The Austrian-Hungarian Press Regarding the Tsar’s Visit to Constanţa in June 1914

Transilvania ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 105-111
Author(s):  
Victor Daniel Crețu ◽  
Radu Racovițan

The historical events in the first part of 1914 catalyzed an intense political discussion either for maintaining in or retreating Romania from the Triple Alliance. The appointment of I.I.C. Brătianu, known for his political orientation in favor of the Entente, as Prime Minister in the early 1914 created a favorable ground for Franco-Russian diplomatic actions. However, the event which produced the most hectic agitation in the German and Austro-Hungarian diplomatic circles regarding the progress the Entente powers were achieving in Romania was the visit of the Russian tsar to Constanța on June 14, 1914, continued by the talks between Brătianu and Sazonov in the coming days. Although the official circles justifiably maintained a reserved attitude, the press of the Great Powers in the Triple Alliance commented extensively and openly on the special significance of the visit made in Romania by Tsar Nicholas II and the Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov.

Author(s):  
Jörg Baberowski

This chapter examines the changes that were made in Russia after Joseph Stalin's death. Within weeks of Stalin's death, the charges against the “murderer doctors” had been dropped, the use of torture had been outlawed, and the punitive authority of the security apparatus had been limited. Furthermore, the last remaining victims of the “Mingrelian Affair” were released from prison, and Solomon Mikhoels, the assassinated chairman of the Jewish Antifascist Committee, was rehabilitated posthumously. Despotism, the hallmark of Stalinism, would disappear from daily life, and fear and dread would no longer be the ruling standard. Nikita Khrushchev became the new party leader, Georgi Malenkov was made prime minister, Vyacheslav Molotov was allowed to return to his former post as foreign minister, and Stalin's executioner Lavrenty Beria assumed control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the state security apparatus. Throughout the years of de-Stalinization, it remained the great exception for any of the crimes against defenseless individuals to be prosecuted.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 619-620

On May 14, 1951 meetings were held of the Council and Political Committee of the Arab League in Damascus. Press reports indicated that the meeting of the Political Committee concerned the question of whether or not the Arab states should put into effect a real military alliance. On the same day the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies had discussed the ratification of the Arab collective security pact. Egypt had been the originator of the pact which although initialled by six of the seven Arab nations had only been ratified by Saudi-Arabia. The press deduced from these reports that Syria wanted to know where it stood in case the Israeli-Syrian conflict became more serious. Iraq had already offered any support Syria asked for and sent some military detachments and an anti-aircraft unit through Syrian territory to the Israeli border. The Acting Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Israel (Sharett), however, in an address to the Knesset Parliament in Jerusalem, warned the Political Committee that Israel was firmly resolved to defend every inch of her territory against encroachment or domination by Syria.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bharat Singh

The handloom sector in India has been a very important source of livelihood to a large number of people since ancient times which attained its peak during the Mughal period owing to the practice of flexible manufacturing system at that time. The sector saw its decline during the British period as a consequence of their unfavourable policy. In present times this sector again assumes special significance in the light of launching ‘Make in India’ campaign by our hon’ble Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi. It is believed that handloom sector may significantly contribute to the generation of output, employment and export earnings in our economy by transforming this sector to create enough space for those seeking better and decent work opportunities in our economy. Using secondary sources of data an attempt has been made in this paper to present an overview of this sector and examine various problems faced by this sector and different programmes and policies of the government of India for encouraging and promoting this sector. 


2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (4/2019) ◽  
pp. 5-23
Author(s):  
Marusia Cîrstea

The present article presents certain aspects of the relations between Romania, the Czech Republic and Yugoslavia in the interwar period. The fourth decade of the last century in particular was extremely rich in political, diplomatic and military events. Within this international context, Romanian Prime Minister Gheorghe Tătărescu (1934-1937) sought to establish bilateral contacts – with the great powers of Europe, but mainly with the members of the Little Entente – meant to both strengthen bilateral relations and clarify the states’ perspective on the events in progress. During his visits to Belgrade and Prague – as emerges from the press of the time – Gheorghe Tătărescu permanently advocated maintaining the status-quo and the political, economic and military cooperation between the states of the Little Entente.


Author(s):  
John T. Lauridsen

John T. Lauridsen: The government’s recommendations were not voiced in vain. Erik Scavenius’ meeting with the press on 14 September 1942 Erik Scavenius did not hold many major press conferences in his time as Foreign Minister, nor as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in the period 1940–43. An exception occurred on 14 September 1942, when a great number of issues coincided and led him to hold a large scale meeting in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to explain simultaneously to prominent members of Danish press, politicians and civil servants what the government’s policy was, how the government and its policy was handled in the press and in particular, how the government’s policy should be presented. Both the government’s partners and the press were severely criticized and it was implied there was a government mole so that confidential information was being leaked. The press needed to understand its responsibility at this difficult time in Denmark. The people from the press were allowed to respond and on the whole were seemingly receptive to the instructions. What took place at the meeting was not reported in the newspapers the following day. Instead, background material was provided with the intent of counteracting tendencies in the press running counter to government policy.


1976 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-347 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pnina Lahav

On 19 January 1976, the Government of Israel announced its intention to impose censorship on two categories of information:(1) Information about the existence or content of a document relating to Israel's foreign affairs which is classified “top secret” or similarly classified and which is addressed from Israel to a foreign country or from a foreign country to Israel.(2) Information relating to a visit by an Israeli official to a foreign country or a visit by a foreign official to Israel, or a meeting between an Israeli and a foreign official—when no diplomatic relations obtain between Israel and that country and when the visit or meeting was not conducted in public nor officially announced in Israel.This step was the Government's response to a series of leakages which appeared in the preceding weeks in the press in Israel. Two publicized items had particularly outraged the Government. One item discussed President Ford's secret message to Prime Minister Rabin. The other item disclosed a secret visit by Foreign Minister Allon to Europe.


2001 ◽  
Vol 12 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 445-446 ◽  

Withdrawal of judges from case following statements in the press by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Justice contesting their decision. Statements made in the press about the applicant by the judge presiding over the court dealing with the merits of criminal proceedings against him. Prohibition by the courts on a prisoner receiving visits by wife and minor daughter. Control of prisoner's correspondence.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-169
Author(s):  
Ronen Yitzhak

This article deals with Lord Moyne's policy towards the Zionists. It refutes the claim that Lord Moyne was anti-Zionist in his political orientation and in his activities and shows that his positions did not differ from those of other British senior officials at the time. His attitude toward Jewish immigration to Palestine and toward the establishment of a Jewish Brigade during the Second World War was indeed negative. This was not due to anti-Zionist policy, however, but to British strategy that supported the White Paper of 1939 and moved closer to the Arabs during the War. While serving in the British Cabinet, Lord Moyne displayed apolitically pragmatic approach and remained loyal to Prime Minister Churchill. He therefore supported the establishment of a Jewish Brigade and the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine in the secret committee that Churchill set up in 1944. Unaware of his new positions, the Zionists assassinated him in November 1944. The murder of Lord Moyne affected Churchill, leading him to reject the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.


1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (38) ◽  
pp. 156-192
Author(s):  
T. Desmond Williams

By March 21 the British prime minister had discovered that, owing to difficulties raised by Poland and Russia, as well as by Rumania, it would be impossible to secure the support of all the four great powers for the declaration he had suggested on March 20. Chamberlain accordingly altered his course, and on the same day, through Halifax, threw out the suggestion of a bilateral arrangement for mutual consultation between Britain and Poland. The foreign secretary had a long discussion with Count Raczynski, who had received instructions from Warsaw to inform London of Polish objections to the proposed four-power declaration.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanna Bäck ◽  
Jan Teorell ◽  
Alexander Von Hagen-Jamar ◽  
Alejandro Quiroz Flores

Abstract Why do some foreign ministers stay longer in office than others? Are they punished when the country loses a war? Several scholars have focused on the tenure of leaders as an important predictor of foreign policy outcomes, such as war onset, creating an interest in leadership survival. We here shift the focus to the survival of other important politicians in cabinet—foreign ministers, hypothesizing that their tenure depends on their performance in office. For example, we expect that foreign ministers stay longer in office when the country experiences an armed conflict resulting in a win or in a compromise agreement. We evaluate and find support for several of our hypotheses using an original historical dataset, which comprises all foreign ministers of the world's thirteen great powers from the early modern period to the present, covering about 1,100 foreign minister-terms of office.


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