scholarly journals The Effects of Judical Bodies’ Interpretation Forms Of Legal Rules in Turkey on the Education Freedom in Universities

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Yavuz GÜLOGLU

The freedom of conscience and belief can be defined as the freedom of people in what they wish to believe without the compulsion of political power and other people by means of laws and other means. The belief of religion that can be accepted as the natural extension of the freedom of conscience and belief is to be free in doing the requirements of the religion that the people believe in with its rituals. While it is not possible and effective to make restrictions in freedom of belief, today, there are some restrictions in some judical systems in freedom of worship. With the principle of secularism which is settled among the principles that the alteration of which are not even be proposed, there have been some different decisions about the administrative acts that cause the violation of belief and worship freedom in the implementation of the right of education which is secured with Constitutional Law in Turkish Constitution. In this study, the effects of the incompatible decisions of administrative jurisdiction about the implementations of the administration related to the education right of students at universities, which is secured by the Fundemental Law, on the freedom of education, especially for the last ten years, will be examined.

2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 595-607
Author(s):  
David T. Konig

The controversy surrounding the Second Amendment—“the right of the people to keep and bear arms”—is, to a large extent, historical in nature, redolent of other matters in this country’s legal and constitutional past. But the historical analogies that might support the Amendment’s repeal do not permit easy conclusions. The issue demands that legal historians venture beyond familiar territory to confront unavoidable problems at the intersection of theory and practice and of constitutional law and popular constitutionalism. An interdisciplinary analysis of Lichtman’s Repeal the Second Amendment illuminates the political, legal, and constitutional dimensions—as well as the perils—of undertaking the arduous amending process permitted by Article V of the U.S. Constitution.


2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (05) ◽  
pp. 145-148
Author(s):  
Ниджат Рафаэль оглу Джафаров ◽  

It can be accepted that the classification of human rights, its division, types, and groups, is of particular importance. The syllogism for human rights can be taken as follows: law belongs to man; human beings are the highest beings on earth like living beings. Therefore, the regulation prevails. The right to freedom is conditional. Man is free. Consequently, human rights are dependent. Morality is the limit of the law. Morality is the limit and content of human actions. Therefore, the law is the limit of human activities. Morality is related to law. Law is the norm of human behavior. Thereby, human behavior and direction are related to morality. The people create the state. The state has the right. Therefore, the right of the state is the right of the people. The state is an institution made up of citizens. Citizens have the privilege. Such blessings as Dignity, honor, conscience, zeal, honor, etc., and values are a part of morality and spiritual life. Morality is united with law. Therefore, moral values are part of the law. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and conscience. Space is about the law. Therefore, everyone has the right to opinion and conscience. Key words: human rights, freedom of conscience, conceptuality, citizenship


Author(s):  
Ross Harrison

Democracy means rule by the people, as contrasted with rule by a special person or group. It is a system of decision making in which everyone who belongs to the political organism making the decision is actually or potentially involved. They all have equal power. There have been competing conceptions about what this involves. On one conception this means that everyone should participate in making the decision themselves, which should emerge from a full discussion. On another conception, it means that everyone should be able to vote between proposals or for representatives who will be entrusted with making the decision; the proposal or representative with most votes wins. Philosophical problems connected with democracy relate both to its nature and its value. It might seem obvious that democracy has value because it promotes liberty and equality. As compared with, for example, dictatorship, everyone has equal political power and is free from control by a special individual or group. However, at least on the voting conception of democracy, it is the majority who have the control. This means that the minority may not be thought to be treated equally; and they lack liberty in the sense that they are controlled by the majority. Another objection to democracy is that, by counting everyone’s opinions as of equal value, it considers the ignorant as being as important as the knowledgeable, and so does not result in properly informed decisions. However, voting may in certain circumstances be the right way of achieving knowledge. Pooling opinions may lead to better group judgement. These difficulties with democracy are alleviated by the model which concentrates on mutual discussion rather than people just feeding opinions into a voting mechanism. Opinions should in such circumstances be better formed; and individuals are more obviously equally respected. However, this depends upon them starting from positions of equal power and liberty; rather than being consequences of a democratic procedure, it would seem that equality and liberty are instead prerequisites which are needed in order for it to work properly.


1979 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Allott

All government is a conspiracy. Each governmental conspiracy has a constitution as its alibi. The constitution describes the way in which the political power of the society is concentrated and places the source of that concentration somewhere other than in the mere fact of power. Because of that dislocation, the constitution is the source not only of political power but also of political duty. The subjection of the organs of government to the constitution runs parallel to the subjection of the people governed to the constitutional power of the organs of government. The constitution justifies constitutional power and constitutional duty by making both of them derivatives from one and the same source.The prior question of whence the constitution itself derives its authority is, for all everyday practical purposes, answered by the mere fact of the constitution. The constitution is self-proving in practice because it is used as the source of maxims affecting the behaviour of those who exercise physical force with actual impunity, or who control its exercise. To preach or to act against the constitution may or may not be permitted by the legal rules of the given society (themselves derived ultimately from the constitution), but it will in any event be ineffective whenever it comes into collision with power exercised, to the point of physical force, under authority derived from the constitution. A revolution occurs when the exercise of constitutional power, to the piont of physical force, ceases or is overridden by the exercise of unconstitutional power, if necessary by the application of greater physical force.


1989 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 29-30

Political power, for individual women, was like a reputation for philosophy or a gift for painting. You had to be the daughter or wife of the right person: it was not possible to make a career, as a man sometimes could, by sheer talent for fighting or arguing or making. You also had to work in the interests of the family and keep a low personal profile.Plutarch, who believed that women were endowed with courage and intelligence, collected instances of Great Deeds by Women (Moralia 242–63). These occur in crises: his heroines do not have, and he does not advocate, an acknowledged social or political role. He admires Aretaphila (257de), who withstood torture, conspired successfully to kill a tyrant, declined an invitation from the people to join the government, and retired gracefully to private life in the women’s quarters. When women are found, in Plutarch’s time, holding magistracies and priesthoods (as they did in Asia Minor in the first and second centuries A.D.), or are honoured by their cities as public benefactors, they too are praised for modesty, charm, and self-restraint, as though everyone needed reassuring that no departure from convention was intended. In fact, it cannot be shown that such women ever chaired a meeting or addressed an assembly, or did more than foot the bills and acknowledge the applause. Some actually have public spokesmen; some are obviously the Lady Mayoress, the wife of the man who had the job.


1939 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 615-633
Author(s):  
J. A. C. Grant

The years 1936–38 were remarkable for the vigorous manner in which the courts attempted to preserve “the American system” from the return of the guild. The right to engage in a normal trade or calling without passing too rigorous an examination as to one's capabilities and training, to charge such prices for services as one sees fit regardless of the wishes of a dominant majority of those engaged in a particular trade or calling, and to close when one wishes rather than when a “code authority” commands, were given judicial protection. The past year has witnessed a partial change of heart. Apparently, opponents of the new economy of control are about to be told to “go to the polls, not to the courts.” Even more remarkable has been the increasing tendency on the part of the legal profession, under an expanding doctrine of “inherent” powers, to take back from the legislature and from the people the right to control that profession. This tendency continued unabated during the past year. In most fields, the cases were merely typical of the normal run of decisions on state constitutional questions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-22
Author(s):  
Ludvig Beckman

It is widely believed that voting rights confer power to individual voters as well as to the collective body of the electorate. This paper evaluates this notion on the basis of two conceptions of political power: the causal view, according to which power equals the ability to exert causal effect, and the legal view, according to which power equals the legal ability to produce legal effect. The proposition defended is that causal conceptions of power are unable to account for the view that voting rights confer power to either individuals or collectives. In particular, the theory according to which the powers conferred by the vote equal the probability of being decisive or “pivotal” in elections does not justify the ascription of power to voters. It does not because the probability of being influential is not a valid interpretation of power as the capacity to mobilize sufficient causal effect to determine an outcome. In addition, causal conceptions of power are unable to recognize the people as the unique owner of political power. The powers exercised by the members of the electorate appear to be just one among several causes that contribute to determine electoral outcomes. In the end, the legal analysis of power proves superior. Power in a democracy is placed with the people as a legal category vested with the legal capacity to revise the legal relationship between individuals and the state.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-113
Author(s):  
Randy Atma R. Massi

In tracing history, the first problem that was questioned after the death of Muhammad Rasulullah was the problem of political power or his successor who would lead the ummah, commonly known as the caliph. The Qur'an as the main source of reference and the Sunnah does not provide a clear and clear explanation of who has the right to continue the leadership of the ummah after Muhammad's death, and how the succession system or method of appointing leaders in selecting the successor of the Prophet's caliph. So it is not surprising that in the course of the succession system in the appointment of the successor of the Prophet, especially in the appointment of Khulafaur Rasyidin, there were always differences in the ways between one caliph and another. In the matter of leadership succession, the issue of deliberation or shura and the legitimacy of the people or the people does not really get more attention and a significant pressure point, if it is traced in more detail, the issue of shura and the legitimacy of the people or people are two things that always exist in every succession of Khulafaur Rasyidin's leadership. So it is very important in discussing the succession of Khulafaur Rasyidin's leadership in relation to issues of deliberation or shura and the legitimacy of the people. Abstrak Dalam penelusuran terhadap sejarah, permasalahan pertama yang dipersoalkan setelah wafatnya Muhammad Rasulullah adalah masalah kekuasaan politik atau pengganti beliau yang akan memimpin umat, yang lazim disebut dengan khalifah.  Al-Qur’an sebagai sumber acuan utama dan Sunnah tidak memberikan penjelasan secara terang dan jelas tentang siapa yang berhak untuk melanjutkan kepemimpinan umat pasca wafatnya Muhammad, dan bagaimana sistem suksesi atau metode pengangkatan pemimpin dalam melakukan pemilihan terhadap khalifah pengganti Rasul. Sehingga tidak mengherankan dalam perjalannya sistem suksesi dalam pengangkatan khalifah pengganti Rasul terutama dalam pengangkatan Khulafaur Rasyidin selalu terjadi perbedaan cara antara khalifah yang satu dengan yang lainnya. Dalam persoalan suksesi kepemimpinan persoalan musyawarah atau syura dan legitimasi umat atau rakyat tidak terlalu mendapat perhatian yang lebih dan titik tekan yang signifikan, jika ditelusuri lebih detail persoalan syura dan legitimasi rakyat atau umat merupakan dua hal yang selalu ada dalam setiap suksesi kepemimpinan Khulafaur Rasyidin. Sehingga sangat penting dalam membahas suksesi kepemimpinan Khulafaur Rasyidin dalam kaitannya dengan persoalan musyawarah atau syura dan legitimasi umat.


Author(s):  
Ross Harrison

Democracy means rule by the people, as contrasted with rule by a special person or group. It is a system of decision making in which everyone who belongs to the political organism making the decision is actually or potentially involved. They all have equal power. There have been competing conceptions about what this involves. On one conception this means that everyone should participate in making the decision themselves, which should emerge from a full discussion. On another conception, it means that everyone should be able to vote between proposals or for representatives who will be entrusted with making the decision; the proposal or representative with most votes wins. Philosophical problems connected with democracy relate both to its nature and its value. It might seem obvious that democracy has value because it promotes liberty and equality. As compared with, for example, dictatorship, everyone has equal political power and is free from control by a special individual or group. However, at least on the voting conception of democracy, it is the majority who have the control. This means that the minority may not be thought to be treated equally; and they lack liberty in the sense that they are controlled by the majority. Another objection to democracy is that, by counting everyone’s opinions as of equal value, it considers the ignorant as being as important as the knowledgeable, and so does not result in properly informed decisions. However, voting may in certain circumstances be the right way of achieving knowledge. Pooling opinions may lead to better group judgement. These difficulties with democracy are alleviated by the model which concentrates on mutual discussion rather than people just feeding opinions into a voting mechanism. Opinions should in such circumstances be better formed; and individuals are more obviously equally respected. However, this depends upon them starting from positions of equal power and liberty; rather than being consequences of a democratic procedure, it would seem that equality and liberty are instead prerequisites which are needed in order for it to work properly.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Wolff

This text explores the main questions of political philosophy and looks at some of the most influential answers, from the ancient Greeks to the present day. Each chapter takes on a particular question or controversy. The natural starting-point is political power, the right to command. The first chapter considers the question of what would happen in a ‘state of nature’ without government, while the second tackles the problem of political obligation. The third chapter is concerned with democracy, asking whether a state should be democratic, for example, or whether there is any rationale for preferring rule by the people to rule by an expert. The next two chapters deal with liberty and property. The text concludes by focusing on questions that have drawn greater attention in more recent decades, such as issues of gender, race, disability, sexual orientation, immigration, global justice, and justice to future generations.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document