scholarly journals Projecting the future of Canada's population: assumptions, implications, and policy

2003 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roderic Beaujot

After considering the assumptions for fertility, mortality and international migration, this paper looks at implications of the evolving demographics for population growth, labour force, retirement, and population distribution. With the help of policies favouring gender equity and supporting families of various types, fertility in Canada could avoid the particularly low levels seen in some countries, and remain at levels closer to 1.6 births per woman. The prognosis in terms of both risk factors and treatment suggests further reductions in mortality toward a life expectancy of 85. On immigration, there are political interests for levels as high as 270,000 per year, while levels of 150,000 correspond to the long term post-war average. The future will see slower population growth, and due to migration more than natural increase. International migration of some 225,000 per year can enable Canada to avoid population decline, and sustain the size of the labour force, but all scenarios show much change in the relative size of the retired compared to the labour force population. According to the ratio of persons aged 20-64 to that aged 65 and over, there were seven persons at labour force ages per person at retirement age in 1951, compared to five in 2001 and probably less than 2.5 in 2051. Growth that is due to migration more so than natural increase will accentuate the urbanization trend and the unevenness of the population distribution over space. Past projections have under-projected the mortality improvements and their impact on the relative size of the population at older age groups. Policies regarding fertility, mortality and migration could be aimed at avoiding population decline and reducing the effect of aging, but there is lack of an institutional basis for policy that would seek to endogenize population.

1986 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 155-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. K. Kezeiri

AbstractThis paper addresses itself to the study of population growth of the small towns in Libya. The Libyan small towns have grown rapidly and it is expected that the majority will continue to grow in the future. Their growth can be attributed to natural increase, internal migration, the influx of foreigners, all of which have been stimulated by the State.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katharine Emma Blair

A decrease in fertility over the last thirty years has led to projections for population growth decline and possible population decline in the near future. Although immigration has traditionally been seen as a source of growth for Canada, current demographic trends suggest a more comprehensive approach may be needed. A pronatalist policy may help offset the long term effects of population decline if used in tandem with increased immigration and increased support for arriving immigrants. In order to be successful such a policy would need to address both the direct and indirect barriers to fertility as experienced by women and families while encouraging increased labour force participation by women.


1997 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 294-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leon F. Bouvier ◽  
Dudley L. Poston ◽  
Nanbin Benjamin Zhai

Natural increase, and net international migration are the demographic processes that determine the amount of growth or decline in a nation's population. In a country such as the United States, the contribution of net international migration to overall population change overshadows the contribution of natural increase. It has long been the practice, however, when making population projections for countries, to consider the role of zero net international migration in an incorrect manner. Some analysts have assumed that if the same number of people leave and enter the country each year, then the effect of net international migration will be zero. This article examines that assumption and shows that it is fallacious. Examining the direct, indirect, total, and negative demographic impacts of zero net international migration through simulations with demographic data, we demonstrate that zero net international migration is not the same and therefore does not have the same demographic results and implications as zero international migration. We conclude that zero net international migration should not be confused with zero international migration. In discussions of international migration in either sending or receiving countries, the two concepts must be kept separate for they are not identical and, moreover, have decidedly different demographic implications and effects.


1998 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graeme Hugo

There has been an unprecedented increase in international population movement in the Asia-Pacific region in the last decade. The causes of this are complex and associated with the rapid economic and social change in the region, the forces of globalization, improvements in transport and communication and proliferation of migration networks. However, the present paper suggests that one element which needs to be considered in explaining contemporary international migration but especially in anticipating trends over the next decade are the differential patterns of growth of population within the region. While population growth overall has slowed, the work force age groups will continue to grow rapidly in Asia over the next decade or so and the contrasts between individual countries will increase. The proportion in the peak mobility age groups will thus continue to grow rapidly in particular countries and will be one of the elements contributing to increased levels of international migration within and out of the region.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katharine Emma Blair

A decrease in fertility over the last thirty years has led to projections for population growth decline and possible population decline in the near future. Although immigration has traditionally been seen as a source of growth for Canada, current demographic trends suggest a more comprehensive approach may be needed. A pronatalist policy may help offset the long term effects of population decline if used in tandem with increased immigration and increased support for arriving immigrants. In order to be successful such a policy would need to address both the direct and indirect barriers to fertility as experienced by women and families while encouraging increased labour force participation by women.


2006 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Ibbott ◽  
Don Kerr ◽  
Roderic Beaujot

ABSTRACTThe future of mandatory retirement is at least partly driven by changing demographics. In Canada, these demographics include slowing population growth, rapid aging, declining rates of labour force participation, and slowing labour force growth. After reviewing the demographic trends and considering alternate scenarios in labour force participation, we consider the determinants of early departures from the labour force and suggest scenarios that might reverse these trends. With a decline in labour force entrants, delays in early life transitions, and possible reductions in retirement benefits, a trend to retire later would bring mandatory retirement into question.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariateresa Ciommi ◽  
Gianluca Egidi ◽  
Rosanna Salvia ◽  
Sirio Cividino ◽  
Kostas Rontos ◽  
...  

Although Southern Europe is relatively homogeneous in terms of settlement characteristics and urban dynamics, spatial heterogeneity in its population distribution is still high, and differences across regions outline specific demographic patterns that require in-depth investigation. In such contexts, density-dependent mechanisms of population growth are a key factor regulating socio-demographic dynamics at various spatial levels. Results of a spatio-temporal analysis of the distribution of the resident population in Greece contributes to identifying latent (density-dependent) processes of metropolitan growth over a sufficiently long time interval (1961-2011). Identification of density-dependent patterns of population growth contributes to the analysis of socioeconomic factors underlying demographic divides, possibly distinguishing between the effects of population concentration and dispersion. Population growth rates were non-linearly correlated with population density, highlighting a positive (or negative) impact of urban concentration on demographic growth when population is lower (or higher) than a fixed threshold (2800 and 1300 inhabitants/km2 in 1961 and 2011, respectively). In a context of low population density (less than 20 inhabitants/km2), the relationship between density and growth was again negative, contrasting with the positive and linear relationship observed in denser contexts. This result evidences a sort of ‘depopulation’ trap that leads to accelerated population decline under a defined density threshold. An improved understanding of density-dependent mechanisms of population growth and decline contributes to rethinking strategies of sustainable development and social policies more adapted to heterogeneous regional contexts.


2000 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-458 ◽  
Author(s):  
SHANE DOYLE

RAPID population growth is commonly depicted as one of the greatest problems facing modern Africa. For decades, the tendency of birth rates to exceed mortality rates has prompted predictions of land shortage, resource depletion and mass starvation. Underlying causes of high fertility are hypothesized to have been an unusually high demand for human agricultural labour, ‘traditional religious pronatalism’ and a ‘horror of barrenness’, while in some areas the later colonial period saw a shortening of the durations of post-partum sexual abstinence and lactation. Mortality decline from the 1920s is commonly linked to the establishment of cash crop economies, networks of roads and railways, and the diffusion of western medicine, maternity facilities, missionary activity and primary education. Yet the empirical evidence supporting this model of population growth is contradictory. Areas such as Buhaya, Buganda and Bunyoro should have experienced rapid demographic expansion by natural increase in the colonial period according to dominant theories but instead experts in the early decades of this century feared the extinction of the Haya, Ganda and Nyoro. This paper will attempt to explain why population decline among the Nyoro was more severe than anywhere else in colonial Uganda, and probably East Africa.


Author(s):  
Richard Bedford ◽  
A. Dharmalingan

The Bay of Plenty Regional Council and the Western Bay and Tauranga District Councils are currently exploring growth options for the period 2001-2051. A critical determinant of their forecasts for the regional economy and the infrastructure and environment that will support significant population growth over the next 50 years is migration. In this paper we explore two different ways of building net migration assumptions into subnational projections. The method currently employed by Statistics New Zealand assumes, by definition, a declining rate of migration for most age groups in a region which is experiencing quite rapid population growth. We examine the implications for projections of the labour force age groups of a method that assumes constant age-specific rates of net migration, rather than constant levels of net migration. The alternative method takes account of the significant changes in the age structure of New Zealand's population over the next 50 years and generates a larger, older workforce (and elderly population) than the method currently employed by Statistics New Zealand The implications of the different methods of estimating the contribution of net migration to population growth are also explored for household composition over the 50 year period.


2020 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 475-497
Author(s):  
Przemysław Śleszyński ◽  
Łukasz Kubiak ◽  
Ewa Korcelli-Olejniczak

This article offers assumptions and results relating to six projection variants of demographic forecasting (scenario analysis of population change) elaborated for Warsaw City Hall (Śleszyński et al., 2019). The analysis was based on the population size estimated by reference to telemetry calculations obtained from the Orange Polska telephone company. It revealed that the so-called ‘night population’ size is larger by 213,000 than the registered population size of the Polish capital. Estimates were made for the 18 districts of Warsaw in one-year intervals for the 2018 2050 period, according to six variant scenarios (continuation, suburbanisation, concentration, polarisation, ‘low’ immigration and ‘high’ immigration). The scenarios were predominately differentiated in terms of internal and international migration levels, and was inter alia conditioned by the socio-economic development model for Poland and the spatial policy pursued in the Warsaw Metropolitan Area. Based on the respective variant, the population estimates for the city as a whole in 2030 range from 1,980,000 to 2,132,000, as compared with 1,785 2,249,000 in 2050. The most important conclusion, which implies practical solutions is related to the finding that till 2050 there is no basis to anticipate a stronger population growth in Warsaw. This reflects both the exhaustion of traditional source regions for migrants and the fertility rates in the city, which remain low in real terms, even if they are relatively high by the standards of Polish cities in general. Only a distinct intensification of immigration and a parallel inflow of migrants from other regions of Poland and abroad, would lead to a population growth of the city. The most probable variant is that of continuation, as it reflects the inertia among the key factors. This would at first denote an increase in population to 2,044,000 in 2028, followed by a slow decline (in 2040 – 2,005,000, in 2050 – 1,929,000). The ageing of the population and a marked increase in post-working age population are both inevitable. By 2050, the population in this category will most probably account for more than 25% of the total for Warsaw (as compared with 18 per cent currently). It is predicted that the downtown districts (especially Śródmieście and Praga Północ) will witness dec¬lines in the number of inhabitants, even as the so-called ‘developing’ parts of the city (like Białołęka, Wilanów or Ursus) continue to increase, while other external districts like Ursynów will move over to population stagnation. The main factor determining the condition and structure of Warsaw’s population will thus be migration, predominately including internal and international immigration. In the future, the most important factor determining mobility will be the absolute decrease in migration resources in the capital’s main basin. At the same time, the expected supply gap on the labour market (2 7 million people nationally by 2050) will result in competition for employees between urban centres at a much greater level than at present. In the case of Warsaw this may result in an intensification of three complementary processes, i.e. increased internal drainage, foreign immigration and commuting to work. There are several reasons why stagnation or population decline will pose no threat to Warsaw. Firstly, the capital ‘operates’ as a functional area, together with its suburban zone, for which at least weak population growth should be expected till 2050. Secondly, the future development of the capital city depends less on its population size, and more on the quality of human capital, including the size of the so-called ‘creative class’. The typical demographic burden parameters associated with the ratio of people of non-productive to productive age are also less important than the latter factor. While population loss in a city as large as Warsaw does not constitute a social problem, the occurrence and increase of social inequalities is a major one.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document