scholarly journals The Holy Trinity of Geometry: Beauty, Virtue & Truth

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  

The virtue of absolute geometry is its accessibility to the ordinary human mind coupled with certain degree of intuition which is kind of connectedness of the human brain to the universal logico-mathematical machinery. In the end all the problem of existence reduces to the elementary operations within the continuum of natural numbers. Nontriviality and consistence of the system make the beauty of geometry. Geometry’s last truths prove to be written in beautiful and mnemonical aphorisms

2006 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jörg Brendle ◽  
Shuguo Zhang

AbstractWe investigate the set (ω) of partitions of the natural numbers ordered by ≤* where A ≤* B if by gluing finitely many blocks of A we can get a partition coarser than B. In particular, we determine the values of a number of cardinals which are naturally associated with the structure ((ω), ≥*), in terms of classical cardinal invariants of the continuum.


2001 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-174
Author(s):  
Edmund Leach

I must start with a personal disavowal. This essay employs an explicitly Lévi-Straussian procedure but it is not intended as a guide to wider aspects of Lévi-Strauss thought. Although I feel reasonably safe with Lévi-Strauss's concept of structure, I am quite out of my depth when it comes to the related but subtler notion of esprit. Lévi-Strauss's esprit appears in sundry guises. In 1952, originally in English, he/it was a personalized “human mind”, an uninvited guest who took his place around the conference table among a group of American linguists and anthropologists (I); in the earlier chapters of La pensée sauvage he is perhaps the bricoleur—handiman—who is busy contriving culture from the junk of history and anything else that comes to hand (2); at the conclusion of Le cru et le cuit (3), in more abstract and more serious vein, esprit seems to be a kind of limiting characteristic of the human brain mechanism and appears as part of an extremely involved interchange relationship in which it (esprit) is the causal force producing myths of which its own structure is a precipitate. Elsewhere again (4) esprit seems to correspond to that very mysterious something which is a mediator between “praxis et pratiques” and which is described as « le schème conceptuel par l'opération duquel une matière et une forme, dépourvues l'une et l'autre d'existence indépendante, s'accomplissent comme structures, c'est-à-dire comme êtres à la fois empiriques et intelligibles ».


Author(s):  
Justin E. H. Smith

This concluding chapter links antiquarian and contemporary conceptions of race, though at the same time noting that there can be no easy distinction between the two. It shows that while there may be transhistorical and innate predispositions to divide human society into a fixed number of essentialized subgroups, it would be extremely hasty to suppose that these “kinks” of the human mind are somehow fixed in the human brain. Between any possible predisposition and the actual modern history of thinking about race, there is a tremendous amount of room for conceptualizing alternative paths our deep-seated propensities for thinking about human diversity might have taken, and could still yet take.


Mind Shift ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
John Parrington

This introductory chapter begins by providing an overview of the power of the human brain, which is displayed in the wonders of modern civilization. Despite the human brain’s capacity for such intellectual and technological feats, we still know astonishingly little about how it achieves them. This deficit in understanding is a problem not only because it means we lack basic knowledge of the biological factors that underlie our human uniqueness, but also because, for all its amazing capabilities, the human mind seems particularly prone to dysfunction. Still, some would argue there is good reason to be optimistic about the prospect of developing new and better treatments for mental disorders in the not-so-distant future. Such optimism is based on the increasing potential to study how the brain works in various important new ways thanks to recent technological innovations. The chapter then considers two overly polarised views of the human mind. Ultimately, this book argues that society radically restructures the human brain within an individual person’s lifetime, and that it has also played a central role in the past history of our species, by shaping brain evolution.


Mind Shift ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 19-31
Author(s):  
John Parrington

This chapter discusses different views on the basis of human consciousness. A major problem with much popular speculation about the biological roots of consciousness is that those who advocate a gene-based view of consciousness often appear to have little understanding of modern genetics, while speculation about how brain structures shape that consciousness often bear little resemblance to emerging knowledge about the complexity of an actual human brain. There is a common thread here, which is that idealised genes and brains have been substituted for real ones. Unfortunately, because of this tendency, it is not clear how much we have really advanced forwards from René Descartes and his belief that the human mind was an unknowable entity, or for that matter, the behaviourists with their view that the human mind could be treated as a black box. In contrast, to understand human consciousness, there is a need to understand real genes, real brains, and how these have evolved in humans compared to other species.


2019 ◽  
pp. 44-71
Author(s):  
Riane Eisler

This chapter introduces a new perspective on the role of love in human evolution and human development. The bonds of love, whether between parent and child, lovers, or close friends, may all have a common biological root, activating neurochemicals that make us feel good. Like other human capacities, such as consciousness, learning, and creativity, love has a long and fascinating evolutionary history. Indeed, the evolution of love appears to be integral to the development of our human brain and hence to much that distinguishes us from other species. Moreover, love plays a vital, though still largely unrecognized, role in human development, with evidence accumulating about the negative effects of love deprivation as well as the benefits of love. But whether or not our needs for meaning and love are met, and whether or not our capacities for creativity and love are expressed, are largely determined by the interaction of biology and culture—specifically, the degree to which a culture or subculture orients to the partnership or domination end of the continuum.


1966 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edmund Leach

I must start with a personal disavowal. This essay employs an explicitly Lévi-Straussian procedure but it is not intended as a guide to wider aspects of Lévi-Strauss thought. Although I feel reasonably safe with Lévi-Strauss's concept of structure, I am quite out of my depth when it comes to the related but subtler notion of esprit. Lévi-Strauss's esprit appears in sundry guises. In 1952, originally in English, he/it was a personalized “human mind”, an uninvited guest who took his place around the conference table among a group of American linguists and anthropologists (1); in the earlier chapters of La pensée sauvage he is perhaps the bricoleur—handiman—who is busy contriving culture from the junk of history and anything else that comes to hand (2); at the conclusion of Le cru et le cuit (3), in more abstract and more serious vein, esprit seems to be a kind of limiting characteristic of the human brain mechanism and appears as part of an extremely involved interchange relationship in which it (esprit) is the causal force producing myths of which its own structure is a precipitate. Elsewhere again (4) esprit seems to correspond to that very mysterious something which is a mediator between “praxis et pratiques” and which is described as « le schème conceptuel par l'opération duquel une matière et une forme, dépourvues l'une et l'autre d'existence indépendante, s'accomplissent comme structures, c'est-à-dire comme êtres à la fois empiriques et intelligibles ».


Author(s):  
Jack M. Gorman

Some scientists now argue that humans are really not superior to other species, including our nearest genetic neighbors, chimpanzees and bonobos. Indeed, those animals seem capable of many things previously thought to be uniquely human, including a sense of the future, empathy, depression, and theory of mind. However, it is clear that humans alone produce speech, dominate the globe, and have several brain diseases like schizophrenia. There are three possible sources within the brain for these differences in brain function: in the structure of the brain, in genes coding for proteins in the brain, and in the level of expression of genes in the brain. There is evidence that all three are the case, giving us a place to look for the intersection of the human mind and brain: the expression of genes within neurons of the prefrontal cortex.


1976 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 188-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Cenzer

Monotone inductive definitions occur frequently throughout mathematical logic. The set of formulas in a given language and the set of consequences of a given axiom system are examples of (monotone) inductively defined sets. The class of Borel subsets of the continuum can be given by a monotone inductive definition. Kleene's inductive definition of recursion in a higher type functional (see [6]) is fundamental to modern recursion theory; we make use of it in §2.Inductive definitions over the natural numbers have been studied extensively, beginning with Spector [11]. We list some of the results of that study in §1 for comparison with our new results on inductive definitions over the continuum. Note that for our purposes the continuum is identified with the Baire space ωω.It is possible to obtain simple inductive definitions over the continuum by introducing real parameters into inductive definitions over N—as in the definition of recursion in [5]. This is itself an interesting concept and is discussed further in [4]. These parametric inductive definitions, however, are in general weaker than the unrestricted set of inductive definitions, as is indicated below.In this paper we outline, for several classes of monotone inductive definitions over the continuum, solutions to the following characterization problems:(1) What is the class of sets which may be given by such inductive definitions ?(2) What is the class of ordinals which are the lengths of such inductive definitions ?These questions are made more precise below. Most of the results of this paper were announced in [2].


2011 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 166-194
Author(s):  
Christopher Bruhn

The philosophy of William James can be useful in the interpretation of works of art, although James himself never specifically set forth an aesthetic theory. As an example, a Jamesian view of consciousness is enacted on multiple levels in Charles Ives's Piano Sonata No. 2, “Concord, Mass., 1840–60,” and the accompanying Essays before a Sonata. James's metaphor for the working of the human mind—a view widely circulated in Ives's day—as a “stream of thought,” the largely transitory movement of which James likened to a bird's flights and perchings; the value James finds in vagueness; and his treatment of the nature of truth as fundamentally mutable and provisional all find musical expression in the “Concord” Sonata. Additionally, the complex genealogy of the sonata and its connection to related works, notably the Fourth and Universe Symphonies, can be interpreted as reflecting James's cosmological vision of a pluralistic universe or “multiverse.” Reading the sonata through a Jamesian lens provides new insights into the behavior of Ives's music by relating it to turn-of-the-century thinking about the functioning of the human brain as well as early-twentieth-century American philosophy and cosmology.


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