Effect of Word-List Consistency on the Correlation between Group Memory and Group Polarization

2013 ◽  
Vol 112 (2) ◽  
pp. 375-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshiko Arima

Two studies investigated the effect of shared knowledge, manipulated using associated or randomly ordered word lists, on the correlation between group remembering and group polarization. Group polarization due to accumulation of information was expected only if it was consistent with shared knowledge among group members (the knowledge shared among group members before discussion). Consistency of information with shared knowledge was manipulated by lists of words that were ordered either randomly or in a manner consistent along with four stereotype categories. In Experiment 1, 159 college students answered a questionnaire about the common stereotype that blood type determines personality; half were given lists of words that were consistent with the stereotype (consistent condition) and the other half, randomly ordered word lists (inconsistent condition). After completion of the questionnaire, they were given, a surprise free-recall test including words from the lists that had appeared in the questionnaire; the test was administered in a group (group condition) or individual (individual condition) setting. The results indicated that stereotype-consistency of the word list reduced the groups' ability to detect incorrect answers compared with the individual condition. In Experiment 2 ( N = 132), the divergence of memory among group members was manipulated by altering the constitution of each group with regard to members' blood type. The results showed that the shift in the score representing belief in the blood-type stereotype correlated with the number of words recalled in the stereotype-consistent word-list condition.

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 147470491201000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Drew H. Bailey ◽  
Benjamin Winegard ◽  
Jon Oxford ◽  
David C. Geary

Men's but not women's investment in a public goods game varied dynamically with the presence or absence of a perceived out-group. Three hundred fifty-four (167 male) young adults participated in multiple iterations of a public goods game under intergroup and individual competition conditions. Participants received feedback about whether their investments in the group were sufficient to earn a bonus to be shared among all in-group members. Results for the first trial confirm previous research in which men's but not women's investments were higher when there was a competing out-group. We extended these findings by showing that men's investment in the in-group varied dynamically by condition depending on the outcome of the previous trial: In the group condition, men, but not women, decreased spending following a win (i.e., earning an in-group bonus). In the individual condition, men, but not women, increased spending following a win. We hypothesize that these patterns reflect a male bias to calibrate their level of in-group investment such that they sacrifice only what is necessary for their group to successfully compete against a rival group.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anja Katrin Munder ◽  
Julia C. Becker ◽  
Oliver Christ

We challenge the common interpretation of targets’ immediate confrontation in reaction todiscrimination as self-serving behavior and propose different underlying motivations for this phenomenon. In five online scenario studies (Noverall = 1,447), we demonstrate across different samples and contexts that targets indicate a distinct pursuit of the following self-reported confrontation goals: individual-benefit (e.g., perpetrator apologizes); group-benefit (e.g., prejudice reduction); and distancing (e.g., demonstrating that one is different from typical group members). Furthermore, meaningful associations of the pursuits of individual-benefitting goals and group- benefitting goals with group identification, disidentification, and further collective action intentions indicate that they represent different confrontation motivations: Individual-benefitting confrontation serves to cope with the individual mistreatment of discrimination, whereas group- benefitting confrontation represents a form of collective action. Distancing goals were associated with disidentification and—unexpectedly—group identification. Our results show that the phenomenon of confrontation in reaction to discrimination can be the result of different underlying psychological processes.


1974 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 251-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard H. Bauer ◽  
James H. Turner

Groups of undergraduates, 4 males, 4 females, 3 males-1 female, or 3 females-1 male made bets in an individual condition (Phase I). One-half the groups were then transferred to a group condition in which Ss knew the bets of other group members and one-half continued to make bets in the individual condition (Phase II). In Phase I males were more risky than females. In Phase II Ss in the group condition were more risky than those in the individual condition and males were more risky than females in both the individual and group conditions. In the group condition males in all-male groups and with one female in the group shifted toward risk, but males with three females in the group shifted toward caution. In the group condition females in all-female groups were cautious, became slightly more risky with one male in the group, and showed a marked shift toward risk with three males in the group These results are similar to the Asch (1952) conformity studies and suggest that shifts toward risk or caution are due to conformity to group pressure.


Author(s):  
Anthony A. Paparo ◽  
Judith A. Murphy

The purpose of this study was to localize the red neuronal pigment in Mytilus edulis and examine its role in the control of lateral ciliary activity in the gill. The visceral ganglia (Vg) in the central nervous system show an over al red pigmentation. Most red pigments examined in squash preps and cryostat sec tions were localized in the neuronal cell bodies and proximal axon regions. Unstained cryostat sections showed highly localized patches of this pigment scattered throughout the cells in the form of dense granular masses about 5-7 um in diameter, with the individual granules ranging from 0.6-1.3 um in diame ter. Tissue stained with Gomori's method for Fe showed bright blue granular masses of about the same size and structure as previously seen in unstained cryostat sections.Thick section microanalysis (Fig.l) confirmed both the localization and presence of Fe in the nerve cell. These nerve cells of the Vg share with other pigmented photosensitive cells the common cytostructural feature of localization of absorbing molecules in intracellular organelles where they are tightly ordered in fine substructures.


Author(s):  
Samuel Bowles ◽  
Herbert Gintis

Why do humans, uniquely among animals, cooperate in large numbers to advance projects for the common good? Contrary to the conventional wisdom in biology and economics, this generous and civic-minded behavior is widespread and cannot be explained simply by far-sighted self-interest or a desire to help close genealogical kin. This book shows that the central issue is not why selfish people act generously, but instead how genetic and cultural evolution has produced a species in which substantial numbers make sacrifices to uphold ethical norms and to help even total strangers. The book describes how, for thousands of generations, cooperation with fellow group members has been essential to survival. Groups that created institutions to protect the civic-minded from exploitation by the selfish flourished and prevailed in conflicts with less cooperative groups. Key to this process was the evolution of social emotions such as shame and guilt, and our capacity to internalize social norms so that acting ethically became a personal goal rather than simply a prudent way to avoid punishment. Using experimental, archaeological, genetic, and ethnographic data to calibrate models of the coevolution of genes and culture as well as prehistoric warfare and other forms of group competition, the book provides a compelling and novel account of human cooperation.


Author(s):  
Andrew M. Yuengert

Although most economists are skeptical of or puzzled by the Catholic concept of the common good, a rejection of the economic approach as inimical to the common good would be hasty and counterproductive. Economic analysis can enrich the common good tradition in four ways. First, economics embodies a deep respect for economic agency and for the effects of policy and institutions on individual agents. Second, economics offers a rich literature on the nature of unplanned order and how it might be shaped by policy. Third, economics offers insight into the public and private provision of various kinds of goods (private, public, common pool resources). Fourth, recent work on the development and logic of institutions and norms emphasizes sustainability rooted in the good of the individual.


Author(s):  
Jennifer Lackey

Groups are often said to bear responsibility for their actions, many of which have enormous moral, legal, and social significance. The Trump Administration, for instance, is said to be responsible for the U.S.’s inept and deceptive handling of COVID-19 and the harms that American citizens have suffered as a result. But are groups subject to normative assessment simply in virtue of their individual members being so, or are they somehow agents in their own right? Answering this question depends on understanding key concepts in the epistemology of groups, as we cannot hold the Trump Administration responsible without first determining what it believed, knew, and said. Deflationary theorists hold that group phenomena can be understood entirely in terms of individual members and their states. Inflationary theorists maintain that group phenomena are importantly over and above, or otherwise distinct from, individual members and their states. It is argued that neither approach is satisfactory. Groups are more than their members, but not because they have “minds of their own,” as the inflationists hold. Instead, this book shows how group phenomena—like belief, justification, and knowledge—depend on what the individual group members do or are capable of doing while being subject to group-level normative requirements. This framework, it is argued, allows for the correct distribution of responsibility across groups and their individual members.


Author(s):  
Pete Dale

Numerous claims have been made by a wide range of commentators that punk is somehow “a folk music” of some kind. Doubtless there are several continuities. Indeed, both tend to encourage amateur music-making, both often have affiliations with the Left, and both emerge at least partly from a collective/anti-competitive approach to music-making. However, there are also significant tensions between punk and folk as ideas/ideals and as applied in practice. Most obviously, punk makes claims to a “year zero” creativity (despite inevitably offering re-presentation of at least some existing elements in every instance), whereas folk music is supposed to carry forward a tradition (which, thankfully, is more recognized in recent decades as a subject-to-change “living tradition” than was the case in folk’s more purist periods). Politically, meanwhile, postwar folk has tended more toward a socialist and/or Marxist orientation, both in the US and UK, whereas punk has at least rhetorically claimed to be in favor of “anarchy” (in the UK, in particular). Collective creativity and competitive tendencies also differ between the two (perceived) genre areas. Although the folk scene’s “floor singer” tradition offers a dispersal of expressive opportunity comparable in some ways to the “anyone can do it” idea that gets associated with punk, the creative expectation of the individual within the group differs between the two. Punk has some similarities to folk, then, but there are tensions, too, and these are well worth examining if one is serious about testing out the common claim, in both folk and punk, that “anyone can do it.”


Author(s):  
Deborah Tollefsen

When a group or institution issues a declarative statement, what sort of speech act is this? Is it the assertion of a single individual (perhaps the group’s spokesperson or leader) or the assertion of all or most of the group members? Or is there a sense in which the group itself asserts that p? If assertion is a speech act, then who is the actor in the case of group assertion? These are the questions this chapter aims to address. Whether groups themselves can make assertions or whether a group of individuals can jointly assert that p depends, in part, on what sort of speech act assertion is. The literature on assertion has burgeoned over the past few years, and there is a great deal of debate regarding the nature of assertion. John MacFarlane has helpfully identified four theories of assertion. Following Sandy Goldberg, we can call these the attitudinal account, the constitutive rule account, the common-ground account, and the commitment account. I shall consider what group assertion might look like under each of these accounts and doing so will help us to examine some of the accounts of group assertion (often presented as theories of group testimony) on offer. I shall argue that, of the four accounts, the commitment account can best be extended to make sense of group assertion in all its various forms.


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