Impressions of the Peruvian Agrarian Reform

1971 ◽  
Vol 13 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 456-474
Author(s):  
John Stephen Gitlitz

On 24 June 1969 the military government of Peru, exercising its de facto power to issue legislation by decree, promulgated a law of agrarian reform. In Latin America legal norms—even radical ones—are not necessarily to be feared. Many countries have agrarian reform laws and in most of these agrarian structures have not been changing rapidly. Indeed, the previous administration in Peru had passed a mild law in 1964, but the hacienda structure of the Peruvian Andes remained virtually intact. Few feared that the new code enacted by the military would present a strong challenge to tradition.Forty-eight hours after its promulgation opinions began to change. The government announced that interventors were being sent to eight of the largest sugar estates on the northern coast. Intervention is the first step toward expropriation. The sugar estates lie at the heart of the Peruvian oligarchy: they were exempt from the 1964 legislation.

Author(s):  
Brian E. Loveman

Latin America’s armed forces have played a central role in the region’s political history. This selective annotated bibliography focuses on key sources, with varying theoretical, empirical, and normative treatments of the military governments in the region, from the Cuban Revolution (1959) until the end of the Cold War (1989–1990). The article is limited to those cases in which military governments or “civil-military” governments were in power. This excludes personalist dictatorships, party dictatorships, and civilian governments in which the armed forces exercised considerable influence but did not rule directly. No pretense is made of comprehensiveness or of treating the “causes” of military coups (a vast literature) and of civil-military relations under civilian governments. Likewise, the closely related topics of guerrilla movements during this period, human rights violations under the military governments, US policy and support for many of the military governments, and the transitions back to civilian government (including “transitional justice”) are not covered in depth, but some of the selections do treat these topics and direct the reader to a more extensive literature on these subjects. Long-term military governments, with changing leadership in most cases, controlled eleven Latin American nations for significant periods from 1964 to 1990: Ecuador, 1963–1966 and 1972–1978; Guatemala, 1963–1985 (with an interlude from 1966–1969); Brazil, 1964–1985; Bolivia, 1964–1970 and 1971–1982; Argentina, 1966–1973 and 1976–1983; Peru, 1968–1980; Panama, 1968–1989; Honduras, 1963–1966 and 1972–1982; Chile, 1973–1990; and Uruguay, 1973–1984. In El Salvador the military dominated the government from 1948 until 1984, but the last “episode” was from 1979 to 1984. Military governments, though inevitably authoritarian, implemented varying economic, social, and foreign policies. They had staunch supporters and intense opponents, and they were usually subject to internal factionalism and ideological as well as policy disagreements. The sources discussed in this article reflect that diversity.


Africa ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 397-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Hart

AbstractIn 1979 Nigeria's military government held the first general elections for fifteen years. The politicians then resumed power under a republican constitution. The National Party of Nigeria, a conservative coalition, narrowly won the elections from four other parties and virtually controlled the next elections in 1983. There were five election rounds: for the President, for nine-teen state governers, for the Senate, for the House of Representatives and for the state assemblies. Increases over the 1979 vote in the presidential round indicated some rigging. Results in the following rounds were incredible. The root cause was northern reluctance within the National Party to honour an agreement to a southern presidential candidate at the next elections in 1987 and southern competition for the 1987 nomination. After the elections the courts failed to redress the rigging and the President to purge corrupt Ministers. The military then overthrew the government and resumed control.


Author(s):  
Lee J. Alston ◽  
Marcus André Melo ◽  
Bernardo Mueller ◽  
Carlos Pereira

This chapter discusses the military government and the belief in “developmentalism” which motivated the institutions put in place by the regime. Developmentalism rested on top-down technocratic planning and was a coalition between the military and the business community, both domestic and foreign. Import substitution policies along with state-led industrialization brought economic growth in the late 1960s and into the mid-1970s. But, the Brazilian miracle of the late 1960s and early 1970s began to sputter out, and, moreover, political rights became more constrained. The years of censorship and a closed political system sowed the seeds for a more open political order. Above all, the failure of the expansionist strategy of growth through import substitution accompanied by inflation and external debt became self-evident. Citizens also began to blame the government for not reducing economic and social inequality. The dominant belief that economic growth should precede social inclusion started losing political support.


1960 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Rupert Emerson

1958 was the year of collapse for democratic constitutionalism in the new countries. Although some, following the example of Latin America, had already abandoned their brave new experiments, hopes were still high for the rest. The major defectors from the democratic ranks in 1958 were Pakistan, Burma, and the Sudan, in all three of which the military took over, but other countries underwent similar experiences which emphasized the nature and extent of the crisis. In Indonesia the existing regime was pushed further toward an unstable combination of disintegration and authoritarian rule by the proclamation in Sumatra of a provisional revolutionary government, claiming to supplant the government headed by President Sukarno. In Thailand, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, who had replaced Field Marshal Pibul Song-gram, reasserted and tightened his dictatorial control. In the Middle East the United Arab Republic was established under the firm authoritarian rule of Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser; Iraq was taken over by General Abdul Karim Kassim; and Lebanon and Jordan were both threatened by upheavals. In Africa south of the Sahara the military had not yet come to prominence but Nkrumah and his Convention People's Party tightened their grip on Ghana; and Guinea, voting its independence from France, set up an explicit one-party system under the leadership of Sékou Touré.


1992 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 119-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rhoda Rabkin

The Literature on democratic transitions suggests two opposite sorts of dangers that the successful democratizer must avoid: too much uncertainty on the one hand, and too little on the other. The first can lead to conflict, violence, and abortive transitions (Karl and Schmitter, 199D; while the second means there is no democracy at all, but leads to something less which has been variously called: "tutelary democracy," "electoralism," or "democradura."Before the government of Patricio Aylwin took office in Chile in March 1990, most observers anticipated that the return to democracy would bring considerable social conflict and political instability. Expressing a widely held view, one expert wrote: "Any return to democracy in Chile would entail vocal demands, from a variety of social groups and movements, to reverse the policies instituted by the regime since 1973" (Loveman 1986-87:29). The need to confront human rights abuses during the military government was another potentially explosive political issue.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 115-143
Author(s):  
Sanjay Ramesh

Fiji’s history is interspersed with ethnic conflict, military coups, new constitutions and democratic elections. Ethnic tensions started to increase in the 1960s and reached its peak with violent indigenous Fijian ethnic assertion in the form of military coups in 1987. Following the coup, the constitution adopted at independence was abrogated and a constitution that provided indigenous political hegemony was promulgated in 1990. However, by 1993, there were serious and irreparable divisions within the indigenous Fijian community, forcing coup leader Sitiveni Rabuka to spearhead a constitution review. The result of the review was the multiracial 1997 Constitution which failed to resolve deep seated ethnic tensions, resulting in another nationalist coup in 2000 and a mutiny at the military barracks in December of that year. Following the failed mutiny, the Commander of the Republic of the Fiji Military Forces, Voreqe Bainimarama, publicly criticised nationalist policies of the government of Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase, culminating in another military coup in 2006. The new military government started plans to de-ethnise the Fijian state and promulgated a constitution that promoted ethnic equality.Post independence Fiji is characterised by these conflicts over ethnocracy. The ethnic hegemony of indigenous Fijian chiefs is set against inter-ethnic counter hegemony. While democratic politics encourages inter-ethic alliance-building, the ethnic hegemony of the chiefs has been asserted by force. Latterly, the fragmentation of the ethnic hegemony has reconfigured inter-ethnic alliances, and the military has emerged as a vehicle for de-ethnicisation. The article analyses this cyclical pattern of ethnic hegemony and multiethnic counter hegemony as a struggle over (and against) Fijian ethnocracy. 


1979 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto Calvo

In a book which has circulated rather widely in Latin America (Lieuwen, 1960), it was stated that, with the passage of time, Latin American military men would intervene less and less in politics. This was not an altogether mistaken belief, considering that in 1961 Paraguay was a “military island” in a sea of Latin American civilian governments. Today the situation has radically changed in many ways. On the one hand, more than half the population of Latin America lives under military regimes; on the other, military domination has a different cast: it is no longer a caudillo who takes over, but the armed forces, which have institutionalized their access to the government. Linked to the foregoing is the emergence of an authoritarian ideological platform—the military call it a doctrine of national security—which provides the armed forces with the necessary rationale for their political activities.


1992 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 65-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Scott Palmer

In Just 20 Years Peru has shifted from beacon of hope to basket case. As late as the mid-1970s, Peru's reformist military government (1968-1980) appeared to offer significant possibilities for economic and political development (defined as improved distribution of income and greater participation by the citizenry). From 1940 to 1975, economic growth and low inflation had been the norm. A major agrarian reform during the military docenio (12-year rule) created production cooperatives nation wide; the industrial community gave workers a meaningful management role in the operation of their firms. Both stirred the imagination of many Peruvians and the academic community alike.


1974 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-148
Author(s):  
G. Ezejiofor

Since 19592 a bill of rights has always been written into successive Nigerian Constitutions. When the Military took over the government of the country in 1966, it suspended3 or amended a number of the provisions of the governing 1963 Constitution. Quite remarkably Chapter 3 of that Constitution embodying the bill of rights is among the portions that have not been altered or suspended. It is therefore significant that even under the military regime the fundamental rights of the individual are protected by the Constitution. It must however be observed that, before the military intervention, the bill of rights was entrenched in the Constitution since the rights and the procedure for their enforcement could only be altered through a rather complicated process in which both the central and regional legislatures had to participate.4 Since the army take-over no part of the Constitution is entrenched. This is because section 4 of the 1963 Constitution providing for a stiff and complicated amending procedure of some of its provisions has been suspended5 and the Supreme Military Council is now competent to enact any laws on any topic by decree6 and no decree is required to be promulgated in any special form or through any special procedure. A decree is valid once it is signed by the Head of the Federal Military Government.7


2012 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANNA CANT

AbstractLatin American military dictatorships of the twentieth century were often right-wing, elitist and violent. A marked exception was the left-wing Peruvian military government of Juan Velasco Alvarado. More exceptional still was the government's use of visual media. Between 1968 and 1970 it produced approximately 20 posters, printed in editions of 50,000 to 200,000, to promote the radical Agrarian Reform Law. These posters provide vibrant representations of the agrarian reform's ideological aspects, which have been under-studied. A detailed exploration of visual communication shows that the government deployed aesthetically sophisticated propaganda and symbols to encourage social participation in the reform.


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