Military-Technical Cooperation of Southeast Asian States

Author(s):  
M. Yevtodyeva ◽  
Ilya Kramnik ◽  
D. Stefanovich

This monograph examines the trends and main areas of arms trade and military-technical cooperation in Southeast Asia over the past decades. In addition to direct acquisitions of weapons and military equipment (WME), the supply of subsystems and components, the licensed production and other forms of militarytechnical cooperation are also considered. Trends in arms trade are analyzed in terms of influence of such factors as internal instability, U.S.-Chinese confrontation in the Pacific region and disputes in the South China Sea, modernization of the armed forces and national defense industries of Southeast Asian countries. Particular attention is paid to various aspects of military-technical cooperation of the regional states with their key arms suppliers – Russia, the US, European countries, China, and South Korea.

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 142-159
Author(s):  
M. G. Yevtodyeva

The article aims to identify the key trends and main areas of development of arms trade and military-technical cooperation between South-East Asian countries and the United States and European Union countries over the past decade (2011–2020). In addition to the direct procurement of weapons and military equipment (with a detailed list of purchased systems for each of the South-East Asian countries), the supply of subsystems and components, the licensed production and other forms of military-technical cooperation are also considered. The growth of military expenditures and arms procurement of the South-East Asian countries over the past decade is analyzed in terms of influence of such drivers as internal instability, the China-US confrontation in the Pacific region and the unresolved disputes between the countries in the South China Sea, the modernization of the armed forces and national defense industries in SouthEast Asia. On this basis, conclusions are made about the prospects for development of military-technical cooperation and arms procurement in the region, as well as how the changes taking place in this sphere affect Russia’s military-technical cooperation with South-East Asian countries.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 12-47
Author(s):  
Yinan Li

The development of the PRC’s armed forces included three phases when their modernization was carried out through an active introduction of foreign weapons and technologies. The first and the last of these phases (from 1949 to 1961, and from 1992 till present) received wide attention in both Chinese and Western academic literature, whereas the second one — from 1978 to 1989 —when the PRC actively purchased weapons and technologies from the Western countries remains somewhat understudied. This paper is intended to partially fill this gap. The author examines the logic of the military-technical cooperation between the PRC and the United States in the context of complex interactions within the United States — the USSR — China strategic triangle in the last years of the Cold War. The first section covers early contacts between the PRC and the United States in the security field — from the visit of R. Nixon to China till the inauguration of R. Reagan. The author shows that during this period Washington clearly subordinated the US-Chinese cooperation to the development of the US-Soviet relations out of fear to damage the fragile process of detente. The second section focuses on the evolution of the R. Reagan administration’s approaches regarding arms sales to China in the context of a new round of the Cold War. The Soviet factor significantly influenced the development of the US-Chinese military-technical cooperation during that period, which for both parties acquired not only practical, but, most importantly, political importance. It was their mutual desire to undermine strategic positions of the USSR that allowed these two countries to overcome successfully tensions over the US arms sales to Taiwan. However, this dependence of the US-China military-technical cooperation on the Soviet factor had its downside. As the third section shows, with the Soviet threat fading away, the main incentives for the military-technical cooperation between the PRC and the United States also disappeared. As a result, after the Tiananmen Square protests, this cooperation completely ceased. Thus, the author concludes that the US arms sales to China from the very beginning were conditioned by the dynamics of the Soviet-American relations and Beijing’s willingness to play an active role in the policy of containment. In that regard, the very fact of the US arms sales to China was more important than its practical effect, i.e. this cooperation was of political nature, rather than military one.


2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 65-89
Author(s):  
Piotr Szymański

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 marks the turning point in Lithuania’s defence policy. Previously, Lithuanian armed forces developed expeditionary capabilities in line with NATO’s out-of-area requirements and had to face substantial manning and equipment shortages as a result of the financial crisis. After 2014 clarion call, Lithuania responded with the most comprehensive measures of all the Eastern Flank states to strengthen its military capabilities. Lithuania’s main strategic concerns encompass both the Russian A2/AD bubble in Kaliningrad as well as the development of Russian offensive capabilities in the Baltic Sea region. The Lithuanian strive for security included a big hike in defence spending and a gradual increase in military personnel, with the reinstatement of conscription, faster modernisation of armed forces, development of military infrastructures, investments in combat readiness and an update of military exercises. This was supplemented by the strengthening of defence co-operation with key partners – both bilaterally and within the NATO framework. Lithuania’s main goal was to convince Allies to establish permanent military presence on its territory in order to strengthen deterrence against Russia. Between the NATO Wales Summit in 2014 and the Warsaw Summit in 2016, Lithuania was focused mainly on a closer military collaboration with the US – a country which then took a leading role in the military reassurance of the Eastern Flank. In Lithuania, the US has traditionally been perceived as the main security provider. The Warsaw Summit constituted a milestone in bolstering the Allied defence posture vis-à-vis Russia, which influenced Lithuania’s defence policy. American rotational company-size units in the Baltic states were subsequently replaced by NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, i.e. the deployment of German-led battalion-size battlegroup in Lithuania. Therefore, between 2016 and 2018 Lithuania tried to augment its strong defence ties with US while deepening military integration with Germany. The most significant sign of a closer military co-operation with Germany was the procurement of 88 Boxer infantry fighting vehicles. Recently, Germany has become the biggest supplier of military equipment to the Lithuanian army. Although Lithuania prefers to develop military co-operation primarily with US and Germany, Poland remains its important orientation point (mainly due to a similar threat perception and Poland’s geographic location). The core dimensions of the Polish-Lithuanian defence collaboration are the strengthening of air defence, including Grom systems deliveries, training of special forces and development of the trilateral brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG) together with Ukraine. In the coming years, the ongoing depopulation will remain the biggest internal challenge for the Lithuanian defence policy. Emigration and an ageing society result not only in a decreasing number of citizens reaching the enlistment age, but may also adversely affect the economic situation and - as a consequence - defence expenditure.


2020 ◽  
Vol 152 (4) ◽  
pp. 105-126
Author(s):  
Jarosław NAWROTEK

Russia has been for many years one of main producers and exporters of arms and military equipment. But even if the Russian Military-industrial Complex still maintains a leading position, there is at least one domain where it was forced to quit positions kept during the Soviet Union and does not present any new achievements. The question refers to firearms where relatively low costs of manufacture are transformed on a few percentage share in the world arms trade. This market has a significant symbolic meaning for Russia despite of its modest financial dimension. Military operations require a deployment of infantry with its firearms, independently on state of the art technology of the arms used by the armies. Beside the armed forces, the firearms are used by special and antiterrorist services, police, border and coastal guards, and also by the structures dedicated for fighting the drugs trafficking.


2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-216
Author(s):  
Mircea Vladu ◽  
Stelian Popescu

Abstract The issue of the impact of emerging and disruptive technologies on security policy is a major concern of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. This is also demonstrated by the meeting between the Board members and the newly-established Advisory Group for Emerging and Disruptive Technologies, consisting of top experts in the fields of Cyber, Artificial Intelligence, Quantum Computing, Big Data, Space, Robotics and Autonomous or Biotechnological Systems, to find new synergies between NATO, the private, governmental and academic sectors and to maintain the technological supremacy of the Alliance. At the same time, the fact that the Romanian Army has mastered the defining elements of the impact of emerging and disrupted technologies on security policy and acts to make them operational is demonstrated by the meeting of July 12, 2021, of the Minister of National Defense, Nicolae-Ionel Ciuca with Heidi Grant, director of the US Defense and Security Cooperation Agency, on which occasion Romania received from the US the name of “Dependable Undertaking (DU)” under which contracts for the purchase of military equipment can be concluded without any payment in advance. Based on these elements, we would like to continue to talk about some aspects of innovation in dual military technologies, such as the influence of emerging and disruptive technologies on the organization and use of the armed forces. The research method undertaken consisted in identifying bibliographic resources, studying them, drawing relevant conclusions and formulating points of view on the impact of emerging and disruptive technologies on security policies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-24
Author(s):  
Volodymyr Dachkovskyi

In order to repel armed aggression in the East of Ukraine, the national defense-industrial complex has modernized and developed a significant nomenclature of weapons and military equipment, which correspond to the forms and methods of conducting modern hostilities. Experience of using the samples of weapons and military equipment, which are allowed to exploitation in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, indicates on the necessity of resolving a number of problematic issues related to tecnical maintenance, repair, providing of logistical means etc., for keeping them in working order Keeping the samples of weapons and military equipment in working order in conditions of fightfare is determined by the number of factors, the one of which is their survivability, namely ability of sample of weapons and military equipment to keep their parameters in given limits,withstand damage of all kinds, and in the event of damage retain the possibility of combat use after repair with minimal cost of time and repair. The article proposes a technique for determining the survivability characteristics of a sample of weapons and military equipment. This technique makes it possible to determine the durability and reproducibility indices of weapons and military equipment samples thereby determining the survivability of a particular weapons and military equipment sample or group of single-purpose machines.


Author(s):  
Kirill V. Seroshtanov ◽  

The role of Russia in the Middle East region has been increasing since the start of operation in Syria. This forces not only Russia, but also the Middle East countries including Saudi Arabia to adjust their politics according to the current situation. Both Russia and Saudi Arabia actively use military technical cooperation to develop relations with other countries, so it is essential that in their interstate relations this instrument should be applied. In this article, the military technical cooperation between Russia and Saudi Arabia is under consideration. The article aims to determine the dependence of military technical cooperation between the countries on politics. There is a lack of literature on the issue; the main part of it covers military technical cooperation between Russia and the Middle East countries and also the interstate relations with them in general. Due to the specific character of the arms trade sphere, the volume of sources is also insufficient. However, it is possible to carry out an analysis that allows forming the general image of the military technical cooperation between Russia and Saudi Arabia and its reason on the basis of related mass media publications and SIPRI data. The analysis of the Russia-Saudi Arabia military technical cooperation development shows that its expansion is in correlation with the growing role of Russia in the Middle East. In the middle of the 2010s, a number of contracts were concluded and performed. The following reasons of this expansion can be mentioned: problems in interstate relations between Saudi Arabia and the Western countries caused by the conflict in Yemen and Jamal Khashoggi's killing, the Arms Trade Treaty limitations for trade with Saudi Arabia for Western countries, Saudi Arabia's diversification of arms suppliers, search of Russia for new arms markets, etc. Nevertheless, these reasons cannot be assumed as reasons of crucial importance: the Western countries maintain their positions on the Saudi Arabia arms market despite all the limitations and issues in interstate relations, Saudi Arabia is not the key arms market for Russia; moreover, the integration of Russian arms systems into Saudi Arabia's armed forces formed by the Western military standard is quite complicated. Taking into account all the limitations related to the military technical cooperation between the countries, it can be stated that neither Russia nor Saudi Arabia has crucial economical or technical reasons for its start. Therefore, the following conclusion can be made: military technical cooperation between these countries is not a single process; it is caused by a whole direction of interstate relations, and it is only an instrument to boost them.


2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brenda L. Moore

This Armed Forces & Society issue is on women in the contemporary armed forces in the United States and other nations to include the South African National Defense Force and the Australian Defense Force. This issue contains a collection of nine papers, each reviewing a current aspect of women serving in the military since the post–Vietnam War Era. There are also two review essays of Megan Mackenzie’s book, Beyond the Band of Brothers: The US Military and the Myth That Women Can’t Fight. An overview of changing laws and the expanding role of women in the military is provided in this introduction, as well as summaries of the nine articles, and comments on the two book reviews mentioned above.


Author(s):  
Ricardo Borges Gama Neto

The article tries to discuss if the impact of the political changes, which occurred in South America from the first decade of the century, influenced the purchase of military equipment by some countries of the region. The emergence of new governments, with a strong left leaning, occurred concurrently with a clear change in the classic pattern of buying defense equipment. European countries and the US have come to be preferred, as opposed to Russia and China, as suppliers of arms to the various South American armed forces.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 357-368
Author(s):  
Adam KUBIAK

The article’s goal is to summarize the perception of China in key US strategic documents in the period of 2010-2019. The rationale behind the selection of such a period was based on an assumption, that the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense upon order from the President, marked and announced, what has been nick-named the „Pacific Pivot”. To get a better understanding of the dynamics of the perception the author suggests a one step backwards move to the 2010 National Security Strategy issued by President Obama on the verge of withdrawing large US contingents from Middle East and just after receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. To meet the goal, author will follow the changes in China-oriented parts of the strategic documents issued by the US Presidents and the Secretaries of Defence until the recently announced NSS and National Defense Strategy.


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