Breaking the self

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (I) ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Wanja Wiese

Are there logically possible types of conscious experience that are nomologically impossible, given independently justified assumptions about the neural underpinnings of consciousness in human beings? In one sense, this is trivial: just consider the fact that the types of perceptual experiences we can have are limited by our sensory organs. But there may be non-trivial types of conscious experience that are impossible. For instance, if there is a basic type of self-consciousness, corresponding to a phenomenal property that is nomologically necessary for consciousness, then experiences lacking this phenomenal property will be (nomologically) impossible. More generally, it may be that there are causal dependencies between the neural mechanisms that are required to instantiate distinct phenomenal properties (in human beings). If this is the case, instantiating one of these phenomenal properties without certain others may be impossible, which means there are non-trivial cases of nomologically impossible types of conscious experience. This paper clarifies this hypothesis, outlines a general methodology for its investigation, and relates it to research on radical disruptions of self-consciousness.

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-100
Author(s):  
Daniel Strassberg

The insight that human beings are prone to deceive themselves is part of our everyday knowledge of human nature. Even so, if deceiving someone means to deliberately misrepresent something to him, it is difficult to understand how it is possible to deceive yourself. This paper tries to address this difficulty by means of a narrative approach. Self-deception is conceived as a change of the narrative context by means of which the same fact appears in a different light. On these grounds, depending on whether the self-deceiver adopts an ironic attitude to his self-deception or not, it is also possible to distinguish between a morally inexcusable self-deception and a morally indifferent one.


Author(s):  
Natalia Marandiuc

The question of what home means and how it relates to subjectivity has fresh urgency in light of pervasive contemporary migration, which ruptures the human self, and painful relational poverty, which characterizes much of modern life. Yet the Augustinian heritage that situates true home and right attachment outside this world has clouded theological conceptualizations of earthly belonging. This book engages this neglected topic and argues for the goodness of home, which it construes relationally rather than spatially. In dialogue with research in the neuroscience of attachment theory and contemporary constructions of the self, the book advances a theological argument for the function of love attachments as sources of subjectivity and enablers of human freedom. The book shows that paradoxically the depth of human belonging—thus, dependence—is directly proportional to the strength of human agency—hence, independence. Building on Søren Kierkegaard’s imagery alongside other sources, the book depicts human love as interwoven with the infinite streams of divine love, forming a sacramental site for God’s presence, and playing a constitutive role in the making of the self. The book portrays the self both as gifted from God in inchoate form and as engaged in continuous, albeit nonlinear becoming via experiences of human love. The Holy Spirit indwells the attachment space between human beings as a middle term preventing its implosion or dissolution and conferring a stability that befits the concept of home. The interstitial space between loving human persons subsists both anthropologically and pneumatologically and generates the self’s home.


Societies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 84
Author(s):  
Chiara Imperato ◽  
Tiziana Mancini

The effects of intergroup dialogues on intercultural relations in digital societies and the growing conflict, inflammatory and hate speech phenomena characterizing these environments are receiving increasing attention in socio-psychological studies. Based on Allport’s contact theory, scholars have shown that online intercultural contact reduces ethnic prejudice and discrimination, although it is not yet clear when and how this occurs. By analyzing the role of the Dialogical Self in online intercultural dialogues, we aim to understand how individuals position themselves and others at three levels of inclusiveness—personal, social, and human—and how this process is associated with attitudes towards the interlocutor, intergroup bias and prejudice, whilst also considering the inclusion of the Other in the Self and ethnic/racial identity. An experimental procedure was administered via the Qualtrics platform, and data were collected among 118 undergraduate Italian students through an anonymous questionnaire. From ANOVA and moderation analysis, it emerged that the social level of inclusiveness was positively associated with ethnic/racial identity and intergroup bias. Furthermore, the human level of inclusiveness was associated with the inclusion of the Other in the Self and ethnic/racial identity, and unexpectedly, also with intergroup bias. We conclude that when people interact online as “human beings”, the positive effect of online dialogue fails, hindering the differentiation processes necessary to define one’s own and the interlocutor’s identities. We discuss the effects of intercultural dialogue in the landscape of digital societies and the relevance of our findings for theory, research and practice.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Bitsch ◽  
Philipp Berger ◽  
Andreas Fink ◽  
Arne Nagels ◽  
Benjamin Straube ◽  
...  

AbstractThe ability to generate humor gives rise to positive emotions and thus facilitate the successful resolution of adversity. Although there is consensus that inhibitory processes might be related to broaden the way of thinking, the neural underpinnings of these mechanisms are largely unknown. Here, we use functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, a humorous alternative uses task and a stroop task, to investigate the brain mechanisms underlying the emergence of humorous ideas in 24 subjects. Neuroimaging results indicate that greater cognitive control abilities are associated with increased activation in the amygdala, the hippocampus and the superior and medial frontal gyrus during the generation of humorous ideas. Examining the neural mechanisms more closely shows that the hypoactivation of frontal brain regions is associated with an hyperactivation in the amygdala and vice versa. This antagonistic connectivity is concurrently linked with an increased number of humorous ideas and enhanced amygdala responses during the task. Our data therefore suggests that a neural antagonism previously related to the emergence and regulation of negative affective responses, is linked with the generation of emotionally positive ideas and may represent an important neural pathway supporting mental health.


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-88
Author(s):  
Robert Farrugia

Michel Henry radicalises phenomenology by putting forward the idea of a double manifestation: the “Truth of Life” and “truth of the world.” For Henry, the world turns out to be empty of Life. To find its essence, the self must dive completely inward, away from the exterior movements of intentionality. Hence, Life, or God, for Henry, lies in non‑intentional, immanent self-experience, which is felt and yet remains invisible, in an absolutist sense, as an a priori condition of all conscious experience. In Christian theology, the doctrine of the Trinity illuminates the distinction between the immanent Trinity (God’s self‑relation) and the economic workings of the Trinity (God‑world relation). However, the mystery of God’s inmost being and the economy of salvation are here understood as inseparable. In light of this, the paper aims to: 1) elucidate the significance of Henry’s engagement with the phenomenological tradition and his proposal of a phenomenology of Life which advocates an immanent auto‑affection, radically separate from the ek‑static nature of intentionality, and 2) confront the division between Life and world in Henry’s Christian phenomenology and its discordancy with the doctrine of the Trinity, as the latter attests to the harmonious unity that subsists between inner life and the world.


Author(s):  
Ian Tattersall

Human beings are symbolic in the sense that they—uniquely—partition the world into a vocabulary of mental symbols that can be recombined to make statements not only about things as they are, but as they might be. An appraisal of the archaeological and fossil records shows that this unusual way of manipulating information was a recent acquisition, and one that occurred within the tenure of Homo sapiens on the planet. Almost certainly, the necessary neural underpinnings were exaptively acquired along with the distinctive skeletal structure of Homo sapiens, although the new potential was only subsequently released by a necessarily cultural stimulus. This stimulus was most likely the spontaneous and sudden invention of language, the quintessential symbolic activity. That the algorithmic change in brain function involved was more frugal metabolically than its intuitive predecessor is strongly supported by the observed 12.7 percent diminution in average human brain volumes since the late Pleistocene.


Author(s):  
Nikolas Rose ◽  
Joelle M. Abi-Rached

This chapter explores the neurobiological self. It argues that the emerging neuroscientific understandings of selfhood are unlikely to efface modern human beings' understanding of themselves as persons equipped with a deep interior world of mental states that have a causal relation to their action. Rather, they are likely to add a neurobiological dimension to human beings' self-understanding and their practices of self-management. In this sense, the “somatic individuality” which was once the province of the psy- sciences, is spreading to the neuro- sciences. Yet psy is not being displaced by neuro: neurobiological conceptions of the self are being construed alongside psychological ones.


2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 01-14
Author(s):  
Meriama Hansali Mebarki

The reinforcement sensitivity theory lacks basic sources of any human experience :time, place, and learning contexts that have shaped the reinforcement; therefore I have assumed a missing link in Gray's framework based on special relativity relying on the «what, where, and when of happenning»? as major resources of human conscious experience, which under punishment or reward exceed the sensitivity to pleasant or unpleasant stimuli transcending therefore the Weber law, that's why I called it: Psychological Space-Time Reinforcement Sensitivity “PSTRS” axis. The lasts explains BAS and BIS systems sensitivity to reinforcement across the cognitive space-time continuum of episodic memory, and not only across the two great dimensions of fear/anxiety and defensive distance of the McNaughton & Corr model of 2004. So, based on the disruption of the high-sensitivity information processing system in the brain, the four-dimensional conscious experience is distorted by its underlying sources and context. Thus, one of the timedominating records prevents the individual from overcoming the present., such in depression, obsessive compulsive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder (psychological sensitivity to the past). These temporal records clearly lose their sequence and associative nature in dissociative symptoms due to the disruption of the most important milestone on which Einstein's physics was based. Consequently, psychological space-time reinforcement sensitivity supposes that psychological disorders can be interpreted according to the laws of special relativity (acceleration / deceleration), but this seems more complicated when it comes to mental disorders where the self is disturbed on its spatio-temporal axis as observed in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia looks like a three-componements disorder characterized by a disruption of the experience of time, place and self, which could be asummed up as a “self space-time disturbance". Notably schizophrenic patients appear losing the ability to gather in a dynamic way these componements, as if the world seemed missig the gestalt characteristic or fragmented. The past felt like an inevitable destiny inhibits the direction towards the future; sometimes disorient the self to the point of feeling lost, as if the psychological time slows down to the point of feeling separated from the « now » the physical time. So are we dealing with an Euclidian space? The article attempts to provide a non-traditional interpretation of mental disorders by including general relativity in psychological studies, based on the neurobiological bases involved in the spatio-temporal processing of the conscious experience in the quantum brain.


Author(s):  
Benjamin K. Johnson ◽  
Michael D. Slater ◽  
Nathaniel A. Silver ◽  
David R. Ewoldsen

Temporarily expanded boundaries of the self (TEBOTS) proposes underlying motivations for engaging with stories. TEBOTS points out that fundamental human drives for agency, autonomy, and connectedness are imperfectly attainable. As a result, human beings turn to transcendent experiences that offer self-expansion, especially engagement with mediated worlds and the stories and characters they provide. TEBOTS provides unique hypotheses about how the self-concept relates to the selection, processing, and effects of media entertainment. Confirmatory evidence for TEBOTS shows that threats to the self can increase responsiveness to narratives, and that effects are attributable to a boundary expansion mechanism. Recent studies demonstrate that boundary expansion during media use can facilitate positive outgroup perceptions and attitude change. The TEBOTS framework also provides testable propositions regarding the influence of life stressors such as finance, health, and relationships on narrative engagement and enjoyment, carrying potential implications for narrative influence on stressed populations.


Author(s):  
Sergio Dellavalle

Within the Western tradition the concept of human dignity is related to the idea of human beings as ‘imagines Dei’. Yet this connection does not guarantee any suitable basis for the principle of the defence of religious freedom. Therefore, modern rationalism developed an alternative proposal, centred on the notion of religious tolerance. This approach, however, proves to be as inadequate as the belief-based vision in order to provide for a convincing foundation of a concept of religious freedom understood not only as a ‘negative freedom’ but as an essential element of the self-realization of humans. To overcome the deficits of both approaches, a third understanding is explored in which the experience of faith is recognized as an essential enrichment of social life and ‘tolerance’ is substituted by ‘mutual recognition’, paving the way to a positive acknowledgement of difference.


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