scholarly journals The Impact of School District on Housing Prices: Based on an Evolutionary Game Model

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen Lin
Keyword(s):  
School District ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Housing Prices ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Impact

scholarly journals A Study of Taxi Service Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Mode Choice ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Taxi Service ◽  
Service Mode ◽  
The Impact

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.

scholarly journals Research on Cooperative Innovation Behavior of Industrial Cluster Based on Subject Adaptability

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaohui Jia ◽  
Minghui Jiang ◽  
Lei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Industrial Cluster ◽  
Industrial Clusters ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Cooperative Innovation ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

From the perspective of the interactive cooperation among subjects, this paper portrays the process of cooperative innovation in industrial cluster, in order to capture the correlated equilibrium relationship among them. Through the utilization of two key tools, evolutionary stable strategy and replicator dynamics equations, this paper considers the cost and gains of cooperative innovation and the amount of government support as well as other factors to build and analyze a classic evolutionary game model. On this basis, the subject’s own adaptability is introduced, which is regarded as the system noise in the stochastic evolutionary game model so as to analyze the impact of adaptability on the game strategy selection. The results show that, in the first place, without considering subjects’ adaptability, their cooperation in industrial clusters depends on the cost and gains of innovative cooperation, the amount of government support, and some conditions that can promote cooperation, namely, game steady state. In the second place after the introduction of subjects’ adaptability, it will affect both game theory selection process and time, which means that the process becomes more complex, presents the nonlinear characteristics, and helps them to make faster decisions in their favor, but the final steady state remains unchanged.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Equilibrium of Block Withholding Attack

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 266-279
Author(s):  
Yukun Cheng ◽  
Zhiqi Xu ◽  
Shuangliang Yao
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Equations ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Replicator Dynamic ◽  
The World ◽  
Stable Solutions ◽  
Simulation Results ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Theoretical Results ◽  
Selection Of

Abstract Bitcoin is the most famous and the most used cryptocurrency in the world, such that it has received extreme popularity in recent years. However the Bitcoin system is accompanied by different attacks, including the block withholding (BWH) attack. When a miner plays the BWH attack, it will withhold all the blocks newly discovered in the attack pool, damaging the honest miners’ right to obtain the fair reward. In this paper, we consider a setting in which two miners may honestly mine or perform the BWH attack in a mining pool. Different strategy profiles will bring different payoffs, in addition influence the selection of the strategies. Therefore, we establish an evolutionary game model to study the behavior tendency of the miners and the evolutionary stable strategies under different conditions, by formulating the replicator dynamic equations. Through numerical simulations, we further verify the theoretical results on evolutionary stable solutions and discuss the impact of the factors on miners’ strategic choice. Based on these simulation results, we also make some recommendations for the manager and the miners to mitigate the BWH attack and to promote the cooperation between miners in a mining pool.

scholarly journals Research on Ecological Restoration Mechanism of Rare-Earth Mines Based on Evolutionary Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Guangli Yan ◽  
Fei Xue ◽  
Zhongxue Li
Keyword(s):  
Rare Earth ◽  
Ecological Restoration ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Smelting Process ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Mining Areas ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Rare Earth

With the continuous improvement of the rare earth’s international status, the status of rare Chinese earth has gradually become prominent all over the world. When China enjoys the advantages of large reserves of rare-earth resources, at the same time, Chinese rare-earth enterprises are lagging in technology and lacking innovation capabilities. The rare-earth industry is mainly concentrated on the separation and smelting process, which has an indelible impact on the ecological environment around the mine. Some scholars have carried out research on ecological restoration in mining areas, but there are few studies on interest subjects in ecological restoration work in mining areas, especially the research based on game theory is more scarce. This article constructs a trilateral evolutionary game model of the central, local governments, and mining enterprises. This article analyzes the impact mechanism of policy changes on the rare-earth mining industry and analyzes the three-party evolutionary game model by adjusting the values of external variables. The research shows that the central government’s subsidies to local enterprises, the central government’s performance evaluation to the government, the local government’s punishment to enterprises, and the local enterprise’s reproduction income are important factors that determine the evolution of the trilateral game. Therefore, the central government should strengthen the supervision of local governments and enterprises when formulating policies related to the rare-earth industry, and local governments should strengthen their own management and local environmental regulations.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Games and Dynamics in Public Goods Supply with Repetitive Actions

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (15) ◽  
pp. 1726
Author(s):  
Simo Sun ◽  
Hui Yang ◽  
Guanghui Yang ◽  
Jinxiu Pi
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Stable Operation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Discount Factors ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Based on a tripartite game model among suppliers of public goods, consumers, and the government, a tripartite repeated game model is constructed to analyze the evolution mechanism of which suppliers supply at low prices, consumers purchase, and the government provides incentives, and to establish the dynamics system of a repeated game. The equilibrium points of the evolutionary game are solved, and among them, the equilibrium points are found to satisfy the parameter conditions of ESS. The numerical simulation is employed to verify the impact of penalty coefficients and discount factors on the stability of strategies, which are adopted by the three players in a tripartite repeated game on public goods, and scenario analyses are conducted. The research results of this paper could provide a reference for the government, suppliers, and consumers to make rapid decisions, who are in the supply chain of public goods, especially quasi-public goods, such as coal, water, electricity, and gas, and help them to obtain stable incomes and then ensure the stable operation of the market.

scholarly journals RENT-SEEKING DECISIONS OF THE MAIN PARTICIPANTS IN CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS BASED ON EVOLUTIONARY-GAME AND SYSTEM DYNAMICS

2022 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 106-119
Author(s):  
Weiwei Zuo ◽  
Qiankun Wang ◽  
Peng Li
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Construction Projects ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Interaction Mechanism ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Behavioral Characteristics ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Dynamics Method

The performance of a construction project can be severely harmed by its participants’ rent-seeking. In order to prevent such attempt, this research integrates the evolutionary game theory with system dynamics method to simulate the impact of the change of some factors that may cause/reduce rent-seeking. Based on the analysis of the behavioral characteristics and interactive relationships of the main participants (the owner, supervisor, and contractor), an evolutionary game model is constructed and simulated with the method of system dynamics based on the replication dynamic equation of the mixed strategy solution of the three-party static game model. By assigning the parameters of project scale, supervision likelihood, supervision success rate, supervision cost, and penalty intensity, the interaction mechanism of the participants on each factor is revealed through a case-based simulation. The results show that the impacts of these factors on participants’ rent-seeking decisions are significantly different. Furthermore, some management suggestions are provided to prevent rent-seeking for project owner according to the research conclusions. This research can help the project owners take proper measures to prevent rent-seeking of the supervisors and the contractors to improve the performances of the projects.

Housing Prices and Government Approval: The Impact of Housing Booms on Left- and Right-Wing Governments in 16 Advanced Industrialized Countries

2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-185
Author(s):  
Sung Min Han ◽  
Mi Jeong Shin
Keyword(s):  
Housing Prices ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Industrialized Countries ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Approval Ratings ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Left And Right ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

AbstractIn this article, we argue that rising housing prices increase voter approval of incumbent governments because such a rise increases personal wealth, which leads to greater voter satisfaction. This effect is strongest under right-wing governments because those who benefit from rising prices—homeowners—are more likely to be right-leaning. Non-homeowners, who are more likely to vote for left-leaning parties, will view rising housing prices as a disadvantage and therefore feel the government does not serve them well, which will mitigate the advantage to left-wing governments. We find support for our arguments using both macro-level data (housing prices and government approval ratings in 16 industrialized countries between 1960 and 2017) and micro-level data (housing prices and individuals’ vote choices in the United Kingdom using the British Household Panel Survey). The findings imply that housing booms benefit incumbent governments generally and right-wing ones in particular.

Has tourism driven house prices in Germany? Time-varying evidence since 1870

2021 ◽  
pp. 135481662110088
Author(s):  
Sefa Awaworyi Churchill ◽  
John Inekwe ◽  
Kris Ivanovski
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Historical Data ◽  
House Prices ◽  
Housing Prices ◽  
Time Varying ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Time Series Modelling ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Tourism Flows ◽  
Non Parametric

Using a historical data set and recent advances in non-parametric time series modelling, we investigate the nexus between tourism flows and house prices in Germany over nearly 150 years. We use time-varying non-parametric techniques given that historical data tend to exhibit abrupt changes and other forms of non-linearities. Our findings show evidence of a time-varying effect of tourism flows on house prices, although with mixed effects. The pre-World War II time-varying estimates of tourism show both positive and negative effects on house prices. While changes in tourism flows contribute to increasing housing prices over the post-1950 period, this is short-lived, and the effect declines until the mid-1990s. However, we find a positive and significant relationship after 2000, where the impact of tourism on house prices becomes more pronounced in recent years.

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