Zelensky and Servant of the People

This work examines the ideological stances of Volodymyr Zelensky and the effectiveness of him and his party so far of breaking with the past politically in Ukraine. It assesses the ideological basis of Servant of the People and Zelensky initially, examining the different and sometimes inconsistent aspects of the party and argues there is an issue in that it appears to be a continuation of personality first politics. It then outlines issues for the new government, both domestically and internationally, and outlines the effects real and potential regarding Ukraine's relationship with the EU and Russia. It finally makes some suggestions on areas to focus on to assist in the growth and stability that Ukraine needs. The author makes the argument that the new government, while implementing some necessary reforms, due to an inexperience, broad, and unsustainable ideological position and oligarchic influence, isn't as adept at modernising as it wants to be and even runs the risk of returning Ukraine to the hands of anti-reformers with some poorly thought out policies.

Reinforcement of the NATO Eastern Flank

After the landmark annexation of Crimea and eruption of hybrid war in the Donbas, some states that in the past used to be under Soviet domination began to ask their stronger NATO allies for increased military presence in the Alliance Eastern flank. The worsening security environment in the Eastern Europe, the fear against potential swift Russian incursion, the relative weakness of Eastern European armies, the significant strategic exposure of the Baltic states, these factors influenced the Alliance's decision to augment NATO military presence in the states bordering Russia. Actions like deployment of additional battalions, prepositioning of heavy military equipment, intensified joint multinational military drills are intended to reassure the most vulnerable NATO member states and to deter Moscow from taking too audacious and too assaultive measures. The author shortly describes the actions NATO has made since 2014 in order to strengthen its military presence in the Eastern flank with particular emphasis on U.S.-enhanced forward presence in the region.

The ‘Steinmeier Formula'

The conflict in Eastern Ukraine has been ongoing for over five years, despite the best attempts of the international community to help resolve it. Rather than the EU, UN, or NATO, it is in fact the Normandy Format talks or the Normandy contact group, which is composed of Germany, Russia, Ukraine, and France, which has taken the lead. This chapter considers historical evidence and problems before continuing to analyse the aims of the actors in the conflict, the Normandy Format talks, the ‘Steinmeier Formula', and whether this represents a solution that can satisfy all the actors. The importance of the wider reforms as part of strengthening Ukraine's ability to fulfil its aims and direct its own policy path is noted as essential, as is uncertainty from all actors over longer term prospects for the fulfilment of their aims once a peace agreement has been enacted.

Russian Minorities and Intimidation Tactics

Rather than seeing recent Russian actions as part of a grand strategy or master plan, it is worth taking a moment to consider the opposite – that such actions may be reactive measures from a regime more lacking grand strategies than is generally supposed. Focusing on the issue of Russian minorities in Ukraine, it is clear that while Putin has been most assertive in his utilisation of Russian minorities as a pretext to interfere with Ukraine, the threat to do so is nothing new. Ever since the prospect of an independent Ukraine arose, during the rule of Gorbachev, Russian elites have made implicit and explicit threats which utilised the Russian minority in Ukraine. The fact that Ukrainian compliance had been achieved without having to resort to such measures, which are likely to prove destructive in the long term, should not be taken as part of a grand master plan. Rather, they should be seen as desperate reactive measures of a regime that must have seen less and less available options.

Danish Foreign and Security Policy (1990-2019)

In this chapter, the Danish foreign and security policy in the framework of the international security policy and its changes vis-à-vis the former Eastern bloc in the period following the Cold War will be analysed in the light of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The analysis will concentrate on three tense areas that form the European core of Danish security policy. Firstly, an analysis of the purpose of the Danish commitment to the EU-enlargement, in the years 1990-2007, and how it anticipates the events of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is done. Secondly, an analysis of the Danish foreign and security policy in the frame of the international policy in the Baltic Sea Region is done, and thirdly, an analysis of the Danish foreign and security policy in the frame of the international policy in the Arctic area in the light of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is done.

What Is the Place of France in the Ukraine and Russia Crisis?

The current world is not moving as all specialists predicted. Brexit, Trump, everyone was wrong. This chapter will have two targets: describing the French policy toward Russia, the past with USSR, and following its position in the Ukrainian conflict. It is good to remind that Hollande was involved in the Ukrainian affairs and had managed with Germany the Minsk I and II agreements. He had also suspended Mistral ships selling and approving sanctions against Russia. Despite these good intentions, which parts or positions would support France? The fears of Putin or the interest of France could drive the French policy in opposition of Charles De Gaulle independent policy.

The Caucasus Geopolitical Dilemma

The chapter reviews the fierce geopolitical competition between global powers over the hegemony positions in the Caucasus region. The geopolitical security when global powers flex their muscle and are on the way to achieve their missions and goals with assistance of new ideological threshold—Eurasia vs. Neo-Atlantism—induces the emergence of confrontation modality for the regional security perceptions not promoting peace and stability. The new security dilemma for the region is really identified as follows: Russia/China vs. USA/EU. It is an interesting point to consider how the competition affects formulating various foreign policy implications of the regional actors and in what capacity it strains geopolitical configuration in the area.

Future of the Eastern Partnership in the Region

The aim of this chapter is to examine the main objectives and key challenges of the EU's Eastern Partnership (EaP). In this effort, the outlook and aspirations of the EU's policy towards its eastern neighbors (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) are explored, and the key issues of the (eastern dimension) policy are discussed as well offering key forecasts as to the EaP future. The chapter endeavors to show that, while relatively new, the EaP has enhanced the role of the EU at the global level in terms of foreign, security, and defense policy. Despite the war in Donbas and the crisis in Ukraine and unresolved issues in the Eastern Neighborhood on matters of governance, democracy, and economy, progress continues improving the EaP.

Ukrainian Legitimacy Equation

This chapter is an attempt to frame a new perspective on the potent sources of external and internal challenges that Ukraine faces today. Hence, it aims to contribute to the outlined body of research in three ways. First, the chapter provides insight on the undervalued importance of legitimacy, explains its correlation with political inclusion, good governance, and sustainable economic development. Second, the authors also aim to identify hidden patterns of sociopolitical importance which are essential not just for Ukraine but for other countries as well. Those patterns are illustrative of a new era of geopolitics which involves fusing the latest tech innovations with political science in order to compete over internal political systems. Finally, the chapter is an attempt to determine if there are new potential approaches to improve the resilience of the DNA of Ukrainian democracy to contemporary threats and challenges. The authors try to combine theoretical findings with their practical implications in the form of feasible tools that can be used by interested stakeholders on the ground.

Polish Policy Toward Ukraine After the Weighty Geopolitical Changes of the Dignity Revolution

After the turbulent events in Ukraine of 2014 and 2015, the geopolitical and geoeconomic situation in the Central-Eastern Europe changed. Ukraine outrightly chose the pro-Western orientation. The Russian Federation, despite some minor success in the form of Crimea incorporation, lost a lot of its former influences in the Ukraine. Ukraine's rapid reorientation opened new possibilities and threats for Poland. Poland, as the biggest Western neighbour of Ukraine with enormous historical bonds with this country, is vividly interested in the developments taking placing there. The author presented in this chapter the most germane points of issue between Warsaw and Kyiv as well as their common interests. Furthermore, the author briefly presented how Moscow and Washington try to impact Polish-Ukrainian relations. Moreover, the prognosis of future evolution of mutual bilateral Polish-Ukrainian relations will be depicted in the chapter. The increasing economic bonds of two countries may portend closer relationships in the future.