scholarly journals Parochialism, place-based identity and radical-right voting

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Ziblatt ◽  
Hanno Hilbig ◽  
Daniel Bischof

What explains the radical right's electoral success? We propose that voters in "parochial" regions are more predisposed to voting for radical-right parties. We define "parochialism'" as a geographic community where voters possess strong place-based social identities characterized by four attributes: low contact with outsiders; strong in-group ties; hostility towards outsiders; and, above all, high dialectal distance from the national standard language. We measure place-based social identity with 725,000 responses to a unique survey of regional German dialects. Using aggregate and individual-level data, we demonstrate that dialectal distance from the national standard language strongly predicts voting for the radical-right AfD party. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we clarify the concept of place-based social identity and its connection to parochialism as a source of radical-right voting. Drawing on recent research in socio-linguistics, we demonstrate that dialects are a useful measure of social identity not previously used to explain political behavior.

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 205316801882239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhen Jie Im ◽  
Nonna Mayer ◽  
Bruno Palier ◽  
Jan Rovny

This paper studies the association between the risk of automation and vote choice in 11 West European countries. We extend upon labour economics literature on the effects of automation on the labour market by focusing on the political consequences of automation. We also build on existing work relating labour market risks to support for radical right parties. We argue that automation threat is most likely to increase support for radical right parties. We demonstrate that those more inclined to vote for the radical right rather than the average voters are those who are both threatened by automation and are still “just about managing” economically. They are more receptive to the narrative of the radical right, which simultaneously highlights the risk, and proposes protection. Using cross-sectional individual level data drawn from the European Social Survey (rounds 6, 7 and 8), we find that individuals who perceive themselves as “coping on present income” are significantly more likely to vote for radical right parties as risk of automation increases. They are also less likely to vote for major right parties.


2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402110243
Author(s):  
Sirus H. Dehdari

This paper studies the effects of economic distress on support for radical right parties. Using Swedish election data, I show that one layoff notice among low-skilled native-born workers increases, on average, support for the Swedish radical right party the Sweden Democrats by 0.17–0.45 votes. The relationship between layoff notices and support for the Sweden Democrats is stronger in areas with a high share of low-skilled immigrants and in areas with a low share of high-skilled immigrants. These findings are in line with theories suggesting that economically distressed voters oppose immigration as they fear increased labor market competition. In addition, I use individual-level survey data to show that self-reported unemployment risk is positively associated with voting for the Sweden Democrats among low-skilled respondents while the opposite is true for high-skilled respondents, echoing the aggregate-level findings.


Author(s):  
A. Badaeva

In recent decades, radicalism has become an integral part of the political scene in Europe. Many countries, including Scandinavia, see an electoral success of nationalist parties. This trend is due to decrease in extent of the “party identification” and disillusionment of the electorate in the earlier dominant parties. The achievements of ultra-right forces do not accidentally coincided with an unprecedented influx of immigrants in the Scandinavian countries. Radical forces stand for preservation of national values and are ready to respond to the pressing social challenges of integrating world. According to the author, these forces are likely to reach the greatest success and to exert a significant impact on government policies.


2017 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane P. Singh ◽  
Jaroslav Tir

Comparative politics scholarship often neglects to consider how militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) shape political behavior. In this project, we advance an argument that considers voter responses to international conflict at the individual level. In particular, we consider how the well-known conditioning effects of partisanship manifest in relation to militarized international conflict. Examining individual- and macro-level data across ninety-seven elections in forty-two countries over the 1996–2011 period, we find consistent evidence of militarized conflict impacting vote choice. This relationship is, however, moderated by partisanship, conflict side (initiator or target), and conflict hostility level. Among non-copartisan voters, the incumbent benefits the most electorally from initiating low-hostility MIDs or when the country is a target of a high-hostility MID; the opposite scenarios (initiator of a high-hostility MID or target of a low-hostility MID) lead to punishment among this voter group. Copartisans, meanwhile, tend to either maintain or intensify their support in most scenarios we examine; when a country is targeted in a low-hostility MID, copartisan support erodes mildly.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-40
Author(s):  
Luiza-Maria Filimon

The Nordic states had an active radical right presence long before the economic and refugee crises that swept the shores of the European Union (EU) left in their wake a reinvigorated right-wing contingent. The radical right parties (RRPs) have not only registered various degrees of electoral success, but have also made inroads into the political mainstream. The three defining characteristics that set these parties apart from the more traditional far-right ones are: 1) the repudiation of hardcore extremism; 2) the search for political viability; and 3) the acquisition of mainstream recognition. The present article argues that as these parties compete for legitimacy, they are forced to alter their discriminatory rhetoric by switching tonal registers. One of the political strategies that enables them to put the outright “overt” in the “covert” is the recourse to dog whistle politics. How well can they overcome the stigma associated with their more extreme reflexes depends on a case by case basis. This article examines whether the four most prominent examples of Nordic radicalism (the Danish People’s Party, Finns Party, Sweden Democrats, and Norway’s Progress Party) have integrated dog whistles in their political messaging and tracks how these coded appeals change from one country to another. In analyzing the response to the 2015 refugee crisis, the study finds that to a certain extent, the rhetoric utilized falls into the coded register or at the very least purposefully attempts to veer away from the radical excesses which are marginalizing and self-exclusionary.


2016 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Werkmann ◽  
Sergiu Gherghina

Over the last three decades a great deal of research has been carried out in an attempt to explain the electoral performance of radical right parties in Europe. Most approaches concentrate on demand-side determinants and have some limitations. We compensate for these shortcomings and focus on the context of party competition and supply-side determinants (consistency of ideological discourse, functioning party propaganda, the continuity of the leader in office and strong party organization) to explain the electoral success of radical right parties in post-communist Europe. We conducted our analysis at party level in nine radical right parties in four countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania) between 1990 and 2014. The bivariate and multivariate (ordinal logistic regression) analyses draw on unique data collected from primary and secondary sources.


2018 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 224-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynette H Ong ◽  
Donglin Han

What drives people to protest in an authoritarian country? Drawing from a rich set of individual-level data from the China General Social Survey 2010, we address the question of protest participation by focusing on the factors of resources, and rewards vs risks, that might be unique to protestors in an authoritarian state. We find strong evidence for education, typically conceived as a key enabling resource in protests, to be negatively associated with likelihood of participation. There are, however, significant differences between political behavior in urban and rural samples. We find some, though rather weak, evidence to suggest that as urban residents become wealthier over time, they will increasingly turn to protests as a form of political participation, demanding greater accountability of government and corporate actions.


Politics ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 026339572110195
Author(s):  
Hugo Marcos-Marne ◽  
Carolina Plaza-Colodro ◽  
Ciaran O’Flynn

The populist radical-right label brings together parties characterised by their adherence to populism, nativism, and authoritarianism. While the relevance of the label to the family is unquestioned, its popularity, combined with the theoretical affinity between the three core elements, may cause radical-right parties to be systematically considered populist without further examination. This article posits that whether a radical-right party is populist is an open empirical question, and to demonstrate this, we test the importance of populism in the discourse and electoral success of a new radical-right party, Spain’s VOX. Our empirical strategy is based on the holistic grading of core political discourses, and the analysis of innovative survey data that includes populist attitudes and voting intention. Our results indicate that, despite the existence of certain populist elements in both the supply and demand sides of the electoral competition, these should be considered supplemental and subordinate to nationalist and traditionalist elements, which are central to explaining both the discourse and electoral success of VOX. We believe that our findings are a cautionary note against assuming that all radical-right parties are populist, and an invitation to improve empirical techniques able to separate populism, nativism, and authoritarianism in political discourses.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 205316801985168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart J. Turnbull-Dugarte

The 2018 regional elections in Andalucía marked the end of Spain’s exceptional status as a country with a party system free from the radical right. The electoral success of the radical right-wing challenger, Vox, who gained 11% of the vote and 12 seats in the regional parliament, brought this exceptionalism to an end. This paper analyses the individual-level determinants that explain the electoral success of Vox and the emergence of the radical right within the Spanish party system. The results indicate that concerns over devolution, likely engendered by the Catalan separatist crisis, predominantly explain voters’ preferences for the right-wing challenger. This is true both amongst the general electorate as well as amongst the former voters of other right-wing parties. Significantly, against popular assumptions and empirical observations explaining the rise of radical right-wing parties across much of Western Europe, the results display no empirical link between immigration and electoral support for Vox.


2020 ◽  
pp. 182-192
Author(s):  
Aleksandr Shaparov ◽  
◽  
Ekaterina Sin'kova ◽  

This article analyzed the rise of far-right political parties and movements in the most developed European countries - Germany, France, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway as well as in the Visegrád Group. The current direction of the political and social development of those major European states shows great resemblance to the 1980s. The political framework is defined by escalating disappointment in social and governmental institutions, growing political fragmentation and increasing complexity of political communications. Under such circumstances radical right parties firmly secured their presence in the national parliaments and enhanced it over the last decade. Alongside their electoral success on the supranational level, it indicates significant alterations in the European political landscape. A new reality is being built while the right radicalism strives to demarginalize itself with its high adaptivity to the essential political institutions. The article analyzed causes and consequences of the ongoing changes. It suggested a new angle to assess the present radical right’s policy effects. Proceeding from the neoinstitutional approach it provided an insight into the key assumptions of radical right, far-right contagion and institutional isomorphism, while outlining the electoral dynamics and distribution of the radical right parties and assembling the concepts of their classification.


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