scholarly journals Intangible investment in the EU and US before and since the Great Recession and its contribution to productivity growth

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol Corrado ◽  
Jonathan Haskel ◽  
Cecilia Jona-Lasinio ◽  
Massimiliano Iommi

This paper uses a new cross-country cross-industry dataset on investment in tangible and intangible assets for 18 European countries and the US.  We set out a framework for measuring intangible investment and capital stocks and their effect on output, inputs and total factor productivity. The analysis provides evidence on the diffusion of intangible investment across Europe and the US over the years 2000-2013 and offers growth accounting evidence before and after the Great Recession in 2008-2009. Our major findings are the following. First, tangible investment fell massively during the Great Recession and has hardly recovered, whereas intangible investment has been relatively resilient and recovered fast in the US but lagged behind in the EU. Second, the sources of growth analysis including only national account intangibles (software, R&D, mineral exploration and artistic originals), suggest that capital deepening is the main driver of growth, with tangibles and intangibles accounting for 80% and 20% in the EU while both account for 50% in the US, over 2000-2013. Extending the asset boundary to the intangible assets not included in the national accounts (Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2005)) makes capital deepening increase. The contribution of tangibles is reduced both in the EU and the US (60% and 40% respectively) while intangibles account for a larger share (40% in EU and 60% in the US). Then, our analysis shows that since the Great Recession, the slowdown in labour productivity growth has been driven by a decline in TFP growth with relatively a minor role for tangible and intangible capital. Finally, we document a significant correlation between stricter employment protection rules and less government investment in R&D, and a lower ratio of intangible to tangible investment.

2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (5) ◽  
pp. 314-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christiaan Luigjes ◽  
Georg Fischer ◽  
Frank Vandenbroucke

Abstract The system of unemployment insurance (UI) used in the United States has often been cited as a model for Europe. The American model illustrates that it is possible to create and maintain a UI system based on federal-state co-financing that intensifies during economic crises and thus reinforces protection and stabilisation. Central requirements and conditional funding can improve the aggregate protection and stabilisation capacity of the system. However, the architecture of the US system financially incentivises states to organise retrenchment of their own efforts for UI, which in turn leads to a divergence of benefit generosity and coverage levels. During the Great Recession, the federal government mitigated these incentives for retrenchment through minimum requirements attached to federal financial intervention. With regards to the European unemployment re-insurance system debate, the US experience implies both positive and encourageing conclusions and cautionary lessons.


Author(s):  
Reuven Avi-Yonah ◽  
Haiyan Xu

The International tax regime (ITR) has been transformed after the Great Recession of 2008–2009. The G20/Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project (2013–2015) has fundamentally changed the ITR, giving new life to the single tax principle (income should be taxed once, i.e., no double taxation and no double non taxation). Reaction to BEPS has varied dramatically between the EU and the US, the two largest markets in the world. In the EU BEPS is taken very seriously, as shown for example by the new Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives that implement the single tax principle. In the US BEPS is almost invisible; while the US model tax treaty has been amended to incorporate it the US has refused to sign the Multilateral Instrument to implement BEPS in its treaties and the only other BEPS action that the US has taken is country by country reporting. It thus appears that the future of BEPS and the ITR depends on whether the EU or the US view prevails, i.e., whether multinationals can be forced to pay significant tax on the 160–240 billion that are currently not taxed annually because of BEPS. While US multinationals as well as EU multinationals are exposed to the EU ATAD and related measures while operating in Europe, they are less subject to EU anti BEPS measures elsewhere in the world. It therefore is crucial to assess the reaction to BEPS in the other large economy that was involved in its development, namely China. This article attempts to assess China’s reaction to BEPS based on Chinese sources. It shows that China takes BEPS seriously. Therefore, given the reactions of China (as well as India, which is even more aggressive than China for example in taxing the digital economy) it seems likely that eventually the EU view of BEPS will prevail and US based multinationals will eventually be forced to pay tax on the over 100 billion they shift offshore each year.


Author(s):  
Abraham L. Newman ◽  
Elliot Posner

Chapter 6 examines the long-term effects of international soft law on policy in the United States since 2008. The extent and type of post-crisis US cooperation with foreign jurisdictions have varied considerably with far-reaching ramifications for international financial markets. Focusing on the international interaction of reforms in banking and derivatives, the chapter uses the book’s approach to understand US regulation in the wake of the Great Recession. The authors attribute seemingly random variation in the US relationship to foreign regulation and markets to differences in pre-crisis international soft law. Here, the existence (or absence) of robust soft law and standard-creating institutions determines the resources available to policy entrepreneurs as well as their orientation and attitudes toward international cooperation. Soft law plays a central role in the evolution of US regulatory reform and its interface with the rest of the world.


2021 ◽  
Vol 118 ◽  
pp. 106873
Author(s):  
Nina Mulia ◽  
Yu Ye ◽  
Katherine J. Karriker-Jaffe ◽  
Libo Li ◽  
William C. Kerr ◽  
...  

Empirica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 835-861
Author(s):  
Maciej Ryczkowski

Abstract I analyse the link between money and credit for twelve industrialized countries in the time period from 1970 to 2016. The euro area and Commonwealth Countries have rather strong co-movements between money and credit at longer frequencies. Denmark and Switzerland show weak and episodic effects. Scandinavian countries and the US are somewhere in between. I find strong and significant longer run co-movements especially around booming house prices for all of the sample countries. The analysis suggests the expansionary policy that cleans up after the burst of a bubble may exacerbate the risk of a new house price boom. The interrelation is hidden in the short run, because the co-movements are then rarely statistically significant. According to the wavelet evidence, developments of money and credit since the Great Recession or their decoupling in Japan suggest that it is more appropriate to examine the two variables separately in some circumstances.


2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Gradín ◽  
Olga Cantó ◽  
Coral del Río

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze the different dynamic characteristics of unemployment in a selected group of European Union countries during the current Great Recession, which had unequal consequences on employment depending on the country considered. Design/methodology/approach – The paper follows Shorrocks’s proposal of a duration-sensitive measure of unemployment, and uses cross-sectional data reported by Eurostat coming from European Labour Force Surveys. Findings – The results add some evidence on the relevance of incorporating spells’ duration in measuring unemployment, finding remarkable differences in unemployment patterns in time among European countries. Research limitations/implications – In this paper unemployment is analyzed for all the labor force. Future research should investigate patterns across specific groups such as young people, women, immigrants or the low skilled. Practical implications – It is generally accepted that the negative impact of unemployment on individual welfare can be very different depending on its duration. However, conventional statistics on unemployment do not adequately capture to what extent the recession is not only increasing the incidence of unemployment but also its severity in terms of duration in time of ongoing unemployment spells. The paper shows an easy and practical way to do it in order to improve the understanding of the unemployment phenomenon, using information usually reported by statistical offices. Originality/value – First, the paper provides a tool for dynamic analysis of unemployment based on reported cross-sectional data. Second, the paper demonstrates the empirical relevance of considering spells’ duration when assessing differences in unemployment across countries or in unemployment trends. This is usually neglected or only partially addressed by most conventional measures of unemployment.


2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 785-816 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takuma Kunieda ◽  
Akihisa Shibata

In this paper, a dynamic general equilibrium model with infinitely lived entrepreneurs and financiers is developed to investigate a possible mechanism that explains business cycles and financial crises. The highest growth rate is achievable only if financiers coexist with entrepreneurs, given a certain extent of financial market imperfections. However, if financiers coexist with entrepreneurs, the economy is highly likely to face a financial crisis at certain parameter values. These two-sided implications of the coexistence of entrepreneurs and financiers explain why both instability and high growth are frequently observed in modern economies. Furthermore, our model can obtain countercyclical movements in total factor productivity growth that cannot be explained by the standard real business cycle theory but were observed in the Great Recession of 2007–2008.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (176) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Garcia-Macia

Why did the Great Recession lead to such a slow recovery? I build a model where heterogeneous firms invest in physical and intangible capital, and can default on their debt. In case of default, intangible assets are harder to seize by creditors. Hence, intangible capital faces higher financing costs. This differential is exacerbated in a financial crisis, when default is more likely and aggregate risk bears a higher premium. The resulting fall in intangible investment amplifies the crisis, and gradual intangible spillovers to other firms contribute to its persistence. Using panel data on Spanish manufacturing firms, I estimate the model matching firm-level moments regarding intangibles and financing. The model captures the extent and components of the Great Recession in Spanish manufacturing, whereas a standard model without endogenous intangible investment would miss more than half of the GDP fall. A policy of transfers conditional on firm age could speed up the recovery, as young firms tend to be more financially constrained, particularly regarding intangible investment. Conditioning transfers on firm size or subsidizing credit (as in current E.U. policy) appears to be less effective.


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