Rawls’ Concept Of Justice As Political

1998 ◽  
pp. 116-119
Author(s):  
Terry Hoy
Keyword(s):  
Public Discourse ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Justification ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Moral Basis ◽  
Modus Vivendi ◽  
History Of ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Nature And Society

Rawls' theory of justice as fairness involves a central contention that principles of justice essential to the structure of a constitutional democracy must be viewed as political in contrast to more comprehensive moral, philosophical or religious doctrines. The concept of justice is not its being true to an antecedent moral order and given to us, but its being congruent with our self-understanding within the history of justice as political is not a mere modus vivendi, for it embodies an overlapping consensus that does have a moral basis. Critical reaction to Rawls has been that what is simply a consensus within a tradition of public discourse cannot afford an adequate criteria of moral justification, and that Rawls cannot define the moral basis for justice as fairness without some reference to a comprehensive theory of the good. But it will be argued that critics are missing what is central to Rawls' theory of moral justification as what he sees to be the outcome of a process of "wide reflective equilibrium" in which principles of justice initially given within a tradition are weighed against rival moral theories and in relation to scientific theories of human nature and society in order to establish what seems "most reasonable to us."

scholarly journals Diskursus Mengenai Keadilan Sosial: Kajian Teori Keadilan dalam Liberalisme Locke, Persamaan Marx, dan 'Justice as Fairness' Rawls

MELINTAS ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 309
Author(s):  
Alfensius Alwino
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
Abstract Theory ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Political Studies ◽  
History Of ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Through the history of philosophy, the theme of justice has become a very important topic. Thinkers of the theories such as utilitarianism, intuitionism, eudaimonism, perfectionism, liberalism, communitarianism, and socialism have discussed the theme. As French philosopher Alain Badiou has pointed out, the central of political studies from the time of Plato to the present day is justice. The question is what is justice? For John Rawls, justice is the supreme virtue of human. In <em>A Theory of Justice</em>, Rawls asserts that justice is the first priority in social institutions, as is truth in the system of thought. A theory, however elegant and economical, must be rejected or revised if it is not true, so the laws and institutions, however efficient and neat, must be reformed or removed if it is unfair. Rawls criticizes the theory of justice in Lockean liberalism and Marxian socialism. Both theories of justice are very strong colouring the landscape of debate on the roots of thinking about justice. For Rawls, liberalism that accentuates basic freedoms can create inequality between people who have better abilities with less fortunate people. Similarly, socialism which accentuates equality ignores basic freedoms. The two theories of justice are considered ideological in the sense that there are hidden interests behind the jargons of freedom and equality. Rawls then develops an abstract theory of justice, in which the participants depart from a veil of ignorance, so that they are free of any interest and ambition. Here they might build a cooperative contract in a society governed by the principles of justice.

Justice as Fairness: For Groups?

1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 607-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vernon Van Dyke
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Homogeneous State ◽  
Dominant Form ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Indigenous Groups ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Almost All

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls assumes that the principles of justice are for individuals in a society, and in general he assumes that the society is an ethnically homogeneous state. He thus follows the tradition associated with the dominant form of the social contract theory, which focuses on the individual and the state. His assumptions neglect the fact that almost all states are ethnically plural or heterogeneous, and that many of them confer special status and rights on ethnic groups as collective entities; for example, many of them confer special status and rights on indigenous groups, on groups disadvantaged by prior discrimination, and on minorities and other groups conceded a right to survive as distinct cultural entities. Status and rights for groups necessarily mean differentiation among individuals depending on their membership; and this in turn means that a theory of justice that focuses on the individual and neglects the group both fails to account for existing practices and fails to give guidance where the practices are at issue.

Morality, Rational Choice, and Semantic Representation

1988 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Gauthier
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Semantic Representation ◽  
New Venture ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Historical Antecedents

(1) In his recent paper, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” John Rawls makes use of a footnote to disown what to many readers must have seemed one of the most striking and original underlying ideas of his theory of justice, that it “is a part, perhaps the most significant part, of the theory of rational choice.” That Rawls should issue this disclaimer indicates, at least in my view, that he has a much clearer understanding of his theory, and its relationship to rational choice than he did at the time that he wrote A Theory of Justice. As I note in Morals by Agreement (pp.4–5), Rawls does not show that principles of justice are principles of rational choice. Hence, in appropriating the idea, I can claim diat I am undertaking a pioneering enterprise. No doubt Thomas Hobbes would have undertaken it had the resources of the theory of rational choice been at his disposal, but I do not intend to pursue counterfactuals in a search for historical antecedents. Moral theory as rational choice theory is, I claim, a new venture.

Justice and the Difference Principle

1974 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Copp
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Public ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Moral Basis ◽  
The People ◽  
Moral Learning ◽  
The Difference

In his book, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls suggests that a theory of social justice is satisfactory only if it has both of two characteristics (pp. 182, 6). First, it must be capable of serving as the “public moral basis of society” (p. 182). That is, it must be reasonable to suppose that it would be strictly complied with while serving as the public conception of justice in a society which is in favourable circumstances—a society in which the people would strictly comply with any public conception of justice if the strains of commitment to it were not too great, given the general facts of psychology and moral learning (p. 145, cf. pp. 8, 175-83, 245-6). Second, a theory of justice must characterize “ … our considered judgements in reflective equilibrium” (p. 182).

scholarly journals An Axiomatic Approach to Justice as Fairness

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takashi Suzuki
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Axiomatic Approach ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Original Position ◽  
First Principle ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Rigorous Definition ◽  
Primary Goods ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Definition Of

<p><i>Justice as Fairness</i> by J. Rawls (1971 and 2001) will be reconsidered in a formal way. We reformulate his theory in an axiomatic manner and revise his original position. We propose a new concept of fundamental rights as membership of the original position, and on this basis, we justify Rawls’s thesis of the priority of the first principle over the second. This would address the criticisms of Arrow (1973) and Hart (1973). This revision of the original position will enable us to deduce the two principles without reference to the primary goods or maximin principles. Therefore, the criticisms of Harsanyi (1975) and Sen (1980) do not apply to our theory. We do this by providing a rigorous definition of reflective equilibrium, which Rawls did not do, and we show that the two principles of justice are in reflective equilibrium but the libertarian principle of Nozick (1974) is not.</p>

Rawlsian Constructivism in Moral Theory

1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
David O. Brink
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Decision Procedure ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Political Theories ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Since his article, ‘Outline for a Decision Procedure in Ethics,’ John Rawls has advocated a coherentist moral epistemology according to which moral and political theories are justified on the basis of their coherence with our other beliefs, both moral and nonmoral (1951: 56, 61). A moral theory which is maximally coherent with our other beliefs is in a state which Rawls calls ‘reflective equilibrium’ (1971: 20). In A Theory of Justice Rawls advanced two principles of justice and claimed that they are in reflective equilibrium. He defended this claim by appeal to a hypothetical contract; he argued that parties in a position satisfying certain informational and motivational criteria, which he called ‘the original position,’ would choose the following two principles of justice to govern the basic structure of their society.

Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points

1980 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Norman Daniels
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls defines a hypothetical contract situation and argues rational people will agree on reflection it is fair to contractors. He solves the rational choice problem it poses by deriving two lexically-ordered principles of justice and suggests the derivation justifies the principles. Its soundness aside, just what justificatory force does such a derivation have?On one view, there is no justificatory force because the contract is rigged specifically to yield principles which match our pre-contract moral judgments. Rawls provides ammunition for this claim: “By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments [about what is just] and conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted.”

POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND TRUTH

Legal Theory ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jody S. Kraus
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Political Conception ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Every theory of justice requires a first-order theory specifying principles of justice, and a second-order view explaining why those principles constitute the correct principles of justice. According to John Rawls, political liberalism is committed to the two principles of justice specified in its first-order theory, “justice as fairness.” Justice as fairness, according to Rawls, in turn presupposes the second-order view that justice is a political conception. A political conception of justice treats the principles derived from the fundamental ideas in the public political culture as the correct principles of justice. Political liberalism, however, nowhere offers a defense of the view that justice is a political conception. Indeed, it even strives to avoid the admission that it presupposes that justice is a political conception by stating only that it uses a political conception of justice, while allowing that justice might not actually be a political conception. As to the truth of its second-order presupposition, political liberalism chooses to remain agnostic. Rawls claims that political liberalism has no choice at all. To do otherwise, he argues, would lead to an internal contradiction.

Rawls, John (1921–2002)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Main Work ◽  
Moral Conception ◽  
Social Unity ◽  
Original Argument ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Stability

Rawls’ main work, A Theory of Justice (1971), presents a liberal, egalitarian, moral conception – ‘justice as fairness’ – designed to explicate and justify the institutions of a constitutional democracy. The two principles of justice outlined in this text affirm the priority of equal basic liberties over other political concerns, and require fair opportunities for all citizens, directing that inequalities in wealth and social positions maximally benefit the least advantaged. Rawls develops the idea of an impartial social contract to justify these principles: Free persons, equally situated and ignorant of their historical circumstances, would rationally agree to them in order to secure their equal status and independence, and to pursue freely their conceptions of the good. In Political Liberalism (1993), his other major text, Rawls revises his original argument for justice as fairness to make it more compatible with the pluralism of liberalism. He argues that, assuming that different philosophical, religious and ethical views are inevitable in liberal society, the most reasonable basis for social unity is a public conception of justice based in shared moral ideas, including citizens’ common comception of themselves as free and equal moral persons. The stability of this public conception of justice is provided by an overlapping consensus; all the reasonable comprehensible philosophical, religious and ethical views can endorse it, each for their own specific reasons.

Contemporary Anglo-American Political Philosophy

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Klosko
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Death Certificate ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Thomas Hobbes ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Anglo American

According to a now familiar narrative, in the middle of the twentieth century, political philosophy was “dead,” but it has since been resurrected in a new form. Credit for the death certificate is given to Peter Laslett, who bemoaned the absence of major philosophers writing in English, like the tradition of thinkers from Thomas Hobbes to Bernard Bosanquet. According to many theorists, responsibility for the revival of political philosophy belongs to John Rawls. One of Rawls's most important contributions is the method of “reflective equilibrium.” In A Theory of Justice (1971), Rawls attempts to reconcile freedom and equality in a principled way, offering an account of “justice as fairness.” Three years after publication of Theory, Rawls's Harvard colleague Robert Nozick published Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), which is, after Theory, probably the most celebrated and widely discussed work in political philosophy in recent decades. This article explores contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy, the evolution of Rawls's thought, communitarianism, feminism and liberalism, multiculturalism, and global justice.

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