Numerically Varied S-R Mapping Disorder

1967 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 361-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Weber ◽  
William Love ◽  
Mymon Goldstein
Keyword(s):  
Discrimination Learning ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Learning Rate ◽  
Task Structure ◽  
Mapping Problem ◽  
Quadratic Component ◽  
Subjective Awareness ◽  
Numerical Variation ◽  
Post Hoc ◽  
The Way

Qualitative support for the effects on learning of various degrees of S-R mapping disorder was cited to show that the way stimulus and response classes are connected or mapped together may have a strong effect on learning rate. Then to study quantitatively the S-R mapping problem a paradigm based on discrimination learning procedures was constructed. It made possible the numerical variation of S-R mapping on an order-disorder basis. The order-disorder dimension was related a priori to a linear variable for number of different correct choices and to a quadratic variable for conditional mapping uncertainty, U.(R). Mean errors were significantly related to only the quadratic component. Other results include: a closer relation between U.(R) and SDs than between U.(R) and means; unique patterns of errors within groups related to mapping structure; and a correspondence between post-experimental subjective awareness and both task structure and difficulty. Finally, among post hoc explanations of mapping effects one phrased in terms of mapping uncertainty and hypothesis storage, sampling, and generation gave the best account of obtained results.

scholarly journals When Does HARKing Hurt? Identifying When Different Types of Undisclosed Post Hoc Hypothesizing Harm Scientific Progress

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 308-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Rubin
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Literature Search ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Research Report ◽  
Research Results ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Replication Crisis ◽  
Post Hoc

Hypothesizing after the results are known, or HARKing, occurs when researchers check their research results and then add or remove hypotheses on the basis of those results without acknowledging this process in their research report ( Kerr, 1998 ). In the present article, I discuss 3 forms of HARKing: (a) using current results to construct post hoc hypotheses that are then reported as if they were a priori hypotheses; (b) retrieving hypotheses from a post hoc literature search and reporting them as a priori hypotheses; and (c) failing to report a priori hypotheses that are unsupported by the current results. These 3 types of HARKing are often characterized as being bad for science and a potential cause of the current replication crisis. In the present article, I use insights from the philosophy of science to present a more nuanced view. Specifically, I identify the conditions under which each of these 3 types of HARKing is most and least likely to be bad for science. I conclude with a brief discussion about the ethics of each type of HARKing.

Phenomenal Explanationism’s Global Ambitions

2021 ◽  
pp. 115-136
Author(s):  
Kevin McCain ◽  
Luca Moretti
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Perceptual Justification ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Comprehensive Account ◽  
Multiple Domains ◽  
The Way

This chapter further elucidates PE by explaining how it applies to multiple domains. Though the preceding chapter already touches upon some of these, here it is cashed out how PE can account for perceptual justification, memorial justification, testimonial justification, introspective justification, and a priori justification. Exploring the contours of PE in this way reveals just how powerful and unified the theory is. Along the way, it is argued that Declan Smithies’ forceful objections to PC fail to impugn PE. Additionally, it is shown that PE has the resources to respond to each of the challenges that Smithies claims are faced by any internalist theory with “global ambitions”––any theory that purports to be a comprehensive account of epistemic justification. (These challenges for instance include the problem of forgotten evidence and the problem of stored beliefs.) The discussion in this chapter makes it clear that PE is a comprehensive account of epistemic justification that achieves its global ambitions.

Boghossian on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori Once Again1

2020 ◽  
pp. 227-239
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian ◽  
Timothy Williamson
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Justification ◽  
Learning Mathematics ◽  
The Way

This chapter replies to Boghossian’s Chapter 15 and amplifies the arguments of the author’s Chapter 14. In particular, it illustrates the loss of underived dispositions with an example from learning mathematics, when the novice gradually ceases to be tempted by a certain kind of mistake. It is also explains why the argument of Chapter 14 does not assume that introspection and postulation are mutually incompatible; rather, it notes the author’s inability to introspect the non-doxastic intellectual seemings Boghossian postulates and suggests that it is not idiosyncratic. Finally, a challenge is raised for Boghossian’s view of a priori justification as coherence with intellectual seemings. What prevents bigoted beliefs being justified a priori in the way he describes by the bigoted intellectual seemings of a consistent Nazi, for example? If nothing does, what prevents the Nazi’s so-justified beliefs as to what one ought to do from justifying the corresponding actions?

Moral epistemology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Wedgwood
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Factual Proposition ◽  
The Way

Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. So moral epistemology is the study of what would be involved in knowing, or being justified in believing, moral propositions. Some discussions of moral epistemology interpret the category of ‘moral propositions’ broadly, to encompass all propositions that can be expressed with terms like ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or ‘ought’. Other discussions have focused on a narrower category of moral propositions – such as propositions about what rights people have, or about what we owe to each other. According to so-called noncognitivists, one cannot strictly speaking know (or be justified in believing) a moral proposition in the same sense in which one can know (or be justified in believing) an ordinary factual proposition. Other philosophers defend a cognitivist position, according to which it is possible to know or be justified in believing moral propositions in the very same sense as factual propositions. If one does know any moral propositions, they must presumably be true; and the way in which one knows those moral truths must provide access to them. This has led to a debate about whether one could ever know moral truths if a realist conception of these truths – according to which moral truths are not in any interesting sense of our making – were correct. Many philosophers agree that one way of obtaining justified moral beliefs involves seeking ‘reflective equilibrium’ – that is, roughly, considering theories, and adjusting one’s judgments to make them as systematic and coherent as possible. According to some philosophers, however, seeking reflective equilibrium is not enough: justified moral beliefs need to be supported by moral ‘intuitions’. Some hold that such moral intuitions are a priori, akin to our intuitions of the self-evident truths of mathematics. Others hold that these intuitions are closely related to emotions or sentiments; some theorists claim that empirical studies of moral psychology strongly support this ‘sentimentalist’ interpretation. Finally, moral thinking seems different from other areas of thought in two respects. First, there is particularly widespread disagreement about moral questions; and one rarely responds to such moral disagreement by retreating to a state of uncertainty as one does on other questions. Secondly, one rarely defers to other people’s moral judgments in the way in which one defers to experts about ordinary factual questions. These two puzzling features of moral thinking seem to demand explanation – which is a further problem that moral epistemology has to solve.

Using Planned Comparisons in Management Research: A Case for the Bonferroni Procedure

1993 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 707-724 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria B. Castaiieda ◽  
Joel R. Levin ◽  
Randall B. Dunham
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Measures ◽  
Multivariate Analyses ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Comparison Method ◽  
Multiple Comparison ◽  
Management Research ◽  
Bonferroni Procedure ◽  
Sequential Hypothesis ◽  
Sequential Hypothesis Testing ◽  
Post Hoc

This article describes the Bonferroni multiple-comparison procedure, and makes a case for researchers’ more frequent and appropriate use of it. The procedure is discussed as a test that facilitates investigation of precise and powerful a priori multiple comparisons. Characteristics of the Bonferroni procedure are described in relation to the more familiar Scheffe post hoc multiple-comparison method, and a step-by-step guide for comparing and choosing between the two is provided. The Bonferroni procedure is discussed in detail in the context of one-factor analysis-of-variance designs. Application of the technique is then considered in the context of factorial designs, analyses of covariance, univariate repeated-measures analyses, multivariate analyses of variance, and recent sequential hypothesis-testing extensions. To aid the presentation, an example from the field of management is included.

scholarly journals Total Energy and Macronutrient Intakes in Masters Athletes

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (Supplement_2) ◽  
pp. 1296-1296
Author(s):  
Quentin Nichols ◽  
Rohit Ramadoss ◽  
Stella Volpe
Keyword(s):  
Total Energy ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Cross Sectional Study ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Significance Level ◽  
Funding Sources ◽  
Masters Athletes ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Study Participants ◽  
Post Hoc

Abstract Objectives Athletes subscribe to different energy and macronutrient intakes based on the needs of the sport. The aim of our study was to evaluate total energy and macronutrient intakes between different types of Masters athletes. Methods Female and male Masters athletes participated in this cross-sectional study. Dietary consumption data were measured using Block's 2005 Food Frequency Questionnaire. A one-way analysis of variance was used to compare total energy, protein, carbohydrate, and fat (in grams [g]) intakes among the athletes. When significant differences were found, a Fisher's LSD post hoc test was performed to identify specific group differences. The significance level was set a priori at P < 0.05. Results A total of 330 athletes (182 women and 148 men) were included in the study. Participants were 36.55 ± 11.2 years of age. The athlete population consisted of general athletes (n = 81), runners (n = 116), triathletes (n = 53), rowers (n = 46), and CrossFit athletes (n = 34). Runners (1941.35 ± 697.25 kilocolaries [kcal]), triathletes (2031.65 ± 912.02 kcal), and rowers (2004.15 ± 978.42 kcal) all had significantly greater total energy intakes compared to CrossFit athletes (1538.80 ± 491.74 kcal) (P < 0.05). Runners (226.21 ± 89.67 g) and triathletes (235.43 ± 134.29 g) had significantly greater carbohydrate intakes compared to CrossFit athletes (162.93 ± 66.99 g) (P < 0.05). Rowers (83.31 ± 44.74 g) had a significantly greater protein intake compared to CrossFit athletes (64.77 ± 21.32 g) (P = 0.027). Rowers (87.35 ± 45.91 g) had a significantly greater fat intake compared to CrossFit athletes (68.86 ± 25.10 g) (P = 0.041). Conclusions Based on our data, runners, triathletes, and rowers all had greater total energy intake compared to CrossFit athletes. Rowers also consumed significantly more protein and fat than CrossFit athletes. Rowers may consume more protein and fat due to the combination of endurance and strength needed to meet the demands of the sport. Further research is needed to continue evaluating total energy and macronutrient intakes between different types of Masters athletes. Funding Sources This project was unfunded.

scholarly journals Incorporating Prior Knowledge into Regularized Regression

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chubing Zeng ◽  
Duncan Campbell Thomas ◽  
Juan Pablo Lewinger
Keyword(s):  
Gene Expression ◽  
Empirical Bayes ◽  
Marginal Likelihood ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Penalized Regression ◽  
Prediction Performance ◽  
Parameters Estimation ◽  
Bayes Estimation ◽  
Lasso Regression ◽  
Post Hoc

AbstractMotivationAssociated with genomic features like gene expression, methylation, and genotypes, used in statistical modeling of health outcomes, there is a rich set of meta-features like functional annotations, pathway information, and knowledge from previous studies, that can be used post-hoc to facilitate the interpretation of a model. However, using this meta-feature information a-priori rather than post-hoc can yield improved prediction performance as well as enhanced model interpretation.ResultsWe propose a new penalized regression approach that allows a-priori integration of external meta-features. The method extends LASSO regression by incorporating individualized penalty parameters for each regression coefficient. The penalty parameters are in turn modeled as a log-linear function of the meta-features and are estimated from the data using an approximate empirical Bayes approach. Optimization of the marginal likelihood on which the empirical Bayes estimation is based is performed using a fast and stable majorization-minimization procedure. Through simulations, we show that the proposed regression with individualized penalties can outperform the standard LASSO in terms of both parameters estimation and prediction performance when the external data is informative. We further demonstrate our approach with applications to gene expression studies of bone density and breast cancer.Availability and implementationThe methods have been implemented in the R package xtune freely available for download from CRAN.

scholarly journals Hume's Correlationism: On Meillassoux, Necessity and Belief

2013 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 132-160
Author(s):  
Paul O'Mahoney
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Weak Form ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Sufficient Criterion ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Final Causes ◽  
The Way ◽  
Priori Knowledge

The article argues that Meillassoux's 'After Finitude' underestimates the nature and profundity of Hume's sceptical challenge; it neglects the fact that Hume's scepticism concerns final causes (and agrees fundamentally with Bacon and Descartes in this respect), and that in Hume even the operations of reason do not furnish entirely a priori knowledge. We contend that Hume himself institutes a form of correlationism (which in part showed Kant the way to counter the sceptical challenge via transcendental idealism), and sought not merely to abolish the 'principle of sufficient reason' but to salvage it in a weak form, in turning his attention to the grounds for our beliefs in necessity. We argue further that the 'mathematizability' of properties is not a sufficient criterion to yield realist, non-correlational knowledge, or to demonstrate the 'irremediable realism' of the 'ancestral' statement. Finally, we contend that Meillassoux himself relies on a certain 'Kantian moment' which exempts the reasoning subject from otherwise 'omnipotent' chaos, and that ultimately the 'speculative materialist' position remains exposed to the original Humean sceptical challenge. 

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