scholarly journals The Network Approach to General Intelligence

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Han van der Maas ◽  
Alexander Olof Savi ◽  
Abe Dirk Hofman ◽  
Kees Jan Kan ◽  
Maarten Marsman
Keyword(s):  
Formal Model ◽  
Human Intelligence ◽  
General Intelligence ◽  
Network Approach ◽  
General Ability ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Clear Conception

Human intelligence is a puzzling concept. There is no consensus on the definition of intelligence, not even within specific fields that study intelligence, such as psychometrics. Within the latter, there are, for instance, major disputes over whether intelligence is one thing (a general ability) or multiple things. In our view, it is important to have a clear conception of what intelligence is. In this chapter we adhere to such a conception and present a formal model of psychometric intelligence. This model illuminates mechanisms that can explain some important and well replicated phenomena in the study of intelligence.

HEALTH DISORDER ASSOSIATED WITH PERMANENT DISABILITY AS THE SIGN OF BODILY HARM

2021 ◽  
Vol 74 (6) ◽  
pp. 1396-1400
Author(s):  
Igor І. Mytrofanov ◽  
Igor V. Lysenko ◽  
Mykola М. Riabushko ◽  
Volodymyr H. Hryn ◽  
Roman M. Riabushko ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Bodily Harm ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
Ability To Work ◽  
Joint Research ◽  
Permanent Disability ◽  
General Ability ◽  
Judicial Practice ◽  
Permanent Loss ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Medical Examinations

The aim: The paper is aimed at creation of the procedure and criteria for determining a health disorder associated with permanent disability as a sign of serious bodily harm. Materials and methods: To identify the problems faced by forensic medical and judicial practice in determining a health disorder associated with permanent disability, we studied more than 100 criminal proceedings from 2007 to the present time. Results: Ways to further improvement of the procedure for conducting expert studies on health disorders, associated with persistent loss of general ability to work as a characteristic feature of the bodily harm have been found to avoid errors in forensic medical and judicial practice. The issues of conducting forensic medical examinations to determine the degree of loss of general ability to work remain unresolved. The lack of joint research projects conducted by both medical and legal scientists leads to the polysemy and different approaches in the stating of certain concepts that are the subject of study of both medical and law sciences. Currently, the definition of the offence against health is debatable and the issues of criteria for determining such damage are not completely settled to date. Conclusions: We consider the development of the Procedure and Criteria for determining the degree (in percentage) of the permanent loss of general ability to work of victims of criminal offences, established by forensic medical experts, is crucial.

Does Violence Have Cognitive Correlates?

1987 ◽  
Vol 151 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Robertson ◽  
P. J. Taylor ◽  
J. C. Gunn
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Function ◽  
General Population ◽  
Psychiatric Illness ◽  
Small Extent ◽  
General Intelligence ◽  
Reasoning Ability ◽  
Violent Behaviour ◽  
Cognitive Correlates ◽  
General Ability ◽  
The Relationship

The relationship between cognitive function and violence in 76 remanded prisoners, without formal psychiatric illness, was investigated. The violent group tended to be of slightly lower general ability than the non-violent group, but not abnormally so in relation to the general population; no relationship was found between specific patterns of cognitive functioning and violence. The violent group reported significantly higher levels of neurotic symptoms than the non-violent group, and were more socially deviant. To a small extent general intelligence (reasoning ability), in interaction with many other factors, may be related to a propensity for violent behaviour, but no particular aspect of cortical functioning seems to be related to violence.

The intelligence explosion revisited

foresight ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-174
Author(s):  
Karim Jebari ◽  
Joakim Lundborg
Keyword(s):  
Design Methodology ◽  
Cognitive Capacity ◽  
Human Intelligence ◽  
Historical Time ◽  
Content Type ◽  
General Ability ◽  
Intelligent Machines ◽  
Technological Artifacts ◽  
Existential Risk

Purpose The claim that super intelligent machines constitute a major existential risk was recently defended in Nick Bostrom’s book Superintelligence and forms the basis of the sub-discipline AI risk. The purpose of this paper is to critically assess the philosophical assumptions that are of importance to the argument that AI could pose an existential risk and if so, the character of that risk. Design/methodology/approach This paper distinguishes between “intelligence” or the cognitive capacity of an individual and “techne”, a more general ability to solve problems using, for example, technological artifacts. While human intelligence has not changed much over historical time, human techne has improved considerably. Moreover, the fact that human techne has more variance across individuals than human intelligence suggests that if machine techne were to surpass human techne, the transition is likely going to be prolonged rather than explosive. Findings Some constraints for the intelligence explosion scenario are presented that imply that AI could be controlled by human organizations. Originality/value If true, this argument suggests that efforts should focus on devising strategies to control AI rather strategies that assume that such control is impossible.

scholarly journals A Model for Artificial General Intelligence

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andy E Williams
Keyword(s):  
Specific Model ◽  
Human Intelligence ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
General Intelligence ◽  
Human Consciousness ◽  
Functional Modeling ◽  
Modeling Framework ◽  
Complete Set ◽  
Interdisciplinary Projects ◽  
Functional Components

A Functional Modeling Framework (FMF) for defining and comparing models of consciousness and cognition has recently been developed. This framework proposes to have the capacity to represent the complete set of the functionality of human consciousness and cognition, which if true, would suggest that all models of consciousness and cognition can be represented within the framework. The framework also proposes to define the criteria for a model of cognition to have the potential for the general problem solving ability commonly recognized as true human intelligence. The FMF provides a single framework for defining models of consciousness and cognition that is human-centric in that the functions can be validated through experiments that can be performed within innate human self-awareness rather than being dependent on assumptions made by any specific model. This human-centric functional modeling approach is intended to enable different models of AGI to be more easily compared so research can reliably converge on a single understanding, enabling the possibility of massively collaborative interdisciplinary projects to research, and implement models of consciousness or cognition where such massive collaborationhas not proved possible before. The FMF defines requirements for all the functional components defined by the framework, but leaves specific models to define their own implementations. This paper summarizes a model of cognition developed within this framework that is proposed to meet the criteria of an AGI as defined within this framework. This description is expanded in a number of other papers.

Architecture and Implementation Issues

2002 ◽  
pp. 16-57
Author(s):  
Ajantha Dahanayake
Keyword(s):  
Information Systems ◽  
Object Representation ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Systems Design ◽  
Service Description ◽  
Formal Approach ◽  
Problem Situations ◽  
Service Object ◽  
Automated Support ◽  
Definition Of

Historically the focus is on the theory of how problem-specific systems design tools can be supported by a Computer Aided Method Engineering (CAME) environment based on service object representation. To arrive at an implementation model, the conceptual model of the service object representation must be formalized. This theory is feasible when there is adequate computer support. Many researchers have emphasized strongly that requirement specification languages should have a rigorous formal basis; however, this need for formality has not been generally acknowledged in the field of information systems development. Most organizations and research groups tend to define their own methods using techniques advocated within such methods that often have no formal foundation. Discussions of modeling techniques are based on numerous examples, mostly using diagrams and notational conventions, to provide a popular style for the definition of new concepts and their behavior. In a CAME environment however, which gives the freedom to specify a modeling technique from scratch, it is difficult to avoid deficiencies such as inconsistency, lack of structure, over specification, incompleteness, ambiguity, and redundancy without using a formal approach. In automated support a formal model is used to provide stable specifications for implementation. In fact, an implementation can be seen as another, enormously detailed formal description, usually in an imperative programming language. To implement this sophisticated automated support, formal specifications of the CAME service description with adequate formal reasoning were derived earlier. In this chapter the concentration is on using representation formalism to construct a problem-specific CAME environment. Such an automated support environment must be provided for the information systems design stage in particular for the required UpperCASE tools according to the methods chosen for the problem situations. The vision is that CAME environments must function as a service-based, object-oriented MetaCASE environment that offers the services required for modeling tools, and using a mechanism to interpret the required modeling knowledge and changing the visual representation to the required form using a graphic object binding mechanism. Further, this environment must offer a mechanism for the populations of models specified according to such UpperCASE tools.

scholarly journals A Theory of Adaptive Intelligence and Its Relation to General Intelligence

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert J. Sternberg
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Hierarchical Model ◽  
Cultural Context ◽  
General Factor ◽  
General Intelligence ◽  
Similarities And Differences ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
And Behavior

Intelligence typically is defined as consisting of “adaptation to the environment” or in related terms. Yet, it is not clear that “general intelligence” or g, traditionally conceptualized in terms of a general factor in a psychometrically-based hierarchical model of intelligence, provides an optimal way of defining intelligence as adaptation to the environment. Such a definition of adaptive intelligence would need to be biologically based in terms of evolutionary theory, would need to take into account the cultural context of adaptation, and would need to take into account whether thought and behavior labeled as “adaptively intelligent” actually contributed to the perpetuation of the human and other species, or whether it was indifferent or actually destructive to this perpetuation. In this article, I consider the similarities and differences between “general intelligence” and “adaptive intelligence,” as well as the implications especially of the differences.

The role of measurement in theorising about the world

2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-326
Author(s):  
Nicole Holzhauser ◽  
Frank Eggert
Keyword(s):  
Role Theory ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Measurement Theory ◽  
Heuristic Approach ◽  
Specific Information ◽  
Scaling Model ◽  
The World ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Representational Approach

The procedure of establishing a measure of an attribute consists of the assignment of numbers to objects whose attributes show some variability according to rules. These rules are chosen so that the assigned numbers contain some ‘information’ about the differing variants of the attribute. In the article, we discuss a heuristic, a scaling, and a representational approach. Within the heuristic approach, rules can be based on a verbal argument heuristically linking the variability in the attribute to differences in the measurements. In this case, the specific information that is represented by the measurements is very hard to determine due to the lack of a formal model. Within the scaling approach, a formal model is used to derive rules for the assignment of numbers to the variants of the attribute. From a scaling model, conclusions about the specific information assumed to be represented in the measurements can be derived. Both approaches depend on the assumption that there is something to measure, namely that the attribute that is going to be measured exists in a realm different from the numerical one. Within the representational approach, one tries to clarify what conditions must be met by an attribute to be considered measurable so that relations between the measurements can be interpreted as reflecting relations between the variants of the attribute. By specifying the conditions an attribute must meet to be measurable at all, measurement theory opens an alternative way to rules and thus to measurements. Following this approach, it is no longer necessary only to assume that there is some measurable attribute, but one can find out whether this indeed is the case. Moreover, the interdependence of the definition of an attribute and its measurability, as well as the role theory plays in defining certain attributes, can be clarified.

scholarly journals Null Sex Differences in General Intelligence: Evidence from the WAIS-III

2002 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto Colom ◽  
Luis F. García ◽  
Manuel Juan-Espinosa ◽  
Francisco J. Abad
Keyword(s):  
Sex Differences ◽  
Sex Difference ◽  
Strong Association ◽  
Geographical Location ◽  
Social Consequences ◽  
Cognitive Test ◽  
General Intelligence ◽  
General Ability ◽  
Test Specificity ◽  
The Difference

There is an increasing number of studies claiming that the sex differences in general intelligence are “real.” The empirical evidence is based on the summation of the standardized sex differences in several cognitive batteries. However, the scientific construct of general ability rests on the correlations among test scores, rather than on their summation. The latter (ability in general) is an arbitrary variable, not a scientific construct. General ability is not a function of any particular cognitive test, but a source of variance evidenced by the correlation between several diverse tests, each of which reflects general ability (g) to some extent, but also group factors and test specificity. Because there are important educational, economic, and social consequences of a group difference in general ability, it is especially germane to evaluate the possibility of an average sex difference in its proxy measures, such as IQ. The Spanish standardization of the WAIS-III is analyzed in the present study. The sample was made up of 703 females and 666 males, aged 15-94, drawn as a representative sample of the population in terms of educational level and geographical location. Although a male advantage of 3.6 IQ points is observed, the difference is in “ability in general,” not in “general ability” (g). Given that the main ingredient of the strong association between IQ and a broad range of social correlates is g, and given that there is no sex difference in g, then the average IQ sex-difference favoring males must be attributed to specific group factors and test specificity.

scholarly journals (Ne)závislosť na poli: kognitívny štýl či schopnosť?

TESTFÓRUM ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (10) ◽  
pp. 4-13
Author(s):  
Lenka Krajčíková
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Field Dependence ◽  
Short Paper ◽  
General Intelligence ◽  
Historical Overview ◽  
Embedded Figures Test ◽  
Valid Method ◽  
Embedded Figures ◽  
Definition Of

Predkladaný krátky článok pojednáva o testovaní kognitívneho štýlu závislosti/nezávislosti na poli podľa Witkina. Tento kognitívny štýl popísaný v 50. rokoch bol v niekoľkých posledných dekádach vystavený kritike, ktorá sa na jednej strane týka samotnej definície kognitívneho štýlu, na strane druhej i metód, ktoré sú k testovaniu tohto štýlu používané. V práci sa čitateľ dozvie ako o metódach testovania závislosti/nezávislosti na poli tak o kritike tohto konceptu. Hlavným zámerom článku je poskytnúť historický exkurz do testovania kognitívneho štýlu závislosti/nezávislosti na poli pomocou testu k tomu pôvodne určenému (Embedded Figures Test). Čitateľ sa dozvie o nejednoznačnosti použitia testu EFT a pochybnostiach o tom, že skutočne testuje spomínaný kognitívny štýl. Test samotný bude predstavený v novom svetle potenciálne zaujímavého nástoja na testovanie priestorovej kognitívnej schopnosti či všeobecnej inteligencie, čo je však nutné ďalším výskumom objasniť. Presented short paper deals with testing of cognitive style of field dependence/independence by Herman Witkin. This cognitive style described in fifties was wildly criticized in last couple of decades. The criticism was aimed towards the definition of a cognitive style and also towards methods evaluating and testing this so called cognitive style. The paper describes various methods of testing this style and provides brief overview of a criticism of the concept. The main goal of this paper is to provide a historical overview of testing cognitive style of field dependence/independence and to evaluate test created for that purpose (Embedded Figures Test). The reader will find out that EFT is not a completely valid method of testing cognitive style mentioned above and there are some doubts about what this test is really measuring. EFT will be introduced from a slightly different angle, as an interesting method of testing spatial cognitive ability or general intelligence, but these new options of use of EFT require further research. 

scholarly journals Within-person structures of daily cognitive performance differ from between-person structures of cognitive abilities

PeerJ ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. e9290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Schmiedek ◽  
Martin Lövdén ◽  
Timo von Oertzen ◽  
Ulman Lindenberger
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Young Adults ◽  
Cognitive Abilities ◽  
Cognitive Tasks ◽  
Human Intelligence ◽  
General Factor ◽  
General Intelligence ◽  
Common Variance ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Over Time

Over a century of research on between-person differences has resulted in the consensus that human cognitive abilities are hierarchically organized, with a general factor, termed general intelligence or “g,” uppermost. Surprisingly, it is unknown whether this body of evidence is informative about how cognition is structured within individuals. Using data from 101 young adults performing nine cognitive tasks on 100 occasions distributed over six months, we find that the structures of individuals’ cognitive abilities vary among each other, and deviate greatly from the modal between-person structure. Working memory contributes the largest share of common variance to both between- and within-person structures, but the g factor is much less prominent within than between persons. We conclude that between-person structures of cognitive abilities cannot serve as a surrogate for within-person structures. To reveal the development and organization of human intelligence, individuals need to be studied over time.

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