scholarly journals وڵاتی كاردۆخیا له‌ سه‌رده‌می ده‌سه‌ڵاتی فارسه‌ هاخامه‌نشییه‌كاندا

Twejer ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 259-294
Author(s):  
Rezan Q. Abdullah Ghafury ◽  
◽  
Qader Mohammad Hassan ◽  

Carduchoi located in the Upper Mesopotamia in the area where the Taurus and Zagros Ranges met, it had a strategic location, several cities and towns built along the narrow valleys and plains along the Tigris river and its branches there. On the other hand, the area surrounded with high ranges of Carduchoi like (Judi Dag), these high mountains made a natural boundary and make the area inaccessible except from the mountain gorges and passes. These passes and gorges were the routes of the caravans and the military campaigns. After the fall of the Median Empire, the land of Carduchoi laid under the Achaemenid hegemony in 547BCE when Cyrus the Great crossed the Tigris and went up to Anatolia through Carduchoi. This paper deals with the political and cultural aspects of Carduchoi and the military and political unrests of the area in this period, discussing the real hegemony of the Achaemenids on Carduchoi, the role of the Carduchois in the revolts against Darius I, the Carduchois resists against the 10 thousands Greek retreat in the Xenophon’s Anabasis, and the relations of the Carduchois with their neighbors, the Achaemenids, and the Greeks.

Author(s):  
Timur Gimadeev

The article deals with the history of celebrating the Liberation Day in Czechoslovakia organised by the state. Various aspects of the history of the holiday have been considered with the extensive use of audiovisual documents (materials from Czechoslovak newsreels and TV archives), which allowed for a detailed analysis of the propaganda representation of the holiday. As a result, it has been possible to identify the main stages of the historical evolution of the celebrations of Liberation Day, to discover the close interdependence between these stages and the country’s political development. The establishment of the holiday itself — its concept and the military parade as the main ritual — took place in the first post-war years, simultaneously with the consolidation of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia. Later, until the end of the 1960s, the celebrations gradually evolved along the political regime, acquiring new ritual forms (ceremonial meetings, and “guards of memory”). In 1968, at the same time as there was an attempt to rethink the entire socialist regime and the historical experience connected with it, an attempt was made to reconstruct Liberation Day. However, political “normalisation” led to the normalisation of the celebration itself, which played an important role in legitimising the Soviet presence in the country. At this stage, the role of ceremonial meetings and “guards of memory” increased, while inventions released in time for 9 May appeared and “May TV” was specially produced. The fall of the Communist regime in 1989 led to the fall of the concept of Liberation Day on 9 May, resulting in changes of the title, date and paradigm of the holiday, which became Victory Day and has been since celebrated on 8 May.


1953 ◽  
Vol 43 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 30-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. S. Staveley

Livy preserves two explanations of the Senatorial decision of 445 B.C. to suspend the election of consuls and to confer imperium consulare upon tribuni militum. One, which he himself accepts, is that it was a political compromise designed to appease agitation for plebeian representation in the consulship. The other is that the military situation demanded the appointment of at least three holders of imperium. Until some forty years ago the majority of scholars, even if ready to admit that the reform had military advantages, joined with Livy in laying the chief emphasis on the political motive. More recently, however, the tendency has been to disown the connection between the innovation and the struggle for office. The change is explained as necessitated wholly by growing military commitments or administrative needs. My purpose here is merely to defend once again the traditional account that the decision of 445 B.C. marked an important stage in the Struggle of the Orders and to remove the major difficulties which have discouraged its acceptance.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (10) ◽  
pp. 75
Author(s):  
EkramBadr El-din ◽  
Mohamed Dit Dah Ould Cheikh

The current study tries to examine the military coups that have occurred in Turkey and Mauritania. These coups differ from the other coups that occurred in the surrounding countries in the phase of democratization as these coups served as a hindrance to the process of democratization in Turkey and Mauritania. The problem of the study revolves around the analysis of the coups that happened in Turkey and Mauritania in the phase of democratic transition. The research is designed to answer the following question: what are the reasons that prompted the military establishment to intervene in political life in the shadow of the process of democratization in Turkey and Mauritania? The study aims at understanding reasons that pushed the military establishment to intervene in the political life. To discuss this phenomenon and achieve the required results, the analytical descriptive approach is adopted for concluding key results that may contribute to understand reasons that pushed the military establishment to intervene in the political life in Turkey and Mauritania in the aftermath democratization occurred in the two countries. The study concluded that the military establishment in both countries engaged in the political action and became ready to militarily intervene in the case of harming its interests and acquisitions. 


1970 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 754-771 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond F. Hopkins

The study of politics in “developing” countries has tended to focus on the less formal organs of government, such as political parties, the military, the bureaucracy, and even the educational system. National legislatures have often been ignored or rated of little significance in the political processes of these states. This practice contrasts markedly with the attention paid to legislatures in Western states. The most obvious explanation for it is that legislatures in new states tend to have little influence. Important decisions and shifts in power are usually made or recorded elsewhere in the political system.The Bunge, or National Assembly, of Tanzania is no exception to this general phenomenon. Nevertheless, an examination of the role of M.P.'s in Tanzania can be illuminating. The Bunge contains most of the major political leaders and has, at least constitutionally, broad authority. As a consequence, if the Assembly is to be only a weak political body, then informal norms limiting the powers of the M.P.'s role must exist. Moreover, these norms should prescribe authority relationships between the legislature and other policy shaping bodies in the political system, particularly the Party. Thus, an analysis of the roles of these men can provide important insights not only into the functions of the Bunge, but also into the elite political culture of Tanzania and the pattern of politics which this culture supports.


2003 ◽  
Vol 29 (S1) ◽  
pp. 199-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karena Shaw

We find ourselves amidst an explosion of literature about how our worlds are being fundamentally changed (or not) through processes that have come to be clumped under the vague title of ‘globalisation’. As we wander our way through this literature, we might find ourselves – with others – feeling perplexed and anxious about the loss of a clear sense of what politics is, where it happens, what it is about, and what we need to know to understand and engage in it. This in turn leads many of us to contribute to a slightly smaller literature, such as this Special Issue, seeking to theorise how the space and character of politics might be changing, and how we might adapt our research strategies to accommodate these changes and maintain the confidence that we, and the disciplines we contribute to, still have relevant things to say about international politics. While this is not a difficult thing to claim, and it is not difficult to find others to reassure us that it is true, I want to suggest here that it is worth lingering a little longer in our anxiety than might be comfortable. I suggest this because it seems to me that there is, or at least should be, more on the table than we're yet grappling with. In particular, I argue here that any attempt to theorise the political today needs to take into account not only that the character and space of politics are changing, but that the way we study or theorise it – not only the subjects of our study but the very kind of knowledge we produce, and for whom – may need to change as well. As many others have argued, the project of progressive politics these days is not especially clear. It no longer seems safe to assume, for example, that the capture of the state or the establishment of benign forms of global governance should be our primary object. However, just as the project of progressive politics is in question, so is the role of knowledge, and knowledge production, under contemporary circumstances. I think there are possibilities embedded in explicitly engaging these questions together that are far from realisation. There are also serious dangers in trying to separate them, or assume the one while engaging the other, however ‘obvious’ the answers to one or the other may appear to be. Simultaneous with theorising the political ‘out there’ in the international must be an engagement with the politics of theorising ‘in here,’ in academic contexts. My project here is to explore how this challenge might be taken up in the contemporary study of politics, particularly in relation to emerging forms of political practice, such as those developed by activists in a variety of contexts. My argument is for an approach to theorising the political that shifts the disciplinary assumptions about for what purpose and for whom we should we produce knowledge in contemporary times, through an emphasis on the strategic knowledges produced through political practice. Such an approach would potentially provide us with understandings of contemporary political institutions and practices that are both more incisive and more enabling than can be produced through more familiarly disciplined approaches.


2008 ◽  
Vol 87 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID CORNELL

In 1314 the English-held castles of Roxburgh, Edinburgh and Stirling were seized and destroyed by Robert Bruce. This was the pinnacle of a policy by which Bruce systematically slighted the castles he seized in Scotland. The reign of Edward II has been seen as a period in which the military value of the castle was in decline and by analysing the role the castle played in the campaigns of Bruce it is possible to assess the importance a successful contemporary commander attached to the castle during this period. Bruce had first-hand experience of the castle at war and knew of its limitations. In 1306, however, he seized and garrisoned a number of castles preparing to use them for a specific purpose, but defeat in the field rendered them redundant. On his return in 1307 Bruce initiated a policy of destruction. Castles in the north of Scotland were slighted as they were the regional focus of the political power of his Scottish enemies, and militarily they were of little value to Bruce. In the Lowlands the first-rate castles of Scotland were destroyed precisely because they were so militarily powerful. Bruce recognised that these castles, used aggressively, were indispensable to the English war effort, and consequently he undertook a prolonged and expensive campaign to reduce them, a campaign which involved the tactic of both surprise assault and, more importantly, the set-piece siege. In 1314 the imminent English campaign led Bruce to launch an unprecedented offensive against the English-held castles of Roxburgh, Edinburgh and Stirling. These castles were subsequently slighted despite their inextricable association with the Scottish Crown. Bruce recognised that, unlike the English, he did not need to occupy castles in Scotland to fight the war. Although in Ireland a small number of castles were occupied, and Berwick was also garrisoned by Scottish troops, in northern England Bruce did not attempt to occupy English castles. Those which were seized were destroyed, an indication that Bruce never intended a conquest of Northumberland. Indeed Bruce never undertook a serious campaign aimed at the seizure of the first-rate castles of Northumberland despite their frequently perilous state. Instead he sought to gain political capital by threatening their loss and so placing enormous pressure on the English Crown. That the castle featured prominently in the campaigns of Bruce demonstrates it was not in decline. Bruce understood the continued military and political value of the castle, but he was able to exploit its inherent vulnerabilities in order to gain victory in war.


2019 ◽  
pp. 89-114
Author(s):  
Karel van der Toorn

This chapter pays attention to the Egyptian experience of the Elephantine Jews. It maintains that there are two areas in Egyptian life that merit a renewed inquiry because they are central to the Elephantine experience. One is the role of Jews as soldiers in the service of the Persians; the other concerns their religion. On both scores, the Papyrus Amherst 63 has bearing—modest in one case, significant in the other. This chapter looks first at the military side of the colony, then discusses various aspects of the religious life of what was essentially a temple community, and finally seeks to present the profile of the various gods that the Jews venerated.


Author(s):  
Mónica Ricketts

The final chapter discusses in parallel the political histories of Spain and Peru in the final years of imperial rule in South America. Peru did not experience a long national struggle and lacked large elites committed to independence. As in the old metropolis, a constant and violent struggle between men of letters and military officers dominated. After decades of military reform and war, army officers with experience in command and government felt entitled to rule. Old subjects and new citizens were also accustomed to seeing them lead. Men of letters, on the other hand, found limited opportunities to exercise their new authority despite their ambitions. Additionally, both in Spain and Peru, liberal men of letters failed to create a new institutional order in which the military would be subjected to civilian rule. It would take decades for both parts of the former Spanish monarchy to accomplish that goal and allow for peace.


Author(s):  
Oren Barak

Since Lebanon’s independence in the mid-1940s, its military—the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)—has played a pivotal role in the country’s politics. The political role of the LAF in Lebanon might seem surprising since the Lebanese state did not militarize, and its political leaders have continuously managed to keep their military relatively weak and small. Indeed, in this respect Lebanon has been markedly different from its close neighbors (Syria and Israel), but also from several other Middle Eastern states (especially Egypt and Iraq), where the military, which was large and powerful, was continuously involved in politics. Additionally, both Lebanon and the LAF have persistently striven to distance themselves from regional conflicts since 1949, particularly in relation to the Palestinian issue, albeit not always successfully. Still, and despite these ostensibly unfavorable factors for the military’s involvement in politics in Lebanon, the LAF has played an important political role in the state since its independence. This role, which has been marked by elements of continuity and change over the years, included mediation and arbitration between rival political factions (in 1945–1958, 2008, 2011, and 2019); attempts to dominate the political system (in 1958–1970 and 1988–1990); intervention in the Lebanese civil war (in 1975–1976 and 1982–1984); attempts to regain its balancing role in politics (in 1979–1982 and 1984–1988); and facilitating the state’s postwar reconstruction (since 1991). The political role of the military in Lebanon can be explained by several factors. First, the weakness of Lebanon’s political system and its inability to resolve crises between its members. Second, Lebanon’s divided society and its members’ general distrust towards its civilian politicians. Third, the basic characteristics of Lebanon’s military, which, in most periods, enjoyed broad public support that cuts across the lines of community, region, and family, and found appeal among domestic and external audiences, which, in their turn, acquiesced to its political role in the state.


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