scholarly journals Into the Hottest Century and into Epochal Change

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-97
Author(s):  
Göran Therborn

El siglo XXI será el siglo más caluroso en miles de años, y el paisaje social del mundo es volcánico. La política global y las relaciones sociales estarán dominadas por dos temas:la crisis climática y la rivalidad entre Estados Unidos y China.Este artículo analiza los efectos dela «pandemia de desigualdad»de Covid-19; efectos que han debilitadoalgunas fuerzas y han fortalecidootras. También profundizaenlos contextos y perspecti-vas de la crisis climática y en el conflicto entre las dos superpotencias.Lasrespuestasgubernamentalesa la pandemia pusieron fin al régimen global del neoliberalismo y la globalización de mercado sin fisuras, acontecimientossucedidos por el conflicto geopolítico y la movilización interna de las grandes potencias.Es probable que las pro-fundas transformaciones tecnológicas y sociales necesarias para hacer frente a la crisis climática sigan en manos de la política,como de costumbre, con resultados confusospero difícilmente apocalípticos.El contexto histórico del conflicto entre Estados Unidos y China suponeel principio del fin de medio milenio de dominación del mundo Occidental, por una dinastía de estados desde Portugal hasta Estados Unidos.El ascenso de China como superpotencia económica y tecnológica abre una tercera fase del declive del imperio Occidental, después dela descolonización y el retroceso de los intentos fallidos de occi-dentalizar el mundo no Occidental tras la victoria de la Guerra Fría.El fin del imperio Occidental probablemente llegará en este siglo, salvo que unaguerra nuclearmodifique el curso de los acontecimientos de forma abrupta; en cualquier caso, las previsiones de futuro constituyen siempreuna pregunta abierta. The 21st century will be the hottest century in thousands of years, and the world’s social landscape is volcanic. Global politics and social relations will be dominated by two issues, the climate crisis and the US-China rivalry. This paper analyses their passage through the «inequality pandemic» of Covid-19, weakening some pertinent forces and strengthened others, and further the contexts and prospects of the climate crisis and the US-China conflict. Governmental response to the pandemic terminated the global regime of neoliberalism and untrammelled market globalization, which have been succeeded by geopolitical conflict and great power domestic mobilization. The profound technological and social transformations needed to meet the climate crisis are likely to remain in the hands of politics as usual, with messy but hardly apocalyptic results. The historical context of the US-China conflict is the half millennium of Western world domination, by a dynasty of states from Portugal to USA. The rise of China as an economic and technological superpower opens a third phase of the decline of the Western empire, after decolonization and the blowback from the failed attempts to westernize the non-Western world after the Cold War victory. The end of the Western empire will probably come in this century –short of nuclear war–, but what will succeed it is an open question.

2020 ◽  
Vol 02 (01) ◽  
pp. 2050005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ciwan M. Can ◽  
Anson Chan

The rise of China has become a central debate in the academic field of international relations. In the Western world, the scholars within this debate can roughly be divided into the ‘pessimists’ and the ‘optimists’. The pessimists see in the rise of China an inevitable hegemonic war, or at least prolonged and intense zero-sum competition, with the US as it will seek to replace the latter and overturn the existing liberal international order. The optimists, on the other hand, see an opportunity for sustained Western dominance through selective accommodation of China in exchange for China’s acceptance of the existing norms and values of the liberal international order and continued US dominance. In this paper, we maintain that both perspectives in the debate are misleading. We argue that China seeks to push for a multipolarized world rather than replacing the US, and that Beijing prefers the relations between the great powers within a multipolar order to be based on the conception of a ‘community of common destiny for humankind’. We also argue that China is unlikely to accept the existing norms and values of the liberal international order as they reflect and reinforce Western dominance. Rather, China has become an ‘order-shaper’ seeking to reform the existing institutions to better reflect the interests of the ‘Rest’, and establish new networks and institutions that will complement and augment the existing arrangements of the liberal international order, instead of challenging it.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-252
Author(s):  
Stuart Rollo

AbstractFor almost a century before the formal alliance between the United States and Australia in 1941, a relationship was being formed around interrelated perceptions of shared identity and economic, political, and strategic interests. Perhaps the single most important factor in the recognition of shared interests lay in the mutually reinforcing fears of a multilayered ‘Asia threat’ that developed in parallel in both countries, originating as a demographic fear over Chinese migration during gold rushes of the 1850s, and progressing to focus on the growing military power of imperial Japan and geostrategic dominance of the Pacific. In recent years, the rise of China has been the central focus of US–Australia alliance, and, in many respects, the security architecture used to confront China is a legacy of the historical ‘Asia threat’. Understanding the historical context of the relationship is necessary for dispelling the anachronistic ‘Asia threat’ perceptions from the contemporary security policy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (7) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Syed Muhammad Saad Zaidi ◽  
Adam Saud

In contemporary times, the geo-political agenda and geo-economic strategy of the world is being dominated by the ongoing US-China hegemonic competition. Where the United States is trying to prolong the ‘unipolar moment’ and deter the rise of China; China is trying to establish itself as the hegemon in the Eastern hemisphere, an alternate to the US. The entirely opposite interests of the two Great Powers have initiated a hostile confrontational competition for domination. This paper seeks to determine the future nature of the US-China relations; will history repeat itself and a bloody war be fought to determine the leader of the pack? or another prolonged Cold War will be fought, which will end when one side significantly weakens and collapses? Both dominant paradigms of International Relations, Realism and Liberalism, are used to analyze the future nature of the US-China relations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nguyen Ngoc Anh

The article analyzes the US’ containment strategy against China at international system level, including the reason, main actions, and impact of this strategy on the US-China relations. The article supposes the main reason for making the strategy is the US’ desire to preserve her hegemony over the rise of China. The strategy consists of five main moves: economic restraint, technology restraint, restraint of territorial sovereignty ambition, assault on soft power, military deterrence, and prevention of coalition alliances. These moves will make the US-China relationship increasingly tense. However, except for the excess of the limit of restraining territorial sovereignty ambition, especially related to Taiwan, the other moves may make the US-China relations tense, but will not drive these two countries to war.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-292
Author(s):  
Lianrui Jia ◽  
Fan Liang

This article examines the rise of TikTok in three aspects: globalization strategies, data and content policies, and geopolitical implications. Instead of focusing on app features and uses within the platform proper, we situate and critically analyse TikTok as a platform business in a global media policy and governance context. We first unpack TikTok’s platformization process, tracing how TikTok gradually diversifies its business models and platform affordances to serve multisided markets. To understand TikTok’s platform governance, we systematically analyse and compare its data and content policies for different regions. Crucial to its global expansion, we then look at TikTok’s lobbying efforts to maintain government relations and corporate responses after facing multiple regulatory probing by various national governments. TikTok’s case epitomizes problems and challenges faced by a slew of globalizing Chinese digital platforms in increasingly contested geopolitics that cut across the chasms and fault lines between the rise of China and India as emergent powers in the US-dominated global platform ecosystem.


Author(s):  
Jude Woodward

The Obama administration announced in 2010 that the US would make a strategic foreign policy turn towards Asia i.e. China. This chapter shows that the discussion on this policy in the US is framed by a shared perception that the rise of China presents an existential challenge to the US-led world order that has prevailed since 1945. Some see conflict as an inevitable consequence of Great Power politics; others allege conflict will be unavoidable because China has regional expansionist aspirations or because China is a revisionist power that does not accept the rules of the ‘pax Americana’. The Pentagon is developing military strategies in the case of conflict with China. This chapter demonstrates that wherever the argument, starts, whether from a neocon or liberal perspective, whether concerned about the US’s economic, military or strategic position, all arrive at the same conclusion: China must be brought into line.


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 11-32
Author(s):  
Abye Assefa

Abstract In received convention, “China” and “global south” are either a priori established as discrete categories or a posteriori prognosticated as linked units. As a consequence of the unambiguous antithesis between the two premises, “China” and “global South” are a fortiori synthesized by a formal tenet fabricated through inductive reasoning and supplanting substantive relations and dynamics. In contrast, this paper attempts to uncover the relational processes articulating “the rise of China” and “the rejuvenation of the global south,” previously the Third World. To that end, it makes use of the framework of world-system analysis in order to gain access to a cogent angle of vision that captures the historical context that actualizes and is actualized by China/global South relations and processes. This paper concludes that the capitalist system’s terminal crisis of accumulation, which has ramifications that are global in scope and cultural in scale, engenders the relational ground that transpires in the rise of China and the rejuvenation of the global south.


2019 ◽  
Vol II (I) ◽  
pp. 8-14
Author(s):  
Usama Shehzad ◽  
Sarah Ahmed Malik ◽  
Muhammad Adnan

The rise of a new economic giant in the Asian region i.e., China in the 21st century has made many global and regional powers stressed and the US is one of those countries which is worried about rising China in Asia and therefore, it is taking different measures to counter the rise of China in every manner. For this purpose, they have collaborated with one of the regional powers in the south of Asia i.e., India to counter China in the region. This paper focuses on the collaboration of countries i.e., India, Japan, along with Australia and the US in the Indo-Pacific region and how this collaboration would be able to serve the interests of the US in the region against China.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (04) ◽  
pp. 19-27
Author(s):  
Weixing CHEN

The rise of China has shaken, to some extent, the pillars sustaining the US dominance in the world. Facing structural challenges from China, the United States has responded on three levels: political, strategic and policy. The Donald Trump administration has adopted a hard-line approach while attempting to engage China at the structural level. The China–US relationship is entering uncertain times, and the reconstruction of the relationship could take a decade.


Author(s):  
Congyan Cai

This chapter aims to answer the following questions: How has China’s state identity changed since the nineteenth century when the Chinese empire began to be forced to engage with the Western world, especially since the founding of the PRC in 1949 when China had begun to embrace socialist ideology and regime at odds with those in the Western world? What is China in the twenty-first century? What implications does China’s identity have on its international legal policies? How does China respond to the conventional assumption of the relationship between state identity and behaviors? And how does China seek to reduce the potential dissonance between its new identity and behavior, as well as reassure other countries that are wary about the rise of China?


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