scholarly journals National-Local Networks and Immigration Governance

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-376
Author(s):  
Jill L. Tao

The ability to regulate the flow of goods, capital and people across borders is one of the defining characteristics of nation-state political power. But there is not always agreement between the central government and local officials as to the desirability of immigration, where local governments may desire greater, or fewer, numbers of immigrants, depending on the local economy and labor needs. In South Korea, a unitary form of government offers an opportunity to examine the policy distance between the national government’s stance on immigration based on the politics of the ruling party, and the attitudes of local officials who work for metropolitan-level governments (those with a population of one million or more). I look at the impact of local economic market needs on local attitudes towards national immigration policy through the lens of intergovernmental relations and Lipsky’s concept of bureaucratic discretion. Comparing two cases drawn from local governments in South Korea with dissimilar economic bases but similar levels of local autonomy, I find that economic needs at the local level are addressed by local approaches to immigration policy. Contrary to expectations, the cases illustrate the relative importance of fiscal autonomy and a new understanding for political autonomy. These cases illustrate the need for caution when applying political and institutional theory within new contexts and offer new variables for future investigations of local autonomy.

2019 ◽  
Vol 243 ◽  
pp. 611-634 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peng Wang ◽  
Xia Yan

AbstractThis article presents a qualitative empirical study of the impact of corruption and anti-corruption on the efficiency of China's bureaucratic system in developing a local economy. Drawing on 40 in-depth interviews and 98 days of participant observation, it first investigates the significance of extravagant position-related consumption in building personalized bureaucratic ties (patronage networks) and mobilizing resources for local economic development. It then examines the causal link between President Xi's campaign against corruption and extravagance and the rise of bureaucratic slack in local governments. The anti-extravagance campaign reduces the level of corruption in local government but it discourages local officials, who are motivated primarily by the desire to avoid risk and ensure political survival, from using banquets and gift-giving to build patronage networks, attract investment and mobilize development resources. The article concludes that corruption may contribute positively to the efficiency of a fragmented Chinese bureaucracy in fostering development at the local level, while the anti-corruption campaign compels local cadres to develop a new coping strategy – bureaucratic slack – for implementing policies and developing local economies.


1979 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberta Sbragia

Until the establishment of regional governments in the early 1970S, Italy was a formally centralized, unitary state. Both the legal and formal administrative frameworks within which local officials worked were such as to support the prevailing scholarly view that, in such a centralized state, the possibilities for local autonomy and initiative were very limited. The formal role of local governments after the Second World War continued to be that which had been specified by the Fascists in legislation designed to complete the centralization of the Italian state. Such a role left little room for local independence and initiative. Administratively, most decisions had to be approved by officials in Rome. Moreover, the policies and finances of local governments were closely supervised by the Prefects, who served as agents of central government.


2021 ◽  
Vol 233 ◽  
pp. 01152
Author(s):  
Gu Jijian

China's economic development is disconnected, not only between local governments, but also the local and the central government. Because of the performance appraisal and the status quo of political power structure, grassroots governments and local interest groups must be closely connected, and at the same time, they also form an alliance with the local bank branches that did not belong to any of the above branches, forming a trilateral conspiratorial economic development model. This model has far-reaching and perilous impacts on local economic development.


Asian Survey ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
pp. 978-1003
Author(s):  
Jacqueline Chen Chen ◽  
Jun Xiang

Existing studies of the impact of economic development on political trust in China have two major gaps: they fail to explain how economic development contributes to the hierarchical trust pattern, and they do not pay enough attention to the underlying mechanisms. In light of cultural theory and political control theory, we propose adapting performance theory into a theory of “asymmetrical attribution of performance” to better illuminate the case of China. This adapted theory leads to dual pathway theses: expectation fulfillment and local blaming. Using a multilevel mediation model, we show that expectation fulfillment mainly upholds trust in the central government, whereas local blaming undermines trust in local governments. We also uncover a rural–urban distinction in the dual pathway, revealing that both theses are more salient among rural Chinese.


Author(s):  
Ruxin Wu ◽  
Piao Hu

Central environmental protection inspections have completed their goal of full coverage of 31 provinces in China, and more than 17,000 officials have been held accountable. The media has evaluated the effectiveness of central environmental protection inspections using the notions of “instant results” and the “miracle drug of environmental governance.” Can this approach effectively promote local environmental governance? This paper takes the treatment effect of central environmental protection inspections on air pollution as an example. Using the method of regression discontinuity, central environmental protection inspections are found to have a positive effect on the air quality index (AQI), but this effect is only short term and unsustainable. Additionally, there are inter-provincial differences. Judging from the research results on sub-contaminants, the treatment effect of central environmental protection inspections on air pollution is mainly reflected in PM10, PM2.5 and CO. Under the current situation in which PM10 and PM2.5 are the main assessment indexes, this phenomenon indicates that due to the political achievements and promotion of local officials and for reasons of accountability, it is more effective for the central government to conduct specific environmental assessments through local governments than to conduct central environmental protection inspections.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002085232198895
Author(s):  
Makoto Kuroki ◽  
Keiko Ishikawa ◽  
Kiyoshi Yamamoto

Accompanying the spread of “new public management” since the 1980s, accrual accounting and results-based management has become a global standard. However, whether accrual accounting results in successful outcomes and which drivers lead to the intended impacts of the reform have been contested. Given the mixed arguments in the literature, we set out two research questions: (1) “Have public sector organizations realized any positive impacts on management practices by adopting mandatory accrual accounting?”; and (2) “What are the primary drivers of such impacts?” To answer these questions, we examine the impact on management practices by analyzing a survey to ascertain how financial department officers in Japanese local governments perceive the benefits of adopting mandatory accrual accounting on management practices. The results indicate that they have so far not recognized the intended benefits, though they had expected higher benefits in internal control. Then, we use technical-rational, socio-political, and institutional isomorphic perspectives in a comprehensive approach to understand the impacts on management practices. The logistic analysis shows that financial managers in local governments that do not have a majority party in the assembly, but consist of several parties in power, as well as in those with greater financial dependence on the central government, perceive higher benefits. Further, we find that financial managers that imitate other local governments as a form of mimetic pressure perceive fewer benefits. The results show that some technical-rational tools, socio-political conditions, and institutional pressures change the perceived benefits for public managers of adopting mandatory accrual accounting. Points for practitioners We find that some technical-rational, socio-political, and institutional factors explain the intended internal benefits of the mandatory adoption of accrual accounting. In practice, financial managers in local government feel the merits of accrual accounting in less autonomy in not only politics, but also finance, and few mimetic conditions. It might be understood that difficult situations would drive practitioners to use mandatory information.


2002 ◽  
Vol 2 (2/3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pete Fussey

This paper examines the implications of New Labour's approaches to crime and disorder on CCTV implementation. It concentrates on the usage of CCTV as one of the government's many initiatives, which are intended to address crime and disorder, including the fear of crime. In particular, the impact of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act (CDA) - the cornerstone of this government's approach to crime reduction - on the generation of such strategies is examined. The paper revisits neo-Marxist and Foucauldian analyses of the so-called surveillance society through an appraisal of the complex relationship between structure and agency in the formulation and implementation of anti-crime and disorder strategies. Drawing on fieldwork data the paper considers the activities of practitioners at a local level by focusing on the influence of central government, local communities and 'common sense' thinking based on certain criminological theories. It is argued that a myriad of micro-level operations, obligations, processes, managerial concerns (particularly conflict resolution and resource issues), structures and agency - as well as the indirect influence of central government - shape CCTV policy. Ultimately, the creation of new local policy contexts under the CDA emphasise the need to consider incremental and malleable processes concerning the formulation of CCTV policy. In turn, this allows a re-examination of theoretical accounts of surveillance, and their attendant assumptions of sovereign or disciplinary power.


2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 485-496
Author(s):  
Lihua Zhang ◽  
Rui Han ◽  
Juanfeng Zhang ◽  
Lele Li ◽  
Danxia Zhang

This study first analyzes how local governments’ land-leasing behaviors affect Chinese cities’ debt risk then examines the impact of officials’ promotion mechanisms on debt risk in China’s urban land bank system. The land-leasing behavior is reflected through three indicators, namely, land-leasing revenue, land-leasing scale, and land financial dependence level. Two new indicators are constructed to measure the local government’ debt risk from the perspective of debt scale and debt repayment: the debt scale risk and debt burden risk. Empirical analyses are based on the data of 281 prefecture-level cities from 2006–2015. The main findings are twofold. First, the debt scale risk is positively affected by the land-leasing revenue, and officials’ promotion pressure. The debt burden risk is positively affected by the land financial dependence and officials’ promotion pressure. Second, the officials’ promotion pressure significantly enhances the positive effect of land-leasing revenue on the debt scale risk. Local officials, who are under promotion pressure, are inclined to expand the size of urban investment bonds, which increases debt scale risk.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 3003-3011
Author(s):  
Xu Jing

Objective: The risk of administrative law enforcement is slowly being exposed to the public. The law enforcement of tobacco monopoly administration plays an important role in maintaining the stability of tobacco market and promoting the benign development of tobacco industry. However, due to the combination of subjective and objective factors, there are many risks in the process of tobacco monopoly law enforcement, which seriously affect the effectiveness of tobacco monopoly law enforcement. In risk society, risk has the characteristics of fluidity and cross-region, which increases the difficulty of administrative law enforcement among local governments. The purpose of this paper is to explore a new model to deal with the risk of local government enforcement against tobacco monopoly administration. Methods: The research adopted the field survey method, 75 local officials were interviewed, including 68 effective interviews and 7 invalid interviews, then analyzed the manifestations of passive cooperation through multiple cases. Results: We found that when risk of tobacco monopoly administrative law enforcement occur frequently, local intergovernmental still choose not to cooperate or cooperate passively at the request of the central government. By analyzing the forms of passive cooperation, we established an analytical framework of initiative cooperation and worked out three elements of initiative cooperation: trust, consensus and tacit understanding. Conclusion: Initiative cooperation is the highest form of cooperation and the best choice for local intergovernmental to deal with risk of tobacco monopoly administrative law enforcement.


2021 ◽  
pp. 80-103
Author(s):  
Alice Beban

This chapter shows how the land titling reform worked to wrest power away from local-level officials into the hands of the central government. It talks about local officials that managed to amass land by clearing forest in expectation of the land reform, while in other areas local people mobilized to prevent the elite's capture of the reform and produce new relationships with local officials. It also examines the relationships between local state officials and their constituencies during the Order 01 land reform. The chapter reviews the leopard skin land reform, which can be seen as the prime minister's attempt to wrest control over land distribution from local authorities in upland areas. It analyzes the rural people's narratives that suggest multiple strategies local authorities and other elites used to grab land, such as clearing forestland in advance of the land survey.


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