The Price of Violence

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 537-569
Author(s):  
Jerome Greenfield

Abstract Much of the nature of French imperialism in Algeria can be explained through an analysis of its financial underpinnings, a subject generally neglected by historians. This article recounts the creation of a colonial fiscal system during the period of the French conquest of Algeria from the 1830s to the 1850s. It argues that money played a decisive role in shaping relations between metropolitan officials and the military leaders who comprised the “men on the spot.” While the French presence in Algeria was to an extent rationalized in terms of imparting “civilization,” the need for money exacerbated the army's tendency to rule through violence. This brutality alienated metropolitan elites, pushing the government to exert greater control over Algerian affairs. Here, money provided crucial leverage, given Algeria's financial dependence on the metropole. In this manner, finance decisively shaped the formation of the French state in Algeria. Souvent négligée par les historiens, l'étude des finances est essentielle pour comprendre l'impérialisme français en Algérie. Cet article traite de l'essor du système fiscal colonial pendant la conquête de l'Algérie. Il souligne le rôle que l'argent a joué dans les relations entre les fonctionnaires métropolitains et les commandants de l'armée en Afrique, « les hommes sur place ». Alors que la présence française en Algérie était en partie justifiée par le projet de « civilisation », les besoins financiers ont exacerbé la disposition de l'armée à gouverner par la violence. Cette brutalité a désenchanté les élites métropolitaines, encourageant le gouvernement à exercer plus de contrôle en Algérie, et pour cela l'argent était indispensable, compte tenu de la dépendance financière de la colonie sur la métropole. Les finances ont donc exercé une influence décisive sur le développement de l'Etat français en Algérie.

2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 409-429
Author(s):  
Bon Sang Koo

This paper revisits the military rule in Korea by paying attention, like Korean specialists, to the disconnection in dictatorship but like comparativists, using the tools in comparative studies of modern authoritarian regimes. This paper argues that the differences in the military leaders’ orientations (personalist vs. party-based type) and survival strategies to deal with potential threat sources (key insiders, political opponents, and economic elites) entailed different regime pathways. Examining (a) how to form a ruling group in terms of unity (competing factions vs. a single dominant faction), (b) how to control the legislative branch (directly controlled organization vs. opposition parties indirectly supported by the government), and (c) how to manage capital owners (tight constraints vs. financial liberalization with occasional punishments), this paper provides an explanation as to why only the second military regime was able to open the door to democratization instead of giving way to authoritarian replacement in Korea.


Significance The response underlines the military's continued internal security role but, given that the restive areas are home to large Rohingya populations, also highlights residual political sensitivity about the military's position and the importance of effective government-military relations. Impacts An immediate trigger for civil-military frictions could be a breakdown in peace negotiations with ethnic minority groups. The government will struggle to convince military leaders that wide concessions to armed ethnic groups are needed. Centralisation of power within the NLD will hamper junior civilian leaders gaining experience of working with the military. In time, the military's economic influence will be politically problematic for the NLD.


Author(s):  
A. Korotaev ◽  
L. Isaev

The authors analyze roots, causes and implications of both major political events that took place in Egypt in the last three years, namely the Tahrir Revolution of 2011 and what they call the Counterrevolution of 2013. Focus of the article is on the role of the military and the Islamists. The young educated democrats of middle class who initiated the revolution in 2011 under the slogans of combatting autocratic and corrupt government were joined by the poverty-stricken population of Cairo, by the desolate and unemployed and – what was especially important – by the Muslim Brotherhood. This combination of forces proved too strong for the army and government, Mubarak had to resign. But the urban poor who played a decisive role in the victory of the revolution had always been under a very strong influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, so it was inevitable that free and fair elections would bring the Islamists to power. Moursi became President. The Islamists, however, made a number of grave mistakes while in power, and the old elites, both economic and military/bureaucratic, did their best to sabotage the government policy. At last the army (supported by the Egyptian economic elites) came on top, so both the Muslim Brothers and the young secular democrats have lost.


1963 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-52
Author(s):  
Charles Willis Simmons

The November 15, 1889, republican revolution in Brazil was led by a man who was a monarchist and an ardent admirer of the emperor whom he deprived of throne and country. This man, Deodoro da Fonseca, believed in constitutionalism and was forced by fate to become Brazil's first dictator. It is unfortunate that Marshal Deodoro's last few years of life made his name synonomous with the arbitrary use and abuse of power. This study seeks to explain fate's part in creating this dictator image and to modify and to mitigate that word when it is used to describe the man who became Brazil's first president.The revolution which made Deodoro provisional president was engineered by republican agitators who manipulated the military leaders in such a manner that they administered the coup de grace to the magnanimous reign of Dom Pedro II. Military leaders had been convinced by a series of incidents dating back two decades that the políticos who controlled the government sought to restrict their prestige and authority. By 1889, these leaders were convinced that further concessions would lead to dishonor. Benjamin Constant and Aristides Lobo with difficulty convinced a reluctant Deodoro that he must act if the honor of the military class was to be saved.


Asian Survey ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-193
Author(s):  
Sahar Shafqat

Pakistan began the year with the military establishment having tightened its grip on political institutions, but as the year progressed, opposition parties sought to reassert themselves and challenged both the PTI government and military leaders. Political movements took center stage as religious extremists as well as regionalist movements drew strength from the challenges to the PTI government. Feminists demanded action after a series of sexual assaults, and religious minorities continued to be targeted by violence. The COVID pandemic upended the economy, which was already straining under low growth and high debt and deficit conditions. Foreign relations provided many challenges as the government sought to target India for its mistreatment of Kashmiris, while the Pakistan–China relationship remained strong.


Author(s):  
А. М. Родригес-Фернандес

В статье рассматриваются основные направления во внутренней и внешней политике Пакистана в конце XX — начале XXI века. Сформировавшаяся в это время правительственная стратегия была не только подготовлена предшествующими 2–3 десятилетиями развития, но и до сих пор является преобладающей либо в открытой, либо в слегка завуалированной форме. Характерно, что именно в этот период (12 октября 1999 г.) произошел военный переворот и новый военный диктатор генерал Первез Мушарраф объявил о задачах экономического оздоровления страны и создания «реальной», то есть мусульманской, демократии. Это означало, что при подавлении антиправительственных и экстремистских группировок новая власть делает резкий крен в сторону государственного исламизма и скрытой поддержке движения «Талибан» в Афганистане и «полосе независимых племён» (территория Пакистана вдоль афганской границы). Важной особенностью этого периода был не потерявший значения в дальнейшем союз исламистов и военной элиты, подготовленной в основном в Англии. Улемы поднимают в нужное время волну общественного недовольства и гражданского неповиновения, а армия устанавливает власть на длительное время и обеспечивает радикальным улемам высокие позиции в государственной иерархии. В статье использованы разнообразные по характеру источники по современной политической, социально-экономической и этноконфессиональной ситуации в Пакистане и Афганистане, включенные в сборник документов пакистанского исследователя Аалима. Интересные детали о военных лидерах Пакистана и реформаторской деятельности правительства к XX — началу XXI века приводятся в библиографических заметках американского эксперта С. Пауэра и пакистанского чиновника Ф. Шотойса. The article treats major trends of Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policy in the late 20th — early 21st centuries. The governmental strategy that was formed in the aforementioned period was prepared by the two or three preceding decades and still prevails in an overt or covert form. It should be noted that during the period there was a military coup (October 12, 1999) and the new military dictator Pervez Musharraf underlined the necessity to revive the economy of the country and to create Muslim democracy. It signified that by suppressing antigovernment extremists the new government favored Political Islamism, covertly supported the Taliban movement in Afghanistan and tribal sovereignty along the Durand Line. An important characteristic of the period was the coalition of the Islamists and the pro-English military elite. The ulama provoked social unrest and civil disobedience while the army usurped the power and enabled radical ulama to acquire high posts in the government. The article analyzes various documents collected by a Pakistani researcher Aalim and dealing with the contemporary political, social, economic, ethnic and confessional situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The article also analyzes bibliographic notes of an American expert S. Power and a Pakistani official Ph. Shotois about the military leaders of Pakistan and the reforms initiated by the Pakistan government in the 20th— early 21st centuries.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 82
Author(s):  
Giovani Ferreira Bezerra

This text discusses strategies mobilized by Apaean leaders in their work in the field of exceptionality, with a view to obtaining public attention, political power and financial resources from the Brazilian federal government before the creation of the National Center for Special Education (Cenesp), in 1973. Historical and documentary research is used, compiling the data through legislation and documents issued by the government, newspapers of general circulation, edited during the 1960s and 1970s, as well as copies of the periodical Mensagem da Apae from 1963 to 1973. It was evident that the Apaean leaders acted with the power established during the military governments installed after 1964, expanding their network of influences and having some government support. Based on national and international contingencies designed in the early 1970s, the creation of Cenesp established a new dynamic in the field of Special Education, which became officially designated and institutionalized, directed and regulated by the federal government, although private-philanthropic interference in the direction of this educational modality has not ceased.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 49-58
Author(s):  
Andriy Tkachuk

The article deals with the process of initiation and implementation of the idea of creating the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the social and political discourse of the USSR in the late 1980s – early 1990s. The positions of key pro-Ukrainian public associations and movements, their programs, and statements concerning the "Ukrainianization" of the military forces that were located in the USSR are explored. An estimation of the position of these forces on public policy in the military sphere is given. It has been found out that the majority of the public associations and movements created under the conditions of "restructuring" insisted on the need for de-ideologization and demilitarization of social and political life. In most cases, members of such organizations required on the need to form military units based on the existing USSR armed forces exclusively from residents of the republic, who would report directly to the leadership of the USSR. Besides, the demand for military service by USSR citizens only within the republic remained one of the principal in the speech of Ukrainian associations and movements. The main proposals for possible reform of the military sphere on the territory of the republic are outlined. The author points out that among the Ukrainian intelligentsia, there were different visions regarding the ways of creating such forces. One part insisted on the creation of armed forces subordinated to the government based on and in the composition of the armed forces of the USSR. The other required a complete reboot of the military sphere, the introduction of a new approach to the army formation, and, ultimately, the creation of an army of an independent Ukraine. Much attention is given to the youth’s opinion about the ideologization and militarization of the Soviet high school. Representatives of the student youth were much more active than other social groups, expressing their dissatisfaction with the current situation, which resulted in spontaneous protests against the authorities. It was concluded that, at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, the issue of military development was one of the key issues in the activities of Ukrainian unions, movements, and the first political parties. The members of these organizations were aware of the need to create an armed force in Ukraine that could counteract potential threats to state sovereignty. Such policies have resulted in numerous political actions, strikes, and demonstrations, which have been used as a mechanism to put pressure on the authorities to achieve individual political goals. In the end, under public pressure, as well as in the context of disintegration processes in the USSR, these requirements were fulfilled, which created the necessary basis for the creation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.


Asian Survey ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 126-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Ockey

In 2012, Thailand continued to take steps toward the creation of a new normal. That new normal encompassed, not always successfully, reconciliations between Red and Yellow adherents, the government and the military, the government and the courts, factions in the Pheu Thai Party, and between the government and Southern insurgents. By year’s end, some normalcy had been achieved, although the future of Thaksin, reconciliation between the colors, and the violence in the South remained unresolved.


Author(s):  
Paul Clarke

The Guinean military was deeply intertwined with political power for the first 50 years after dependence in 1958. Under its founding president, Ahmed Sékou Touré, who led Guinea as a one-party state from 1958 to 1984, it was built with support from the Warsaw Pact and became a small, competent force which supported national development and regional peacekeeping. While Touré politicized the army, it was not an important political actor, and in the end it fell victim to Touré’s brutality. Colonel Lansana Conté seized power after Touré, leading a military dictatorship that fully controlled the government and succumbed to factionalism, corruption, and indiscipline. Conté died in 2008, and within a year, the successor regime had slipped into so much brutality that the military leaders accepted transition to civilian rule, making Guinea a fledging multiparty democracy since 2010, while the military returned to the barracks.


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