scholarly journals MAKNA PERSETUJUAN BERSAMA DPR DAN PRESIDEN DALAM PEMBENTUKAN UNDANG-UNDANG

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-59
Author(s):  
Aris Arianto ◽  
Afif Hasbullah ◽  
Sholihan Sholihan
Keyword(s):  
Research Method ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Collective Agreement ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Presidential System ◽  
The Law ◽  
Mutual Agreement

The establishment of the Act must be approved by the President as stated in Article 20 of the 1945 Constitution paragraph (2). Interesting when Indonesia uses a presidential system with the separation of powers. However, in the formation of the Act involving the President. Article 20 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution confirms the necessity of mutual agreement in the discussion and ratification of the Law. However, there are other assertions, namely that in Article 20 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution, even without the President's signature, the Act can still be promulgated within 30 days of the Draft Law being discussed. Things like that can't just happen without a reason. Therefore, the writing of this study will look for the meaning of the agreement between the DPR and the President in the formation of the Law and how the legal politics of Article 20 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution. The writing of this study is focused on researching and searching for the meaning of mutual agreement and focusing on legal politics from Article 20 paragraph 5 of the 1945 Constitution. The research method in this writing is normative juridical. The results of the research can be concluded that the meaning of the joint agreement between the DPR and the President in the establishment of the Law is an agreement in determining the policy in the form of a Law which is a reflection of the principle of checks and balances. Legal politics Article 20 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution is an affirmation of Article 20 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution or can be called an affirmation of collective agreement. The establishment of the Act must be approved by the President as stated in Article 20 of the 1945 Constitution paragraph (2). Interesting when Indonesia uses a presidential system with the separation of powers. However, in the formation of the Act involving the President. Article 20 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution confirms the necessity of mutual agreement in the discussion and ratification of the Law. However, there are other assertions, namely that in Article 20 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution, even without the President's signature, the Act can still be promulgated within 30 days of the Draft Law being discussed. Things like that can't just happen without a reason. Therefore, the writing of this study will look for the meaning of the agreement between the DPR and the President in the formation of the Law and how the legal politics of Article 20 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution. The writing of this study is focused on researching and searching for the meaning of mutual agreement and focusing on legal politics from Article 20 paragraph 5 of the 1945 Constitution. The research method in this writing is normative juridical. The results of the research can be concluded that the meaning of the joint agreement between the DPR and the President in the establishment of the Law is an agreement in determining the policy in the form of a Law which is a reflection of the principle of checks and balances. Legal politics Article 20 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution is an affirmation of Article 20 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution or can be called an affirmation of collective agreement.

scholarly journals Control parlamentario y convergencia entre presidencialismo y parlamentarismo

2016 ◽  
pp. 61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier García Roca
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Political Responsibility ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Presidential System ◽  
Presidential Systems ◽  
Parliamentary Oversight ◽  
Cross Fertilization

Es posible comparar presidencialismo y parlamentarismo en los controles parlamentarios. Sin control parlamentario, no puede existir democracia representativa, tampoco en el presidencialismo. Las normas constitucionales y de los Reglamentos ya reflejan ya esa tendencia en Iberoamérica. Esta conclusión lleva a que el clásico debate sobre ambos sistemas de gobierno deba contemplarse de una manera distinta. Hay una pluralidad de tipos presidenciales y semipresidenciales de confusa diferenciación en la realidad. El presidencialismo originario estadounidense es antiguo y difícilmente exportable. El presidencialismo iberoamericano contemporáneo se ha ido parlamentarizando. Existe actualmente un continuum en el binomio presidencialismo/ parlamentarismo con diferencias de grado más que cualitativas. Se advierten tres tendencias: la presidencialización del parlamentarismo europeo, la parlamentarización del presidencialismo iberoamericano, e influencias recíprocas entre los Reglamentos parlamentarios. Pluripartidismo extremado, representación proporcional, y un entendimiento absolutista de la separación de poderes presidencial, que impida los controles parlamentarios, son rasgos incompatibles. La solución más fácil está en abandonar ese entendimiento absolutista que no garantiza bien constitucional alguno. La duración fija del mandato presidencial y la idea de que el Presidente debe responder de forma diferida y directa ante el electorado hacen imposible mecanismos de control- responsabilidad política de su figura, pero puede bastar con reforzar los de control-fiscalización para construir checks and balances y representación política en el Parlamento.It is perfectly possible to compare presidentialism and parlamentarism with regard to controls. Without parliamentary oversight representative democracy does not exist, not even in the presidential system. Constitutional norms and Standing Orders already reflect this tendency in Latin America. This conclusion leads us to a different approach to the classic controversy on both systems of government. There are various kinds of presidential and semi-presidential systems in practice and the differences among them become confusing. The original US presidential system is somewhat outdated and difficult to export. Current Latin American presidentialism has adopted parliamentary patterns. The binomial presidentialism/parlamentarism is nowadays more a continuum with differences in degree rather than in quality. Three tendencies can be detected: European parliamentarism has evolved towards presidential leadership, Latin American presidentialism has incorporated parliamentary tools, and, finally, cross-fertilization among Parliamentary Standing Orders has developed. Extreme multi-party systems, proportional representation, and an absolutist understanding of presidential separation of powers which makes parliamentary oversight impossible are incompatible features. The easiest solution emerges from abandoning that separatist interpretation: such a strong separation on behalf of what? The fixed presidential term of office and the idea that the President should be directly accountable to the electorate and not to the Parliament make mechanisms of political responsibility especially difficult, but certain devices of control-supervision could be enough to achieve checks and balances and parliamentary political representation.

scholarly journals Penyelesaian Perkara Pelanggaran Hak atas Merek

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 67-71
Author(s):  
I Gede Mahendra Juliana Adiputra ◽  
Ida Ayu Putu Widiati ◽  
Ni Made Puspasutari Ujianti
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Alternative Dispute Resolution ◽  
Research Method ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Geographical Indications ◽  
Legal Research ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Mutual Agreement

The existence of competition causes the original brand owner to feel disadvantaged because the sales result has decreased. It is permissible for someone to use another party's mark as long as they ask permission from the trademark owner first. The owner can give trademark rights to other people as agreed in an agreement. The formulation of the problem in this research is as follows: how is the legal protection of trademark rights and how to resolve violations of trademark rights. The research method used in this research is normative legal research. The results of the discussion in this study are as follows: Legal protection of the right to a trademark has been regulated by Law Number 20 of 2016 concerning Trademarks and Geographical Indications, in the provisions of the Law it is expressly stated that if it has been registered in the law that the right to a trademark has been protected. The sanction imposed on the perpetrator of the crime of trademark rights is a fine of Rp. 20,000,000, - (twenty million rupiah) on condition that if the fine is not paid, he will be subject to imprisonment for 6 (six) months. Settlement of trademark cases can be carried out through institutions that can be used to resolve trademark disputes, including: Alternative Dispute Resolution, Arbitration and Courts. Alternative dispute resolution wants the disputing parties to resolve their own dispute with the aim of obtaining a mutual agreement, if the agreement fails, can take arbitration, namely the disputing parties to be able to resolve the dispute to the arbitration institution based on the agreement, furthermore, if the arbitration is successful the last action is through the court, namely the commercial court which has the authority to adjudicate trademark disputes.

Part II The Relationship Between the Legislature and the Executive, 4 Kenya’s Budding Bicameralism and Legislative–Executive Relations

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bosire Conrad M
Keyword(s):  
Political Culture ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Degree Of Separation ◽  
Presidential System ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Overall Effectiveness ◽  
New System

This chapter examines the changes in the 2010 Kenyan constitution, which have resulted in a higher degree of separation of powers between the legislature and executive with an elaborate system of checks and balances. The decision to opt for a presidential system of government (as opposed to a parliamentary or mixed one) and the re-introduction of the Senate are the defining features of the legislative and executive organs. However, the new system is superimposed on a longstanding institutional and political culture that was based on the presence of executive dominance in legislative affairs in a unicameral setting. The new system of government will, therefore, operate in a broader social, political, and historical context that will have a greater impact on their overall effectiveness.

scholarly journals Sistem Pemerintahan Indonesia: Pendekatan Teori dan Praktik

Lentera Hukum ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 248
Author(s):  
Ahmad Yani
Keyword(s):  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Legal Research ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Presidential System ◽  
Governmental System

Abstract Indonesia’s presidential system requires the separation of powers (executive, legislative and judiciary) as it is based on checks and balances. It is stated in the Indonesian Constitution, but it still needs further reform, particularly on the limitation of such tripartite powers. This article uses legal research to analyse and discuss theoretical and practical issues on the governmental system of Indonesia. Theoretically, the authority of state institutions in Indonesia encourages an executive-centered government system. In fact, in carrying out functions and authorities, state institutions do not reflect that the Indonesian system of government embraces the separation of powers. In addition, this study recommends the need for refinement and improvement efforts, to enforce ideal concept and practice. Keywords: Theory and  Practice, Governmental System, Indonesia

Part 4 Constitutionalism and Separation of Powers, 4.8 Indonesia: A Presidential System with Checks and Balances

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hosen Nadirsyah
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Muslim Country ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
The World ◽  
Presidential System ◽  
State Method ◽  
Islamic Political Parties

This chapter focuses on the presidential system of Indonesia. The amendments to the 1945 Constitution have transformed the constitution from a vague and incomplete document rooted in the antidemocratic political philosophy of organic statism into a more coherent, complete, democratic framework for a presidential system with significant separation of powers and checks and balances. The very fact that Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world did not lead Islamic political parties to propose that Indonesia should become an Islamic state. According to the amendments, Indonesia remains a republic, with a presidential system and three branches of government. The chapter discusses the form of the Indonesian state, method of election, requirements, accountability, and relationship among the executive, the parliament, and the judiciary.

Institutional organisation of the European Union in the time of crisis – horizontal division of power and functions

2016 ◽  
pp. 54-66
Author(s):  
Monika Poboży
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
European Council ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Strong Position ◽  
Institutional System ◽  
The Eu

The article poses a question about the existence of the rule of separation of powers in the EU institutional system, as it is suggested by the wording of the treaties. The analysis led to the conclusion, that in the EU institutional system there are three separated functions (powers) assigned to different institutions. The Council and the European Parliament are legislative powers, the Commission and the European Council create a “divided executive”. The Court of Justice is a judicial power. The above mentioned institutions gained strong position within their main functions (legislative, executive, judicial), but the proper mechanisms of checks and balances have not been developed, especially in the relations between legislative and executive power. These powers do not limit one another in the EU system. In the EU there are therefore three separated but arbitrary powers – because they do not limit and balance one another, and are not fully controlled by the member states.

scholarly journals An Attack on the Separation of Powers? Strategic Climate Litigation in the Eyes of U.S. Judges

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (15) ◽  
pp. 8335
Author(s):  
Jasmina Nedevska
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Climate Change ◽  
United States ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The United States ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Climate Politics ◽  
The Social ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
Research Plan

Climate change litigation has emerged as a powerful tool as societies steer towards sustainable development. Although the litigation mainly takes place in domestic courts, the implications can be seen as global as specific climate rulings influence courts across national borders. However, while the phenomenon of judicialization is well-known in the social sciences, relatively few have studied issues of legitimacy that arise as climate politics move into courts. A comparatively large part of climate cases have appeared in the United States. This article presents a research plan for a study of judges’ opinions and dissents in the United States, regarding the justiciability of strategic climate cases. The purpose is to empirically study how judges navigate a perceived normative conflict—between the litigation and an overarching ideal of separation of powers—in a system marked by checks and balances.

Teaching the Presidency: Idealizing a Constitutional Office

2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (01) ◽  
pp. 17-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Fisher
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Great Care ◽  
World War ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Constitutional System

From World War II to the present, prominent scholars placed their hopes in the presidency to protect the nation from outside threats and deal effectively with domestic crises. Their theories weakened the constitutional system of separation of powers and checks and balances by reviving an outsized trust in executive power (especially over external affairs) that William Blackstone and others promoted in eighteenth-century England. The American framers of the Constitution studied those models with great care and fully rejected those precedents when they declared their independence from England.

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