The Superiority of the Confucian Hybrid Regime Defended

Author(s):  
Tongdong Bai

This chapter considers a few challenges to the desirability and superiority of the Confucian hybrid regime, especially the meritocratic elements in this regime that are apparently a significant departure from the present liberal democratic regimes. Some people may object to this regime because it apparently violates what they take as principles of liberal democracy: the principle that the legitimacy of a government comes from popular votes and the principle of equality. This kind of objection is an “external” one because it considers some fundamental ideas of the Confucian hybrid regime problematic. The chapter also looks at some “internal” objections to this regime, such as it will lead to consequences that it considers bad within its own framework, it is not as good as it claims to be, or we do not have to go that far to achieve what is desired by the framer of the Confucian hybrid regime. By answering all these challenges, the chapter hopes to elaborate on the designs of this regime and the reasoning behind it, and to further show the superiority and the desirability of it.

2007 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Bican Sahin

How can Muslim societies marked by religious, cultural, and ethnic diversity secure peace and stability? I argue that the principle of toleration provides the most appropriate environment for the peaceful coexistence of these differences, for individuals living in a polity can adopt different moral views and experience their cultural, ethnic, and other differences peacefully. Toleration is mainly a characteristic of liberal democratic regimes. However, different traditions of liberalism lead to different versions of liberal democracy. Also, not all versions of liberalism value toleration to the same degree. I argue that a liberal democracy based on “political” rather than “comprehensive” liberalism provides the broadest space for the existence of differences, for it does not present a shared way of life, but only a political framework within which individuals and groups with different worldviews can solve their common political problems. However, a liberal democracy based on comprehensive liberalism requires cultural groups and/or individuals to subscribe to fundamental liberal values (e.g., autonomy), and this stance limits its room for toleration. Thus, if liberal democracy is going to be introduced into the Muslim world to bring about peace and stability, it must be a liberal democracy based on political, rather than comprehensive, liberalism.


Author(s):  
Tongdong Bai

This chapter shows that there are some fundamental problems with contemporary democracy, especially the ideology beneath the one person, one vote system and the inevitable consequences of it. It identifies four problems of democracy: the suspicion of the elite, the neglect of the interests of nonvoters, the neglect of the interests of the minority, and the irrationality of voters. Then the chapter shows how the “internal” solutions are inadequate. Next, this chapter constructs a Confucian hybrid regime that is based on Mencius’s ideas discussed in Chapter 2, and shows how it can address the problems with democracy more adequately than present liberal democratic regimes. That is, the chapter reveals that the Mencian reservation of one person, one vote is actually a good thing about Confucianism.


2007 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Bican Sahin

How can Muslim societies marked by religious, cultural, and ethnic diversity secure peace and stability? I argue that the principle of toleration provides the most appropriate environment for the peaceful coexistence of these differences, for individuals living in a polity can adopt different moral views and experience their cultural, ethnic, and other differences peacefully. Toleration is mainly a characteristic of liberal democratic regimes. However, different traditions of liberalism lead to different versions of liberal democracy. Also, not all versions of liberalism value toleration to the same degree. I argue that a liberal democracy based on “political” rather than “comprehensive” liberalism provides the broadest space for the existence of differences, for it does not present a shared way of life, but only a political framework within which individuals and groups with different worldviews can solve their common political problems. However, a liberal democracy based on comprehensive liberalism requires cultural groups and/or individuals to subscribe to fundamental liberal values (e.g., autonomy), and this stance limits its room for toleration. Thus, if liberal democracy is going to be introduced into the Muslim world to bring about peace and stability, it must be a liberal democracy based on political, rather than comprehensive, liberalism.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Davide Vittori

Abstract Scholars have long debated whether populism harms or improves the quality of democracy. This article contributes to this debate by focusing on the impact of populist parties in government. In particular, it inquires: (1) whether populists in government are more likely than non-populists to negatively affect the quality of democracies; (2) whether the role of populists in government matters; and (3) which type of populism is expected to negatively affect the quality of liberal-democratic regimes. The results find strong evidence that the role of populists in government affects several qualities of democracy. While robust, the findings related to (2) are less clear-cut than those pertaining to (1). Finally, regardless of their role in government, different types of populism have different impacts on the qualities of democracy. The results show that exclusionary populist parties in government tend to have more of a negative impact than other forms of populism.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
William E. Scheuerman

I spent a few unseasonably hot summer days in 1996 digging around in the German Federal Archives in Koblenz for what later became a lengthy essay on Ernst Fraenkel (1898–1975), the neglected German socialist political and legal thinker. I still recall struggling to justify my efforts not simply as an historian of ideas but also as a political theorist who, at least in principle, was expected to make systematic contributions to contemporary debates. The problem was that Fraenkel had focused his acumen on investigating liberal democratic instability and German fascism, matters that did not seem directly pertinent to a political and intellectual constellation in which political scientists were celebrating democracy's “third wave.” With Tony Blair and Bill Clinton touting Third Way politics, and many former dictatorships seemingly on a secure path to liberal democracy, Fraenkel's preoccupations seemed dated. Even though Judith Shklar had noted, as late as 1989, that “anyone who thinks that fascism in one guise or another is dead and gone ought to think again,” political pundits and scholars in the mid-1990s typically assumed that capitalist liberal democracy's future was secure. When I returned to the US and described my research to colleagues, they responded, unsurprisingly, politely but without much enthusiasm.


2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 495-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
ARASH ABIZADEH

This paper subjects to critical analysis four common arguments in the sociopolitical theory literature supporting the cultural nationalist thesis that liberal democracy is viable only against the background of a single national public culture: the arguments that (1) social integration in a liberal democracy requires shared norms and beliefs (Schnapper); (2) the levels of trust that democratic politics requires can be attained only among conationals (Miller); (3) democratic deliberation requires communicational transparency, possible in turn only within a shared national public culture (Miller, Barry); and (4) the economic viability of specifically industrialized liberal democracies requires a single national culture (Gellner). I argue that all four arguments fail: At best, a shared cultural nation may reduce some of the costs liberal democratic societies must incur; at worst, cultural nationalist policies ironically undermine social integration. The failure of these cultural nationalist arguments clears the way for a normative theory of liberal democracy in multinational and postnational contexts.


Acorn ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-129
Author(s):  
Sanjay Lal ◽  
Jeff Shawn Jose ◽  
Douglas Allen ◽  
Michael Allen ◽  

In this author-meets-critics dialogue, Sanjay Lal, author of , argues that Gandhian values of nonviolence raise aspirations of liberal democracy to a higher level. Since Gandhian values of nonviolence are closely associated with religious values, liberal democracy should make public commitments to religions on a non-sectarian basis, except for unreasonable religions. Critic Jeff Shawn Jose agrees that Gandhian values can strengthen liberal democracy. However, Jose finds a contradiction in Lal’s proposal that a liberal state should support reasonable religions only. A more consistent Gandhian approach would focus on everyday interactions between citizens and groups rather than state-directed preferences. Critic Douglas Allen also welcomes Lal’s project that brings Gandhian philosophy into relation with liberal democratic theory; however, he argues that universalizing the Absolute Truth of genuine religion is more complicated than Lal acknowledges. D. Allen argues for a Gandhian approach of relative truths, which cannot be evaluated apart from contingency or context, and he offers autobiographical evidence in support of his critical suspicion of genuine religion. Critic Michael Allen argues that Lal’s metaphysical approach to public justification violates a central commitment of political liberalism not to take sides on any metaphysical basis. M. Allen argues that democratic socialism is closer to Gandhi’s approach than is liberalism. Lal responds to critics by arguing that Gandhi’s evaluation of unreasonable religions depends upon an assessment of violence, which is not as problematic as critics charge, either from a Gandhian perspective or a liberal one. Furthermore, by excluding unreasonable or violent religions from state promotion, Lal argues that he is not advocating state suppression. Finally, Lal argues that Gandhian or Kingian metaphysics are worthy of support by liberal, democratic states seeking to educate individuals regarding peaceful unity in diversity.


2015 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 9-23
Author(s):  
Adéla Gjuričová

The Czechoslovak federal parliament was designed in 1968 to replace the National Assembly of a unitary state and thus formally express equality between Czechs and Slovaks in the newly established federation. After the crash of the Prague Spring reforms, the socialist parliament lost most of its sovereignty, while preserving its federal character and formal procedures, thus providing a sort of “backup” legislature. The Velvet Revolution of 1989, with its proclaimed respect to peace and legality, logically found the ancient régime’s parliament in the centre of new politics. In the revolutionary parliament of 1989-1990, the concept of socialist parliamentarianism began to clash with new motives, such as the national unity, a break with the Communist past, liberal democracy, or subsidiarity. Various blends of socialist, revolutionary and liberal democratic views of the parliament consequently came to life, while each of these concepts as well as every practical policy was perceived and accepted in conflicting manners by the Czech and Slovak publics as well as political representations. Some of these differences turned out to be irreconcilable and the federal parliament eventually played a key role in administering the break-up of Czechoslovak federation in 1992.


Curatopia ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 227-243
Author(s):  
Billie Lythberg ◽  
Wayne Ngata ◽  
Amiria Salmond

Current ontological critiques point to how discourses of diversity like multiculturalism help domesticate difference by making it fit into pre-determined categories, such as those we are accustomed to thinking of as cultures. These ways of conceiving relations within and between groups of people—common to anthropology and museums, as well as to liberal democratic regimes of governance—assert that differences between peoples are relatively superficial in that our cultures overlay a fundamental and universal sameness. Museums showcasing cultural artefacts have thus helped domesticate difference by promoting world-making visions of (natural) unity in (cultural) diversity. Yet some artefacts exceed the categories designed to contain them; they oblige thought and handling beyond the usual requirements of curatorial practice. This chapter considers the challenges of ‘curating the uncommons’ in relation to work carried out by and with the Māori tribal arts management group Toi Hauiti and their ancestor figure, Paikea, at the American Museum of Natural History in New York.


2021 ◽  
pp. 101-114
Author(s):  
Yves Mény

There is unanimous agreement about the growing discontent vis-à-vis liberal democracy. Despite a considerable diversity of its manifestations, the disenchantment with democracy, its institutions as well as its policies is universal. The disease has contaminated every democratic system: those recently set up as well as consolidated democracies such as the UK and USA; rich countries as well as less affluent ones; social-democratic regimes as well as neoliberal ones; federal as well as centralized states. This new trend is well consolidated. Thirty years after the fall of the Soviet regimes, the naïve belief that there was no alternative to liberal democracy has faded away. This chapter argues that the crisis is not a mere effect of the post-2008 financial collapse but rather a consequence of three processes. First is the incremental but deep transformation of what we call democracy over the past 50 years. We have a single word (democracy) to label systems which have gone through a profound transformation and which, at the end, do not fit with democracy’s ideals, hopes, and expectations. The second process is the shaking of the very foundations of the past equilibrium based on a compromise between two conflicting values: the power of the people, on one hand, and the liberal limitations on the people’s capacity to act, decide, and control, on the other. The new equilibrium reached after many years of slow evolution is characterized by a serious imbalance between the popular input and the checks and balances, contributing to the frustration of those who are, in theory, the ‘sovereign’. Third is the increasing discrepancy between democratic systems and institutions that have developed exclusively within the Westphalian nation-state, and policies that are more and more framed by or dependent upon global actors. Finally, the failure of the European Union to tackle the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ has disillusioned those who had dreamed of reconciling democratic processes and policies with supranational institutions, flows, and actors. The populist outburst in both its anarchic and authoritarian versions, while fuelling discontent, might become a mere ‘impasse’. There is, indeed, ‘only a single bed for two dreams’ and some new balance between the contradicting values of democracy and liberalism has to be established for the future.


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