scholarly journals Iran’s Changing Foreign Policy Trends

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 95
Author(s):  
Iqra Jathol ◽  
Muhammad Qazafi ◽  
Tahir Husain

The changes in international politics caused change in foreign policies of the states. The governments of many countries began to develop foreign policies to alliances and relations. According to with the "Look to the Iranian government, the East" can serve Iran's national interests and can break dependence on the West and balanced foreign policy problems: political isolation logical isolation. These are caused by Iran's foreign policy; Iran has rejected the prevailing norms of the international system and the regional dynamics. The immediate consequences are: political showdown with the West particularly the U.S. and in the region tensions have increased with the neighbors. At the same time Iran heavily relies on its oil and gas revenue to achieve an economic growth. At this time when Iran is facing increasing international isolation, "Look to the East" policy can serve as fine recipe for its stagnated oil business and the Asian nations. Iranian state is looking proactively towards the Asian Countries especially India. Iran’s foreign policy raises many unanswered questions. The objectives of study to provide an account and assessment of Iran’s relations with the outside world within these new systemic conditions and account of Iran’s relations with the rest of the world will be preceded by a brief historical account of these relations. The study tries to highlight about Iran’s foreign policy? How does Iran define its interests and choose to pursue them? Is this a matter to be explained or to be understood? Is its foreign policy based on words or deeds, behavior or action?

1998 ◽  
Vol 154 ◽  
pp. 308-329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong Deng

The pursuit of national interests is the legitimate goal of a state's foreign policy. Yet in the 1990s, politicians in the West and the U.S. have criticized the Chinese government for its allegedly narrow-minded, backward view, especially on issues concerning human rights and irredentist claims. Many scholarly analyses in North America also point to a “hard-core,” well-entrenched Chinese realpolitik “worldview” with little ingrained liberal thinking. The conclusion seems to be that, in the Chinese worldview, the international system consists essentially of atomistic nation-states locked in a perpetual struggle for power. China's foreign policy is based on an outmoded Westphalian notion of sovereignty in a world where state sovereignty is being eroded and the traditional notion of national interests is under increasing challenge, thanks to unprecedentedly “dense interdependence.” The blunt policy criticisms and subtle scholarly analyses point to a problematic Chinese definition of national interests.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 112-150
Author(s):  
S. K. Pestsov

Due to a rapid economic growth over the past several decades China has significantly strengthened its international positions. This growth in its own turn was to a large extent due to a pragmatic and sound foreign strategy that the country has been pursuing since mid-1970s. However, in recent years both within and outside China there has been an on-going debate on the alleged radical transformation of the PRC’s perceptions of its national interests, its place in world politics, and its foreign policy. The variety of opinions becomes increasingly complicated as the number of discussants grows and new arguments are adduced in support of different positions. Whereas outside China this debate structures around the narrative of the Chinese assertiveness, within the country the main dispute is between the advocates of a traditional policy of ‘keeping a low profile’ (taoguang yanghui) and proponents of a new ‘striving for achievements’ (fenfa youwei) strategy. The present paper aims to provide a framework for a systematization of debates on the contemporary foreign policy of China in the English language academic literature based on two criteria: whether a researcher admits that the Chinese foreign policy is changing and how he assesses implications of these changes. Such an approach undoubtedly entails certain schematization of the presented views and arguments. However, it differs favorably from traditional, more narrative approaches to conceptualization of the debate since it establishes a clear, transparent theoretical framework aimed to identify the substantive core of the presented views. This, in turn, can bring about a better understanding of the current state and possible evolution of Chinese foreign policy in general. The author concludes that although these debates are far from being over, most researchers admit the PRC’s foreign policy strategy is undergoing a radical transformation. Since the latter half of 2000s there has been a steady trend in the foreign policy of China towards greater assertiveness. At the same time this transformation ensures continuity of the basic principles of Chinese diplomacy. All this means that further debates on the Chinese foreign policy should focus primarily on potential implications of this transformation for the PRC, the regional dynamics and international relations system as a whole.


Does political Islam have a specific vision of global politics? How has the foreign policy of Islamist forces developed in order to impose their ideas onto the diplomatic agenda of other countries? How do these actors perceive the world, international affairs, and the way Islamic countries should engage with the international system? Eager to break with the dominant grammar of international relations, and instead to fuse Muslim states in a unique religious and political entity, Muslim actors have had to face up to the realities that they had promised to transform. Drawing on a series of case studies, this collective work sheds light on six national trajectories of Islamism: in Morocco (the Party of Justice and Development), Tunisia (Ennhada), Egypt (the Muslim Brotherhood), Palestine (Hamas), Lebanon (Hizbullah) and Turkey (AKP). It looks at what has been produced by the representatives of political Islam in each case, and the way these representatives have put their words and their ideological aspirations into action within their foreign policies.


2009 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 103-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pınar Bilgin

AbstractHow are Turkey's insecurities relevant to the analysis of its international relations? While it is interesting to look at how particular security concerns have affected Turkey's foreign policies at various moments in history, this article will take a different route. Following the distinction that David Campbell has drawn between “Foreign Policy” (through which others are rendered “foreign) and “foreign policy” (through which relations with others are managed), the article will explore how Turkey's insecurities have shaped a Foreign Policy that rests on the West/non-West divide. While the literature has analyzed specific acts of foreign policy and how they were crafted in response to specific military insecurities, the role that Turkey's non-military and non-specific insecurities have played in shaping its international relations has remained understudied. Thus, the literature has not been able to fully account for the centrality of Turkey's western orientation to its security. The argument here proceeds in three steps: First, the article draws attention to the necessity of looking at non-material as well as material insecurities in designing research on foreign policy. Second, it illustrates this necessity by focusing on the case of Turkey's foreign policy. Thirdly, in view of this second point the article highlights the centrality of Turkey's western orientation (i.e., its Foreign Policy) to its security, more persuasively than studies that exclusively focus on the material aspects of security.


Author(s):  
Anders Wivel

Realists explain foreign policy in terms of power politics. They disagree on the exact meaning of power and on how and to what extent politics is likely to influence policy. But they all find that power has a strong materialist component and that the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy is likely to vary with security challenges stemming from the external environment. The relative size of a state’s material resources is likely to influence its ability to set agendas and influence specific decisions and outcomes in international affairs. And the nature of the strategic environment, most importantly whether the security and survival of the state is under immediate threat, is likely to influence the relative weight of domestic influences on foreign policy. In sum, great powers enjoy a bigger external action space in their foreign policies than weaker states, and secure states enjoy a bigger external action space in their foreign policies than insecure states. Realism is a top-down approach to explaining foreign policy. Realists begin from the anarchic structure of the international system. They argue that the absence of a legitimate monopoly of power in the international system create a strong incentive for states to focus on survival as their primary goal and self-help as the most important means to achieving this goal. However, “survival” and “self-help” may take many forms. These forms are shaped by mechanisms of socialization and competition in the international system and systemic incentives are filtered through the perceptions of foreign policy decision makers and domestic institutions enabling and restraining the ability of decision makers to respond to external incentives. Neoclassical realists combine these factors in order to explain specific foreign policies. Offensive realists and defensive realists focus on the effects of structure on foreign policy, but with contrasting assumptions about the typical behavior of states: defensive realists expect states to pursue balancing policies, whereas offensive realists argue that only by creating an imbalance of power in its own favor will a state be able to maximize its security. In addition to being an analytical approach for explaining foreign policy, realists often serve as foreign policy advisors or act in the function of public intellectuals problematizing and criticizing foreign policy. This illustrates the potential for realism as an analytical, problem-solving and critical approach to foreign policy analysis. However, it also shows the strains within realism between ambitions of creating general theories, explaining particular foreign policies, and advising on how to make prudent foreign policy decisions.


Author(s):  
Jason E. Strakes ◽  
Mikhail A. Molchanov ◽  
David J. Galbreath

To gain a comprehensive understanding of the relationships of elite/citizen preferences and strategies—and its consequent impact on the perceived role of their countries in the greater international system—it is necessary to put an emphasis on interactions within and across contrasting areas of the formerly communist world. Until recently, the systematic investigation of foreign policy-making processes has been a relatively neglected dimension within the general domain of post-communist studies. During the mid-to-late 1990s, various scholars addressed ideological redefinition in post-communist states. Other scholars have addressed the foreign policy trajectory of the newly independent states from the perspective of governance, institutional structure, and state capacity. Among the analytic tools that have been adopted to evaluate the international activities of post-communist states in recent years is the burgeoning concept of “multi-vector” foreign policy. However, due to the vast cross-regional scope and complexity of the former Soviet region, it has become more analytically useful to identify this group of countries in terms of their location in separate and respective geographic subregions. Two regional overviews provide a synthesis of the four analytic foci: national identity, political transition, rationality, and regionalism. The first offers an assessment of the foreign policy decisions and strategies of the Baltic republics since 1990–1. The second evaluates the foreign relations between the Russian Federation and the five independent republics of Central Asia.


Author(s):  
Martha Shimuleni

Foreign policy articulates and gears the process of pursuit of national interests. The research aims at looking into the diverse foreign policies of various states in the Southern region of Africa. It brings out the nature of Namibia and Zimbabwe interaction with other countries in Europe, America, Asia (China in particular) and even other African countries through what is being induced in their respective foreign policy agenda. African countries, belonging to the «global south» are characterized with under development due to long experience of war which renders them dependent on the «core» or «global north» for co-operation and interaction. A country’s foreign policy is peculiar to it, as it represents the interests of a country which is usually distinctive in nature. It is safe to say that foreign policy can be likened to an organizational set of objectives. Basically, an organizational set of objectives entails the processes of goal attainment. Based on this, foreign policy is an agenda that enlists national interests, and ways to attaining them. It is noteworthy that Zimbabwe and Namibia hold strong ties with their colonial masters. Both countries have strong foreign relations with the country that colonized them far more than with other countries. Zimbabwe has got strong ties with Britain and Namibia has got strong ties with Germany. Over the years, the efficiency of Zimbabwe and Namibia foreign policy has been undermined by conflict. The study reveals the development in Namibia and Zimbabwe is attributed to their relations with other countries of the world. Mainly, in the areas of finding market for locally made products and in the aspects of attracting foreign investors. A major issue that jets itself into the foreign policy agenda of both of these countries is the issue of security both domestically and internationally. However, the reason is no foreign policy can be successful in area of chaos, unrest and hunger. A potent foreign policy is that which is flexible, versatile and serves the interest of all, the formulation of policies based on these criteria will ensure efficiency and ultimately development.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Alexander Slocombe

<p>Understanding national identity through foreign policy provides a strong means of ascertaining the prevailing social constructions within a great power nation state. There is a growing need to understand the national identities of Russia and China without pre-theorising or depending on asymmetric comparative studies with regional states. China and Russia are frequently compared to their regional neighbours which undermines understanding their unique identities. There are also frequent misunderstandings of contemporary Chinese and Russian national motives, often likening the modern Russian state to the Soviet Union, or attempting to understand China as a challenger to US unipolarity. Both great powers exhibit common characteristics of authoritarianism, both have recently endured massive social and national changes, and both have global interests that manifest in the Middle East such as securing vital geostrategic resources, both states are conscious of their native Muslim populations and to be recognised as a great power identity both must demonstrate influence in the Middle East. Yet, there have been significant differences in agendas and outcomes of their foreign policy decisions. This thesis seeks to use a constructivist framework to discern Russian and Chinese identity through comparison of their respective foreign policy. Contrary to “neo-realist” and “neo-liberal” arguments that accept state interests as rational, determined by the international system, and not determined by identity, this thesis seeks not to pre-theorise but to identify how their respective actions towards three key case studies in the Middle East; the Syrian Civil Conflict, the Iranian Nuclear Framework, and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, indicate their prevailing social constructions. This thesis compares Russian and Chinese attitudes and actions towards these cases. Despite their similar disposition and principles towards international relations these two nations had significant points of difference. Drawing upon foreign policy analysis and a comparative model this thesis finds that despite the commonalities between the Russian and Chinese nations, Russian identity as great power, unique Eurasian power, and an alternative to the West, ensures a defiance of its relatively weak economic position to engage in positions of leadership in the Middle East, whilst China’s identity constructions that are common with Russia, its great power, civilisational, and alternative to the West constructions manifest despite an increasingly influential and material position in the world order, has provided little incentive to engage in meaningful ways throughout the Middle East’s recent conflicts.</p>


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-164
Author(s):  
Christina Griessler

Abstract This contribution explores the Visegrad Four’s (V4) foreign policy initiatives in the Western Balkans by considering each state’s interests and policies and the evolution of joint V4 objectives. My underlying hypothesis is that the foreign policy‑related behaviour of individual states is shaped by certain roles that they assume and by their national interests. This work uses role theory to explain the V4 states’ foreign policies both generally and in the specific case of the Western Balkans. The V4 have prioritised cooperation with this region, and I analyse the programmes of the last four V4 presidencies (Slovakia 2014-2015, the Czech Republic 2015-2016, Poland 2016-2017 and Hungary 2017-2018) to reveal key foreign policy objectives and explore why they were selected. At the same time, I examine the interests of each V4 country and the reasons for their joint attention to the Western Balkan region. My analysis shows that the V4 perceive themselves as supportive and constructive EU and NATO members and see their policies as reflective of European values. Moreover, they believe they should contribute to EU enlargement by sharing experiences of economic and political transformation with the Western Balkan states and serving as role models.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 27
Author(s):  
Imelda Masni Juniaty Sianipar

On October 20, 2014, Joko Widodo or familiarly known as Jokowi was sworn in as the Seventh President of the Republic of Indonesia. The majority of Indonesian society supports Jokowi because He is simple, honest and populist. The presence of populist leaders in international politics often attracts the attention of Western countries, particularly the United States. Populist leaders are often considered as the authoritarian leaders, anti-democratic, anti-Western, anti-foreign and anti-market. Hugo Chavez from Venezuela and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from Iran are the examples. Chavez and Ahmadinejad are considered as threats by the United States because they challenge the United States led regional and global order. This article will examine the direction of Jokowi’s foreign policy. This article argues that Jokowi is a moderate populist leader. Jokowi is friendly to other countries including the West but still prioritize the national interests. Thus, Indonesia under Jokowi is not a threat to other countries and the West. In fact, they can work together to achieve their common national interests. Keywords: populism, foreign policy, Indonesia, jokowi, moderate populism


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