IDLIB, THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

After seven years of conflict, the future of the Syrian civil war may come down to the battle for Idlib. Syrian leader Bashar Assad has already taken back control of much of the country, and this northwestern province is the last remaining rebel stronghold. But taking back Idlib won’t be easy. In fact, it’ll be harder and more complicated than many of the other recent campaigns in the south for two reasons. First, it is a much larger region than the areas in the south, such as Daraa, Eastern Ghouta and Quneitra, that the Syrian army seized in recent months. It is, therefore, also more heavily populated with rebels, in part because many of the cease-fires brokered by Russia in the south allowed rebels safe passage out of these areas and into Idlib. Second, Turkey has a military presence in Idlib. This complicates the situation for all parties involved because Turkey and the Syrian regime have conflicting interests in this region. Russia supports the regime but doesn’t want to go to war with Turkey, a country with which it needs to maintain good relations. For this reason, the Syrians are afraid the Russians may abandon them. Meanwhile, Turkey wants room to maneuver in relation to the U.S., and having hostile relations with Russia would limit its options. A battle over Idlib would therefore pose a threat to all parties involved in the conflict. In the wider power struggle among countries in this war, Idlib may be little more than a distraction, but it’s a dangerous one. Winning a military battle here may cost far more than anyone is prepared to pay. This article will consider another option: a deal among these countries to oust the rebel group that controls much of the province. All of these parties have an interest in eliminating this group – one of the most extreme in Idlib – and so it’s the one area where they can cooperate. For now, though, the most likely next phase in Idlib and the Syrian civil war is a concerted effort to eliminate HTS (and its offshoots like Hurras al-Din), and an acceptance of a more permanent Turkish presence in northwest Syria. A deal to eliminate HTC would, therefore, be in the interest of all these parties. But it could break down in two ways. The first would be through insurgent groups’ refusal to accept Turkish control. The second possible breakdown would involve Assad making moves to take back control of Idlib. This would, however, largely depend on how much support the regime could count on from its other stalwart ally, Iran. A solution to the struggle over this pocket of the country is less important than the relations among the big players in this war. It would therefore have to involve some sort of balance among them, perhaps with intermittent and indecisive small-scale combat but without a full-blooded attempt to win. They may not get everything they want out of such a deal, but they will all benefit in some way. And at this point, that may be the best they can hope for.