scholarly journals „Długi telegram” George’a Kennana

2020 ◽  
Vol 73 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-224
Author(s):  
Bartosz Bieliszczuk ◽  
Joanna Bieliszczuk

The Long Telegram by George Kennan was a turning point in the career of the American diplomat, and his theses contributed to the formulation of the Truman Doctrine, which involved fighting the growing influence of the USSR in the world. In the above-mentioned analysis sent in February 1946 to the headquarters of the State Department, Kennan included his observations and beliefs about the nature of the Soviet system and its impact on the foreign policy pursued by the USSR. Despite the fact that the text was written almost 75 years ago and concerned the Soviet Union, many of its theses are still valid, and reading it allows for a better understanding of the foreign policy of contemporary Russia.

Author(s):  
Toby C. Rider

This chapter explores the range of tactics used by the U.S. government in securing a favorable climate of opinion on the U.S. participation in the Olympics and discrediting the performance of the Soviet Union in the case of either victory or defeat. While it was easier to defend the U.S. sporting culture when U.S. athletes were winning athletic events around the world and dominating at the Olympics, the evolving nature of Soviet foreign policy in the aftermath of Stalin's death put pressure on the U.S. psychological warfare apparatus in the Olympic propaganda war. Thus, psychological warfare experts became even more involved in the activities of U.S. sports organizations, and began to press the boundaries of the state–private relationship.


Worldview ◽  
1971 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 9-11
Author(s):  
Donald Brandon

For a generation now, America has played a significant role in world affairs. Until Pearl Harbor a reluctant belligerent in World War II, this country was also slow to respond to the challenge of the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of that gigantic conflict. But for almost twenty-five years American Presidents have been more or less guided by the policy of “containment.” Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson all introduced variations on the multiple themes of the policy adopted by Harry Truman. Yet each concluded that the world situation allowed no reasonable alternative to an activist American foreign policy in most areas of the globe.


1950 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-214

The thinking of Left Wing Labourites on foreign policy since 1945 reveals the frustration, and, withal, the persistence of Utopian hopes in a period of particularly rapid and alarming change on the world stage.The victory of the British Labour Party in the elections of July, 1945 opened up to Left Wing Labourites intoxicating vistas of permanent peace and socialist brotherhood. The moment of triumph was ironically favorable to the fervor of Socialist Utopian hopes. Fascist military power in Europe had been crushed, and thb feat had been accomplished by the combined endeavors of the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union. Russia, so long the Janus of the socialists, socialist state and enemy of socialists, appeared to be ready for cooperation. Labourites gladly abandoned their “red-baiting” suspicions, and looked for the building of a socialist Europe, aided by the Resistance parties, whose work was generally exaggerated and, just as generally, claimed for socialism. Problems of economic reconstruction were of a magnitude to encourage believers in planning that the capitalist world would itself become socialist in its solutions; and the apparently imminent liquidation of old colonial empires made the radiance of freedom's dawn even more dazzling.


2021 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-38
Author(s):  
Maria Avanesova

The Russian Orthodox Church has become a significant actor in Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union. This text is dedicated to its role in Russiaʼs foreign policy, specifically to the topic of the Russian interest in problems and protection of Christians, which is one of the most essential parts of the cooperation between the state and the Church. Analyzing primary sources (state and Church documents), the author shows when and under what circumstances this topic became relevant to both actors, what role the Russian Orthodox Church played in this regard and how the topic of protecting Christians is used by the Russian regime today. The study shows that the interest in protection of Christians did not arise simultaneously on both sides and that it is connected mainly with situations where a threat for Christians is posed by unfriendly actors.


Author(s):  
Joseph Heller

This chapter shows the change in America’s attitude towards Israel, from opposition to de jure recognition of Israel’s military capabilities for the west during ther Korean war. While in 1948 secretary of state General Marshall warned against an enduring conflict with the Arabs, Truman recognized it de facto. However, the state department continued to treart Israel as a liability. Henry Byroade claimed that Israel should not be the homeland of the Jewish people. Israel was left outside of strategic western alliances because it was assumed that its membership might push the Arabs towards the Soviet Union. The notion that Truman’s administration was pro-Israel is a myth. Although Truman himself was sympathetic, the State Department and the Pentagon did not consider Israel an asset.


Author(s):  
Craig L. Symonds

The dissolution of the Soviet Union did not erase the need for a global U.S. Navy, as events in the Middle East and elsewhere provoked serial crises that led to the dispatch of U.S. naval combat groups to various hot spots around the world. ‘The U.S. Navy in the twenty-first century’ explains how the U.S. Navy continues to fulfill many of its historic missions—suppressing pirates, protecting trade, and pursuing drug runners. It is also a potent instrument of American foreign policy and a barometer of American concern. In addition to its deterrent and peacekeeping roles, the U.S. Navy also acts as a first responder to natural or man-made disasters that call for humane intervention.


2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mircea Munteanu

Romania's position regarding the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was the culmination of almost a decade of increasingly autonomous moves vis-à-vis Moscow. Based on new evidence from the Romanian archives, this article paints a more complete picture of Nicolae Ceauşescu's reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, placing it in the context of the international system and especially the Sino-Soviet split. Following the invasion, Romania remained just as committed as before to the goal of ensuring its maneuverability on the world scene, especially with regard to sovereignty and independence. Although Romanian leaders tried not to provoke the Soviet Union outright, they did not back down on important issues concerning Sino-Romanian relations and did not embrace Moscow's call for a common Warsaw Pact foreign policy. Romania did agree to certain compromises, but only because Ceauşescu believed that Romania would remain largely unaffected by them.


2005 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 657-678
Author(s):  
Paul Marantz

This paper analyzes the way in which internal forces are likely to affect Soviet foreign policy over the next few years. Four developments are examined: potential Soviet petroleum shortages, the growing Soviet Muslim population, the slowdown in the rate of economic growth in the Soviet Union, and the imminent post-Brezhnev succession struggle. The question is posed: Will these factors soon impel the Soviet Union toward foreign expansion and adventurism? It is our conclusion that two of these factors, the leveling off of oil production and the rapid growth of Soviet Muslims, are not likely to have a strong influence on Soviet foreign policy. On the other hand, the decline in growth rates and the demise of Brezhnev are likely to have a major impact on future Soviet policies. The Soviet system is not experiencing a terminal crisis, but it is definitely laboring under growing burdens. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that this will necessarily result in foreign expansion. A new, rejuvenated leadership may well seek a relaxation of tensions, as it did upon Stalin’s death in 1953, so as to create favorable conditions for dealing with its pressing problems. The future remains highly uncertain. International developments will be at least as important as domestic factors, and much will depend upon the policies adopted by Western governments.


1961 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Richard Lowenthal

The policy declaration and the appeal to the peoples of the world adopted last December by the Moscow conference of eighty-one Communist parties mark the end of one phase in the dispute between the leaderships of the ruling parties of China and the Soviet Union—the phase in which the followers of Mao for the first time openly challenged the standing of the Soviet Communists as the fountain-head of ideological orthodoxy for the world movement. But the “ideological dispute” which began in April was neither a sudden nor a self-contained development: it grew out of acute differences between the two Communist Great Powers over concrete diplomatic issues, and it took its course in constant interaction with the changes in Soviet diplomatic tactics. Hence the total impact of that phase on Soviet foreign policy on one side, and on the ideology, organisation and strategy of international Communism on the other, cannot be evaluated from an interpretation of the Moscow documents alone, but only from a study of the process as a whole, as it developed during the past year on both planes.


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