Personal identity

Author(s):  
Brian Garrett

What is it to be the same person today as one was in the past, or will be in the future? How are we to describe cases in which (as we might put it) one person becomes two? What, if anything, do the answers to such questions show about the rationality of the importance we attach to personal identity? Is identity really the justifier of the special concern which we have for ourselves in the future? These are the concerns of this entry. In order to answer the question about the persistence-conditions of persons we must indulge in some thought experiments. Only thus can we tease apart the strands that compose our concept of personal identity, and thereby come to appreciate the relative importance of each strand. There are plausible arguments against attempts to see the relation of personal identity as constitutively determined by the physical relations of same body, or same brain. I can survive with a new body, and a new brain. But it does not follow; nor is it true, that a person’s identity over time can be analysed exclusively in terms of psychological relations (relations of memory, belief, character, and so on). To the contrary, the most plausible view appears to be a mixed view, according to which personal identity has to be understood in terms of both physical and psychological relations. This is the view which can be extracted from our core (that is, minimally controversial) set of common-sense beliefs about personal identity. The possibility of the fission of persons– the possibility that, for example, a person’s brain hemispheres might be divided and transplanted into two new bodies – shows that the mixed view has to incorporate a non-branching or uniqueness clause in its analysis. The concept of personal identity, contrary to what we might first be inclined to believe, is an extrinsic concept (that is, whether a given person exists can depend upon the existence of another, causally unrelated, person). Some philosophers have recently tried to forge an important connection between theories of personal identity and value theory (ethics and rationality). The possibility of such a connection had not previously been investigated in any detail. It has been argued that, on the correct theory of personal identity, it is not identity that matters but the preservation of psychological relations such as memory and character. These relations can hold between one earlier person and two or more later persons. They can also hold to varying degrees (for example, I can acquire a more or less different character over a period of years). This view of what matters has implications for certain theories of punishment. A now reformed criminal may deserve less or no punishment for the crimes of their earlier criminal self. Discussions of personal identity have also provided a new perspective on the debate between utilitarianism and its critics.

GEOgraphia ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 9 (18) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marie-Vic Ozouf-Marignier ◽  
Marie-Claire Robic

No âmbito da renovação dos estudos sobre a história do pensamento geográfico, este artigo se opõe as interpretações que consagraram Paul Vidal de la Blache como um intelectual restrito às relações homem-meio e nostálgico da França camponesa. Uma leitura mais atent valiando a dinâmica sócio-econômica e seus impactos espaciais, a contribuição de Vidal de la Blache propunha, como solução para o futuro da França, uma nova regionalização do território nacional. Abstract This article presents a new perspective in the history of geographic thought, by opposing established approaches to Paul Vidal de Ia Blache as an intelectual restrict to relations man-environment and as a nostalgic of peasant France. A deeper reading of his work reveals a progressive passage from an initial "naturalistic" view to a socio-economic and urban-industrial approach. Through these economic impacts, Vidal proposes, as a solution for the future of France, a new regionalization of national temtory.


Author(s):  
James DiGiovanna

Enhancement and AI create moral dilemmas not envisaged in standard ethical theories. Some of this stems from the increased malleability of personal identity that this technology affords: an artificial being can instantly alter its memory, preferences, and moral character. If a self can, at will, jettison essential identity-giving characteristics, how are we to rely upon, befriend, or judge it? Moral problems will stem from the fact that such beings are para-persons: they meet all the standard requirements of personhood (self-awareness, agency, intentional states, second-order desires, etc.) but have an additional ability—the capacity for instant change—that disqualifies them from ordinary personal identity. In order to rescue some responsibility assignments for para-persons, a fine-grained analysis of responsibility-bearing parts of selves and the persistence conditions of these parts is proposed and recommended also for standard persons who undergo extreme change.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 260-278
Author(s):  
Christoph Demmerling

Abstract The following article argues that fictional texts can be distinguished from non-fictional texts in a prototypical way, even if the concept of the fictional cannot be defined in classical terms. In order to be able to characterize fictional texts, semantic, pragmatic, and reader-conditioned factors have to be taken into account. With reference to Frege, Searle, and Gabriel, the article recalls some proposals for how we might define fictional speech. Underscored in particular is the role of reception for the classification of a text as fictional. I make the case, from a philosophical perspective, for the view that fictional texts represent worlds that do not exist even though these worlds obviously can, and de facto do, contain many elements that are familiar to us from our world. I call these worlds reading worlds and explain the relationship between reading worlds and the life world of readers. This will help support the argument that the encounter with fictional literature can invoke real feelings and that such feelings are by no means irrational, as some defenders of the paradox of fiction would like us to believe. It is the exemplary character of fictional texts that enables us to make connections between the reading worlds and the life world. First and foremost, the article discusses the question of what it is that readers’ feelings are in fact related to. The widespread view that these feelings are primarily related to the characters or events represented in a text proves too simple and needs to be amended. Whoever is sad because of the fate of a fictive character imagines how he or she would fare if in a similar situation. He or she would feel sad as it relates to his or her own situation. And it is this feeling on behalf of one’s self that is the presupposition of sympathy for a fictive character. While reading, the feelings related to fictive characters and content are intertwined with the feelings related to one’s own personal concerns. The feelings one has on his or her own behalf belong to the feelings related to fictive characters; the former are the presupposition of the latter. If we look at the matter in this way, a new perspective opens up on the paradox of fiction. Generally speaking, the discussion surrounding the paradox of fiction is really about readers’ feelings as they relate to fictive persons or content. The question is then how it is possible to have them, since fictive persons and situations do not exist. If, however, the emotional relation to fictive characters and situations is conceived of as mediated by the feelings one has on one’s own behalf, the paradox loses its confusing effect since the imputation of existence no longer plays a central role. Instead, the conjecture that the events in a fictional story could have happened in one’s own life is important. The reader imagines that a story had or could have happened to him or herself. Readers are therefore often moved by a fictive event because they relate what happened in a story to themselves. They have understood the literary event as something that is humanly relevant in a general sense, and they see it as exemplary for human life as such. This is the decisive factor which gives rise to a connection between fiction and reality. The emotional relation to fictive characters happens on the basis of emotions that we would have for our own sake were we confronted with an occurrence like the one being narrated. What happens to the characters in a fictional text could also happen to readers. This is enough to stimulate corresponding feelings. We neither have to assume the existence of fictive characters nor do we have to suspend our knowledge about the fictive character of events or take part in a game of make-believe. But we do have to be able to regard the events in a fictional text as exemplary for human life. The representation of an occurrence in a novel exhibits a number of commonalities with the representation of something that could happen in the future. Consciousness of the future would seem to be a presupposition for developing feelings for something that is only represented. This requires the power of imagination. One has to be able to imagine what is happening to the characters involved in the occurrence being narrated in a fictional text, ›empathize‹ with them, and ultimately one has to be able to imagine that he or she could also be entangled in the same event and what it would be like. Without the use of these skills, it would remain a mystery how reading a fictional text can lead to feelings and how fictive occurrences can be related to reality. The fate of Anna Karenina can move us, we can sympathize with her, because reading the novel confronts us with possibilities that could affect our own lives. The imagination of such possibilities stimulates feelings that are related to us and to our lives. On that basis, we can participate in the fate of fictive characters without having to imagine that they really exist.


Meliora ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chaya Sara Oppenheim

 This thesis proposes that “George Silverman’s Explanation”—the last short story completed by Charles Dickens—should be read as Dickens’s final and most comprehensive treatise on writing. The argument states that Dickens, instead of outlining an explicit approach to the writing process, utilizes the narrative of George Silverman as an allegory to detail the formation of a story. The thesis suggests that the framework of “George Silverman’s Explanation” portrays the growth trajectory of the writer and his eternal struggle to create original work from the world of literature that precedes him. For a renowned author like Dickens, approaching his last short story as his departing discourse on the construction of literature is invaluable instruction for future writers. Interestingly, “George Silverman’s Explanation” is also Dickens’s least analyzed work. For this reason, this thesis addresses essentially all of the scholarship that has been written on the short story before preceding to add a new perspective on how the short story can be approached. Understanding this short story as a blueprint for writers provides an innovative and unique angle for approaching literature, since a writer reads with their eyes on the future—and the original works that they can create.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Flavio Pons ◽  
Davide Faranda

<p>We study the future frequency of atmospheric environments leading to severe thunderstorms over Europe under different climate change scenarios in CMIP5 models. Our method is founded on dynamical system theory, which makes it possible to detect future atmospheric configurations that are close analogues of past events in the class of interest.</p><p>We rely on the EM-DAT and the European Severe Weather Database to select an ensemble of past events leading to significant damage or disruption, including severe thunderstorms, hail storms, derechos and tornadoes, between 1950 and 2020. We consider the geopotential height field at 500 hPa in ERA5 data as a dynamical proxy of the corresponding configurations. Then, we leverage extreme value theory to detect close dynamic analogues in the output of CMIP5 climate projection models under two emission scenarios, namely RCP4.5 and RCP8.5.</p><p>First of all, we assess possible differences between the trends in severe weather frequency due to different radiative forcing. Then, we study the spatial structure of such trends, highlighting regions where the occurrence of such phenomena could see a sharp increase or decrease. Finally, we estimate potential future impact of such phenomena where the information about economic damage is available in EM-DAT.</p><p> </p>


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fruzsina Pataki-Bittó ◽  
Kata Kapusy

Purpose The purpose of this study is to find out the future workforce’s work values and, based on them, to examine the work environment Generation Z are looking for in the situation of job search. Moreover, this study aims to provide ideas for organizations on how to transform the work environment for the post-COVID-19 era to attract and retain employees, especially the members of Generation Z. Design/methodology/approach The research design is based on the theory development method. Data were generated and collected from 28 focus groups and a survey (n = 773). First, initial coding was done with an affinity diagram, followed by the intermediate coding phase, when the authors compared the codings’ results and selected the core data. Finally, the advanced coding resulted in a work value model, which presents Generation Z’s core work value categories. Findings The paper presents a work value theory for Generation Z, which reflects their expectations of the physical work environment and the flexible work arrangements among the work values. To prepare for the post-COVID-19 era, this study suggests organizations applying hybrid working models. Practical implications Based on impacts and expected transformations in office work in the post-COVID-19 era, the paper calls attention to the critical management issues concerning Generation Z’s preferences and expectations. Originality/value The findings propose a broader work value theory approach that highlights the work environment’s convenience features and integrates values that support the employees’ desired lifestyle and well-being.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pallavi Goswami ◽  
Arpita Mondal ◽  
Christoph Rüdiger ◽  
Tim J. Peterson

<p>Large-scale climate processes such as the El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO), Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) and Southern Annular Mode (SAM) influence the hydro-climatology of Southeast Australia (SEA). In the present study, we show that low-flow events in many catchments in SEA are significantly influenced by variability in these climate drivers. Extreme value distributions and Generalised Linear Models (GLMs) are used here to model low-flow characteristics such as intensity, duration and frequency with respect to these climate drivers. Further, we study how the future projections of ENSO, IOD and SAM are likely to evolve under climate change by examining the projected values of their representative indices and how they will impact low-flow events in the region. It is found that the future dry phases of these climate drivers are likely to be more dry than those in the historic period. This in turn is expected to lead to intensification of low-flow events in the future, resulting in lower availability of fresh water during occurrences of the dry phases of these climate drivers. Thus, climate change in the future is expected to significantly influence future low-flow events in the region thereby making it even more crucial for water managers to adequately manage and ensure water availability.</p><p><br>Keywords: low-flows, ENSO, IOD, SAM, Extreme Value Theory, Generalised Linear Models, Southeast Australia, CMIP5, RCP8.5.</p>


Author(s):  
Ruth Boeker

This chapter offers a close analysis of Locke’s approach to questions of individuation and identity over time. It examines how Locke distinguishes individuation from identity and proposes that Locke’s approach to identity is best understood as kind-dependent. This means that the persistence conditions vary depending on the kind of being under consideration. For Locke it is important to first examine the kind under consideration, before persistence conditions for members of this kind can be specified. More precisely, if the nominal essences of kind F and kind G vary, then it is likely that the persistence conditions for members of kind F will vary from the persistence conditions for members of kind G. This chapter provides the framework for the subsequent discussion of Locke’s account of persons and personal identity.


2021 ◽  
pp. 15-38
Author(s):  
David O. Brink

As discussed by John Locke, Joseph Butler, and Thomas Reid, prudence involves a special concern for the agent’s own personal good that she does not have for others. This should be a concern for the agent’s overall good that is temporally neutral and involves an equal concern for all parts of her life. In this way, prudence involves a combination of agent relativity and temporal neutrality. This asymmetrical treatment of matters of interpersonal and intertemporal distribution might seem arbitrary. Henry Sidgwick raised this worry, and Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit have endorsed it as reflecting the instability of prudence and related doctrines such as egoism and the self-interest theory. However, Sidgwick thought that the worry was unanswerable only for skeptics about personal identity, such as David Hume. Sidgwick thought that one could defend prudence by appeal to realism about personal identity and a compensation principle. This is one way in which special concern and prudence presuppose personal identity. However, as Jennifer Whiting has argued, special concern displayed in positive affective regard for one’s future and personal planning and investment is arguably partly constitutive of personal identity, at least on a plausible psychological reductionist conception of personal identity. After explaining both conceptions of the relation between special concern and personal identity, the chapter concludes by exploring what might seem to be the paradoxical character of conjoining them, suggesting that there may be no explanatory priority between the concepts of special concern and personal identity.


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