Darwin's Straw God Argument

2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-88
Author(s):  
Jonathan Wells ◽  

In the controversy between Darwinian evolution and Intelligent Design, the fonver is commonly portrayed as science and the latter as theology or phitosophy. Yet Charles Darwin's "one long argument" in The Origin of Species was heavily theological. In particular, Darwin argued that the geographical distribution of living things, the fossil record, vestigial organs, and homologies were "inexplicabte on the theory of creation," but made sense on his theory of descent with modification. In this context, "The theory of creation" did not imply young-earth creationism, but a God conceived by Darwin to create all species separately, arbitrarily, and perfectly. In the many instances when the evidence was not sufficient to support his positive case for descent with modification, Darwin would simply declare that the only altemative-the "theory of creation"-was not a scientific explanation. Darwin's followers often argue similarly. Thus, arguments for Darwinian evolution, in both its ordinal and modem forms, are commonly bound up with arguments from theology and philosophy.

Entropy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 524 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leigh Sheneman ◽  
Jory Schossau ◽  
Arend Hintze

Information integration theory has been developed to quantify consciousness. Since conscious thought requires the integration of information, the degree of this integration can be used as a neural correlate (Φ) with the intent to measure degree of consciousness. Previous research has shown that the ability to integrate information can be improved by Darwinian evolution. The value Φ can change over many generations, and complex tasks require systems with at least a minimum Φ . This work was done using simple animats that were able to remember previous sensory inputs, but were incapable of fundamental change during their lifetime: actions were predetermined or instinctual. Here, we are interested in changes to Φ due to lifetime learning (also known as neuroplasticity). During lifetime learning, the system adapts to perform a task and necessitates a functional change, which in turn could change Φ . One can find arguments to expect one of three possible outcomes: Φ might remain constant, increase, or decrease due to learning. To resolve this, we need to observe systems that learn, but also improve their ability to learn over the many generations that Darwinian evolution requires. Quantifying Φ over the course of evolution, and over the course of their lifetimes, allows us to investigate how the ability to integrate information changes. To measure Φ , the internal states of the system must be experimentally observable. However, these states are notoriously difficult to observe in a natural system. Therefore, we use a computational model that not only evolves virtual agents (animats), but evolves animats to learn during their lifetime. We use this approach to show that a system that improves its performance due to feedback learning increases its ability to integrate information. In addition, we show that a system’s ability to increase Φ correlates with its ability to increase in performance. This suggests that systems that are very plastic regarding Φ learn better than those that are not.


1999 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 47-82
Author(s):  
Kevin Padian ◽  
Kenneth D. Angielczyk

The record of the history of life, as preserved in the fossil record, is not complete for reasons related to erosion and deposition, preservation and sampling bias, and approaches to analysis of the information provided by fossils. Incomplete knowledge is not unique to paleontology; the record of extant humans is no better for many questions of human genealogy. The problem is not that there are no or few transitional fossils; it is rather that, given the incompleteness of the fossil record, it is unreasonable to expect to find transitions of forms rather than transitions of features. The use of cladistic analysis largely overcomes this problem methodologically, but does not itself improve the fossil record. However, when the characters of fossil and living taxa are analyzed cladistically, they can tell us not only the sequence of origination of clades, but also how functional, adaptational, physiological, and behavioral transitions took place. In this way, hypotheses about the origins of major groups and major adaptations can be tested by standard scientific methods. In contrast, notions of the ontology of these groups as explained by “Intelligent Design” are vacuous and untestable.


1969 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 1233-1246
Author(s):  
John G. Gunnell

The purpose here is to explore certain aspects of the philosophy of science which have serious implications both for the practice of social and political science and for understanding that practice. The current relationship between social science and the philosophy of science (or the philosophy of the social sciences) is a curious one. Despite the emergence of a considerable body of literature in philosophy which is pertinent to the methodological problems of social science, there has been a lack of osteusive ties between the two areas. A justified concern with the independence of social scientific research has contributed to a tendency toward isolation which is unfortunate in view of the proliferation of philosophical problems which necessarily attends the rapid expansion of any empirical discipline. Although in the literature of contemporary social science there are frequent references to certain works in the philosophy of science and to philosophical issues relating to methodology, these are most often in the context of bald pronouncements and shibboleths relating to the nature of science, its goals, and the character of its reasoning. But what is most disturbing about the fact that social scientists have little direct and thorough acquaintance with the philosophy of science is not merely that there has been a failure to carefully examine the many logical and epistemological assumptions which are implicit in social scientific inquiry, since this task might normally and properly be considered to be within the province of the philospher of science.


1970 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-191
Author(s):  
Martin Poulsom

The theories of Darwinian evolution and Intelligent Design appear to be locked in an intractable debate, partly because they offer rival scientific explanations for the phenomenon of descent with modification in biology. This paper analyses the dispute in two ways: firstly, it seeks to clarify the exact nature of the logical flaw that has been alleged to lie at the heart of Intelligent Design theory. Secondly, it proposes that, in spite of this error, the Intelligent Design theory advocated by Michael Behe takes at least one significant step in the right direction. Although Behe's suggestion is promising, it is shown to be not nearly radical enough.


1971 ◽  
Vol 64 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 315-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Darrell Lance

In a collection of essays dedicated to the memory of Paul Lapp it is fitting that one of them should deal with the lmlk or royal jar stamps to the study of which he made such an important contribution. It is our purpose here not to emulate his example nor to present a full review of the many problems associated with the interpretation of these stamps but to deal with the question of their date and to make some suggestions about the historical implications of the pattern of their geographical distribution.


2006 ◽  
Vol 49 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 21-35
Author(s):  
Milan Cirkovic

We consider the misuse of anthropic principles (being a serious research topic in contemporary cosmology) in the service of creationism, which became a commonplace in the modern agressive creationist discourse. Unfortunately the confusion rests on the fact that the disteleological nature of the anthropic reasoning is insufficiently known and elaborated in both philosophical and scientific circles. Specifically, mathematical and (astro)physical fine-tunings are shown to be entirely different concepts, and only the latter is observed in our universe. Anthropical coincidences in cosmology are empirical phenomena requiring scientific explanation, and one of the two explanatory hypotheses advanced is somewhat unfortunately dubbed the "design hypothesis". However, this has almost nothing in common with the creationist ideological construction known as the "intelligent design". This important distinction has not been sufficiently highlighted in the philosophical literature thus far. This particular case-study from the cosmological domain simultaneously highlights a more general problem we face in the modern world: aggressive advance of the ideological coalition between quasireligion and pseudoscience jeopardizes authentic interdisciplinary and intercul-tural dialogue, so necessary as the humanity faces serious existential risks, as the biggest challenge in its history on Earth.


2019 ◽  
pp. 187-202
Author(s):  
Alcino J. Silva ◽  
John Bickle

Human creativity intuitively seems beyond the reach of molecular, cellular, and circuit neuroscience. However, in this chapter, the authors propose that mechanisms that link memories across time have a critical role in a key aspect of human creativity, namely, the many ways in which distinct memories acquired on separate occasions can be related and connected in novel and generative ways. Recent work in mice suggests a detailed molecular, cellular, and systems neuroscience mechanism of memory linking that provides a framework for this key component of creativity in humans. This proposal shares some interesting features with psychological and systems-neurobiological accounts of human creativity but differs from such accounts since data in support of it are drawn from controlled interventional experiments in mice. Yet this purely mechanistic account raises a philosophical dilemma based on the intuitive differences between “mechanism” and “creativity.” The authors conclude the chapter with a brief exploration of this dilemma and its potential implications for a scientific explanation of the human creative process.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (6) ◽  
pp. 578-581
Author(s):  
HUAN-YU LIAO ◽  
XIN-NENG LIAN ◽  
JIAN GAO ◽  
CHEN-YANG CAI ◽  
ZHUO FENG ◽  
...  

Clam shrimp (Spinicaudata) are worldwide distributed branchiopod crustaceans specialised in ephemeral freshwater habitats. The Carboniferous is an important period for the early evolution and diversification of clam shrimp. Compared with the rare and geographically confined fossil record of the Devonian, clam shrimp in the Carboniferous have a much wider geographical distribution and higher biodiversity. Over 20 genera of clam shrimp have been recorded in the Carboniferous all over the world, but they are sparse in China. To date, five records of Carboniferous clam shrimp have been reported from China (Pruvost, 1927; Zhang et al., 1976; Wang, 1987; Zheng et al., 1988; Liu & Fan, 1995; Liao et al., 2019). Among them, four species Lioestheria? mathieui Pruvost, 1927, Protomonocarina huixianensis Wang, 1987, Retrofractus lingyuanensis Liu & Fan, 1995, and Pemphilimnadiopsis cheni Liao, Shen & Huang, 2019, are found in the Pennsylvanian Benxi Formation in North China (Pruvost, 1927; Zhang et al., 1976; Wang, 1987; Liu & Fan, 1995; Liao et al., 2019).


Paleobiology ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jere H. Lipps

Micropaleontology is a peculiar subject: it is not easily defined, it focuses on geologic problems, and it ignores fundamental paleontologic and evolutionary questions it could best attack. As a result of its historic development, micropaleontology is directed to the solution of stratigraphic, paleoceanographic and paleoclimatologic problems, but it has seldom addressed paleobiologic or evolutionary ideas. It is a tradition rather than a discipline. The term “micropaleontology” and all it signifies should be abandoned, for it obscures natural relationships, attracts people with geologic rather than biologic approaches, isolates its practitioners in a blanket of systematics, biostratigraphies, and terminologies, and, as a result, discourages outsiders with other viewpoints or contributions from utilizing its fine fossil record. The growth of the field has been exponential in people-power and literature but not in the development of fundamentally new ideas. Micropaleontology has therefore contributed little to recent paleobiologic or evolutionary hypotheses, in spite of the possession by the many organisms relegated to it of biological properties and fossil records which have much potential for the generation and testing of such hypotheses. Microfossil studies have served geology powerfully and they should continue in that role, but they should also be used to fulfill their promise in the interpretation of paleobiogeography, paleoecology, morphology, evolutionary processes and the origin of new groups and ground plans.


1986 ◽  
Vol 60 (6) ◽  
pp. 1277-1280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert L. Evander

The genus Merychippus was erected by Leidy (1857), who named as the type species Merychippus insignis. The type specimen of M. insignis is an immature and incomplete maxilla containing a broken dp2 and a dp3. The type comes from the Bijou Hills of South Dakota, probably from the Barstovian (middle Miocene) Fort Randall Formation of South Bijou Hill in Charles Mix County (Skinner and Taylor, 1967), but possibly from the overlying undifferentiated Ogallala Formation, or possibly from North Bijou Hill in Brule County. Despite this enigmatic type, the species M. insignis has frequently been identified in the fossil record, and the genus Merychippus has grown to include all mesodont horses (Stirton, 1940). Conceptually, the taxon Merychippus is considered a horizontal grade rather than a vertical clade (Simpson, 1945, p. 18). As a horizontal concept, the genus Merychippus derived importance as the ancestral group for the many Mio-Pliocene lineages of hypsodont horses. Today, as horse classification is remodeled along cladistic lines, the taxon Merychippus derives importance from its early naming. Several distinctive horse clades extend upward from a middle Miocene radiation (Stirton, 1940; Quinn, 1955). If M. insignis can be placed within one of these clades, then it is likely that the clade will bear the generic nomen Merychippus because of the antiquity of the name.


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