scholarly journals The Aim of Inquiry

Disputatio ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (61) ◽  
pp. 95-119
Author(s):  
Avery Archer
Keyword(s):  
Complete Answer ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Epistemic Standing

Abstract I defend the thesis that the constitutive aim of inquiring into some question, Q, is improving one’s epistemic standing with respect to Q. Call this the epistemic-improvement view. I consider and ultimately reject two alternative accounts of the constitutive aim of inquiry—namely, the thesis that inquiry aims at knowledge and the thesis that inquiry aims at (justified) belief—and I use my criticisms as a foil for clarifying and motivating the epistemic-improvement view. I also consider and reject a pair of normative theses about when inquiry goes awry or is inappropriate. The first is the normative thesis defended by Dennis Whitcomb who claims that inquiry goes awry if it culminates in a belief that falls short of knowledge and that one should not inquire into Q if one already knows the answer to Q. The second is the normative thesis defended by Jane Friedman who claims that one should not inquire into Q if one already believes some complete answer to Q.

Justificación, educación y libertad

2018 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 79-89
Author(s):  
Mónica Gómez Salazar
Keyword(s):  
Young People ◽  
Social Practices ◽  
Democratic Society ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Epistemological Pluralism ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

This paper argues the thesis that education should be understood as a guide that directs the young people towards reflexive and imaginative social practices that allow them to formulate new and varied hypotheses as well as alternative justifications. Based on Dewey, we will expose that a goal such as this is only applicable to members of a democratic society. Next, we present some features of onto-epistemological pluralism in relation to freedom and responsibility. It is concluded that there is no justification that is closer to truth or reality. The relevance of a justified belief with good reasons lies in its practical consequences for specific conditions of existence.

Evidence and Its Limits

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clayton Littlejohn
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Evidential Support ◽  
Way Of Thinking

On a standard way of thinking about the relationships between evidence, reasons, and epistemic justification, a subject’s evidence consists of her potential reasons for her beliefs, these reasons constitute the normative reasons that bear on whether to believe, and justification is taken to result from relations between a subject’s potential reasons for her beliefs and those beliefs. This chapter argues that this view makes a number of mistakes about the rational roles of reasons and evidence and explores some parallels between practical and theoretical reasons. Just as justified action is unobjectionable action, justified belief is unobjectionable belief. Just as you cannot object to someone deciding to do something simply on the grounds that their reasons for acting didn’t give them strong reason to act, you cannot object to someone believing something simply on the grounds that they didn’t believe for reasons that gave their beliefs strong evidential support.

scholarly journals Toughness, Forbidden Subgraphs and Pancyclicity

2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 839-866
Author(s):  
Wei Zheng ◽  
Hajo Broersma ◽  
Ligong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Recent Article ◽  
Forbidden Subgraph ◽  
Forbidden Subgraphs ◽  
Free Graph ◽  
Induced Subgraph ◽  
Complete Answer ◽  
Open Case

AbstractMotivated by several conjectures due to Nikoghosyan, in a recent article due to Li et al., the aim was to characterize all possible graphs H such that every 1-tough H-free graph is hamiltonian. The almost complete answer was given there by the conclusion that every proper induced subgraph H of $$K_1\cup P_4$$ K 1 ∪ P 4 can act as a forbidden subgraph to ensure that every 1-tough H-free graph is hamiltonian, and that there is no other forbidden subgraph with this property, except possibly for the graph $$K_1\cup P_4$$ K 1 ∪ P 4 itself. The hamiltonicity of 1-tough $$K_1\cup P_4$$ K 1 ∪ P 4 -free graphs, as conjectured by Nikoghosyan, was left there as an open case. In this paper, we consider the stronger property of pancyclicity under the same condition. We find that the results are completely analogous to the hamiltonian case: every graph H such that any 1-tough H-free graph is hamiltonian also ensures that every 1-tough H-free graph is pancyclic, except for a few specific classes of graphs. Moreover, there is no other forbidden subgraph having this property. With respect to the open case for hamiltonicity of 1-tough $$K_1\cup P_4$$ K 1 ∪ P 4 -free graphs we give infinite families of graphs that are not pancyclic.

Personal Information as Symmetry Breaker in Disagreements

Philosophy ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Diego E. Machuca
Keyword(s):  
Personal Information ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
First Order ◽  
Natural Reaction ◽  
Epistemic Standing

Abstract When involved in a disagreement, a common reaction is to tell oneself that, given that the information about one's own epistemic standing is clearly superior in both amount and quality to the information about one's opponent's epistemic standing, one is justified in one's confidence that one's view is correct. In line with this natural reaction to disagreement, some contributors to the debate on its epistemic significance have claimed that one can stick to one's guns by relying in part on information about one's first-order evidence and the functioning of one's cognitive capacities. In this article, I argue that such a manoeuvre to settle controversies encounters the problem that both disputants can make use of it, the problem that one may be wrong about one's current conscious experience, and the problem that it is a live possibility that many of one's beliefs are the product of epistemically distorting factors. I also argue that, even if we grant that personal information is reliable, when it comes to real-life rather than idealized disagreements, the extent of the unpossessed information about one's opponent's epistemic standing provides a reason for doubting that personal information can function as a symmetry breaker.

scholarly journals JUSTIFIED BELIEF IN A DIGITAL AGE: ON THE EPISTEMIC IMPLICATIONS OF SECRET INTERNET TECHNOLOGIES

Episteme ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boaz Miller ◽  
Isaac Record
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Search Engines ◽  
Digital Age ◽  
Epistemic Responsibility ◽  
Modes Of Operation ◽  
Internet Technologies ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
Justificatory Status

AbstractPeople increasingly form beliefs based on information gained from automatically filtered internet sources such as search engines. However, the workings of such sources are often opaque, preventing subjects from knowing whether the information provided is biased or incomplete. Users' reliance on internet technologies whose modes of operation are concealed from them raises serious concerns about the justificatory status of the beliefs they end up forming. Yet it is unclear how to address these concerns within standard theories of knowledge and justification. To shed light on the problem, we introduce a novel conceptual framework that clarifies the relations between justified belief, epistemic responsibility, action and the technological resources available to a subject. We argue that justified belief is subject to certain epistemic responsibilities that accompany the subject's particular decision-taking circumstances, and that one typical responsibility is to ascertain, so far as one can, whether the information upon which the judgment will rest is biased or incomplete. What this responsibility comprises is partly determined by the inquiry-enabling technologies available to the subject. We argue that a subject's beliefs that are formed based on internet-filtered information are less justified than they would be if she either knew how filtering worked or relied on additional sources, and that the subject may have the epistemic responsibility to take measures to enhance the justificatory status of such beliefs.

Common Sense Propositions

Philosophy ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 48 (186) ◽  
pp. 363-379
Author(s):  
A. C. Ewing
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Physical Object ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Vast Number ◽  
Know How ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Right ◽  
Past Experiences

Philosophers have not been sceptical only about metaphysics or religious beliefs. There are a great number of other beliefs generally held which they have had at least as much difficulty in justifying, and in the present article I ask questions as to the right philosophical attitude to these beliefs in cases where to our everyday thought they seem so obvious as to be a matter of the most ordinary common sense. A vast number of propositions go beyond what is merely empirical and cannot be seen to be logically necessary but are still believed by everybody in their daily life. Into this class fall propositions about physical things, other human minds and even propositions about one's own past experiences based on memory, for we are not now ‘observing’ our past. The phenomenalist does not escape the difficulty about physical things, for he reduces physical object propositions, in so far as true, not merely to propositions about his own actual experience but to propositions about the experiences of other human beings in general under certain conditions, and he cannot either observe or logically prove what the experiences of other people are or what even his own would be under conditions which have not yet been fulfilled. What is the philosopher to say about such propositions? Even Moore, who insisted so strongly that we knew them, admitted that we did not know how we knew them. The claim which a religious man makes to a justified belief that is neither a matter of purely empirical perception nor formally provable is indeed by no means peculiar to the religious. It is made de facto by everybody in his senses, whether or not he realizes that he is doing so. There is indeed a difference: while everyone believes in the existence of other human beings and in the possibility of making some probable predictions about the future from the past, not everybody holds religious beliefs, and although this does not necessarily invalidate the claim it obviously weakens it.

Normative Principles are Synthetic A Priori

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-383
Author(s):  
Paul Boghossian
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
Open Question Argument ◽  
Moral Domains ◽  
And Mathematics ◽  
Open Question

AbstractI argue for the claim that there are instances of a priori justified belief – in particular, justified belief in moral principles – that are not analytic, i.e., that cannot be explained solely by the understanding we have of their propositions. §1–2 provides the background necessary for understanding this claim: in particular, it distinguishes between two ways a proposition can be analytic, Basis and Constitutive, and provides the general form of a moral principle. §§3–5 consider whether Hume's Law, properly interpreted, can be established by Moore's Open Question Argument, and concludes that it cannot: while Moore's argument – appropriately modified – is effective against the idea that moral judgments are either (i) reductively analyzable or (ii) Constitutive-analytic, a different argument is needed to show that they are not (iii) Basis-analytic. Such an argument is supplied in §6. §§7–8 conclude by considering how these considerations bear on recent discussions of “alternative normative concepts”, on the epistemology of intuitions, and on the differences between disagreement in moral domains and in other a priori domains such as logic and mathematics.

Two open problems in the fixed point theory of contractive type mappings on quasimetric spaces

2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-180
Author(s):  
MITROFAN M. CHOBAN ◽  
◽  
VASILE BERINDE ◽  
◽  
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Point ◽  
Metric Spaces ◽  
Fixed Point Theory ◽  
Point Theory ◽  
Partial Answer ◽  
Open Problems ◽  
Complete Answer ◽  
Contractive Type ◽  
Generalized Distances

Two open problems in the fixed point theory of quasi metric spaces posed in [Berinde, V. and Choban, M. M., Generalized distances and their associate metrics. Impact on fixed point theory, Creat. Math. Inform., 22 (2013), No. 1, 23–32] are considered. We give a complete answer to the first problem, a partial answer to the second one, and also illustrate the complexity and relevance of these problems by means of four very interesting and comprehensive examples.

Virtue Epistemology as Anti-luck Epistemology

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 77-94
Author(s):  
Alexey Z. Chernyak ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Propositional Knowledge ◽  
General Study ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
Mental Attitude ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
The Status ◽  
Veritic Luck ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology

The idea that knowledge as an individual mental attitude with certain propositional content is not only true justified belief but a belief the truth of which does not result from any kind of luck, is widely spread in contemporary epistemology. This account is known as anti-luck epistemology. A very popular explanation of the inconsistency of that concept of knowledge with the luck-dependent nature of truth (so called veritic luck taking place when a subject’s belief could not be true if not by mere coincidence) presumes that the status of propositional knowledge crucially depends on the qualities of actions that result in the corresponding belief, or processes backing them, which reflect the socalled intellectual virtues mainly responsible for subject’s relevant competences. This account known as Virtue Epistemology presumes that if a belief is true exclusively or mainly due to its dependence on intellectual virtues, it just cannot be true by luck, hence no place for lucky knowledge. But this thesis is hard to prove given the existence of true virtuous beliefs which could nevertheless be false if not for some lucky (for the knower) accident. This led to an appearance of virtue epistemological theories aimed specifically at an assimilation of such cases. Their authors try to represent the relevant situations as such where the contribution of luck is not crucial whereas the contribution of virtues is crucial. This article provides a critical analysis of the corresponding arguments as part of a more general study of the ability of Virtue Epistemology to provide justification for the thesis of incompatibility of propositional knowledge with veritic luck. It is shown that there are good reasons to doubt that Virtue Epistemology can do this.

On the logic of incomplete answers

1965 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. J. Cresswell
Keyword(s):  
Formal Analysis ◽  
Complete List ◽  
Strict Implication ◽  
Complete Answer ◽  
Questions And Answers ◽  
Image Position

I have argued in [1] that a concept bearing some resemblance to ‘p is the answer to d’ (p a proposition and d a question) can be defined wherever d has the form,‘For which a's is it the case that A (a)?’ (Qa)A(a)where a is a variable and A a wff containing a. To say that p is the true and complete answer to (Qa)A(a) is expressed as saying that p is logically equivalent to the true conjunction of A(a) or ~A(a) for each a. It is defined as;Such a concept of answer is like Belnap's [2] direct true answer to a complete list question, or like Harrah's use [3] (p. 43) of the notion of a state description. The main difference between my approach and that of Belnap and Harrah is that while they are concerned to develop a formal metalanguage for discussion of questions and answers I am concerned to express, as far as possible in existing systems, certain interrogative statements; in particular statements of the form ‘— is the (an) answer to —’.While the account in [1] does give a formal analysis of one ‘answer’ concept there are respects in which it is inadequate.1. Since it uses entailment (or strict implication) to define the relation between p the answer and d the question we can shew that if p is the answer to d and q is logically equivalent to p then q is the answer to d.

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