Emerging Democratic Values in Soviet Political Culture

2019 ◽  
pp. 69-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
James L. Gibson ◽  
Raymond M. Duch
1995 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael L. Hughes

As Central and East Europeans (including Germans) strive to build new democracies on the ruins of old dictatorships, they seek to establish democratic values as well as democratic institutions. They know that democratic institutions alone were not able to save democracy in Germany's Weimar Republic, which had also risen out of the collapse of an authoritarian regime. West Germans, though, later built a viable democracy, the Federal Republic, from even more devastated and authoritarian remnants. To help explain such differing outcomes, historians have posited changes in political values, arguing that West Germans developed a democratic political culture to replace the authoritarian values many Germans had held earlier. As illuminating as such arguments could be, historians have had great difficulty finding evidence on just what political values Germans, especially common citizens, have in fact held at various times.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (25) ◽  
pp. 32
Author(s):  
Y. Popovych

The article is devoted to the current situation in Ukrainian society´s political culture, where there are several segments that give grounds for a statement about the fragmentary type of political culture. First, it focuses on foreign experience, in particular in countries of Europe and America. Absolutizing their experience is not enough to shape democratic values in Ukrainian society.Keywords: policy, political culture, citizens, tolerance.


2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 785-805 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANNELIEN de DIJN

ABSTRACTAccording to the textbook version of history, the Enlightenment played a crucial role in the creation of the modern, liberal democracies of the West. Ever since this view – which we might describe as the modernization thesis – was first formulated by Peter Gay, it has been repeatedly criticized as misguided: a myth. Yet, as this paper shows, it continues to survive in postwar historiography, in particular in the Anglophone world. Indeed, Gay's most important and influential successors – historians such as Robert Darnton and Roy Porter – all ended up defending the idea that the Enlightenment was a major force in the creation of modern democratic values and institutions. More recently, Jonathan Israel's trilogy on the Enlightenment has revived the modernization thesis, albeit in a dramatic new form. Yet, even Israel's work, as its critical reception highlights, does not convincingly demonstrate that the Enlightenment, as an intellectual movement, contributed in any meaningful way to the creation of modern political culture. This conclusion raises a new question: if the Enlightenment did not create our modern democracies, then what did it do? In answer to that question, this paper suggests that we should take more seriously the writings of enlightened monarchists like Nicolas-Antoine Boulanger. Studying the Enlightenment might not allow us to understand why democratic political culture came into being. But, as Boulanger's work underscores, it might throw light on an equally important problem: why democracy came so late in the day.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Olagunju Oluwo

Norway democracy was ranked as the best in the world owing to the country strong democratic values which political parties and stable political culture have helped to shape. These values are still lacking in Nigeria and as such, Nigerian democracy cannot be regarded as advanced democracy. Nigerian political parties engaged in rivalry competition and political culture was still at lower ebb with high stake for politicians. Women are under-represented and executive/legislature dichotomy persisted beyond imagination. It is against this backdrop that the paper seeks to examine political parties in advanced democracy: experience from Norway and lesson for Nigeria. The study was a descriptive one with qualitative method. Data were collected through secondary sources. Drawing from the experience of Norway the study found that the key areas which propelled Norway’s ranking as best democracy were still far from being achieve in Nigeria. The study recommends that: the stake on politics should be reduced and improved women political participation should be encouraged among others.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-74
Author(s):  
Dev Raj Dahal

This paper is an essay about civic values or ‘virtues’, and the need for civic education in contemporary Nepal. It makes an argument for ‘recovering the roots of civil society inNepal’, which the author locates first and foremost in Hindu philosophy. This is necessary as, in its current form, mainstream or ‘elite’ civil society has lost touch with democratic values and the sense of social responsibility that the author refers to as ‘niskam karma’. Divided along political party lines and moved by the pursuit of profit and self-promotion, ‘elite’ civil society has hampered rather than facilitated, progress towards the creation of a modern state in Nepal. Civic education programmes grounded in age-old philosophical traditions in Nepal has the potential to transform current political culture and go some way towards resolving many of Nepal’s present ills.


2000 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 517-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRIAN D. SILVER ◽  
KATHLEEN M. DOWLEY

Comparative studies of mass political culture based on surveys, such as the World Values Survey (WVS), typically leap to using aggregate-level statistics for the entire population. No previous analyses of the WVS have examined the value differences associated with a common source of cleavage: ethnicity. The authors test for ethnic differences on 10 democratic values in 16 WVS countries from 1990 to 1993. Ethnic differences within countries on these indicators are often far larger than the aggregate differences between countries. Of 259 paired comparisons between the majority and the minority groups within the 16 countries on the 10 indicators, by chance alone the authors should have found about 13 statistically significant differences; instead, they found 134. Thus, the differences in support for democratic values between ethnic groups within countries are far from just a random phenomenon.


2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-96
Author(s):  
Khadga K.C.

Unless Bangladesh will find credible means to change the political culture within which it function, the viability of democracy will remain doubtful. Though it is about four decades of independence, the history of democracy isn’t worth to value its principles in its actual practice. Bangladesh’s democracy is distorted by the malpractices of political power by her politicians. The quality of democracy in the country has been jeopardized by the immature practices and attitudes by its political party, in or out of power. In fact, the democracy in Bangladesh is deprived within/by the practice of democracy itself. Consequently, democracy becomes fragile and cannot run smoothly with its own spirit. It is now widely accepted that Bangladesh is facing a crisis of governance which originates in malfunctioning of the democratic process. The qualitative deterioration of governance leads to raise lack of concern in pursuing democratic values in practice. The people of this country cannot extract favors from democracy rather their interests become somewhat distorted. In this way the steady failure to get better governance could threaten the sustainability of practicing democracy in Bangladesh repeatedly.


2020 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-26
Author(s):  
Marta Kołczyńska

This article examines the links between education, democratic values, and political trust. Research on education systems as carriers of modern orientations and democratic values worldwide predicts that educated individuals will exhibit more democratic values than less educated ones, regardless of the country’s level of democracy. In the political culture approach, political trust can be understood as a reflection of the congruence or incongruence between individual democratic values and the level of democracy of the political system, which emphasizes trust’s relational character. Integrating these strands of literature, I formulate hypotheses about the mediating effect of democratic values between education and political trust. To test these hypotheses, I employ multilevel models of data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Study covering 73 countries. The results show that democratic values partially mediate the effect of education on political trust, but the magnitude of this effect depends on the level of democracy. Analyses also show that, while education is positively associated with democratic values regardless of the country’s level of democracy, this association is much stronger in democratic countries than in non-democratic ones.


2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (2) ◽  
pp. 366-380
Author(s):  
Marlene Mauk

The question whether democratic values are on the rise or in decline has received much attention in political-culture research. Yet, few scholars have studied the consequences either of these trends has for political trust. Although political trust has long been attributed a central role for the functioning and stability of any political system, we still know little about the relationship between citizens’ value orientations and political trust. Recent advances have furthered the discussion by conceptualizing this relationship to be conditional on the respective country’s level of democracy; yet this literature does not take into account findings that demonstrate citizens rarely have an accurate grasp of their country’s democratic quality. Integrating the two strands of literature, this contribution suggests a relationship between democratic value orientations and political trust that is universally contingent on citizens’ perceptions of democratic quality. Testing this proposition for over one hundred democracies and autocracies, it finds that democratic value orientations decrease political trust whenever citizens perceive their regime’s democratic quality as lacking and increase political trust whenever citizens perceive their political regime as being of high democratic quality. In contrast, the actual level of democracy plays no role for the effect of democratic value orientations on political trust.


Author(s):  
Elizabeth J. Zechmeister ◽  
Daniela Osorio Michel

Political culture in Latin America leans democratic and participatory. Even amid institutional backsliding in the early 21st century, most leaders assume office and claim their mandate via elections. However, in the face of significant governance challenges, reservations regarding democracy and democratic processes are on the rise. In 2014, 68% of individuals in the average Latin American country expressed support for democracy. Five years later, in 2019, that figure was 58%. Support for state-led redistribution declined during this period as well. In brief, there are signs that the public is moving away from a social democratic orientation. Generalizations about political culture risk overlooking significant heterogeneity in Latin American beliefs and inclinations. Survey data, especially from comparative projects, permit assessments of the region’s political culture across time, countries, and population subgroups. Analyses of these data paint an appropriately nuanced portrait of Latin American political culture. Support for core democratic values is highest in the Southern Cone countries of Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile. Support for democratic institutions and processes is far lower in countries that have experienced recent instability and governance challenges, including Honduras and Peru. In Latin America, the young tend to be less committed to democratic institutions and processes. Those in rural areas tend to be more inclined to engage in local politics. Those who are poor tend to perceive themselves as less capable of understanding key national issues. Finally, women tend to be politically more conservative. How people in the region believe politics ought to be organized and function—that is, political culture in Latin America—matters. This is because the public’s inclinations to express core democratic values and to engage in the system shape political outcomes. Where individuals lack confidence in the democratic state, they are less prone to support it. Further, they are more likely to issue demands, and to look for leadership, outside of formal political channels. The comparatively low and decreasing levels of support for democracy place Latin America at a crossroads. Failure to meet key governance challenges—corruption, inequality, crime—could accelerate declines in confidence and interest in participatory democracy, to the detriment of political culture and democratic consolidation in Latin America.


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