Part 4 Constitutionalism and Separation of Powers, 4.8 Indonesia: A Presidential System with Checks and Balances

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hosen Nadirsyah
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Muslim Country ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
The World ◽  
Presidential System ◽  
State Method ◽  
Islamic Political Parties

This chapter focuses on the presidential system of Indonesia. The amendments to the 1945 Constitution have transformed the constitution from a vague and incomplete document rooted in the antidemocratic political philosophy of organic statism into a more coherent, complete, democratic framework for a presidential system with significant separation of powers and checks and balances. The very fact that Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world did not lead Islamic political parties to propose that Indonesia should become an Islamic state. According to the amendments, Indonesia remains a republic, with a presidential system and three branches of government. The chapter discusses the form of the Indonesian state, method of election, requirements, accountability, and relationship among the executive, the parliament, and the judiciary.

Vertically Disconnected

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 54-77
Author(s):  
Jennifer Epley ◽  
Eunsook Jung
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Electoral Politics ◽  
Political Affiliation ◽  
Muslim Country ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
The World ◽  
Islamic Parties ◽  
Islamic Political Parties ◽  
Over Time

Although Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world, secular political parties have been more successful than Islamic parties in the last four legislative elections since the country democratised in 1998. Why have Islamic parties been unable to dominate Indonesian electoral politics? This article argues that the underperformance of Islamic parties is because Islam itself is not a sufficient variable for political affiliation. Instead, we must analyse interactions among voters, Muslim civil society and Islamic political parties. The disconnection and fragmentation of linkages between these three levels explain electoral weaknesses over time. Original fieldwork research and survey data provide strong evidence for this argument.

Toward Islam Through Political Parties, Ideology, and Democracy: A Discourse Analysis on Turkey’s AK Party, Tunisian Ennahda, and Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-51
Author(s):  
Md. Nazmul Islam ◽  
Yılmaz Bingöl ◽  
Israel Nyaburi Nyadera ◽  
Gershon Dagba
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Development ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Role Model ◽  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
Political Movement ◽  
The World ◽  
Characteristic Features ◽  
Democratic Principles ◽  
Islamic Political Parties

This article aims to examine the legacy and policy of AK Party in Turkey, Ennahda’s political movement in Tunisia, and Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI) in Bangladesh, which is ostensibly identified with Islamic political ideology and acquainted with the world as a ‘moderate-conservative political Islam party.’ The study interrogates the nature, processes, and the characteristic features of the three countries’ administrative system, comparatively from three regions of the world, particularly from the Middle East and Europe region, Africa and Arab region, and the South Asian region. This study also highlights these political parties’ history, political ideology differences, and their practices reflective of democratic principles from a theoretical perspective on politics, policy, and philosophy. It also acknowledges whether the political development of Turkey from 2002 onward is feasible for Bangladeshi and Tunisian Islamic political parties to accept as a role model in their political arena.

scholarly journals Control parlamentario y convergencia entre presidencialismo y parlamentarismo

2016 ◽  
pp. 61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier García Roca
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Political Responsibility ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Presidential System ◽  
Presidential Systems ◽  
Parliamentary Oversight ◽  
Cross Fertilization

Es posible comparar presidencialismo y parlamentarismo en los controles parlamentarios. Sin control parlamentario, no puede existir democracia representativa, tampoco en el presidencialismo. Las normas constitucionales y de los Reglamentos ya reflejan ya esa tendencia en Iberoamérica. Esta conclusión lleva a que el clásico debate sobre ambos sistemas de gobierno deba contemplarse de una manera distinta. Hay una pluralidad de tipos presidenciales y semipresidenciales de confusa diferenciación en la realidad. El presidencialismo originario estadounidense es antiguo y difícilmente exportable. El presidencialismo iberoamericano contemporáneo se ha ido parlamentarizando. Existe actualmente un continuum en el binomio presidencialismo/ parlamentarismo con diferencias de grado más que cualitativas. Se advierten tres tendencias: la presidencialización del parlamentarismo europeo, la parlamentarización del presidencialismo iberoamericano, e influencias recíprocas entre los Reglamentos parlamentarios. Pluripartidismo extremado, representación proporcional, y un entendimiento absolutista de la separación de poderes presidencial, que impida los controles parlamentarios, son rasgos incompatibles. La solución más fácil está en abandonar ese entendimiento absolutista que no garantiza bien constitucional alguno. La duración fija del mandato presidencial y la idea de que el Presidente debe responder de forma diferida y directa ante el electorado hacen imposible mecanismos de control- responsabilidad política de su figura, pero puede bastar con reforzar los de control-fiscalización para construir checks and balances y representación política en el Parlamento.It is perfectly possible to compare presidentialism and parlamentarism with regard to controls. Without parliamentary oversight representative democracy does not exist, not even in the presidential system. Constitutional norms and Standing Orders already reflect this tendency in Latin America. This conclusion leads us to a different approach to the classic controversy on both systems of government. There are various kinds of presidential and semi-presidential systems in practice and the differences among them become confusing. The original US presidential system is somewhat outdated and difficult to export. Current Latin American presidentialism has adopted parliamentary patterns. The binomial presidentialism/parlamentarism is nowadays more a continuum with differences in degree rather than in quality. Three tendencies can be detected: European parliamentarism has evolved towards presidential leadership, Latin American presidentialism has incorporated parliamentary tools, and, finally, cross-fertilization among Parliamentary Standing Orders has developed. Extreme multi-party systems, proportional representation, and an absolutist understanding of presidential separation of powers which makes parliamentary oversight impossible are incompatible features. The easiest solution emerges from abandoning that separatist interpretation: such a strong separation on behalf of what? The fixed presidential term of office and the idea that the President should be directly accountable to the electorate and not to the Parliament make mechanisms of political responsibility especially difficult, but certain devices of control-supervision could be enough to achieve checks and balances and parliamentary political representation.

scholarly journals The Dynamics of Relationship Between Legislative and Executive in Post Reformation Era: A Critical Thinking for Amendment of the 1945 Constitution

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-157
Author(s):  
Sunarto Sunarto
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
The Other ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Indonesian Government ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Presidential System ◽  
The Government ◽  
Opposition Parties

Amendment of the 1945 Constitution brought significant shifting on the Indonesian government. Before amendment, the government was dominated by the enormous power of President (executive heavy). The amendment strengthens the DPR’s power realizing the checks and balances between DPR and President. The amendment of the 1945 Constitution also brought the purification of presidential system. These two things make the dynamics of relationship between the DPR and the President. In post amendments, the government is characterized by an increasing controlling function of DPR. But the combination of presidential system and the multi-party still brings problem related to government instability. Relationship between the DPR and the President was strongly influenced by the presence of opposition parties, which in the previous was regarded as “a taboo” in Indonesian democracy. On the other hand, the elected president also became a strong magnet to get the support of political parties in DPR. Therefore, certain parties that previously became the government’s opposition crossed and supported government. Thus, the presumption that the elected President would find difficulties in implementing his policies because of the lack of support in the DPR was not proven.

scholarly journals SOME THOUGHTS ON SEPARATION OF POWERS: WESTMINSTER MODEL versus AMERICAN MODEL

2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ibrahim bin Ismail
Keyword(s):  
United States Of America ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The United States ◽  
Parliamentary System ◽  
Westminster Model ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
American Model ◽  
The World ◽  
Presidential System ◽  
Model Versus

The focus of this paper is of the working system of government based on the theory of separation of powers. The theory in its original idea is hardly implemented in the world today. Necessary modifications and adjustments ought to be made to suit the adopting countries. As a result of the theory, there exists two dominant world governmental systems, which have been championed by the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The UK’s system is better known as the Westminster model or parliamentary system; whereas the USA’s system is popularly known as the presidential system. Each system has its own strengths and weaknesses. This paper also highlights the influence of the theory through constitutional provisions and judicial pronouncements, which indicates the modification of the two models to suit countries like Malaysia.

scholarly journals URGENSI CHECKS AND BALANCES KETATANEGARAAN INDONESIA DAN ISLAM

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 221
Author(s):  
Bustamin Bustamin ◽  
Rony Jaya
Keyword(s):  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Analysis Model ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Islamic History ◽  
Interactive Analysis ◽  
Library Research ◽  
Qualitative Descriptive ◽  
Constitutional System

The reform movement opened the door to implementation of the 1945 amendment to the constitution. The urgency of the Indonesian government's control system, which included the legislative, executive and judicial institutions, was quite a concern. This condition is based on the fact that during the Orde Baru the concept of the Trias Politica Montesquieu was castrated by the authorities. Unlike the case of the Islamic constitutional system, the concept of mutual control was much more familiar when Khulafaur Rasyidin Umar bin Khattab called six (six) high-ranking friends to find a replacement. This was later considered the first Syura Institute in Islamic history. The purpose of this paper is to recognize the urgency of checks and balances in the Indonesian government system and in the Islamic state administration. This article uses a library research method with a qualitative descriptive approach, which is then analyzed using the interactive analysis model of Miles, Huberman, and Saldana. The results show that following the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, the legislature, including the DPR and the DPD, has taken control of the executive and the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court as a judicial body can control each other and establish a balance between these institutions. While the Islamic constitutional system in the Fiqh study of Siyasah was already familiar with the separation of powers and the separation of powers in the institutions of Tasyri'iyah, Tanfidziyah and Qada'iyah.

scholarly journals MAKNA PERSETUJUAN BERSAMA DPR DAN PRESIDEN DALAM PEMBENTUKAN UNDANG-UNDANG

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-59
Author(s):  
Aris Arianto ◽  
Afif Hasbullah ◽  
Sholihan Sholihan
Keyword(s):  
Research Method ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Collective Agreement ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Presidential System ◽  
The Law ◽  
Mutual Agreement

The establishment of the Act must be approved by the President as stated in Article 20 of the 1945 Constitution paragraph (2). Interesting when Indonesia uses a presidential system with the separation of powers. However, in the formation of the Act involving the President. Article 20 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution confirms the necessity of mutual agreement in the discussion and ratification of the Law. However, there are other assertions, namely that in Article 20 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution, even without the President's signature, the Act can still be promulgated within 30 days of the Draft Law being discussed. Things like that can't just happen without a reason. Therefore, the writing of this study will look for the meaning of the agreement between the DPR and the President in the formation of the Law and how the legal politics of Article 20 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution. The writing of this study is focused on researching and searching for the meaning of mutual agreement and focusing on legal politics from Article 20 paragraph 5 of the 1945 Constitution. The research method in this writing is normative juridical. The results of the research can be concluded that the meaning of the joint agreement between the DPR and the President in the establishment of the Law is an agreement in determining the policy in the form of a Law which is a reflection of the principle of checks and balances. Legal politics Article 20 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution is an affirmation of Article 20 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution or can be called an affirmation of collective agreement. The establishment of the Act must be approved by the President as stated in Article 20 of the 1945 Constitution paragraph (2). Interesting when Indonesia uses a presidential system with the separation of powers. However, in the formation of the Act involving the President. Article 20 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution confirms the necessity of mutual agreement in the discussion and ratification of the Law. However, there are other assertions, namely that in Article 20 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution, even without the President's signature, the Act can still be promulgated within 30 days of the Draft Law being discussed. Things like that can't just happen without a reason. Therefore, the writing of this study will look for the meaning of the agreement between the DPR and the President in the formation of the Law and how the legal politics of Article 20 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution. The writing of this study is focused on researching and searching for the meaning of mutual agreement and focusing on legal politics from Article 20 paragraph 5 of the 1945 Constitution. The research method in this writing is normative juridical. The results of the research can be concluded that the meaning of the joint agreement between the DPR and the President in the establishment of the Law is an agreement in determining the policy in the form of a Law which is a reflection of the principle of checks and balances. Legal politics Article 20 paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution is an affirmation of Article 20 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution or can be called an affirmation of collective agreement.

scholarly journals The impeachment process and party loyalty

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (38) ◽  
Author(s):  
Álvaro Ricardo de Souza Cruz ◽  
Lorena Nascimento Ramos de Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Minas Gerais ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Porto Alegre ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Party Loyalty ◽  
Legal Literature ◽  
Shed Light

 The impeachment process and party loyalty Processo de impeachment e fidelidade partidária Álvaro Ricardo de Souza Cruz* Lorena Nascimento Ramos de Almeida** REFERÊNCIA CRUZ, Álvaro Ricardo de Souza; ALMEIDA, Lorena Nascimento Ramos de. Processo de impeachment e fidelidade partidária. Revista da Faculdade de Direito da UFRGS, Porto Alegre, n. 38, p. 101-120, ago. 2018. RESUMOABSTRACTO presente trabalho visa trazer à baila a pesquisa sobre o tema da fidelidade partidária, sob o enfoque do exercício dos parlamentares de seu voto no processo de impeachment. Primeiramente analisaremos o instituto da fidelidade partidária, sob o enfoque de seu tratamento no ordenamento jurídico pátrio. Além disso, iremos estudar o que seria o “fechamento de questão” e como ele funcionaria – de forma genérica – nos partidos brasileiros. Ainda iremos estudar o processo de impeachment e a atuação dos parlamentares (Deputados e Senadores) e sua função dentro da teoria de checks and balances, no referido procedimento. Por fim, traremos um estudo de caso referente ao “fechamento de questão” pelo Partido Democrático Trabalhista – PDT, no processo de impeachment da ex-presidente Dilma Rousseff. Para atingimento dos objetivos científicos traçados, procederemos a uma abordagem de estudo qualitativa do tipo exploratória, tendo como base o levantamento bibliográfico da literatura jurídica a fim de melhor compreender os institutos jurídicos envolvidos e efetivar a contraposição dos posicionamentos existentes na atualidade sobre os temas acima descritos, almejando compreender qual o melhor posicionamento acerca dos temas por meio do desenvolvimento argumentativo das teorias atuais. The present work aims to shed light to the research on the theme of party loyalty, under the focus on the exercise of the parliamentarians’ vote during the process of impeachment. First, we will analyze the institution of party loyalty, under the focus of its treatment on the country’s legal order. In addition, we will study what would be the "fixation of matter" and how it would function – in a generic way – inside Brazilian political parties. We will then study the process of impeachment and the performance of parliamentarians (Deputies and Senators) and their function within the theory of checks and balances, in the previously mentioned procedure. Finally, we will bring a case study on the "fixation of matter" by the Democratic Labor Party - PDT, during the impeachment process of former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff. In order to reach the scientific objectives outlined above, we will proceed to an exploratory qualitative study based on a bibliographical legal literature research in order to better understand the legal institutions involved in it as well as turning effective the counter parts of already existing positions on the topics described above, intending to understand the best positioning on the themes through the argumentative development of current theories. PALAVRAS-CHAVEKEYWORDSFidelidade Partidária. “Fechamento de Questão”. Impeachment. Separação de Poderes. Mandato Legislativo.Party Loyalty. “Fixation of Matter”. Impeachment. Separation of Powers. Legislative Mandate.* Professor adjunto III da Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais. Graduação em Economia pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais (1985). Graduação em Direito pela Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (1986), Mestrado em Direito pela Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (1990) e Doutorado em Direito pela Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (2003). Procurador da República.** Mestranda em Direito pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais. Especialização em Direito Administrativo e Especialização em Direito Constitucional pela Faculdade Internacional Signorelli. Bacharel em direito pela Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais. Integrante da Comissão de Direito Militar da OAB/MG (2015/2018). Advogada.

Part II The Relationship Between the Legislature and the Executive, 4 Kenya’s Budding Bicameralism and Legislative–Executive Relations

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bosire Conrad M
Keyword(s):  
Political Culture ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Degree Of Separation ◽  
Presidential System ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Overall Effectiveness ◽  
New System

This chapter examines the changes in the 2010 Kenyan constitution, which have resulted in a higher degree of separation of powers between the legislature and executive with an elaborate system of checks and balances. The decision to opt for a presidential system of government (as opposed to a parliamentary or mixed one) and the re-introduction of the Senate are the defining features of the legislative and executive organs. However, the new system is superimposed on a longstanding institutional and political culture that was based on the presence of executive dominance in legislative affairs in a unicameral setting. The new system of government will, therefore, operate in a broader social, political, and historical context that will have a greater impact on their overall effectiveness.

Los frenos del poder (Una introducción al principio de separación de poderes y al control de las instituciones en los sistemas constitucionales)

2014 ◽  
pp. 1791-1812
Author(s):  
Rafael JIMÉNEZ ASENSIO
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
French Revolution ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The United States ◽  
Original Model ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Institutional Control ◽  
El Sistema ◽  
And Control ◽  
Formal Application

LABURPENA: Lan hau laster argitaratuko den izenburu bereko ikerketa baten sarrera da: «Boterearen balaztak (botere-banaketa eta instituzioen kontrola sistema konstituzionaletan). Sarrera honetan, zuzenean, botere-banaketa ulertzeko bi ikuskera handi daudela planteatzen da. Lehenengoa, orekaren ideian oinarritua (edo «checks and balances») anglosaxoia da jatorriz, baina Estatu Batuetan bakarrik errotu zen; Ingalaterra, berriz, pixkanaka urrundu egin zen hasiera batean babestu zuen eredutik. Bigarrenak Frantziako Iraultzan du jatorria, non botere-banaketaren printzipioa aplikatu zen «formalki», nahiz eta benetan botereetako bat besteen gainetik egon zen beti. Botere-banaketaren printzipioaren inteligentzia desberdin horren ondorioak instituzioak kontrolatzeko sistemetan proiektatu ziren, eta bi eredu handi sortu ziren, nahiz eta hiru aldaera izan bakoitzak. Lan honetan, bilakaera horren oinarrizko elementuak marrazten dira, azalduz zein den alderdi politikoen egitekoa boterearen kontrolak diseinatzeko sistema instituzionalean, zein rol jakin hartuko duen jurisdikzio konstituzionalak Europan gabezia horietako batzuk zuzentzeko bitarteko gisa, eta nola ugaritu diren kontrol— eta arau-organoak, boterea kontrolatzeko bitarteko gisa (askotan bitarteko formala eta urria). RESUMEN: El presente trabajo es una Introducción a un Estudio que, titulado igualmente, «Los frenos del poder (separación de poderes y control de las instituciones en los sistemas constitucionales)» verá la luz próximamente. En esta Introducción se plantea directamente la existencia de dos grandes concepciones de entender el principio de separación de poderes. La primera, basada en la idea de equilibrio (o «checks and balances») es de origen anglosajón, pero arraigó solo en Estados Unidos, mientras que Inglaterra se fue distanciando de ese modelo inicial que había auspiciado. La segunda tiene su origen en la Revolución Francesa donde se llevó a cabo una aplicación «formal» del principio de separación de poderes, pero que en la práctica siempre supuso el dominio de uno de los poderes sobre los demás. Las consecuencias de esa distinta inteligencia del principio de separación de poderes se proyectaron sobre los sistemas de control institucional, dando lugar a dos grandes modelos, aunque con tres variantes. En el trabajo se dibujan los elementos básicos de esa evolución, mediante el papel que juegan los partidos políticos en el sistema institucional de diseño de controles del poder, el rol particular que adquirirá la jurisdicción constitucional en Europa como medio de subsanar algunas de esas carencias y la multiplicación de órganos de control y reguladores como medio (muchas veces formal e insuficiente) de controlar el poder. ABSTRACT: This work is and introduction to a study entitled “The brakes to power (separation of powers and control of the institutions in constitutional systems)” which will see the light soon. In this introduction it is directly suggested that two great conceptions of understanding the separation of powers exist. The first one, based on the idea of balance (or “check and balances”) is of anglosaxon origin but it only became ingrained in the United States, whereas England did separate from that original model that it had supported. The second one has its origin in the French Revolution where a formal application of the principle of separation of powers took place, but that in the practice it always meant a control of one power over the others. The consequences of this different comprehension of the principle of separation of powers did project on the systems of institutional control, resulting in two great models, although with three variants. In this work the basic elements of this evolution are drawn by means of the role played by political parties in the design of the institutional system of controlling the power, the particular role that will achieve the constitutional jurisdiction across Europe as a mean of addressing the lacks and the multiplication of bodies of control and regulation as means (many times formal and not sufficient) of controlling the power.

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