scholarly journals Digital Rights – New Generation of Human Rights?

Author(s):  
NATALIA V. VARLAMOVA

The digitalization substantially affects virtually all social relationships, the fact that requires reassessment of many basic legal concepts. Among them are human rights. It is now increasingly asserted that technological innovations result in the emergence of new digital rights being that fundamentally differ from conventional rights and form a new generation of human rights. The most frequent among such rights are a right to internet access, right to personal data protection and right to be forgotten (right to erasure). To assess the validity of such assertions it is necessary to clarify the grounds for classification of human rights by generations and to determine the correlation between new human rights and the conventional ones.The classification of human rights by their generations offered in 1970 by K. Vasak can be based upon substantive (essential) and chronological criteria. In the latter case the number of new generations of human rights can be whatsoever high while the difference between them is insignificant. If to proceed from the substantive criterion, the rights of the first generation express claims of a human being towards individual freedom and assume the obligation of the State to respect and protect it; rights of the second generation are claims towards social assistance on the part of the State and society to maintain an adequate standard of living; rights of the third generation are a sort of projection of rights of the first and second generations to relations between social communities (international, in proper sense, non сross-border, relations). In such context to substantiate the emergence of a new generation of human rights it is necessary to prove that the related rights forming it have an absolutely different legal nature as compared to the rights of the first and second generations.The right for internet access in international acts, national constitutions and laws as well as in judicial practice is primarily treated as a condition and guarantee of exercise of conventional human rights. Along with this, with due regard to a special significance of Internet for exercise of many human rights, development of democracy and civil society, transparency of state administration the access to it may be recognized as an independent human right. However, the legal nature of such right is quite conventional, it includes claims related both to the first and second generation of human rights. As a right of the first generation it assumes negative obligations of the State not to prohibit and not to restrict an access to Internet (certain Internet resources) and its positive obligations to establish a statutory regulation of access to Internet and provision of protection against illegal restrictions, interalia, on the part of private entities. As a right of the second generation the accessibility of Internet in its material and technical aspects may be regarded, the fact that assumes positive obligations of the State to establish a corresponding infrastructure, to subsidize the provider-supplied services, to organize public access points and to develop educational programs etc. Moreover, the currently applicable international and national regulation of this sphere of relations does not allow asserting that the legal recognition of the right to Internet access has taken place.

Author(s):  
Serhii Perepolkin ◽  
Danylo Perepolkin ◽  
Milena Averianova

The article examines the approaches of foreign and Ukrainian scientists to the division of human rights into three generations and the adoption of the category «fourth generation of human rights» into the scientific turnover. It has been established that both the initiative to put the said proposal into practice and the legislative consolidation of human rights defined as belonging to the fourth generation of human rights at national and international levels are ambiguously perceived by representatives of different nations. It is emphasized that human rights are a complex of natural and indestructible freedoms and legal possibilities, which have emerged due to the fact of human existence in society. Jurisprudence acknowledges the existence of three generations of human rights, each of which had arisen from the need to meet needs that arose alongside the course of human evolution. Nowadays, we can say that a radically new generation of human rights is emerging. Its appearance is related to the technological progress of humanity. The rights of the fourth generation are a category of rights that is ambiguously perceived by society in different countries. A large number of such rights is criticized both by religion and by morality. At the same time, notwithstanding the ongoing scientific debate on the formation of the fourth generation of human rights, it is necessary to acknowledge the existence of human rights, which include the right to die, the human right to dispose of the organs and tissues of his body, sexual rights, reproductive rights, the right to change sex, digital rights. The fourth generation of human rights is in its formation, and therefore the scientists’ proposed approaches to the classification of human rights based on exhaustive lists cannot fully reflect its actual state. In our opinion, at the present stage of its formation, the catalog of human rights of the fourth generation should include digital rights and somatic rights. It is important to emphasize that the doctrinal discussion of the fourth generation of human rights will not provide a complete overview of the topic. Therefore, there is a need to conduct a comprehensive analysis of specific human rights of the fourth generation at the international level, taking into account the consequences that their introduction or refusal to be recognized and implemented may result.


2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Auwais Rafudeen

This paper examines a South African debate on legislating Muslim marriages in the light of anthropologist Talal Asad’s critique developed in his Formations of the Secular (2003). It probes aspects of the debate under four Asadian themes: (1) the historicity of the secular, secularism, and secularization; (2) the place of power and the new articulations of discourses it creates; (3) the state as the arm of that power; and (4) the interconnections (or dislocations) among law, ethics, and the organic environment (habitus). I argue that Asad illumines the debate in the following ways: (1) by providing a deeper historical and philosophical appreciation of its terms of reference, given that the proposed legislation will be subject to South Africa’s secular Bill of Rights and constitution; (2) by requiring us to examine and interrogate the genealogies of such particular hegemonic discourses as human rights, which some participants appear to present as ahistorical and privileged; and (3) by showing, through the concept of habitus, why this debate needs to go beyond its present piecemeal legal nature and develop an appreciation of the organic linkages among the Shari‘ah, morality, community, and self. Yet inevitable nuances are produced when applying Asad’s ideas to the South African context.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felipe Schmidt

<p class="resumo"><strong>Resumo</strong>: O estudo trata da disciplina do acordo amigável entre o peticionário e o Estado-parte no âmbito da Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos e das características dessa avença (previsão, natureza jurídica, oportunidade, procedimento, papel da Comissão, obrigatoriedade ou não) e medidas adotadas em caso de êxito ou insucesso.</p><p class="resumo"><strong>Palavras-chave: </strong>Acordo Amigável, Sistema Interamericano de Direitos Humanos, Convenção Americana de Direitos Humanos, Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos.</p><p class="resumo"> </p><h3>BRIEF NOTES ON THE FRIENDLY SEETLEMENT IN THE INTER-AMERICAN COMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS</h3><div><p class="abstractCxSpFirst"><strong>ABSTRACT </strong>The study deals with the friendly seetlement between the petitioner and the State party within the framework of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the characteristics of this agreement (foreseeing, legal nature, timing, procedure, role of the Commission, mandatory or not) and measures adopted on success or failure).</p><p class="abstractCxSpLast"><strong>Keywords: </strong>Friendly Seetlement, Inter-american Human Rights System, American Convention on Human Rights, Inter-american Comission of Human Rights.</p></div>


2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (05) ◽  
pp. 145-148
Author(s):  
Ниджат Рафаэль оглу Джафаров ◽  

It can be accepted that the classification of human rights, its division, types, and groups, is of particular importance. The syllogism for human rights can be taken as follows: law belongs to man; human beings are the highest beings on earth like living beings. Therefore, the regulation prevails. The right to freedom is conditional. Man is free. Consequently, human rights are dependent. Morality is the limit of the law. Morality is the limit and content of human actions. Therefore, the law is the limit of human activities. Morality is related to law. Law is the norm of human behavior. Thereby, human behavior and direction are related to morality. The people create the state. The state has the right. Therefore, the right of the state is the right of the people. The state is an institution made up of citizens. Citizens have the privilege. Such blessings as Dignity, honor, conscience, zeal, honor, etc., and values are a part of morality and spiritual life. Morality is united with law. Therefore, moral values are part of the law. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and conscience. Space is about the law. Therefore, everyone has the right to opinion and conscience. Key words: human rights, freedom of conscience, conceptuality, citizenship


Author(s):  
Claire Whitlinger

This chapter investigates the causal connection between the 2004 commemoration and another racially significant transformation: Mississippi Senate Bill 2718, an education bill mandating civil rights and human rights education in Mississippi schools. Providing historical perspective on the legislation—the first of its kind in the country—the chapter traces its origins to the fortieth anniversary commemoration in Philadelphia, Mississippi in 2004. After providing a brief history of school desegregation in Mississippi and previous efforts to mandate Holocaust education in the state, the chapter demonstrates how the 2004 commemoration and subsequent civil rights trial mobilized a new generation of local memory activists. When joined with institutional resources at the state-level, these developments generated the commemorative capacity for local organizers to institutionalize civil rights memory through curricular change. Thus, in contrast to other multicultural or human rights education mandates, which have typically been outgrowths of large-scale progressive social movements or the diffusion of global norms, Mississippi’s civil and human rights education bill emerged out of local commemorative efforts.


1990 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 252-261
Author(s):  
Candace S. Brown ◽  
Stephen G. Bryant

The major advantage of the new generation of antidepressants lies in their enhanced ability to avoid unwanted side effects, such as anticholinergic or cardiovascular toxicities, and in many cases, to reduce fatalities after overdose. Second-generation antidepressants are as effective as the first generation agents, but are more selective, enabling precise targeting of symptoms. Caution in recommending the newer antidepressants must be applied, however, because these agents possess differing side effects, and unforeseen toxicities may not appear until after several years of use. Conventional tricyclics should not be overlooked in managing the depressed patient. This article discusses the symptoms of major depression, followed by the latest information on second-generation antidepressants. It concludes by providing the pharmacist with guidelines for when to select a newer over an older agent.


The article is devoted to the study of such sources of electoral law in Ukraine as the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the first Protocol to the Convention and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. The legal nature of these international sources of suffrage in Ukraine is considered. Attention is drawn to the peculiarities of the wording of the right to free election in Article 3 the first Protocol to the Convention. The peculiarities of the application of the above article by the European Court of Human Rights are disclosed. The importance the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights as a source of suffrage in Ukraine is emphasized. This assertion is justified by the fact that the rules of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols are of a general and abstract nature and are interpreted and filled with real meaning in judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, which are of precedent nature. A number of legal positions of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the obligation of the state to organize and hold democratic elections, enshrined in the specific decisions of this international judicial institution, have been analyzed. In the article were covered such legal positions as: the possibility of limiting the suffrage of citizens, provided that such conditions do not interfere with the free expression of the people's opinion on the election of the legislative body; evaluation of the electoral legislation in the light of the political development of the country, taking into account national characteristics; wide discretion of the state in the choice of the electoral system, which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people, etc. There are a number of unresolved issues regarding the application of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in judicial and administrative practice in Ukraine, one of which is the possible conflict between the case-law of the Court and the rules of Ukrainian law. It is proposed to resolve this conflict at the legislative level. The conclusions focus on the peculiarities of the legal nature of these sources of suffrage in Ukraine. KEY WORDS: sources of suffrage, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, right to free elections.


2013 ◽  
pp. 653-665
Author(s):  
Natasa Mrvic-Petrovic ◽  
Zdravko Petrovic

The legal basis of state responsibility for damage caused by unfair sentence or unfounded arrest is the need to protect fundamental human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution and generally accepted international rules. The right to compensation on this basis (although subjective civil right) has a sui generis legal nature, because it is connected with the protection of human rights. Joint public-private legal nature of such a request is expressed in the legislation of the Republic of Serbia, because the circle of authorized persons and the conditions under which they may be entitled to compensation is determined by the criminal procedural rules, while the existence of a legally recognized forms of damage and the extent to which the damage may be reimbursed is estimated according to the general rules of Law of obligations. While the legislation is very progressive, it is observed that, in practice, the applications for compensation are usually submitted because of the most unreasonable detention of up to one month or three months, and the inefficiency of the criminal proceedings, suspended upon the expiration of the absolute limitation of prosecution. The state could easily affect these practices. Also, the priority of state must be meeting its financial obligations with regard to final adjustments, and the imposition of demands for compensation.


1987 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 296-322 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Waldron

There is talk today of a ‘new generation’ of human rights. An idea which was associated in the first instance with civil and political liberties (‘first generation’ rights), and which was used after the Second World War to express popular aspirations to economic and social well-being (‘second generation’ rights), is now being invoked as a vehicle for claims about the importance of the environment, peace, and economic development, particularly in the Third World. No one doubts that these are worthy aims. But instead of merely saying that Third World countries need to develop their economies, instead of saying simply that peace is essential in a nuclear world, and that we must maintain and respect the eco-systems on which human life depends, the proclamation is being made that these are human rights —things to which people are entitled in the same way that they are entitled to democratic freedom or the right not to be tortured.


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