Polityka obronna Litwy w latach 2014-2018

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 65-89
Author(s):  
Piotr Szymański

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 marks the turning point in Lithuania’s defence policy. Previously, Lithuanian armed forces developed expeditionary capabilities in line with NATO’s out-of-area requirements and had to face substantial manning and equipment shortages as a result of the financial crisis. After 2014 clarion call, Lithuania responded with the most comprehensive measures of all the Eastern Flank states to strengthen its military capabilities. Lithuania’s main strategic concerns encompass both the Russian A2/AD bubble in Kaliningrad as well as the development of Russian offensive capabilities in the Baltic Sea region. The Lithuanian strive for security included a big hike in defence spending and a gradual increase in military personnel, with the reinstatement of conscription, faster modernisation of armed forces, development of military infrastructures, investments in combat readiness and an update of military exercises. This was supplemented by the strengthening of defence co-operation with key partners – both bilaterally and within the NATO framework. Lithuania’s main goal was to convince Allies to establish permanent military presence on its territory in order to strengthen deterrence against Russia. Between the NATO Wales Summit in 2014 and the Warsaw Summit in 2016, Lithuania was focused mainly on a closer military collaboration with the US – a country which then took a leading role in the military reassurance of the Eastern Flank. In Lithuania, the US has traditionally been perceived as the main security provider. The Warsaw Summit constituted a milestone in bolstering the Allied defence posture vis-à-vis Russia, which influenced Lithuania’s defence policy. American rotational company-size units in the Baltic states were subsequently replaced by NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, i.e. the deployment of German-led battalion-size battlegroup in Lithuania. Therefore, between 2016 and 2018 Lithuania tried to augment its strong defence ties with US while deepening military integration with Germany. The most significant sign of a closer military co-operation with Germany was the procurement of 88 Boxer infantry fighting vehicles. Recently, Germany has become the biggest supplier of military equipment to the Lithuanian army. Although Lithuania prefers to develop military co-operation primarily with US and Germany, Poland remains its important orientation point (mainly due to a similar threat perception and Poland’s geographic location). The core dimensions of the Polish-Lithuanian defence collaboration are the strengthening of air defence, including Grom systems deliveries, training of special forces and development of the trilateral brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG) together with Ukraine. In the coming years, the ongoing depopulation will remain the biggest internal challenge for the Lithuanian defence policy. Emigration and an ageing society result not only in a decreasing number of citizens reaching the enlistment age, but may also adversely affect the economic situation and - as a consequence - defence expenditure.

Author(s):  
Przemysław Furgacz

After the landmark annexation of Crimea and eruption of hybrid war in the Donbas, some states that in the past used to be under Soviet domination began to ask their stronger NATO allies for increased military presence in the Alliance Eastern flank. The worsening security environment in the Eastern Europe, the fear against potential swift Russian incursion, the relative weakness of Eastern European armies, the significant strategic exposure of the Baltic states, these factors influenced the Alliance's decision to augment NATO military presence in the states bordering Russia. Actions like deployment of additional battalions, prepositioning of heavy military equipment, intensified joint multinational military drills are intended to reassure the most vulnerable NATO member states and to deter Moscow from taking too audacious and too assaultive measures. The author shortly describes the actions NATO has made since 2014 in order to strengthen its military presence in the Eastern flank with particular emphasis on U.S.-enhanced forward presence in the region.


Baltic Region ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (8) ◽  
pp. 33-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Konyshev ◽  
A. Sergunin ◽  
S. Subbotin

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stanislav Mikhailovich Ivanov

The article analyzes the military operation of the United States and its NATO allies in Afghanistan, which lasted for 20 years, and the prospects for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from this country. The author states that the new US President D. Biden does not abandon the foreign policy course pursued by his predecessors earlier to reduce the US military presence in Afghanistan. Moreover, the new president reaffirmed his commitment to the peace agreement between the United States and the opposition Taliban, reached in the Qatari capital of Doha in February 2020, which provides for the withdrawal of US troops and their NATO allies from the country. However, the author comes to the conclusion that due to a number of objective and subjective factors, the timing of the final withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan may be postponed indefinitely, and even the deadline recently declared by the White House on September 11, 2021, may be far from final and may be repeatedly subjected to revisions. The main obstacle to the implementation of this important clause of the bilateral agreement is the lack of progress in negotiations between the Taliban representatives and the central government, as well as the lack of security guarantees for the withdrawn contingent of the US Armed Forces, NATO and the remaining staff of Western foreign missions in Afghanistan. Not only the radical Taliban wing, but also a number of current ministers in Kabul are trying to sabotage the conclusion of a second peace agreement and the subsequent integration of the Taliban into power. Without a lasting agreement between the Taliban and the central authorities in Kabul and the formation of a new coalition government, the likelihood of a resumption of civil war in the country will remain. New terrorist attacks and outbursts of violence on the part of the radical wing of the Taliban movement against the central government and foreign troops are not excluded. The penetration of Islamic State gangs into Afghanistan, which can undermine the stability of the military-political situation from within and provoke new armed conflicts, also carries certain risks. Much will also depend on the position of one of the main external players in Afghan affairs — Islamabad. Time will show whether Pakistan will be ready to take on part of the functions of a peaceful settlement within the Afghan conflict. The US administration would like more participation in stabilizing the further situation in Afghanistan from other regional forces (China, Russia, India, Iran, Turkey, Uzbekistan).


2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-216
Author(s):  
Mircea Vladu ◽  
Stelian Popescu

Abstract The issue of the impact of emerging and disruptive technologies on security policy is a major concern of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. This is also demonstrated by the meeting between the Board members and the newly-established Advisory Group for Emerging and Disruptive Technologies, consisting of top experts in the fields of Cyber, Artificial Intelligence, Quantum Computing, Big Data, Space, Robotics and Autonomous or Biotechnological Systems, to find new synergies between NATO, the private, governmental and academic sectors and to maintain the technological supremacy of the Alliance. At the same time, the fact that the Romanian Army has mastered the defining elements of the impact of emerging and disrupted technologies on security policy and acts to make them operational is demonstrated by the meeting of July 12, 2021, of the Minister of National Defense, Nicolae-Ionel Ciuca with Heidi Grant, director of the US Defense and Security Cooperation Agency, on which occasion Romania received from the US the name of “Dependable Undertaking (DU)” under which contracts for the purchase of military equipment can be concluded without any payment in advance. Based on these elements, we would like to continue to talk about some aspects of innovation in dual military technologies, such as the influence of emerging and disruptive technologies on the organization and use of the armed forces. The research method undertaken consisted in identifying bibliographic resources, studying them, drawing relevant conclusions and formulating points of view on the impact of emerging and disruptive technologies on security policies.


Author(s):  
Donatas Palavenis

The aim of the study is to characterize the U.S. and Lithuanian defense cooperation from 1990–2020 including arms procurements. Findings suggest close defense cooperation between countries at Presidential, Congressional, and Defense Ministry/Secretary levels. The most developed cooperation areas are joint participation in international operations, improvements of the Lithuanian Armed Forces’ capabilities, and an increase of the U.S. military presence in the Baltic region. An analysis of Lithuanian defense procurements between 1990–2020 indicates that the majority of defense armaments were acquired from the U.S. using the Foreign Military Sales venue while other options to obtain armaments were not used.


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 60-72
Author(s):  
I. Istomin ◽  
A. Sokolov

The article discusses the dynamics of the US military presence in Germany through the evolution of American foreign policy. The article presents data on the quantitative presence of the American army in Germany and assesses the impact of various incentives to change the size of the American contingent and their comparison. The presence of the US armed forces in Germany is one of the most striking examples of the long-term deployment of foreign troops on the territory of a major power. In terms of the duration and size of the contingent, it is comparable only to the deployment of American troops in Japan. In both countries, foreign troops played an occupying role after the end of World War II. In the future, the American contingent remained in them already as an ally. At the same time, in the case of Germany, the presence of foreign military personnel was combined with the creation of an efficient and relatively large army. For a long time, Tokyo was limited only by compact self-defense forces. The presence of independent capabilities to ensure security is often a prerequisite for pursuing an independent policy and encourages the refusal to deploy a contingent of another state on its territory. It is all the more surprising that in the FRG the question of the withdrawal of US forces was never seriously raised. On the contrary, the German leadership has repeatedly expressed concern about the possibility of reducing the American presence. In this it was very different from the Japanese establishment, in which the expediency of maintaining allied relations with the United States was sometimes critically assessed. The authors conclude that ensuring the loyalty of the German leadership was not associated with the size of Washington’s military presence on the territory of Germany. The buildup of the American contingent in the Federal Republic of Germany was influenced by fears around external threats, the correlation of conventional and nuclear deterrence in the US strategy and the desire to reduce military costs. Acknowledgements. The research was carried out at the expense of a grant from the Russian Science Foundation (project No. 17-78-20170 “Typology of Modern Military-Political Alliances and Model of Russia’s Relations with Allies”).


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Yevtodyeva ◽  
Ilya Kramnik ◽  
D. Stefanovich

This monograph examines the trends and main areas of arms trade and military-technical cooperation in Southeast Asia over the past decades. In addition to direct acquisitions of weapons and military equipment (WME), the supply of subsystems and components, the licensed production and other forms of militarytechnical cooperation are also considered. Trends in arms trade are analyzed in terms of influence of such factors as internal instability, U.S.-Chinese confrontation in the Pacific region and disputes in the South China Sea, modernization of the armed forces and national defense industries of Southeast Asian countries. Particular attention is paid to various aspects of military-technical cooperation of the regional states with their key arms suppliers – Russia, the US, European countries, China, and South Korea.


Author(s):  
Ricardo Borges Gama Neto

The article tries to discuss if the impact of the political changes, which occurred in South America from the first decade of the century, influenced the purchase of military equipment by some countries of the region. The emergence of new governments, with a strong left leaning, occurred concurrently with a clear change in the classic pattern of buying defense equipment. European countries and the US have come to be preferred, as opposed to Russia and China, as suppliers of arms to the various South American armed forces.


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-44
Author(s):  
D. Shikhov

Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union raises questions on how UK defence policy will develop. Significant shifts inside the United Kingdom as well as its changing position in the international arena caused by Brexit require new approaches in its military strategy. National Security Strategy 2015 and UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy 2017 do not fully reflect current geopolitical realities while new strategic documents haven’t been presented so far. UK armed forces modernization is becoming even more relevant, however there are few signs that London has capabilities to increase its defence budget. The latest statistics shows stable decline in UK military expenditure as percentage of GDP. The armed forces have been shrinking in size for several decades and some large modernization projects have come across considerable difficulties. After years of heated debates an ambitious plan to replace all four ballistic missile submarines with the new ones has been approved. However Brexit caused another wave of claims for Scottish independence raising concerns over the future of the Britain’s only Scotland-based naval facility for nuclear forces. Brexit inevitably poses a dilemma of setting UK’s foreign and defence policy priorities. Though leaving the EU doesn’t mean that Britain will fully withdraw from European defence and security initiatives, active cooperation in this sphere between London and Brussels is highly unlikely. Given that, the importance of NATO as well as other multilateral security mechanisms (especially the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force with Scandinavian and Baltic states) and bilateral defence cooperation (particularly with the US and France) is significantly increasing. Despite numerous challenges for British defence and security policy caused by Brexit these difficulties together with the UK’s traditional strong points such as the special relationship with the US and network of military facilities around the globe may give impetus to a more proactive military strategy aimed at strengthening UK’s global influence.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-64
Author(s):  
В. Н. Конышев ◽  
А. А. Сергунин ◽  
С. В. Субботин

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