scholarly journals Sex Differences in In-Group Cooperation Vary Dynamically with Competitive Conditions and Outcomes

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 147470491201000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Drew H. Bailey ◽  
Benjamin Winegard ◽  
Jon Oxford ◽  
David C. Geary
Keyword(s):  
Young Adults ◽  
Sex Differences ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Previous Trial ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Male Bias ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Individual Condition

Men's but not women's investment in a public goods game varied dynamically with the presence or absence of a perceived out-group. Three hundred fifty-four (167 male) young adults participated in multiple iterations of a public goods game under intergroup and individual competition conditions. Participants received feedback about whether their investments in the group were sufficient to earn a bonus to be shared among all in-group members. Results for the first trial confirm previous research in which men's but not women's investments were higher when there was a competing out-group. We extended these findings by showing that men's investment in the in-group varied dynamically by condition depending on the outcome of the previous trial: In the group condition, men, but not women, decreased spending following a win (i.e., earning an in-group bonus). In the individual condition, men, but not women, increased spending following a win. We hypothesize that these patterns reflect a male bias to calibrate their level of in-group investment such that they sacrifice only what is necessary for their group to successfully compete against a rival group.

scholarly journals Hunger affects social decisions in a multi-round Public Goods Game but not a single-shot Ultimatum Game

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Fraser ◽  
Daniel Nettle
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Experimental Tests ◽  
Single Shot ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Social Decisions ◽  
Group Members

Objective. People have the intuition that hunger undermines social cooperation, but experimental tests of this have often produced null results. One possible explanation is that the experimental tasks used are not rich enough to capture the diverse pathways by which social cooperation can be sustained or break down in real life. We studied the effects of hunger on cooperation in two tasks of differential interaction richness. Methods. We manipulated hunger by asking participants to eat, or refrain from eating, breakfast. Participants in experiment 1 (n = 106) played a one-shot Ultimatum Game. Participants in experiment 2 (n = 264) played twenty rounds of a Public Goods Game in the same groups of four, ten rounds with the possibility of punishing other group members, and ten without. Results. In experiment 1, skipping breakfast had no significant effects on either amounts proposed or minimum acceptable offers. In experiment 2, there were multiple different significant effects of the manipulation. No-breakfast participants were more generous in the first round of the game without punishment, and in subsequent rounds, were more influenced by what other group members had done the round before. In the punishment game, no-breakfast participants were also less likely to punish their group-mates than breakfast participants. Consequently, the possibility of punishment was less effective in increasing group cooperation levels in no-breakfast groups. Conclusion. Replicating earlier findings, we found a null effect of hunger on cooperation in a one-shot Ultimatum Game. However, in our richer Public Goods Game, the dynamics of cooperation differed with hunger, in subtle ways not simply classifiable as hungry participants being ‘more’ or ‘less’ cooperative overall.

scholarly journals Cooperation and competition between pair and multi-player social games in spatial populations

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Szolnoki ◽  
Xiaojie Chen
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Pair Interaction ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Point Interactions ◽  
Social Games ◽  
The Public ◽  
Specific Parameter ◽  
Group Members

AbstractThe conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a battlefield. For instance some people like to be part of a larger group while other persons prefer to interact in a more personalized, individual way. Both attitudes can be formulated via appropriately chosen traditional games. In particular, the prisoner’s dilemma game is based on pair interaction while the public goods game represents multi-point interactions of group members. To reveal the possible advantage of a certain attitude we extend these models by allowing players not simply to change their strategies but also let them to vary their attitudes for a higher individual income. We show that both attitudes could be the winner at a specific parameter value. Interestingly, however, the subtle interplay between different states may result in a counterintuitive evolutionary outcome where the increase of the multiplication factor of public goods game drives the population to a fully defector state. We point out that the accompanying pattern formation can only be understood via the multipoint or multi-player interactions of different microscopic states where the vicinity of a particular state may influence the relation of two other competitors.

scholarly journals Parochial Versus Universal Cooperation: Introducing a Novel Economic Game of Within- and Between-Group Interaction

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hillie Aaldering ◽  
Robert Böhm
Keyword(s):  
Social Dominance ◽  
Social Dominance Orientation ◽  
Intergroup Conflict ◽  
Social Value Orientation ◽  
Group Interactions ◽  
Group Relations ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Natural Groups

Engaging in personally costly within-group cooperation benefits one’s in-group members but also impacts other groups by benefiting, neglecting, or harming out-group members, leading to a range of potential consequences for between-group relations (e.g., collaboration vs. competition). We introduce the Intergroup Parochial and Universal Cooperation (IPUC) game to investigate the prevalence of the individual preferences underlying these different expressions of within-group cooperation: universalism, weak parochialism, and strong parochialism. In two online experiments with natural groups, we show that the IPUC has value beyond existing economic games in measuring these preferences separately. In a third experiment conducted in the lab, we show how dispositional measures traditionally associated with within- and between-group cooperation, that is, social value orientation, social dominance orientation, honesty-humility, and empathic concern, predict different preferences. Thus, the IPUC provides a tool to better understand within- and between-group interactions and to test interventions to overcome intergroup conflict.

Ideology and social cognition

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-25
Author(s):  
Jordan Mansell
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Cognition ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Prosocial Behavior ◽  
Social Behaviors ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Cognitive Characteristics ◽  
The Social ◽  
Group Members

AbstractResearch links liberal and conservative ideological orientations with variation on psychological and cognitive characteristics that are important for perceptual processes and decision-making. This study investigates whether this variation can impact the social behaviors of liberals and conservatives. A sample of subjects (n = 1,245) participated in a modified public goods game in which an intragroup inequality was introduced to observe the effect on individuals’ tendency toward self-interested versus prosocial behavior. Overall, the contributions of neither liberal- nor conservative-oriented individuals were affected by conditions of a general intragroup inequality. However, in response to the knowledge that group members voted to redress the inequality, levels of contribution among liberals significantly increased in comparison to the control. This was not true for conservatives. The results provide evidence that differences in ideological orientation are associated with individual differences in social cognition.

THE COEVOLUTION OF GROUP SIZE AND LEADERSHIP: AN AGENT-BASED PUBLIC GOODS MODEL FOR PREHISPANIC PUEBLO SOCIETIES

2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (01n02) ◽  
pp. 1150007 ◽  
Author(s):  
TIMOTHY A. KOHLER ◽  
DENTON COCKBURN ◽  
PAUL L. HOOPER ◽  
R. KYLE BOCINSKY ◽  
ZIAD KOBTI
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Goodness Of Fit ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
The Public ◽  
Group Competition ◽  
Monitoring Group ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Pueblo Societies

We present an agent-based model for voluntaristic processes allowing the emergence of leadership in small-scale societies, parameterized to apply to Pueblo societies of the northern US Southwest between AD 600 and 1300. We embed an evolutionary public-goods game in a spatial simulation of household activities in which agents, representing households, decide where to farm, hunt, and locate their residences. Leaders, through their work in monitoring group members and punishing defectors, can increase the likelihood that group members will cooperate to achieve a favorable outcome in the public-goods game. We show that under certain conditions households prefer to work in a group with a leader who receives a share of the group's productivity, rather than to work in a group with no leader. Simulation produces outcomes that match reasonably well those known for a portion of Southwest Colorado between AD 600 and 900. We suggest that for later periods a model incorporating coercion, or inter-group competition, or both, and one in which tiered hierarchies of leadership can emerge, would increase the goodness-of-fit.

Effect of Word-List Consistency on the Correlation between Group Memory and Group Polarization

2013 ◽  
Vol 112 (2) ◽  
pp. 375-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshiko Arima
Keyword(s):  
Word List ◽  
Blood Type ◽  
Shared Knowledge ◽  
Group Polarization ◽  
Consistent Condition ◽  
Word Lists ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Individual Condition

Two studies investigated the effect of shared knowledge, manipulated using associated or randomly ordered word lists, on the correlation between group remembering and group polarization. Group polarization due to accumulation of information was expected only if it was consistent with shared knowledge among group members (the knowledge shared among group members before discussion). Consistency of information with shared knowledge was manipulated by lists of words that were ordered either randomly or in a manner consistent along with four stereotype categories. In Experiment 1, 159 college students answered a questionnaire about the common stereotype that blood type determines personality; half were given lists of words that were consistent with the stereotype (consistent condition) and the other half, randomly ordered word lists (inconsistent condition). After completion of the questionnaire, they were given, a surprise free-recall test including words from the lists that had appeared in the questionnaire; the test was administered in a group (group condition) or individual (individual condition) setting. The results indicated that stereotype-consistency of the word list reduced the groups' ability to detect incorrect answers compared with the individual condition. In Experiment 2 ( N = 132), the divergence of memory among group members was manipulated by altering the constitution of each group with regard to members' blood type. The results showed that the shift in the score representing belief in the blood-type stereotype correlated with the number of words recalled in the stereotype-consistent word-list condition.

scholarly journals Between-group competition and human cooperation

2008 ◽  
Vol 276 (1655) ◽  
pp. 355-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikael Puurtinen ◽  
Tapio Mappes
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Distinctive Feature ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Moral Emotions ◽  
Group Conflict ◽  
Widespread Occurrence ◽  
Organizational Hierarchy ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Group Competition ◽  
Group Members

A distinctive feature of human behaviour is the widespread occurrence of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Explaining the maintenance of costly within-group cooperation is a challenge because the incentive to free ride on the efforts of other group members is expected to lead to decay of cooperation. However, the costs of cooperation can be diminished or overcome when there is competition at a higher level of organizational hierarchy. Here we show that competition between groups resolves the paradigmatic ‘public goods’ social dilemma and increases within-group cooperation and overall productivity. Further, group competition intensifies the moral emotions of anger and guilt associated with violations of the cooperative norm. The results suggest an important role for group conflict in the evolution of human cooperation and moral emotions.

scholarly journals Self-reliance crowds out group cooperation and increases wealth inequality

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jörg Gross ◽  
Sonja Veistola ◽  
Carsten K. W. De Dreu ◽  
Eric Van Dijk
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Wealth Inequality ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Self Reliance ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Shared Problem

Abstract Humans establish public goods to provide for shared needs like safety or healthcare. Yet, public goods rely on cooperation which can break down because of free-riding incentives. Previous research extensively investigated how groups solve this free-rider problem but ignored another challenge to public goods provision. Namely, some individuals do not need public goods to solve the problems they share with others. We investigate how such self-reliance influences cooperation by confronting groups in a laboratory experiment with a safety problem that could be solved either cooperatively or individually. We show that self-reliance leads to a decline in cooperation. Moreover, asymmetries in self-reliance undermine social welfare and increase wealth inequality between group members. Less dependent group members often choose to solve the shared problem individually, while more dependent members frequently fail to solve the problem, leaving them increasingly poor. While self-reliance circumvents the free-rider problem, it complicates the governing of the commons.

scholarly journals Effects of experimental situation on group cooperation and individual performance: comparing laboratory and online experiments

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiroki Ozono ◽  
Daisuke Nakama
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Experimental Situation ◽  
Individual Performance ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Online Experiments ◽  
Creative Task ◽  
The Public ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
External Incentive

With the spread of online behavioral experiments, estimating the effects of experimental situations and populations is increasing in discussions of the generalizability of data. In this study, we examined how the experimental situations (laboratory/online) affected group cooperation and individual performances. The participants were Japanese university students, randomly assigned to laboratory or online experiments. For the group cooperation task, they were asked to perform the public goods game with or without punishment, but no effect of the experimental situation was found both for cooperative and punitive behaviors. For the individual tasks, participants were asked to perform a creative task and a dull task. We manipulated the presence or absence of an external incentive. As a result, there was no significant difference between the experimental situations with one exception: only in the laboratory situation was the performance of the difficult creative task lower in the presence of an external incentive. Furthermore, we conducted as an additional experiment using the same treatments for a general Japanese sample online. This general sample was less cooperative in the public goods game than the student sample, both with and without punishment. In addition, the presence of external incentives facilitated performance of the general sample only for the dull task. We discuss the similarities and differences with previous studies that examined the effects of experimental situations and populations, and the implications for remote work in the real world.

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