Pozycja ustrojowa Rady Ministrów w partyjnych projektach… Konstytucji Czwartej Rzeczypospolitej z lat 2004–2013

Author(s):  
Marian Kallas

The article begins with a succinct characteristic of the political position of the Council of Ministers as determined by the Constitution of the Republic of Poland dated 2 April 1997. The next portion of the text discusses the constitutional program of the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość [PiS, Eng. Law and Justice] party in 2003. It is an introduction to presenting the suggested political position of the government in non-parliamentary party projects of the Constitution in the years 2004–2013 (five texts publically available). Particular attention was devoted to PiS drafts of the Basic Law of 2005 and 2010 as coming from the ruling party in the years 2005–2007 and again since 2015.

2020 ◽  
pp. 14-29
Author(s):  
Lyubov Prokopenko

The article considers the political aspect of land reform in the Republic of Zimbabwe. The problem of land reform has been one of the crucial ones in the history of this African country, which celebrated 40 years of independence on April 18, 2020. In recent decades, it has been constantly in the spotlight of political and electoral processes. The land issue was one of the key points of the political program from the very beginning of Robert Mugabe’s reign in 1980. The political aspect of land reform began to manifest itself clearly with the growth of the opposition movement in the late 1990s. In 2000–2002 the country implemented the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP), the essence of which was the compulsory acquisition of land from white owners without compensation. The expropriation of white farmers’ lands in the 2000s led to a serious reconfiguration of land ownership, which helped to maintain in power the ruling party, the African National Union of Zimbabwe – Patriotic Front (ZANU – PF). The government was carrying out its land reform in the context of a sharp confrontation with the opposition, especially with the Party for the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), led by trade union leader Morgan Tsvangirai. The land issue was on the agenda of all the election campaigns (including the elections in July 2018); this fact denotes its politicization, hence the timeliness of this article. The economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe in the 2000–2010s was the most noticeable phenomenon in the South African region. The analysis of foreign and domestic sources allows us to conclude that the accelerated land reform served as one of its main triggers. The practical steps of the new Zimbabwean president, Mr. Emmerson Mnangagwa, indicate that he is aware of the importance of resolving land reform-related issues for further economic recovery. At the beginning of March 2020, the government adopted new regulations defining the conditions for compensation to farmers. On April 18, 2020, speaking on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the independence of Zimbabwe, Mr. E. Mnangagwa stated that the land reform program remains the cornerstone of the country’s independence and sovereignty.


1974 ◽  
Vol 64 ◽  
pp. 62-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. W. Lintott

The battle of Bovillae on 18th January, 52 B.C., which led to Clodius' death, was literally treated by Cicero in a letter to Atticus as the beginning of a new era—he dated the letter by it, although over a year had elapsed. It is difficult to exaggerate the relief it afforded him from fear and humiliation for a few precious years before civil war put him once more in jeopardy. At one stroke Cicero lost his chief inimicus and the Republic lost a hostis and pestis. Moreover, the turmoil led to a political realignment for which Cicero had been striving for the last ten years—a reconciliation between the boni and Pompey, as a result of which Pompey was commissioned to put the state to rights. Cicero's behaviour in this context, especially his return to the centre of the political scene, is, one would have thought, of capital importance to the biographer of Cicero. Yet two recent English biographies have but briefly touched on the topic. It is true that, in the background of Cicero's personal drama, Caesar and Pompey were taking up positions which, as events turned out, would lead to the collapse of the Republic. However, Cicero and Milo were not to know this, nor were their opponents; friendly cooperation between the two super-politicians apparently was continuing. Politicians on all sides were still aiming to secure power and honour through the traditional Republican magistracies, and in this pursuit were prepared to use the odd mixture of violence, bribery and insistence on the strict letter of the constitution, which was becoming a popular recipe. In retrospect their obsession with the customary organs of power has a certain irony. Yet it is a testimony to the political atmosphere then. Their manoeuvres are also important because both the instability caused by the violence of Clodius and Milo, and the eventual confidence in the rule of law established under Pompey's protection, helped to determine the political position of the boni associated with Pompey in 49 B.C. Cicero's relationship with Milo is at first sight one of the more puzzling aspects of his career. What had they in common, except that Milo, like most late Republican politicians, was at one time associated with Pompey? Properly interpreted, however, this relationship may not only illuminate Cicero's own attitudes but illustrate the character of the last years of Republican politics.


Author(s):  
Y. S. Kudryashova

During the government of AK Party army leaders underprivileged to act as an exclusive guarantor preserving a secular regime in the country. The political balance between Secular and Islamite elites was essentially removed after Erdogan was elected Turkish President. Consistently toughening authoritarian regime of a ruling party deeply accounts for a military coup attempt and earlier periodically occurred disturbance especially among the young. The methods of a coup showed the profundity of a split and the lack of cohesion in Turkish armed forces. Erdogan made the best use of a coup attempt’s opportunities to concentrate all power in his hands and to consolidate a present regime. The mass support of the population during a coup attempt ensured opportunities for a fundamental reorganization of a political system. Revamped Constitution at most increases political powers of the President.


Author(s):  
Wojciech Sadurski

After transforming the Constitutional Tribunal (CT) into an active ally of the government, the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)) party in Poland embarked upon the comprehensive subjection of the entire judicial system to the executive, and in particular to the president of the Republic and the minister of justice/prosecutor general (MJ/PG). This chapter discusses how, for this purpose, the National Council of Judiciary (Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (KRS)) was packed with the party faithful thanks to a changed system for selecting members of the KRS (they are now directly elected by Parliament, rather than by judges). It also deals with how the effect of the new law on the Supreme Court was a brand new court composition with a pro-PiS majority: this was created by combining early retirement for incumbent judges and increasing the number of seats on the Court. The chief justice’s constitutionally guaranteed term of office has been extinguished. It also looks at another statute, on the common courts, that has strengthened the power of the MJ to control court presidents, and hold judges accountable for their verdicts through a new disciplinary procedure. Finally, the chapter looks at how the prosecutorial system (prokuratura) was merged with that of the MJ, with the MJ becoming the ex officio PG, producing a deeply politicized system of public prosecution.


2013 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
András Jakab ◽  
Pál Sonnevend

Hungarian constitutional law – New Basic Law – Continuity with the previous democratic Constitution – Vision of the political community embedded in the new Basic Law – The level of protection of fundamental rights – Continuity and lack of foreseeability in the organisation of the state – European legal procedures against or about Hungary – The life prospects of the new Basic Law – Danger of constitutional crisis whenever the government does not hold a constitution-amending majority


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Badran

AbstractTo maintain political stability and to preserve the plurality and the diversity that characterise its societies, consociational democracies require, more than other states, a grand coalition government. In this type of democracy, the grand coalition is not a model that is used in exceptional cases, as in majoritarian democracies. It is a deliberate and permanent political choice. In Lebanon, following the modifications implemented by the 1989 Ṭā’if Accord, the Constitution instituted a collegial power-sharing within the executive that implies the establishment of a grand coalition which enables the political participation of the main Lebanese religious confessions in the government. On the other hand, the formation of the Lebanese Council of ministers since the spring of 2005 has become increasingly difficult and coalitions are often less stable than in the past. These laborious negotiations for unstable governmental coalitions are especially problematic in what may be called the perversion of the constitutional procedure by leaders of the parliamentary blocs.


Author(s):  
J. Monballyu

AbstractIn Belgium, the Royal Prerogative of pardoning convicted criminals was legally embedded in the Constitution of 14th February, 1831. It allowed the King to reduce a sentence or to grant a discharge of a sentence given by a court. Any Royal decision to pardon had, however, to be countersigned by a member of the Government, who took on the political responsibility of the decision towards Parliament. In most cases, the task fell upon the Minister of Justice. During the 19th century, in both Houses of the Belgian Parliament, the Minister of Justice was repeatedly questioned about the way the prerogative of pardoning was exercised. This usually occurred when a death sentence had been commuted to a lesser sentence. In such cases, members of the Chamber of Representatives or of the Senate would ask for an explicit justification of a particular pardon. Only exceptionally would a Government Minister be challenged about the legality of a decision either granting or refusing a pardon. Because of the constitutional convention which prevents exposing directly the political position of the King, Jules d'Anethan (Minister of Justice 1843–1847) defended the Minister's right to refuse to give any reasons for a decision regarding a pardon. He only acknowledged Parliament's right to question a Minister about his general policy on pardons. In his view, it was not within Parliament's powers to ask a Minister of Justice why a pardon had been granted or refused in a specific case. That view tended to limit considerably a Minister's responsibility for Royal pardons: it became no more than an empty shell. Another Minister of Justice, Théophile De Lantsheere (1871–1878), took an opposite view. He refused to state his general policy on pardons, but he accepted to explain the specific reasons why a Royal decision granting or refusing a pardon had been made. In his view, a pardon was in the first place a matter for the Minister's conscience. Parliament was therefore entitled to assess his particular actions. However, in the line of his predecessors' and successors' view, he believed that the reasons why the King had insisted on a pardon or refused to grant a pardon should not be mentioned to Parliament. Pardon was an issue between King and Government, not between King and Parliament. As the saying goes in Belgian constitutional law: The Crown should never be laid 'bare'.


2021 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 223-252
Author(s):  
Milan Rapajić

One of the characteristics of the system of government in the Fifth French Republic is the strengthened position of the head of state, but also the existence of the first minister as a constitutional category with a significant role. The constitution provides the political responsibility of the government with the Prime Minister and ministers before parliament. Certain French writers have opinion that the Prime Minister appears as the central figure of the constitutional structure. The Prime Minister shall direct the actions of the Government. This is 21 of Constitution. Also, there are specific powers that put the Prime Minister in the position of its real head of government. Among the prime minister's most important powers is his right to elect members of the government. It is the right to propose to the President of the Republic the appointment but also the dismissal of members of the government. The Prime Minister is authorized to re-sign certain acts of the President of the Republic. In case of temporary impediment of the head of state, the Prime Minister chairs the councils and committees for national defense, as well as the Council of Ministers. The paper analyzes the constitutional provisions that lead to the conclusion that the position of the Prime Minister is institutionally constructed as strong. Political practice, with the exception of periods of cohabitation, has indicated that most prime ministers have been overshadowed by mostly powerful heads of state. For that reason, it is necessary to analyze the political practice of all eight presidential governments. A review of the already long political life that has lasted since 1958. points to the conclusion that in its longest period, presidents of the Republic dominated the public political scene. The Prime Minister has a more pronounced role in the executive branch during cohabitation periods. However, nine years in three cohabitations cannot change the central conclusion of this paper that the dominant political practice of the Fifth Republic has led to the Prime Minister being essentially in the shadow of the head of state.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-51
Author(s):  
M. Ya'kub Aiyub Kadir

This paper is a reflection of the peace agreement between the Free Aceh Movement and the Government of Indonesia from 2005 to 2018. There have been improvement after a decade but there are still challenges that must be realized. The Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (known as Helsinky peace agreement) on 15 August 2005 resulted a consensus that Aceh could have greater rights than before, as stipulated in the Law on Governing Aceh number 11/2006. Thus, Aceh has more authorities to redefine the political, economic, social and cultural status in the Republic of Indonesia system. This paper attempts to analyze this problem through a historical description of the movement of the Acehnese people, in the hope of contributing to increasing understanding of the concept of the Helsinki peace agreement in the context of sustainable peace and welfare improvement for the people of Aceh


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