Populism and new radical-right parties: The case of VOX

Politics ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 026339572110195
Author(s):  
Hugo Marcos-Marne ◽  
Carolina Plaza-Colodro ◽  
Ciaran O’Flynn

The populist radical-right label brings together parties characterised by their adherence to populism, nativism, and authoritarianism. While the relevance of the label to the family is unquestioned, its popularity, combined with the theoretical affinity between the three core elements, may cause radical-right parties to be systematically considered populist without further examination. This article posits that whether a radical-right party is populist is an open empirical question, and to demonstrate this, we test the importance of populism in the discourse and electoral success of a new radical-right party, Spain’s VOX. Our empirical strategy is based on the holistic grading of core political discourses, and the analysis of innovative survey data that includes populist attitudes and voting intention. Our results indicate that, despite the existence of certain populist elements in both the supply and demand sides of the electoral competition, these should be considered supplemental and subordinate to nationalist and traditionalist elements, which are central to explaining both the discourse and electoral success of VOX. We believe that our findings are a cautionary note against assuming that all radical-right parties are populist, and an invitation to improve empirical techniques able to separate populism, nativism, and authoritarianism in political discourses.

Author(s):  
A. Badaeva

In recent decades, radicalism has become an integral part of the political scene in Europe. Many countries, including Scandinavia, see an electoral success of nationalist parties. This trend is due to decrease in extent of the “party identification” and disillusionment of the electorate in the earlier dominant parties. The achievements of ultra-right forces do not accidentally coincided with an unprecedented influx of immigrants in the Scandinavian countries. Radical forces stand for preservation of national values and are ready to respond to the pressing social challenges of integrating world. According to the author, these forces are likely to reach the greatest success and to exert a significant impact on government policies.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Endre Borbáth ◽  
Theresa Gessler

Abstract As they become more successful, populist radical right parties face a tension between keeping their nativist credentials and moderating their appeal to gain new voters. We argue that differentiating party messages to core supporters and the wider electorate allows parties to pursue both goals. We outline and empirically illustrate the previously underexplored phenomenon of selective messaging based on the communication strategy of the Hungarian Jobbik party throughout its lifespan (2006–19) in partisan outlets, press releases and Facebook. Using a dictionary approach, we map the co-evolution of populist and nativist mobilization under conditions of supply- and demand-side changes. Our results show the decline and transformation of Jobbik's nativist appeal, and an increasing reliance on populism. The trend is not uniform; Jobbik relies on nativism as a function of targeting party identifiers or the general electorate in specific media outlets. Our findings show the importance of mapping parties’ programmatic appeal across platforms and over time.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-40
Author(s):  
Luiza-Maria Filimon

The Nordic states had an active radical right presence long before the economic and refugee crises that swept the shores of the European Union (EU) left in their wake a reinvigorated right-wing contingent. The radical right parties (RRPs) have not only registered various degrees of electoral success, but have also made inroads into the political mainstream. The three defining characteristics that set these parties apart from the more traditional far-right ones are: 1) the repudiation of hardcore extremism; 2) the search for political viability; and 3) the acquisition of mainstream recognition. The present article argues that as these parties compete for legitimacy, they are forced to alter their discriminatory rhetoric by switching tonal registers. One of the political strategies that enables them to put the outright “overt” in the “covert” is the recourse to dog whistle politics. How well can they overcome the stigma associated with their more extreme reflexes depends on a case by case basis. This article examines whether the four most prominent examples of Nordic radicalism (the Danish People’s Party, Finns Party, Sweden Democrats, and Norway’s Progress Party) have integrated dog whistles in their political messaging and tracks how these coded appeals change from one country to another. In analyzing the response to the 2015 refugee crisis, the study finds that to a certain extent, the rhetoric utilized falls into the coded register or at the very least purposefully attempts to veer away from the radical excesses which are marginalizing and self-exclusionary.


2016 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 461-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Werkmann ◽  
Sergiu Gherghina

Over the last three decades a great deal of research has been carried out in an attempt to explain the electoral performance of radical right parties in Europe. Most approaches concentrate on demand-side determinants and have some limitations. We compensate for these shortcomings and focus on the context of party competition and supply-side determinants (consistency of ideological discourse, functioning party propaganda, the continuity of the leader in office and strong party organization) to explain the electoral success of radical right parties in post-communist Europe. We conducted our analysis at party level in nine radical right parties in four countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania) between 1990 and 2014. The bivariate and multivariate (ordinal logistic regression) analyses draw on unique data collected from primary and secondary sources.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Castanho Silva

Radical parties have been found to succeed under conditions of mass polarization. It is argued that their message resonates better with voters at the extremes of an ideological spectrum. This paper investigates if the reverse also holds, meaning that radical parties may contribute to the polarization of the public. I test this claim in the Netherlands, a country that has experienced the rise of populist radical right parties since 2002, using a synthetic control model built with a pool of comparable countries and Eurobarometer survey data. Results show that, after the rise of Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders, the level of polarization among the Dutch public increased more than it otherwise would have. These findings contribute to understanding the connection between elite- and mass-level polarization, and the consequences of populist radical right parties’ emergence in Western Europe.


2020 ◽  
pp. 182-192
Author(s):  
Aleksandr Shaparov ◽  
◽  
Ekaterina Sin'kova ◽  

This article analyzed the rise of far-right political parties and movements in the most developed European countries - Germany, France, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway as well as in the Visegrád Group. The current direction of the political and social development of those major European states shows great resemblance to the 1980s. The political framework is defined by escalating disappointment in social and governmental institutions, growing political fragmentation and increasing complexity of political communications. Under such circumstances radical right parties firmly secured their presence in the national parliaments and enhanced it over the last decade. Alongside their electoral success on the supranational level, it indicates significant alterations in the European political landscape. A new reality is being built while the right radicalism strives to demarginalize itself with its high adaptivity to the essential political institutions. The article analyzed causes and consequences of the ongoing changes. It suggested a new angle to assess the present radical right’s policy effects. Proceeding from the neoinstitutional approach it provided an insight into the key assumptions of radical right, far-right contagion and institutional isomorphism, while outlining the electoral dynamics and distribution of the radical right parties and assembling the concepts of their classification.


Sociologie ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-221
Author(s):  
Stijn Daenekindt ◽  
Willem de Koster ◽  
Jeroen van der Waal

Abstract Social scientists generally agree that all individuals structure their cultural attitudes in the same unidimensional fashion. However, various populist radical right parties remarkably combine moral progressiveness with conservatism regarding immigration-related issues. This suggests that the structuring of cultural attitudes among the electorate may also be more complex than typically assumed. Applying Correlational Class Analysis to representative survey data, we uncover three cultural belief systems. For individuals adhering to an integrated one, all cultural attitudes are interdependent, as typically assumed. However, we also uncover two alternative belief systems: intermediate and partitioned. In the latter, positions on one cultural attitude (e.g., ethnocentrism) are barely related to positions on others (e.g., rejecting Islam or opposing homosexuality). The existence of multiple cultural belief systems challenges the widely-held assumption that all people organize their cultural attitudes similarly. Both political party agenda’s and individuals’ education level and religion appear key to understanding variation in belief systems.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Ziblatt ◽  
Hanno Hilbig ◽  
Daniel Bischof

What explains the radical right's electoral success? We propose that voters in "parochial" regions are more predisposed to voting for radical-right parties. We define "parochialism'" as a geographic community where voters possess strong place-based social identities characterized by four attributes: low contact with outsiders; strong in-group ties; hostility towards outsiders; and, above all, high dialectal distance from the national standard language. We measure place-based social identity with 725,000 responses to a unique survey of regional German dialects. Using aggregate and individual-level data, we demonstrate that dialectal distance from the national standard language strongly predicts voting for the radical-right AfD party. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we clarify the concept of place-based social identity and its connection to parochialism as a source of radical-right voting. Drawing on recent research in socio-linguistics, we demonstrate that dialects are a useful measure of social identity not previously used to explain political behavior.


2020 ◽  
pp. 135406882096543
Author(s):  
Michael Jankowski ◽  
Christina-Marie Juen ◽  
Markus Tepe

Independent local lists (ILL) have become an important non-partisan actor in many local elections. However, little is known about which factors explain their electoral success. Drawing on recent contributions regarding the anti-establishment attitudes of many ILL, we argue that the rise of anti-establishment parties, especially the rise of populist radical-right parties, potentially harms the electoral success of ILL. Our main argument is that both actors attract voters that are dissatisfied with established parties. To test this hypothesis, we draw on the case of municipal elections in the German federal state of Lower Saxony. In the election of 2016, the populist radical-right party AfD competed in only a subset of all municipalities, meaning that some voters could cast their vote for the AfD in only some of the municipalities. We use a difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effect of the AfD on independent local list’s vote share and demonstrate that ILL suffered strongly from the entrance of the AfD to the electoral arena. More specifically, our findings demonstrate that the increase in the success of ILL was halted in municipalities in which the AfD competed, while it continued to increase in regions where the AfD was absent. These findings suggest that the increasing success of ILL is due to voters’ dissatisfaction with the established parties and not necessarily due to an increasing interest in local issues.


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