Brokers, clients and elite political networks in Mexico
In closed but competitive political regimes, political leaders face a strategic choice between centralizing and inclusive strategies of elite coalition formation. While studies of political networks in these regimes focus on patron-client systems -- a classic centralization strategy -- I argue that political leaders are likely to pursue mixed strategies that blend patronage with more deferential strategies, including elite brokerage. This paper analyzes the role of patron-client ties and brokerage positions in Mexican cabinet appointments over a period of sixty years (1940-2000), demonstrating that elite brokers were more likely to be included in elite coalitions. Although network theorists have argued that brokers are most important in "factionalized" elites, the results show that brokers were valued elite coalition partners during the period of consolidated one-party rule, but not during the earlier, more contested period of regime formation. The analysis also suggests that patronage became less hierarchical as the regime consolidated, shifting towards a sponsorship system of competing patrons rather than a classic patronage pyramid.