Economic Development and Institutional Change, 1980–2015

2018 ◽  
pp. 275-302
Author(s):  
Şevket Pamuk
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Capital Inflows ◽  
World War ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Global Trends ◽  
Savings Rate ◽  
Domestic Savings ◽  
Foreign Capital Inflows ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
Rates Of Growth

This chapter explores how, in the decades after World War II, Turkey had attained unprecedented rates of growth by raising both its savings and investments rates from 11 percent of GDP in the early 1950s to 22 percent of GDP in the late 1970s. Investments in plant and equipment as well as education were financed primarily by domestic savings, even though as per capita incomes continued to rise after 1980, the savings rate did not rise. The growing dependence on short-term foreign capital inflows caused a significant increase in macroeconomic instability. The fluctuations in short-term movements of capital, arising from both global trends and domestic political instability, have led to major fluctuations in the economy since 1980.

Economic Development and Institutional Change, 1950–1980

2018 ◽  
pp. 222-244
Author(s):  
Şevket Pamuk
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Gdp Per Capita ◽  
World War ◽  
Per Capita Gdp ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
The Developed Countries ◽  
Rates Of Growth ◽  
Gdp Gap

This chapter explores how the decades after World War II were a period of rapid growth for Turkey. Despite the crises in the mid-1950s and in the second half of the 1970s, GDP per capita increased at an average annual rate above three percent and more than doubled during the period 1950–1980. These rates of growth were unprecedented for Turkey. The long-term rates of growth achieved in Turkey after World War II were roughly comparable to the averages for both the developed countries and developing countries as a whole. As a result, the per capita GDP gap between Turkey and the developed countries changed little during this period.

Indifferent Sanctuary: German-Speaking Refugees and Exiles in Argentina, 1933-1945

1982 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 395-420 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald C. Newton
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Total Population ◽  
World War ◽  
European Origin ◽  
World Crisis ◽  
Jewish Refugees ◽  
The World ◽  
German Speaking ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
Almost All

Between 1933 and the end of World War II, Argentina became the home of some 43,000 Jewish refugees from Nazism, almost all of them of German, Austrian, or West European origin. Measured against the country's total population, 13 million in 1931, 16 million according to the 1947 census, Argentina received more Jewish refugees per capita than any other country in the world except Palestine (Wasserstein, 1979: 7,45). This did not occur by design of the Argentine government; on the contrary, its immigration policies became interestingly restrictive as the years of the world crisis wore on.In practice, however, Argentina was unable to patrol effectively its long borders with the neighboring republics of Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, and Uruguay. The overseas consuls of these nations, especially the first three, did a brisk and lucrative trade in visas and entry permits for persons desperate to escape the Nazi terror.

Boom-or-Bust Commodities and Industrialization in Pre–World War II Malaya

2002 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 1074-1115 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. G. Huff
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Labor Market ◽  
Rapid Growth ◽  
Economic History ◽  
Terms Of Trade ◽  
World War ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
Economic Boom ◽  
Pre World War Ii

This article links the terms of trade, money supply, labor market, and money and credit markets to explore a puzzle in Malayan economic history: why, despite rapid growth and high per capita income, did pre–World War II Malaya industrialize so little? A range of data is drawn together to show how for Malayan manufacturers economic boom was accompanied by precipitate deterioration in the real exchange rate, while in a slump credit contracted sharply and with it the size of the Malayan market for manufactures. Analysis of Malayan experience may be relevant for understanding slight industrialization elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

Economic Conditions and the Presidential Vote

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (2) ◽  
pp. 567-573 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert S. Erikson
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Capita Income ◽  
Important Determinant ◽  
Per Capita Income ◽  
World War ◽  
Relative Growth ◽  
Income Change ◽  
National Election Study ◽  
Per Capita

This analysis demonstrates that the relative growth of per capita income change is an important determinant of post-World War II presidential election outcomes. Per capita income change is even a better predictor of presidential election outcomes than the electorate's relative attraction to the Democratic and Republican candidates as calibrated in National Election Study surveys. The significance of this finding is discussed.

The Demographic Transition in the Middle East and North Africa

1980 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Allman
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Health Communication ◽  
North Africa ◽  
Demographic Transition ◽  
Capita Income ◽  
Cultural Background ◽  
Per Capita Income ◽  
World War ◽  
Per Capita

Is there indeed a new or renewed demographic transition? The evidence suggests that there is. A rapidly growing number of countries of diverse cultural background have entered the natality transition since World War II and after a 25-year lapse in such entries. In these countries the transition is moving much faster than it did in Europe. This is probably related to the fact that progress in general is moving much faster in such matters as urbanization, education, health, communication, and often per capita income.

Economic Concentration and Monopoly in Japan—A Second View

1976 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugene Rotwein
Keyword(s):  
Growth Rate ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Total Output ◽  
World War ◽  
The Third ◽  
Economic Achievement ◽  
The World ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
Economic Concentration ◽  
The Impact

In the period since the end of World War II, the Japanese economic achievement has been of prodigious proportions. During this period, its growth rate—an average of almost 10% in GNP per year—has been the highest in the world. Japan has become the third-ranking industrial nation and its world standing, in terms of per capita GNP, has risen from fortieth in the early 1950s to twelfth at the present time. Growth so sweeping and rapid inevitably has brought a multitude of changes, not least in the composition of total output. At a highly accelerated rate, industries have declined, others have blossomed, new industries have appeared, and the importance of various sectors of the economy has changed. Amidst the continuing adjustments and readjustments, it is of interest to consider the nature of the impact on Japanese industrial organization. More specifically, what has been the effect on economic concentration and monopoly in Japan?

Food and Agriculture Organization

1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 472-476 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Agricultural Production ◽  
World War ◽  
Technical Developments ◽  
Food And Agriculture ◽  
Food And Agriculture Organization ◽  
Legal Questions ◽  
The World ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
The Right

The eighth session of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was held in Rome from November 4 through 25, 1955 under the chairmanship of the Right Honorable K. J. Holyoake (New Zealand). The Conference had accepted the proposals submitted by the FAO Council on the organization of the eighth session, and consequently established various commissions to deal with agenda items pertaining to program trends and policy questions in food and agriculture, constitutional and legal questions, and administrative and financial questions. During its discussion of the world food and agricultural situation, the Conference noted that world per capita agricultural production, which had decreased by ten to fifteen percent at the end of World War II, had regained its pre-war level in spite of an increase of nearly 25 percent in population. However, agricultural production had increased more rapidly in advanced countries than in economically under-developed ones, so that per capita production in Asia and Latin America was still below pre-war levels, while surpluses had built up in the more advanced countries. The Conference felt that this situation was due to a failure to expand effective demand for farm products as rapidly as technical developments made it possible to expand production. Although the Conference noted that surplus agricultural commodities had increased more slowly in 1954–1955 than in the two preceding years, it felt that this had been due at least as much to poor crops in some countries as to increased consumption or to a planned reduction of output.

scholarly journals Why Nations Fail? (Keynote Video Lecture)

2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (4I-II) ◽  
pp. 301-312
Author(s):  
Daron Acemoglu
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
United States Of America ◽  
Indian Subcontinent ◽  
World War ◽  
Great Pleasure ◽  
Video Lecture ◽  
The World ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
End Of The World

First of all, it is a great pleasure to be here. Thank you for inviting me. Given that communicating from a far is not the easiest thing to do, what I have decided to do is to give a quick overview of the arguments that have emerged from the book that James and I wrote. In fact, this book is a synthesis of about 16 years of research that James and I did. I think it is fair to say that a lot of economic development and economic growth is motivated by patterns that are reported in the book. In particular, this is data from Angus Madison’s life’s work, which is not entirely uncontroversial, but the overall pattern here is fairly uncontroversial. The patterns that we observe have actually been in the background of many attempts to understand long patterns of economic development. I think they also point out that it is going to be very difficult to understand why certain parts of the world that were either on par with, say, Asia, in particular the Indian Subcontinent and China, have increased their income per capita and their prosperity so much in 500 years leading to today, particularly from the period around early 1800s to essentially to the end of the World War II, where there is this big divergence taking place. The trends in economic development show that United States of America, Canada, New Zealand and Australia have pulled so much ahead of, say, Asia, where both India, the Indian Subcontinent in this case, and China more or less show the same picture, where there is not much growth going on until the end of the World War II.

scholarly journals CONVERGÊNCIA E DIVERGÊNCIA NOS NÍVEIS DE RENDA PER CAPITA: UMA CRÍTICA À APLICABILIDADE DOS MODELOS NEOCLÁSSICOS DE CRESCIMENTO ECONÔMICO

2004 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Almeida Fonseca ◽  
José Luís Oreiro
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Capita Income ◽  
Growth Models ◽  
The United States ◽  
Per Capita Income ◽  
World War ◽  
Catch Up ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
Neoclassical Growth

O artigo pretende analisar em que medida os modelos neoclássicos de crescimento econômico – mais especificamente, o modelo de Solow (1956, 1957), o modelo de Mankiw, Romer e Weill (1992) e o modelo de Romer (1990) – são capazes de explicar a divergência global nos níveis de renda per capita nos últimos dois séculos e a convergência nos níveis de renda per capita e o catch-up ocorridos entre Europa e Estados Unidos no período do Pós Segunda Guerra Mundial. Com efeito, trata-se de uma confrontação entre teoria e prática, de modo a analisar de que forma tais modelos explicam (ou não) os fatos supramencionados. No trabalho, demonstra-se que a ocorrência dos fatos anteriormente mencionados deveu-se fundamentalmente às diferenças do progresso técnico existente entre as economias (no caso da divergência) e à redução de tais disparidades entre os Estados Unidos e a Europa no período de tempo imediatamente após a 2.a Guerra Mundial (no caso da convergência e do catch-up). Na verdade, tenta-se demonstrar que os modelos apresentados não conseguem explicar satisfatoriamente os fatos ocorridos, sendo válidos apenas em casos específicos. O que o artigo se propõe a expor é que a realidade do crescimento econômico mundial é bastante diferente das conclusões dos modelos neoclássicos considerados. Abstract This work intends to analyze in which way the neoclassical growth models – more specifically, Solow (1956, 1957), Mankiw, Romer and Weill (1992) and Romer (1990) – are capable to explain the global divergence on the levels of per capita income over the last two centuries and the convergence on the levels of per capita income and the catch-up occurred between Europe and the United States after World War II. In fact, it is a confrontation between theory and practice, in order to view in which way these models explain (or not) the above-mentioned facts. During the present work, we demonstrate that the occurrence of these facts were mainly caused by differences on technological progress between economies (case of divergence) and the reduction of such disparities between the United States and Europe on the period of time immediately after World War II (case of convergence and catch-up). In fact, we try to demonstrate that these models are incapable to give a satisfactory explanation to the occurred facts, being only valid on specific cases. The work tries to propose that the reality of global economic growth differs considerably from the conclusions of the considered neoclassical growth models.

The Cost of World War II to the Soviet People: A Research Note

1978 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 959-962 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Millar ◽  
Susan J. Linz
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
National Income ◽  
Soviet Economy ◽  
World War ◽  
The Real ◽  
Real Cost ◽  
Soviet People ◽  
Income Data ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
The Cost

Although the total real cost of World War II to the Soviet people has yet to be fully tallied, there can be little doubt that it exceeds that of any other major participant, per capita as well as absolutely. The objective of this paper is to compare and evaluate the real war costs reported by the Soviets with those implied by Soviet pronouncements and those using Soviet national income data. Our purpose is to determine the reasonableness of the Soviet claim that World War II cost the Soviet economy two Five-Year Plans.

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