Are Spending Patterns of Local Government Interdependent?: Strategic Interactions of U.S. Local Governments in California

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sungchan Kim ◽  
Soyoung Park

This study examines if a local government’s policies depend on that of similarly situated counties, called “neighborliness,” by analyzing the panel data of county governments in California from 2001 to 2014. In our study, the results show that the spending pattern of a local government is positively influenced by neighboring governments that are similar in terms of personal income and geographic proximity, whereas racial similarity does not work as a “neighboring” characteristic. Local governments benchmark the policies or programs of other neighboring governments, as they might face similar policy issues based on similar economic and environmental conditions. Interestingly, we also find that the degree of mimicking behavior depends on fiscal autonomy.

2002 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 557-577 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. T. Akindele ◽  
O. R. Olaopa ◽  
A. Sat. Obiyan

The most severe problem facing public institutions in Nigeria is the fiscal one, particularly in local government. This problem has been provoked by a number of factors, including ‘over dependence’ on statutory allocations from both the state and federal governments, deliberate tax evasion by the local citizenry, creation of nonviable local government areas, differences in the status of local governments in terms of the rural–urban dimension, and inadequate revenue and restricted fiscal jurisdiction. This article examines these factors and their attendant problems, implications and effects within the context of the fiscal federalism established by the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. For financially healthy local governments to exist, responsibilities and functions must be allocated in accordance with their taxing power and ability to generate funds internally. The constitutional provision that recognizes local governments’ power in this regard must give them full freedom to operate and this must be well guaranteed and adequately protected. These measures, coupled with a review of the revenue-sharing formula, the granting of fiscal autonomy and fiscal discipline as well as making local government responsive, responsible and accountable to the people will set local governments free from the fiscal stress promoted and strengthened by the 1999 constitution.


2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 335-347
Author(s):  
Juanfeng Zhang ◽  
Ting Yu ◽  
Lele Li ◽  
Danxia Zhang ◽  
Guochao Zhao ◽  
...  

Land value appreciation in the urbanization process has triggered market speculation. The Land Bank System strengthens local governments’ ability to control land supply and distribution rights. Local governments are considered close stakeholders. Under the pressure of guaranteeing economic growth and promotion, local governments have increased their dependence on land finances. It is important for investors to understand the local governments’ behaviors, and draw up business strategies. This study aims to examine the influencing factors and formation mechanism of local government land hoarding. The research hypothesis was tested by collating provincial-level panel data of China from 2004 to 2015 and using dynamic panel data estimated by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). A significant positive correlation was found between residential land price and land hoarding area by local governments. Land speculation in the eastern region is also more pronounced than that in central and western regions. In addition, empirical studies have found a correlation between the degree of government intervention and local government land hoarding behavior. The higher the degree of government intervention, the less land sold through bid invitation, auction, and listing, which are linked to the corresponding hoarding land area.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher B Goodman ◽  
Suzanne M. Leland

This study uses forty years of data from the US Census of Governments to examine the impact of changes in local autonomy on the creation of the fastest growing form of local governments, special districts. Using fixed effects regression specified at the urban county and metropolitan statistical area level, we find that restrictions of fiscal autonomy of cities is associated with creation of new special districts. When the limits on fiscal autonomy interacts with grants of functional autonomy, amplification occurs. We find no analogous effects for county governments. These two findings are consistent with the circumvention argument made in the local autonomy literature.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chijioke Basil Onuoha ◽  
◽  
Henry Ufomba ◽  
Ebong Itoro Bassey

One of the most contested issues in Nigeria’s political landscape and federal structure is the debate on the fiscal autonomy of the Local Government as the third tier of government. The literature on the subject appears to zero down the issue of Local Government fiscal autonomy to a political ‘devil’. The position of existing scholarship on the subject concludes that by taking advantage of Sections 7 and 162 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, it is common practice for the State Governors to usurp the autonomy of the Local Governments. The Governors are also accused of using the Joint Account framework to control the statutory allocations of the Local Governments. Hence, Local Governments in Nigeria lacks fiscal autonomy which is one of the main principles of the three tiers of government structure. However, the underlying politics that has played out in the Fourth Republic in Nigeria reveals that this historical and legalistic perception does not provide a complete explanation of the problem. This is because the literature does not consider the role of the political elite at the Local Government level in sustaining the shrewd nature of State and Local Governments interaction in Nigeria’s Federal structure, rather the existing literature focused entirely on the governor as a ‘devil’ and ignores the role of the political class at the grassroots level as “lying angels”. This paper is therefore an invitation for a deeper theoretical deconstruction of this phenomenon to stimulate an encompassing and interesting perceptive on what we conceptualize as State-Local Government Interactions in Nigeria (SLIN). Our primary objective is to draw attention to the role of the personalities of the political class at the grassroots level which makes up the highest cadre of the hierarchy in the Local Government in shaping SLIN. We present a case that future debates should go beyond “devil” and also focus on the profound role of “lying angels”.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 431-450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanja Kmezić ◽  
Jadranka Kaluđerović ◽  
Mijat Jocović ◽  
Katarina Đulić

This article examines the fiscal decentralisation process and local government financing in Montenegro from 2002 to 2015 by focusing on the key legislative changes that occurred during the period under observation, as well as on the fiscal impact these changes and the economic crisis have had on municipal budgets. The analysis identifies two distinct phases of municipal financing in Montenegro. In the first phase (2003-2008), the Republic adopted legislation that strengthened the role and fiscal autonomy of local governments. During the second phase (2008-2015), several of the national government’s centralistic policies came into force. Together with the effects of the economic crisis, they deteriorated both local public finance and macroeconomic stability and hindered local economic development.


2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher B. Goodman ◽  
Suzanne M. Leland

This study uses 40 years of data from the U.S. Census of Governments to examine the impact of changes in local autonomy on the creation of the fastest growing form of local governments, special districts. Using fixed effects regression specified at the urban county and metropolitan statistical area level, we find that restrictions of fiscal autonomy of cities are associated with creation of new special districts. When the limits on fiscal autonomy interact with grants of functional autonomy, amplification occurs. We find no analogous effects for county governments. These two findings are consistent with the circumvention argument made in the local autonomy literature.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Marcus R. Maspaitella ◽  
Lillyani M. Orisu ◽  
Rahel Y. Tiwery

Regional autonomy has provided a rightful authority for local governments to set and manage their own governmental affairs. The implication derived from this regulation is that local governments have to fulfill the regions’ needs as well as to explore much more potentials owned. This can enhance the capacity of local governments that could be a useful capital in financing operational programs. This research aims to analyse the influence of region own source revenue, balance fund, and other lawful local revenues on local government expenditure of regencies and city in Papua Barat province between 2010 and 2015. Sample in this research includes six regencies and one city. Panel data regression was employed to estimate the fitted model. The result indicated that the effects of balance fund and other lawful local revenues were positive and significant, whereas the influence of region own source revenue was not significant on government expenditure of regency/city in Papua Barat.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chijioke Basil Onuoha ◽  
Henry Ufomba ◽  
Ebong Itoro Bassey

One of the most contested issues in Nigeria’s political landscape and federal structure is the debate on the fiscal autonomy of the Local Government as the third tier of government. The literature on the subject appears to zero down the issue of Local Government fiscal autonomy to a political ‘devil’. The position of existing scholarship on the subject concludes that by taking advantage of Sections 7 and 162 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, it is common practice for the State Governors to usurp the autonomy of the Local Governments. The Governors are also accused of using the Joint Account framework to control the statutory allocations of the Local Governments. Hence, Local Governments in Nigeria lacks fiscal autonomy which is one of the main principles of the three tiers of government structure. However, the underlying politics that has played out in the Fourth Republic in Nigeria reveals that this historical and legalistic perception does not provide a complete explanation of the problem. This is because the literature does not consider the role of the political elite at the Local Government level in sustaining the shrewd nature of State and Local Governments interaction in Nigeria’s Federal structure, rather the existing literature focused entirely on the governor as a ‘devil’ and ignores the role of the political class at the grassroots level as “lying angels”. This paper is therefore an invitation for a deeper theoretical deconstruction of this phenomenon to stimulate an encompassing and interesting perceptive on what we conceptualize as State-Local Government Interactions in Nigeria (SLIN). Our primary objective is to draw attention to the role of the personalities of the political class at the grassroots level which makes up the highest cadre of the hierarchy in the Local Government in shaping SLIN. We present a case that future debates should go beyond “devil” and also focus on the profound role of “lying angels”.


2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-109
Author(s):  
Soyoung Park ◽  
Sungchan Kim

As fiscal decentralization has been vigorously implemented, fiscal autonomy has become more prevalent in subnational governments. However, fiscal outcomes with greater fiscal autonomy depend upon how well and how responsibly government finances are managed. This study examines how fiscal autonomy affects fiscal outcomes depending on the level of corruption by using a panel data set of 83 cities in South Korea from 2010 to 2017. According to the results, fiscal autonomy causes local governments to spend more. However, its effectiveness may differ based on the composition of fiscal autonomy and its expenditure categories. Additionally, this study finds that less corrupt local governments spend less and have less debt under higher levels of fiscal autonomy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (Special edition 2021/2) ◽  
pp. 88-107
Author(s):  
Jaka Winarna ◽  
Muhtar Muhtar ◽  
Sutaryo Sutaryo ◽  
Prihatnolo Gandhi Amidjaya

This study investigates the effect of local government internal control systems on local government administration performance. We use secondary data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Financial and Development Supervisory Agency, Indonesian Statistics Bureau, and respective local government financial statements and websites. We generate a set of panel data from 508 local governments during 2017-2019 with 1524 observations analysed with panel data regression. We evidence that several local governments still have low and medium administration performance in 2017-2019 that has not met the expectation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs as stated in the strategic plan in 2015. Our analysis provides empirical evidence that control environment, risk assessment, and information and communication positively affect local government administration performance. Our result provides implications to the Financial and Development Supervisory Agency to continuously optimise internal control system development programs in Indonesian local governments and the Ministry of Internal Affairs to have higher enforcement of local government administration performance achievement.


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