy had begun to disintegrate during World War I and the Revolution. Komuch’s path involved the combination of a market economy (not necessarily just capitalist), state regulation, and broad social rights. After the Bolshevik promises, the workers and peasants took it quite calmly, fearing the possible cancellation of the social gains of the Revolution and expressing dissatisfaction with violations of promised civil rights. But the bourgeoisie, convinced of the “inconsistency” of dismantling institutions that infringed on the right of private property, stood in sharp opposition to Komuch, betting on its opponents in the anti-Soviet camp. At the same time, Komuch did not have time to build a state system for monitoring compliance with social rights and had to rely on the activity of trade unions, which, due to their social function, were critical of the government – in this case, Komuch. Komuch followed the law regulating the socialisation of land adopted by the Constituent Assembly and proposed a relatively successful version of regulating the food supply for the cities. Initially, the people’s army created by Komuch was also successful (enjoying support from the Czechoslovak Corps). However, Komuch faced a blockade by the Provisional Siberian Government. It was the opposition of more right-wing forces in the rear that predetermined the defeat of the Komuch alternative.

Myanmar government-military ties could be at risk

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Minority Groups ◽  
Ethnic Minority Groups ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Peace Negotiations ◽  
Civilian Leaders ◽  
The Government ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Significance The response underlines the military's continued internal security role but, given that the restive areas are home to large Rohingya populations, also highlights residual political sensitivity about the military's position and the importance of effective government-military relations. Impacts An immediate trigger for civil-military frictions could be a breakdown in peace negotiations with ethnic minority groups. The government will struggle to convince military leaders that wide concessions to armed ethnic groups are needed. Centralisation of power within the NLD will hamper junior civilian leaders gaining experience of working with the military. In time, the military's economic influence will be politically problematic for the NLD.

Anatomy of the Egyptian Counterrevolution

2014 ◽  
pp. 91-100
Author(s):  
A. Korotaev ◽  
L. Isaev
Keyword(s):  
Urban Poor ◽  
Decisive Role ◽  
Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
Political Events ◽  
Economic Elites ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Muslim Brotherhood ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Revolution

The authors analyze roots, causes and implications of both major political events that took place in Egypt in the last three years, namely the Tahrir Revolution of 2011 and what they call the Counterrevolution of 2013. Focus of the article is on the role of the military and the Islamists. The young educated democrats of middle class who initiated the revolution in 2011 under the slogans of combatting autocratic and corrupt government were joined by the poverty-stricken population of Cairo, by the desolate and unemployed and – what was especially important – by the Muslim Brotherhood. This combination of forces proved too strong for the army and government, Mubarak had to resign. But the urban poor who played a decisive role in the victory of the revolution had always been under a very strong influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, so it was inevitable that free and fair elections would bring the Islamists to power. Moursi became President. The Islamists, however, made a number of grave mistakes while in power, and the old elites, both economic and military/bureaucratic, did their best to sabotage the government policy. At last the army (supported by the Egyptian economic elites) came on top, so both the Muslim Brothers and the young secular democrats have lost.

scholarly journals Pakistan in 2020

Asian Survey ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-193
Author(s):  
Sahar Shafqat
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Political Movements ◽  
Sexual Assaults ◽  
Military Establishment ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Religious Minorities ◽  
Center Stage ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military

Pakistan began the year with the military establishment having tightened its grip on political institutions, but as the year progressed, opposition parties sought to reassert themselves and challenged both the PTI government and military leaders. Political movements took center stage as religious extremists as well as regionalist movements drew strength from the challenges to the PTI government. Feminists demanded action after a series of sexual assaults, and religious minorities continued to be targeted by violence. The COVID pandemic upended the economy, which was already straining under low growth and high debt and deficit conditions. Foreign relations provided many challenges as the government sought to target India for its mistreatment of Kashmiris, while the Pakistan–China relationship remained strong.

scholarly journals Islamism in the Political Strategy of Pakistan (Late 20th — Early 21st Centuries)

2021 ◽  
pp. 78-83
Author(s):  
А. М. Родригес-Фернандес
Keyword(s):  
Social Economic ◽  
Civil Disobedience ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
Tribal Sovereignty ◽  
Political Strategy ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
Social Unrest ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
Governmental Strategy

В статье рассматриваются основные направления во внутренней и внешней политике Пакистана в конце XX — начале XXI века. Сформировавшаяся в это время правительственная стратегия была не только подготовлена предшествующими 2–3 десятилетиями развития, но и до сих пор является преобладающей либо в открытой, либо в слегка завуалированной форме. Характерно, что именно в этот период (12 октября 1999 г.) произошел военный переворот и новый военный диктатор генерал Первез Мушарраф объявил о задачах экономического оздоровления страны и создания «реальной», то есть мусульманской, демократии. Это означало, что при подавлении антиправительственных и экстремистских группировок новая власть делает резкий крен в сторону государственного исламизма и скрытой поддержке движения «Талибан» в Афганистане и «полосе независимых племён» (территория Пакистана вдоль афганской границы). Важной особенностью этого периода был не потерявший значения в дальнейшем союз исламистов и военной элиты, подготовленной в основном в Англии. Улемы поднимают в нужное время волну общественного недовольства и гражданского неповиновения, а армия устанавливает власть на длительное время и обеспечивает радикальным улемам высокие позиции в государственной иерархии. В статье использованы разнообразные по характеру источники по современной политической, социально-экономической и этноконфессиональной ситуации в Пакистане и Афганистане, включенные в сборник документов пакистанского исследователя Аалима. Интересные детали о военных лидерах Пакистана и реформаторской деятельности правительства к XX — началу XXI века приводятся в библиографических заметках американского эксперта С. Пауэра и пакистанского чиновника Ф. Шотойса. The article treats major trends of Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy in the late 20th — early 21st centuries. The governmental strategy that was formed in the aforementioned period was prepared by the two or three preceding decades and still prevails in an overt or covert form. It should be noted that during the period there was a military coup (October 12, 1999) and the new military dictator Pervez Musharraf underlined the necessity to revive the economy of the country and to create Muslim democracy. It signified that by suppressing antigovernment extremists the new government favored Political Islamism, covertly supported the Taliban movement in Afghanistan and tribal sovereignty along the Durand Line. An important characteristic of the period was the coalition of the Islamists and the pro-English military elite. The ulama provoked social unrest and civil disobedience while the army usurped the power and enabled radical ulama to acquire high posts in the government. The article analyzes various documents collected by a Pakistani researcher Aalim and dealing with the contemporary political, social, economic, ethnic and confessional situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The article also analyzes bibliographic notes of an American expert S. Power and a Pakistani official Ph. Shotois about the military leaders of Pakistan and the reforms initiated by the Pakistan government in the 20th— early 21st centuries.

Peru before the Election for the Constituent Assembly: Ten Years of Military Rule and The Quest for Social Justice

1978 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 288-306
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Gorman
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
Second Phase ◽  
The Road ◽  
Constituent Assembly ◽  
Third Phase ◽  
Political Resources ◽  
Popular Classes ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Revolution

ELECTIONS FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ARE SCHEDULED TO TAKE place in Peru in 1978. In view of this event and of the changes which it might bring about, it would be useful to examine the tenyear record of the military revolutionary government in that country.If the road to hell truly is paved with good intentions, it is of little solace to those who must walk it. So it is that after nearly a decade of revolution in Peru we can no longer concern ourselves with ferreting out the motives of the military officers who have led it, but must turn instead to an assessment of the damage that has been done. Peru's Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces has attracted considerable attention and even admiration within and without Latin America since its inception through a bloodless coup on 3 October 1968. In subsequent years the military junta, in which the Army dominates over the Air Force and Navy, has passed through three perceptible stages. The first corresponded to the presidency of General Juan Velasco Alvarado, architect of the coup and leader of the revolution until he was ousted in August 1975. His tenure, now referred to officially as the ‘First Phase’ of the revolution, was responsible for dramatic and far-reaching reforms which eventually over-taxed the financial and political resources of his government and forced him from office. The so-called ‘Second Phase’ of the revolution began with Velasco's replacement by his more conservative Prime Minister, General Francisco Morales Bermddez. Attention turned to consolidating the gains of the revolution during this period but the inability of the government to shore up the economy and rationalize the programmes of the Velasco era resulted in the imposition ofa severe austerity programme in July 1976. Violent political upheavals within the popular classes in July, and the backlash of the conservative factions within the military, caused a purge of most of the remaining liberal officers in the government. It is fair to speak of a ‘Third Phase’ of the revolution since the latter part of 1976 in which President Morales has been pressured into systematically dismantling many of the popular reforms of the Velasco era. Official announcements in 1977 clarified the military's intention to withdraw from direct management of the state over the next two to three years. Thus, it is appropriate now to begin assessment of the Institutional Revolution of the Armed Forces and its legacy for Peru.

Guinea: The History of the Military as a Political Actor

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Clarke
Keyword(s):  
Political Power ◽  
National Development ◽  
Political Actor ◽  
Military Dictatorship ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
Rule Making ◽  
Party State

The Guinean military was deeply intertwined with political power for the first 50 years after dependence in 1958. Under its founding president, Ahmed Sékou Touré, who led Guinea as a one-party state from 1958 to 1984, it was built with support from the Warsaw Pact and became a small, competent force which supported national development and regional peacekeeping. While Touré politicized the army, it was not an important political actor, and in the end it fell victim to Touré’s brutality. Colonel Lansana Conté seized power after Touré, leading a military dictatorship that fully controlled the government and succumbed to factionalism, corruption, and indiscipline. Conté died in 2008, and within a year, the successor regime had slipped into so much brutality that the military leaders accepted transition to civilian rule, making Guinea a fledging multiparty democracy since 2010, while the military returned to the barracks.

Regime Change in Contemporary Turkey

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Necati Polat
Keyword(s):  
Recent Change ◽  
Political Regime ◽  
New Order ◽  
Making Sense ◽  
Turkish Politics ◽  
Subsequent Phase ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Public Sphere ◽  
The Arab Spring ◽  
The Military

This book explores the transformation of Turkey’s political regime from 2002 under the AKP rule. Turkey has been through a series of major political shifts historically, roughly from the mid-19th century. The book details the most recent change, locating it in its broader historical setting. Beginning with the AKP rule from late 2002, supported by a wide informal coalition that included liberals, it describes how the ‘former’ Islamists gradually acquired full power between 2007 and 2011. It then chronicles the subsequent phase, looking at politics and rights under the amorphous new order. This highly accessible assessment of the change in question places it in the larger context of political modernisation in the country over the past 150 or so years, covering all of the main issues in contemporary Turkish politics: the religious and secular divide, the Kurds, the military, foreign policy orientation, the state of human rights, the effective concentration of powers in the government and a rule by policy, rather than law, initiated by Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian populism. The discussion at once situates Turkey in the broader milieu of the Arab Spring, especially in terms of Islamist politics and Muslim piety in the public sphere, with some emphasis on ‘Islamo-nationalism’ (Millî Görüş) as a local Islamist variety. Effortlessly blending history, politics, law, social theory and philosophy in making sense of the change, the book uses the concept of mimesis to show that continuity is a key element in Turkish politics, despite the series of radical breaks that have occurred.

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