scholarly journals When the Part Mirrors the Whole: Interactions Beyond “Simple Location”

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Gomez-Marin ◽  
Juan Arnau

Reductionism relies on expectations that it is possible to make sense of the whole by studying its parts, whereas emergentism considers that program to be unattainable, partly due to the existence of emergent properties. The emergentist holistic stance is particularly relevant in biology and cognitive neuroscience, where interactions amongst system components and environment are key. Here we consider Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy as providing important insights to metaphysics of science in general, and to the reductionism vs. emergentism debate in particular. An appraisal of Whitehead's perspective reveals a difficulty shared by both approaches, referred to him as “simple location”: the commitment to the idea that the nature of things is exhausted by their intrinsic or internal properties, and does not take into account relations or dynamic interactions denoting “togetherness.” In a word, that things are simply where they are. Whitehead criticizes this externalist ontological perspective in which each interacting element exists, and can be thought, without essential reference to other elements. The aim of this work is to uncover such a stance, particularly in the context of dynamical systems, and to show its shortcomings. We propose an alternative relational approach based on Whitehead's notion of “internal relations,” which we explicate and illustrate with several examples. Our work aims to criticize the notion of simple location, even in the framework of emergentist accounts, so as to contribute to a “relational turn” that will conceive “inter-identities” as “intra-identities” in which interactants are not enduring substances, but internally related processes. In sum, we argue that the notion of internal relations has a strong theoretical power to overcome some fundamental difficulties in the study of life and mind.

Author(s):  
Peng Xu

AbstractMicrobial consortium is a complex adaptive system with higher order dynamic characteristics that are not present by individual members. To accurately predict the social interactions, we formulate a set of unstructured kinetic models to quantitatively capture the dynamic interactions of multiple microbial species. By introducing an interaction coefficient, we analytically derived the steady state solutions for the interacting species and the substrate profile in the chemostat. We analyzed the stability of the possible co-existing states defined by competition, parasitism, amensalism, commensalism and cooperation. Our model predicts that only parasitism, commensalism and cooperation could lead to stable co-existing state. We also determined the optimal social interaction criteria of microbial coculture with sequential metabolic reactions compartmentalized into two distinct species. Coupled with Luedeking–Piret and Michaelis-Menten equations, accumulation of metabolic intermediates in one species and formation of end-product in another species could be derived and assessed. We discovered that parasitism consortia disfavor the bioconversion of intermediate to final product; and commensalism consortia could efficiently convert metabolic intermediates to final product and maintain metabolic homeostasis with a broad range of operational conditions (i.e., dilution rates); whereas cooperative consortia leads to highly nonlinear pattern of precursor accumulation and end-product formation. The underlying dynamics and emergent properties of microbial consortia may provide critical knowledge for us to engineer efficient bioconversion process, deliver effective gut therapeutics as well as elucidate probiotic-pathogen interactions in general.


2016 ◽  
Vol 371 (1693) ◽  
pp. 20150379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanne De Jaegher ◽  
Ezequiel Di Paolo ◽  
Ralph Adolphs

A recent framework inspired by phenomenological philosophy, dynamical systems theory, embodied cognition and robotics has proposed the interactive brain hypothesis (IBH). Whereas mainstream social neuroscience views social cognition as arising solely from events in the brain, the IBH argues that social cognition requires, in addition, causal relations between the brain and the social environment. We discuss, in turn, the foundational claims for the IBH in its strongest form; classical views of cognition that can be raised against the IBH; a defence of the IBH in the light of these arguments; and a response to this. Our goal is to initiate a dialogue between cognitive neuroscience and enactive views of social cognition. We conclude by suggesting some new directions and emphases that social neuroscience might take.


2005 ◽  
Vol 48 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 21-34
Author(s):  
Slobodan Perovic

It is widely believed among philosophers that a higher-level property, if it is a physical property, must be instantiated by a complex structure consisting of more basic physical properties. Dynamic properties of a higher than the most basic level are thus merely recombination of atomic properties. Consequently, no dynamics describing changes in the world, such as development, and/or interactions between physical, chemical, biological, or other systems, can possibly contradict this claim. Traditionally analogically emergent properties are understood to be novel "internal" properties of complex entities that cannot be reduced to lower-level properties. Taxonomies of emergence driven by reductionist motives regard such properties as mythical (e.g. vital force), acknowledging a possibility of only epistemic emergence in the world of physical properties. I propose in response that such a taxonomy may be incomplete. Biological systems as they are explained in terms of non-linear dynamics, I suggest, may fit requirements of non-epistemic emergence, exhibiting properties of relationally holistic systems. In a system explained in terms of nonlinear dynamics, none of the external properties influencing the system is singled out as the cause of its abrupt changes. Instead, a relation among the constituents of the system seems to be responsible for such a turn of events. I illustrate applications of nonlinear dynamics to the cases of metabolic control and biological pattern-formation. I outline relevant conceptual and empirical questions that should be addressed in order to answer whether the accounts concerning biological and possibly other types of natural systems which appeal to nonlinear dynamics, may be suggesting that behavior of these systems goes beyond epistemic emergence.


2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 316-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuichi Shoda ◽  
Scott LeeTiernan ◽  
Walter Mischel

The implications of conceptualizing personality as a cognitive-affective processing system that functions as a parallel constraint satisfaction network are explored. Computer simulations show that from dynamic interactions among the units in such a network, a set of stable attractor states and functionally equivalent groups of situations emerge, such that IF exposed to situation group X, THEN the system settles in attractor Y. This conceptualization explicitly models the effect of situations on a given individual, and therefore can also be used to model the function of interpersonal systems. We demonstrate this possibility by modeling dyadic systems in which one partner's behavior becomes the situational input into the other partner's personality system, and vice versa. The results indicate that each member of the dyad will, in general, exhibit new attractor states. This suggests that the thoughts, affects, and behaviors that an individual typically experiences are a function not of that individual's personality system alone, but rather a function of the interpersonal system of which the individual is a part. Just as individuals have distinctive and stable IF-THEN signatures, so do interpersonal relationships. Understanding the structure of the cognitive-affective processing system of each relationship partner also should enable predictions of their distincitve relational signatures as emergent properties of the interpersonal system that develops.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis H. Favela ◽  

I defend the claim that emergence is always a kind of interaction dominance. I utilize Francescotti’s (2007) definition of emergence, which captures five features typically thought crucial for emergence: downward causal influence, novelty, relationality, supervenience, and unpredictability. I then explicate interaction dominance, a concept from complexity science. In short, a system is interaction dominant when the interactions of the parts give rise to features that override the features of the parts in isolation or linked via additive and linear dynamics. Locust swarms are presented as an illustrative case of a natural phenomenon that meets the definition for emergent properties. Moreover, locust swarms provide a case of an emergent property arising via interaction-dominant dynamics. I conclude by discussing the relationship of emergence and interaction dominance, with emphasis on the claim that all emergent properties occur due to interaction dominance, but not all systems that exhibit interaction-dominant dynamics have emergent properties.


Entropy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 568
Author(s):  
Ian Durham

In this article, I develop a formal model of free will for complex systems based on emergent properties and adaptive selection. The model is based on a process ontology in which a free choice is a singular process that takes a system from one macrostate to another. I quantify the model by introducing a formal measure of the ‘freedom’ of a singular choice. The ‘free will’ of a system, then, is emergent from the aggregate freedom of the choice processes carried out by the system. The focus in this model is on the actual choices themselves viewed in the context of processes. That is, the nature of the system making the choices is not considered. Nevertheless, my model does not necessarily conflict with models that are based on internal properties of the system. Rather it takes a behavioral approach by focusing on the externalities of the choice process.


Sociology ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 003803852110202
Author(s):  
Nick Crossley

In this article I argue for a relational approach to the agency–structure problem. Structure has three dimensions from this perspective but, at its most fundamental, it is a network comprising social actors (human and corporate) and the relations connecting them. Defined thus structure has measurable properties which generate both opportunities and constraints for actors and which shape processes, such as diffusion, which affect and implicate them. Agency is integral to this model. Actors are the nodes of the network and their relations are built, maintained, modified and broken by way of their interactions. However, I argue that the human organism only fully becomes a social actor by way of interaction. In effect, both agency and structure are emergent properties of social interactions/relations which act back upon and shape those interactions/relations. In addition to resolving theoretical problems this approach has the advantage of facilitating empirical analysis of structure.


2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 3-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina Zarowsky ◽  
Slim Haddad ◽  
Vinh-Kim Nguyen

This paper reviews approaches to vulnerability in public health, introducing a series of 10 papers addressing vulnerability in health in Africa. We understand vulnerability as simultaneously a condition and a process. Social inequalities are manifest in and exacerbate three key dimensions of vulnerability: the initial level of wellbeing, the degree of exposure to risk, and the capacity to manage risk effectively. We stress the dynamic interactions linking material and social deprivation, poverty, powerlessness and ill health: risks or shocks and their health impacts are intimately interconnected and reinforce each other in a cycle which in the absence of effective interventions, increases vulnerability. An inductive process which does not begin with an a priori definition or measurement of ‘vulnerability’ and which does not assume the existence of fixed ‘vulnerable groups’ allowed us both to re-affirm core aspects of existing conceptual frameworks, and to engage in new ways with literature specifically addressing vulnerability and resilience at the population level as well as with literature – for example in ecology, and on the concept of frailty in research on aging – with which researchers on health and poverty in Africa may not be familiar. We invite conceptual and empirical work on vulnerability in complex systems frameworks. These perspectives emphasize contexts and nonlinear causality thus supporting analyses of vulnerability and resilience as both markers and emergent properties of dynamic interactions. We accept a working definition of vulnerability, and recognize that some definable groups of people are more likely than others to suffer harm from exposure to health risks. But we suggest that the real work – at both intellectual and policy/political levels – lies in understanding and responding to the dynamics, meanings and power relations underlying actual instances and processes of vulnerability and harm.


2008 ◽  
Vol 18 (06) ◽  
pp. 1821-1824 ◽  
Author(s):  
VICENTE ABOITES

It is proposed that any dynamical system with coexisting chaotic attractors has an emergent property. This provides a nonreductive explanation of mental states and their high sensitivity to noise and initial conditions. If metaphysical terms result from the mental states and these are emergent properties of dynamical systems with coexisting attractors, such as the brain, it is suggested that this may provide a physical explanation of metaphysical concepts.


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