scholarly journals LEFT, RIGHT, AND ANTISEMITISM IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 341-371
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Е. Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
European Social Survey ◽  
Future Research ◽  
The Political ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Far Right ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
European Public ◽  
Mass Publics ◽  
Right Wing Populism

Antisemitism has long been found on both the political far-right and farleft. The recent rise in antisemitism worldwide raises the question of whether current antisemitism is found more with the far-right or far-left, the former a function of right-wing populism and the latter with what has been termed the new antisemitism. This paper uses data from the 2014 round of the European Social Survey in 20 nations to test for the connection between ideological selfplacement and antisemitic attitudes in mass publics. Analysis finds greater levels of antisemitism with the extreme far-right compared to the far-left, but extreme leftists appear slightly more antisemitic than moderate leftist. Further, there is less antisemitism than anti-Muslim and anti-Roma (Gypsy) attitudes at all positions on the left-right continuum. The conclusion puts the findings into context and suggests directions for future research.

scholarly journals Left-Wing Xenophobia in Europe

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Svenja Kopyciok ◽  
Hilary Silver
Keyword(s):  
Socioeconomic Status ◽  
European Social Survey ◽  
The Political ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Ethnic Inequality ◽  
Far Right ◽  
Redistributive Policies ◽  
Political Left ◽  
Political Spectrum

Given rising populist nationalism and multiplying meanings of “right” and “left,” this paper assesses whether Europeans who identify as extremely left-wing on the political spectrum hold anti-immigrant attitudes. In contrast to right-wing xenophobes, we further examine whether the political left, who conventionally emphasize class conflict, oppose immigrants less for cultural reasons and more for materialist reasons. We also consider whether socioeconomic status and values traditionally associated with the political left—favoring redistributive policies, egalitarianism, or social rights to benefits and services for immigrants—temper left- more than right-wing xenophobia. We find that a surprisingly large share of those who identify as far left do express extremely xenophobic attitudes, and we profile them in contrast to far right xenophobes. With logistic regression analysis of nine waves of the European Social Survey (2002–2018), we find that, all things equal, socioeconomic status influences far left xenophobia more than far right xenophobia, but inegalitarian values, less support for redistributive policies, and welfare chauvinism can only partially account for far left xenophobia and unexpectedly do not distinguish it from far right xenophobia. This implies that far left parties might adopt anti-immigrant policies to try to retain their loyal voters, even though such policies do not comport with broader left-wing values and may increase racial and ethnic inequality. Controlling for demographic and attitudinal differences reduces the probability of xenophobia among the far left by about sixty percent, but there remains some residual anti-immigrant attitudes among this group still to be explained.

scholarly journals Are anti-immigrant attitudes the Holy Grail of populists? : A comparative analysis of attitudes towards immigrants, values, and political populism in Europe

Intersections ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 100-127
Author(s):  
Vera Messing ◽  
Bence Ságvári
Keyword(s):  
European Social Survey ◽  
Political Orientation ◽  
Human Values ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
Competition Theory ◽  
Level Model ◽  
Right Wing Populism ◽  
And Migration

In this paper we aim to discuss attitudes towards immigrants in a European context and analyse drivers of anti-immigrant attitudes such as the feeling of control, basic human values, political orientation and preferences related to right-wing populism. Based on data from the European Social Survey, we first describe how attitudes of people in Europe changed throughout a period of almost two decades (between 2002 and 2018). We will show that although attitudes are influenced by a number of demographic and subjective features of individuals, on the macro-level they seem to be surprisingly stable, yet hide significant cross-country differences. Then, we zoom in to the three most significant elements influencing attitudes towards immigrants: the feeling of control, basic human values, and political orientation. Applying a multi-level model we test the validity of three theories about factors informing attitudes towards immigrants—competition theory, locus of control, and the role of basic human values—and include time (pre- and post-2015 refugee-crisis periods) into the analysis. In the discussion we link ESS data to recent research on populism in Europe that categorizes populist parties across the continent, and establish that the degree to which anti-migrant feelings are linked to support for political populism varies significantly across European countries. We show that right-wing populist parties gather and feed that part of the population which is very negative towards migrants and migration in general, and this process is also driven by the significance awarded the value of security vis-à-vis humanitarianism.

Right-wing populist attitudes among European public servants – A cross-country comparison

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 485-506
Author(s):  
Wouter van Acker
Keyword(s):  
Policy Making ◽  
European Social Survey ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Public Servants ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
Country Comparison ◽  
European Public ◽  
Cross Country ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Beliefs And Attitudes

Thus far, there has not been any investigation into the populist held beliefs and attitudes among public servants. These attitudes, given the considerable discretionary decision power of public servants, and their influence in policy-making processes, could have a significant impact on public policies. This paper investigates the populist attitudes of public servants, based on data that are retrieved from the European Social Survey. The paper compares public servants from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. The results show that public servants hold surprisingly similar populist views as compared with non-public servants, and that there are striking differences between countries. There are significant implications for the work public servants do, and the representativeness of the administration.

Post-COVID era could be better for European populists

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Far Right ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Crisis Period ◽  
Strong Position ◽  
Right Wing Populism ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Migration Crisis

Significance This left little room for politicisation by parties to engage public opinion. However, support for such parties is stable compared to pre-pandemic levels, suggesting they are well-positioned to benefit in the post-crisis period. Impacts Centrists will try to ensure that the Taliban victory in Afghanistan does not lead to a fresh migration crisis that boosts populists. Following Brexit and the creation of the European recovery fund, Euroscepticism may become less of a feature of right-wing populism. Based on current polling, the far-right Brothers of Italy are in a strong position to lead Italy’s next government.

scholarly journals Self-employment as atypical or autonomous work: diverging effects on political orientations

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 381-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giedo Jansen
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
European Social Survey ◽  
The Political ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
Self Employment ◽  
Employment Share ◽  
Class Voting ◽  
Political Orientations ◽  
Political Right

Abstract It is often held that the self-employed are an economically conservative, political right-wing class. Previous studies, however, have primarily dealt with self-employed workers as a relatively monolithic social class with shared interests as entrepreneurs and (potential) employers. But, with its recent rise, self-employment has developed into a heterogeneous employment type, with a growing number of dependent and precarious self-employed. In this article, the political preferences of people in self-employment are compared to the preferences of employees on temporary contracts. In doing so, hypotheses are tested from both classic theories on class voting, as well as theories on job precariousness and labor market vulnerabilities. For this purpose, European Social Survey Round 4 (ESS-4) data on eight West European countries are analyzed. The findings suggest that particular segments of self-employment share the characteristics of other forms of ‘atypical’ work, not only with respect to labor market insecurities, but also regarding the political orientations associated with such insecurities.

scholarly journals ‘Fascism… but with an open mind.’ Reflections on the Contemporary Far Right in (Western) Europe

Fascism ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Copsey
Keyword(s):  
Western Europe ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Radical Right ◽  
The Political ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Far Right ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Science Community ◽  
Right Wing Populism ◽  
Right Wing Extremism

The political science community would have us believe that since the 1980s something entirely detached from historical or neo-fascism has emerged in (Western) Europe - a populist radicalization of mainstream concerns - a novel form of ‘radical right-wing populism.’ Yet the concept of ‘radical right-wing populism’ is deeply problematic because it suggests that (Western) Europe’s contemporary far right has become essentially different from forms of right-wing extremism that preceded it, and from forms of right-wing extremism that continue to exist alongside it. Such an approach, as this First Lecture on Fascism argues, fails to appreciate the critical role that neo-fascism has played, and still plays, in adapting Europe’s contemporary far right to the norms and realities of multi-ethnic, liberal-democratic society. Political scientists should fixate less on novelty and the quest for neat typologies, and instead engage far more seriously with (neo) fascism studies.

PaReSoGo: Dataset on party representation of social groups for 25 countries, 2002–2016

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882110238
Author(s):  
Olga Zelinska ◽  
Joshua K Dubrow
Keyword(s):  
Social Groups ◽  
European Social Survey ◽  
Political Elite ◽  
The Political ◽  
Dissimilarity Index ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
Measure Representation ◽  
Gender And Age ◽  
The Masses

Whereas social scientists have devised various ways to measure representation gaps between the political elite and the masses across nations and time, few datasets can be used to measure this gap for particular social groups. Minding the gap between what parties social groups vote for and what parties actually attain seats in parliament can reveal the position of social groups in the political power structure. We help to fill this gap with a new publicly available dataset, Party Representation of Social Groups (PaReSoGo), consisting of 25 countries and 150 country-years, and a method for its construction. We used the European Social Survey 2002–2016 and ParlGov data for this time span to create a Dissimilarity Index. To demonstrate the utility and flexibility in the combination of cross-national surveys and administrative data, we chose social groups of gender, age, and education, as well as intersectional groups based on gender and age, and attitudinal groups. We conclude this research note with empirical illustrations of PaReSoGo’s use.

scholarly journals Democracy belief systems in Europe: cognitive availability and attitudinal constraint

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 485-502
Author(s):  
Enrique Hernández
Keyword(s):  
Belief Systems ◽  
European Social Survey ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
Complex Concept ◽  
Country Level ◽  
Mass Publics ◽  
Low Levels ◽  
Main Components ◽  
The Empirical Analysis ◽  
Constitutive Principles

AbstractThere is a growing interest in analyzing what citizens think about democracy. However, gauging citizens’ opinions about a complex concept such as democracy might be hindered by the apparent low levels of political sophistication of mass publics. This paper contributes to the emerging literature on citizens’ views and evaluations of democracy by analyzing to what extent ordinary citizens are capable of developing structured opinions about democracy and its constitutive principles. For this purpose, the paper adapts Converse’s notion of political belief systems to analyze the articulation of individuals’ democracy belief systems (DBS). The first goal of this paper is to conceptualize and operationalize the main components of individuals’ DBS: cognitive availability, horizontal constraint, and vertical constraint. Drawing on data from the sixth round of the European Social Survey, the second goal is to describe the articulation of DBS in Europe. The third and final aim of this paper is to trace the most relevant individual- and country-level correlates of the articulation of the three components of DBS. In line with recent findings about political belief systems in other policy domains, the results indicate that most Europeans have coherently structured attitudes about democracy. However, even if the results imply that Europeans have a relatively articulated DBS, the empirical analysis also reveals some individual- and country-level variation in the articulation of specific components of DBS.

scholarly journals When economic and cultural interests align: the anti-immigration voter coalitions driving far right party success in Europe

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 427-448 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daphne Halikiopoulou ◽  
Tim Vlandas
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
European Social Survey ◽  
Strong Positive Correlation ◽  
Far Right ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
Positive Correlation ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Party Support ◽  
The Impact

AbstractThis article contests the view that the strong positive correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and far right party success necessarily constitutes evidence in support of the cultural grievance thesis. We argue that the success of far right parties depends on their ability to mobilize a coalition of interests between their core supporters, that is voters with cultural grievances over immigration and the often larger group of voters with economic grievances over immigration. Using individual level data from eight rounds of the European Social Survey, our empirical analysis shows that while cultural concerns over immigration are a stronger predictor of far right party support, those who are concerned with the impact of immigration on the economy are important to the far right in numerical terms. Taken together, our findings suggest that economic grievances over immigration remain pivotal within the context of the transnational cleavage.

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