EXISTENTIAL MEANING OF HUMAN DESIGN PROJECTS

Chelovek RU ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 229-243
Author(s):  
Pavel Tishchenko ◽  

The idea of human design rests in the heart of European humanist project. The existential meaning of the idea of human design is analyzed. A piece of the work by J. Pico della Mirandola is interpreted as a prophecy expressing the fate of the New European era (by M. Heidegger). Several aspects could be distin-guished in this prophecy: the throwing of man into the world without his place, form and purpose, the right and demand to define both place and form and raison d 'être by reason. Historically, special exper-iments of solving the fundamental mystery are considered - what it means to be human from Descartes to modern transhumanistic projects of human self-construction? The meaning of the New Time era is de-fined through J. Pico 's proposed existential task. It is emphasized that at every historically special stage of subjugation of the nature of man, the dream of almighty condensed in the strange topos of about-being. Faced with the impossibility of defeating death, and without abandoning new projects of its sub-jugation, the modern era generates existential substitution. Suffering is put on the scene of death as the main representative of evil. The result is euthanasia technologies that view death not just as a lesser evil compared to suffering (pain), but as the most radical mean of achieving the new goal - radical pain relief. A thought experiment is being conducted to demonstrate the possibility of self-destruction of mankind motivated by the desire to solve the difficult problems of mankind in the way of its euthanasia.

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Nils Franzén

Abstract This article discusses why it is the case that we refuse to accept strange evaluative claims as being true in fictions, even though we are happy to go along with other types of absurdities in such contexts. For instance, we would refuse to accept the following statement as true, even in the context of a fiction: (i) In killing her baby, Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was a girl. This article offers a sensibilist diagnosis of this puzzle, inspired by an observation first made by David Hume. According to sensibilism, the way we feel about things settles their evaluative properties. Thus, when confronted with a fictional scenario where the configuration of non-evaluative facts and properties is relevantly similar to the actual world, we refuse to go along with evaluative properties being instantiated according to a different pattern. It is the attitudes we hold in the actual world that fix the extension of evaluative terms, even in nonactual worlds. When engaging with a fiction, we (to some extent) leave our beliefs about what the world is like behind, while taking our emotional attitudes with us into the fiction. To substantiate this diagnosis, this paper outlines a sensibilist semantics for evaluative terms based on recent discussion regarding predicates of personal taste, and explains how, together with standard assumptions about the nature of fictional discourse, it makes the relevant predictions with respect to engagement with fictions.


2000 ◽  
Vol 45 (S8) ◽  
pp. 159-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hotze Lont

Financial self-help organizations can be found in many parts of the world, and the cities of Java are among the areas where they are particularly widespread. Since about the 1950s, interest in these institutions among anthropologists and development sociologists has increased considerably. Analyses of financial self-help organizations have most often focused on their economic or their social function; few scholars have pointed to their function as providers of security and identified self-help organizations as typical forms of local social security institutions. The main shortcoming of most of these studies is that they base their conclusions solely on an analysis of the financial arrangements provided by these self-help organizations, neglecting the accommodating practices that people undertake in order to fit the provisions of self-help organizations to their own household needs. This essay explores the observation that financial self-help organizations do not simply provide security through the different kinds of insurance mechanisms they might contain, but that, particularly through the way in which people use them and participate in them, these institutions become meaningful for coping with insecurity. It examines the question of whether participation in financial self-help organizations contributes to the ability of households to cope with adversities and deficiencies in a concrete social context. Research aiming to answer this question was conducted in Bujung, an urban ward on the outskirts of Yogyakarta, on the island of Java.


2011 ◽  
Vol 685 ◽  
pp. 181-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen Li ◽  
Xian Zheng Gong ◽  
Su Ping Cui ◽  
Zhi Hong Wang ◽  
Yan Zheng ◽  
...  

With increasing concerns about global warming, and the cement plants emitting huge CO2, it is necessary to know how the CO2 emits and how much the CO2 emits due to cement manufacture in both direct and indirect ways. A precise method to calculate CO2 emissions including three processes was established in this paper and a case study was provided. From the case of LQDX plant, we can see the amount of CO2 emissions at the right level. The summary of CO2 emissions is consisted by emissions from raw materials, fuels and electricity. The direct CO2 emissions are 0.822 ton CO2 per ton clinker, and the total CO2 emissions are 0.657 ton CO2 per ton cement in this study. Therefore, the way that CO2 emissions due to cement manufacture was pictured and then measured. An approach provides a basic framework to identify various situations in different cement plants in China and other in the rest of the world. The framework would be useful in quantitatively evaluating CO2 emissions for government to know precisely CO2 emissions in cement plants.


Author(s):  
Simon Blackburn

‘Projectivism’ is used of philosophies that agree with Hume that ‘the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on the world’, that what is in fact an aspect of our own experience or of our own mental organization is treated as a feature of the objective order of things. Such philosophies distinguish between nature as it really is, and nature as we experience it as being. The way we experience it as being is thought of as partly a reflection or projection of our own natures. The projectivist might take as a motto the saying that beauty lies in the eye of the beholder, and seeks to develop the idea and explore its implications. The theme is a constant in the arguments of the Greek sceptics, and becomes almost orthodox in the modern era. In Hume it is not only beauty that lies in the eye (or mind) of the beholder, but also virtue, and causation. In Kant the entire spatio-temporal order is not read from nature, but read into it as a reflection of the organization of our minds. In the twentieth century it has been especially non-cognitive and expressivist theories of ethics that have adopted the metaphor, it being fairly easy to see how we might externalize or project various sentiments and attitudes onto their objects. But causation, probability, necessity, the stances we take towards each other as persons, even the temporal order of events and the simplicity of scientific theory have also been candidates for projective treatment.


Worldview ◽  
1968 ◽  
Vol 11 (11) ◽  
pp. 6-9
Author(s):  
William J. Barnds

The idealists and crusaders of every age and era develop certain underlying attitudes and values which, while connected with the specific goals they struggle to attain, are clearly distinct from them. Often these attitudes and values grow out of their effort to obtain more limited and specific goals. However, many of the participants in today's turmoil, and particularly the younger ones, seem to have little in the way of a general program — though they often protest against specific acts or situations — but instead proclaim that unless the nation and the world adopt a new set of values no particular set of reforms will leave a lasting imprint.


PMLA ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 130 (1) ◽  
pp. 158-162
Author(s):  
Jonathan Freedman

What are we mourning when we mourn helen tartar's loss? we are responding, first and foremost, to the loss of a friend, a collaborator, a companion in crime. Like so many, I owe my career to Helen. She plucked me out of a professional abyss at a crucial pre-promotion moment, got a stalled manuscript accepted, into production, and out into the world in an unheard-of nine months. Along the way she sent me countless messages of support testifying (I can now see) to her savvy and ingenuity but phrased in a way that made me think it was merely my due. Heady stuff for an oppressed-feeling assistant professor at an Ivy League school coming up for promotion to associate professor, and inspiring enough in all the right ways to catalyze not just that promotion but a continuing sense that someone—somewhere—would respond to my work and push me in the right directions. More than an editor, Helen was the reader I—we all—yearn for: responsive, generous, exacting.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sappeami Sappeami

This paper examines the mental revolution in applying the Islamic economics system which is expected to open the horizon of humans’ thought, especially Muslims, so as they are always careful in carrying out all economics activities. The significance embodied in the idea of the mental revolution is the transformation of the ethos, namely the fundamental change in the mentality, the way of thinking, the way of feeling, and the way of believing that is proven in daily behavior and actions. The mistake which occurs in the economics system of this modern era vastly needs a mental revolution to restore the consciousness of economics actors that the world is only an intermediary towards the real life in hereafter so that the economics activities will constantly be performed with good and correct actions dealing with Al-Qur’an and As-Sunnah.


2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 84-101
Author(s):  
Nerijus Čepulis

Šiuo straipsniu siekiama permąstyti tradicinę tapatumo sąvoką. Į tapatumą Vakarų mąstymo istorijoje buvo žiūrima visų pirma ontologiniu požiūriu. Moderniųjų laikų posūkis į subjektą susitelkia į Aš kaip bet kokio tapatumo centrą, pagrindą ir gamintoją. Fenomenologinė analizė tapatumo ištakas pagilina iki Aš santykio su išore, su pasauliu, su kitybe. Tačiau kitybė, tapdama sąmonės turiniu, nėra absoliuti kitybė. Būdas, kuriuo tapatumas, įsisavindamas savinasi pasaulį ir naikina kitybę, yra reprezentacija, siekianti akivaizdumo. Reprezentacija kaip intencionalus įžvalgumas bet kokį objektą lokalizuoja sąmonės šviesoje. Šviesa ir regėjimas – tai paradigminės Vakarų mąstymo tradicijos metaforos. Straipsnyje siekiama parodyti, kodėl ir kaip šviesa bei akivaizdumas netoleruoja absoliučios kitybės. Iš akivaizdumo kerų tapatumas atsitokėti gali tik per atsakingą santykį su Kitu, tai yra etiką. Čia tapatus subjektas praranda pirmumo teisę kito asmens imperatyvo atžvilgiu. Begalybės idėja, draskydama totalų tapatumą iš vidaus, neleidžia jam nurimti ir skatina atsižvelgti į transcendenciją, į kitybę, idant ji būtų laisva nuo prievartinio tapimo egocentrinio tapatumo turiniu ir manipuliacijos auka. Atsakomybė kito žmogaus veido akivaizdoje eina pirma akivaizdaus suvokimo ir įteisina jį.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: tapatumas, akivaizdumas, kitybė, socialumas.Charms of Evident IdentityNerijus Čepulis SummaryIn this article I seek to rethink the traditional notion of identity. In the tradition of Western thought identity was viewed first and foremost from an ontological point of view. After the turn toward the subject, the I is thought of as the centre, the base and the producer of any identity. Phenomenological analysis deepens the origin of identity to the relation of the I to the world, i.e. to the alterity. Yet the alterity, by becoming the content of consciousness, is not an absolute alterity. The way, in which identity assimilates, possesses the world and annihilates alterity, is representation. Representation seeks evidence. Representation as intentional perceptivity localizes every object in the light of consciousness. Light and vision are paradigmatic metaphors of the traditional Western thought. Hence in this article I seek to show why and how light and evidence do not tolerate absolute alterity. Identity can be sobered from the charms of evidence only by responsible relation to the Other, i.e. by ethics. Here identical subject loses the right of priority in front of the imperative of the other person. Idea of infinity worries total identity from within. Infinity does not permit identity to quiet down and induces to heed transcendence and alterity. Only in this way alterity can escape the violence to become a content of egocentrical identity and the victim of manipulation. Responsibility in the face of the other person precedes evident perception and legitimates the latter.Keywords: identity, evidence, alterity, sociality.


of supposing that there are intrinsic qualitative features of mental representations—I doubt that this is a mistake—but the mistake of supposing that these intrinsic qualitative features represent the world by mirroring or picturing it so that representation goes first and foremost by way of intrinsic similarity. What could be intrinsically similar to an array of sense qualities across a sense field? Answer: an array of qualities across space and time. If this is what is primarily represented by a perceptual representation then the problem is how it is we arrive at representational contents to the effect that there are persisting objects. The natural answer is that we derive such contents; it is as if we infer them demonstratively or non-demonstratively from what is primarily represented. So persisting objects are either constructions out of distributions of qualities or the inferred causes of such distributions. It is this whole empiricist problematic which must be rejected. Representation is our characteristic activity. What justifies a particular kind of representation or judgement made immediately as a result of perceptual experience is not that it mirrors or pictures or is intrinsically similar to an independently characterizable reality but that it is the representation or judgement which we would standardly and non-collusively make under just those conditions of perceptual experience. So it is with perceptual judgements of persistence. We spontaneously and non-collusively make them on the basis of perceptual experience. Although particular judgements of persistence may be overturned by the discovery of the sort of trickery mentioned above, the overturning takes place by means of accounting for the illusory appearance of persistence as due to the causal powers of a more inclusive framework of persisting objects. The global commitment to the effect that the world is made up of persisting objects is not a reasoned consequence of some prior commitment to the effect that the world contains at least distributions of qualities over space­ time. It is something we spontaneously and dogmatically employ as a fundamental theme in our everyday representation of the way the world is. How do we earn the right to this dogmatism? How do we earn the right to spontaneously go in for representations as of persisting objects? (By what right do we so synthesize the


2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 232-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Goldie

I argue that emotional feelings are not just bodily feelings, but also feelings directed towards things in the world beyond the bounds of the body, and that these feelings ( feelings towards) are bound up with the way we take in the world in emotional experience.


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