The ‘Asia threat’ in the US–Australia relationship: then and now

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-252
Author(s):  
Stuart Rollo

AbstractFor almost a century before the formal alliance between the United States and Australia in 1941, a relationship was being formed around interrelated perceptions of shared identity and economic, political, and strategic interests. Perhaps the single most important factor in the recognition of shared interests lay in the mutually reinforcing fears of a multilayered ‘Asia threat’ that developed in parallel in both countries, originating as a demographic fear over Chinese migration during gold rushes of the 1850s, and progressing to focus on the growing military power of imperial Japan and geostrategic dominance of the Pacific. In recent years, the rise of China has been the central focus of US–Australia alliance, and, in many respects, the security architecture used to confront China is a legacy of the historical ‘Asia threat’. Understanding the historical context of the relationship is necessary for dispelling the anachronistic ‘Asia threat’ perceptions from the contemporary security policy.

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (7) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Syed Muhammad Saad Zaidi ◽  
Adam Saud

In contemporary times, the geo-political agenda and geo-economic strategy of the world is being dominated by the ongoing US-China hegemonic competition. Where the United States is trying to prolong the ‘unipolar moment’ and deter the rise of China; China is trying to establish itself as the hegemon in the Eastern hemisphere, an alternate to the US. The entirely opposite interests of the two Great Powers have initiated a hostile confrontational competition for domination. This paper seeks to determine the future nature of the US-China relations; will history repeat itself and a bloody war be fought to determine the leader of the pack? or another prolonged Cold War will be fought, which will end when one side significantly weakens and collapses? Both dominant paradigms of International Relations, Realism and Liberalism, are used to analyze the future nature of the US-China relations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (04) ◽  
pp. 19-27
Author(s):  
Weixing CHEN

The rise of China has shaken, to some extent, the pillars sustaining the US dominance in the world. Facing structural challenges from China, the United States has responded on three levels: political, strategic and policy. The Donald Trump administration has adopted a hard-line approach while attempting to engage China at the structural level. The China–US relationship is entering uncertain times, and the reconstruction of the relationship could take a decade.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-97
Author(s):  
Göran Therborn

El siglo XXI será el siglo más caluroso en miles de años, y el paisaje social del mundo es volcánico. La política global y las relaciones sociales estarán dominadas por dos temas:la crisis climática y la rivalidad entre Estados Unidos y China.Este artículo analiza los efectos dela «pandemia de desigualdad»de Covid-19; efectos que han debilitadoalgunas fuerzas y han fortalecidootras. También profundizaenlos contextos y perspecti-vas de la crisis climática y en el conflicto entre las dos superpotencias.Lasrespuestasgubernamentalesa la pandemia pusieron fin al régimen global del neoliberalismo y la globalización de mercado sin fisuras, acontecimientossucedidos por el conflicto geopolítico y la movilización interna de las grandes potencias.Es probable que las pro-fundas transformaciones tecnológicas y sociales necesarias para hacer frente a la crisis climática sigan en manos de la política,como de costumbre, con resultados confusospero difícilmente apocalípticos.El contexto histórico del conflicto entre Estados Unidos y China suponeel principio del fin de medio milenio de dominación del mundo Occidental, por una dinastía de estados desde Portugal hasta Estados Unidos.El ascenso de China como superpotencia económica y tecnológica abre una tercera fase del declive del imperio Occidental, después dela descolonización y el retroceso de los intentos fallidos de occi-dentalizar el mundo no Occidental tras la victoria de la Guerra Fría.El fin del imperio Occidental probablemente llegará en este siglo, salvo que unaguerra nuclearmodifique el curso de los acontecimientos de forma abrupta; en cualquier caso, las previsiones de futuro constituyen siempreuna pregunta abierta. The 21st century will be the hottest century in thousands of years, and the world’s social landscape is volcanic. Global politics and social relations will be dominated by two issues, the climate crisis and the US-China rivalry. This paper analyses their passage through the «inequality pandemic» of Covid-19, weakening some pertinent forces and strengthened others, and further the contexts and prospects of the climate crisis and the US-China conflict. Governmental response to the pandemic terminated the global regime of neoliberalism and untrammelled market globalization, which have been succeeded by geopolitical conflict and great power domestic mobilization. The profound technological and social transformations needed to meet the climate crisis are likely to remain in the hands of politics as usual, with messy but hardly apocalyptic results. The historical context of the US-China conflict is the half millennium of Western world domination, by a dynasty of states from Portugal to USA. The rise of China as an economic and technological superpower opens a third phase of the decline of the Western empire, after decolonization and the blowback from the failed attempts to westernize the non-Western world after the Cold War victory. The end of the Western empire will probably come in this century –short of nuclear war–, but what will succeed it is an open question.


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Sri Yunanto ◽  
Galby Rifqi Samhudi

The rise of China that goes along with strategic shifts around the Indian and the Pacific Ocean has started a new stage of major power contestation recently. ASEAN which acts as a host in Southeast Asia has certain stands to deal with the challenges and opportunities presented by the competition. On the other hand, the US Government with its global interests will never ever allow this region to fall into China’s influence. Simultaneously, both ASEAN and the US have the same approach in this situation to utilize the framework of Indo-Pacific cooperation that is definitively open to any explication in order to gain advantages resulted from the global interaction over the region. Nevertheless, their perceptions on the matter of defining the cooperative framework of Indo-Pacific are apparently diverse. Hence, this paper attempts to analyze the rationale of ASEAN and the US development of the Indo-Pacific cooperative concept based on their respective strategic assessment. This paper argues that the distinctive interests and insight of threats from ASEAN and the US toward the rise of China as well as major power contestation in the region are being the two main factors in their different perceptions on the concept of Indo-Pacific cooperative framework.


Author(s):  
Øystein Tunsjø

This chapter discusses the impact of the rise of China on the great power structure and the gradual transformation of the international system from post-Cold War U.S. unipolarity to U.S.–China bipolarity. It develops a hedging framework for analysis and argues that whereas hedging had characterized regional diplomacy under U.S.-led unipolarity, under emerging bipolarity balancing is becoming the dominant security policy for the United States, China, and the smaller regional powers. Since 2009, this tendency toward balancing behaviour has been reflected in China's “assertive diplomacy,” in the U.S. “pivot” to East Asia, and in the security policies of the smaller regional powers. The chapter examines the traditional sources of great power capabilities to observe China's emergence as the world's second great power.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Fahim Khan , Anwar Ali , Dr. Hafiz Hammaduddin

In this article, there is a brief discussion on how the rising of China's state created a major threat for the United States Hegemony. According to Power Transition Theory (PTT), power is central in understanding the international system as a relative power to demonstrate the prerequisite for peace and war in the international system. So, power is basically an ability to impose on or convince a revolutionary act to comply with demands. The study is a qualitative analysis of the grounded facts and previously produced documents and researches. With the document analysis it is evident that both the countries work on the mutual interests, there is a low possibility of actual war like situation on any of the political or economic grounds between China and the US. China can be considered as an economic superpower if it peruse all its economic expansion plans, on the other hand US will remain on top on the political or military fronts.


Author(s):  
Salvatore Babones

Contrary to declinist narratives, the dominance of the United States in the contemporary world-system is increasingly solid and stable. The US economy remains vibrant, but the US benefits also from the desire of people to participate in the global economic system that has the United States at its core. The fact that the American Tianxia acts on an individual basis at least as much as on an international one massively privileges US individuals, organizations, and institutions. Others pay this price due to the network externalities gained from membership in the system. These flows counteract political entropy -- the tendency of imperial political systems to disintegrate. The American Tianxia thus does not fit the "new medievalism" model of international relations; as Vladimir Putin protests, it is a unipolar system with "one master, one sovereign." Advocates of a return to multipolarity (including Vladimir Putin) point to the rise of China as their main hope, but forecasts of China's continuing economic rise are vastly oversold.


2009 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARK BEESON

AbstractThe ‘rise of China’ is seen by some observers as a precursor of inevitable hegemonic competition in East Asia. At the very least, it seems likely that China’s influence in East Asia will grow at the expense of the United States. Whether this will eventually amount to a form of ‘hegemonic transition’ is far less clear. It is, therefore, an opportune moment to consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of China and the US in East Asia. This paper suggests that the nature of hegemonic competition and transition is more uncertain and complex than some of the most influential theoretical understandings of hegemony would have us believe.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 350
Author(s):  
Fadhila Inas Pratiwi ◽  
Dini Putri Saraswati ◽  
M. Muttaqien

The rise of China can be perceived either as a threat or as an opportunity to and for the US, mostly depending on US grand foreign policy interests and its related strategies. If the US feels comfortable living in a multipolar world in which it is considered to be an equal among the major powers, China is more likely to be perceived as a partner. However, if the goal of US foreign policy is to strengthen its position as the sole superpower or even as a hyper-power, and does not choose to recognise other major countries, then the rise of China will be perceived as a threat. Based on this underlying assumption, this article seeks to examine the exact interests of the US: Is it threatened by the rise of China or is it not? This article starts by explaining the grand theories and relating it to the research question. The next explanation examines the economic ties between the two countries. The final consideration is the possibility of military conflict given several recent occurrences, such as the Taiwan and South China Sea (SCS) dispute. This article concludes that the rise of China will threaten the interests of the US. However, it will not necessarily lead to war between them.


2013 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 583-606 ◽  
Author(s):  
IL HYUN CHO ◽  
SEO-HYUN PARK

AbstractWhat drives East Asian regionalism? The rise of China and the perceived decline in the influence of the United States have sparked debates about the future of the regional order, including the yet-unresolved question of whose leadership is likely to be more stable and accepted as legitimate by other regional actors. What is puzzling, however, is that persistent demands for the formation of a coherent and uniquely East Asian regional institution have come not from China or the US, as is the focus of existing studies, but rather Japan and South Korea. In this article, we propose an alternative framework that conceptualises the varieties of East Asian regionalism, emphasising the multiple pivots and variegated levels of politics involved in efforts toward regional cooperation. We find that competing proposals for East Asian regionalism since the 1990s are not determined by structural pressures or the convergence of interests but rather result from domestic legitimacy politics. Japanese and Korean leaders have, at different time periods, proposed their own alternative region-making initiatives appealing to domestically contested views on how best to seek autonomy from the region's Great Powers as a way to enhance their political standing domestically and regionally.


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