scholarly journals Political Authority, Personal Autonomy and Higher Education

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 154-170
Author(s):  
Christopher Martin
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Personal Autonomy ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Compulsory Education ◽  
Educational Choices ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Direct Role ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Educational Authority ◽  
Service Conception

Does the liberal state have a role in helping mature citizens make worthwhile educational choices? The question has clear relevance for the aims of higher education in a liberal democratic society. As systems of higher education internationalize, it has become difficult for liberal states to steer high education policy in directions that serve civic interests. This is, in part, because political liberalism imposes restrictions on what one might call directive educational authority: the power to direct citizens toward specific kinds of knowledge, understanding and skills in the interests of making their lives better. This restriction follows from the view that citizens have the capacity to make thier own decisions about how best to live, including decisions about the kind of education they need. My aim in this paper is to make the case for a more direct role for the state in promoting a good life through higher education. In particular, I argue that the liberal state’s obligation to promote autonomy across its citizenry confers legitimate educational authority over post-compulsory, as well as compulsory, education. This argument affirms the State’s educational obligations to citizens beyond a basic or compulsory education. Getting in the way of this affirmation, however, is an overly restrictive account of educational authority that occludes these obligations under the guise of respect for autonomy. Accordingly, in making my case I propose an autonomy-based account educational authority derived from Joseph Raz’s Service Conception, defending this account against the charge that such authority is illegitimately paternalistic.

Does Liberal Democracy Require a Gandhian Approach to Religion?

Acorn ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-129
Author(s):  
Sanjay Lal ◽  
Jeff Shawn Jose ◽  
Douglas Allen ◽  
Michael Allen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Religious Values ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Absolute Truth ◽  
Democratic Socialism ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Unity In Diversity

In this author-meets-critics dialogue, Sanjay Lal, author of , argues that Gandhian values of nonviolence raise aspirations of liberal democracy to a higher level. Since Gandhian values of nonviolence are closely associated with religious values, liberal democracy should make public commitments to religions on a non-sectarian basis, except for unreasonable religions. Critic Jeff Shawn Jose agrees that Gandhian values can strengthen liberal democracy. However, Jose finds a contradiction in Lal’s proposal that a liberal state should support reasonable religions only. A more consistent Gandhian approach would focus on everyday interactions between citizens and groups rather than state-directed preferences. Critic Douglas Allen also welcomes Lal’s project that brings Gandhian philosophy into relation with liberal democratic theory; however, he argues that universalizing the Absolute Truth of genuine religion is more complicated than Lal acknowledges. D. Allen argues for a Gandhian approach of relative truths, which cannot be evaluated apart from contingency or context, and he offers autobiographical evidence in support of his critical suspicion of genuine religion. Critic Michael Allen argues that Lal’s metaphysical approach to public justification violates a central commitment of political liberalism not to take sides on any metaphysical basis. M. Allen argues that democratic socialism is closer to Gandhi’s approach than is liberalism. Lal responds to critics by arguing that Gandhi’s evaluation of unreasonable religions depends upon an assessment of violence, which is not as problematic as critics charge, either from a Gandhian perspective or a liberal one. Furthermore, by excluding unreasonable or violent religions from state promotion, Lal argues that he is not advocating state suppression. Finally, Lal argues that Gandhian or Kingian metaphysics are worthy of support by liberal, democratic states seeking to educate individuals regarding peaceful unity in diversity.

The Dual Penal State

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus D. Dubber
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Personal Autonomy ◽  
Wide Field ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
Penal State ◽  
Penal Law ◽  
War On Crime ◽  
History Of ◽  
Patriarchal Power

Dual Penal State: The Crisis of Criminal Law in Comparative-Historical Perspective addresses one of today’s most pressing social and political issues: the rampant, at best haphazard, and ever-expanding use of penal power by states ostensibly committed to the enlightenment-based legal-political project of Western liberal democracy. Penal regimes in these states operate in a wide field of ill-considered and little constrained violence, where radical and prolonged interference with the autonomy of the very persons upon whose autonomy the legitimacy of state power is supposed to rest has been utterly normalized. At bottom, this crisis of modern penality is a crisis of the liberal project itself; the penal paradox is merely the sharpest formulation of the general paradox of power in a liberal state: the legitimacy of state sovereignty in the name of personal autonomy. To capture the depth and range of the crisis of contemporary penality in ostensibly liberal states, Dual Penal State leaves behind customary temporal and parochial constraints, and turns to historical and comparative analysis instead. This approach reveals a fundamental distinction between two conceptions of penal power, penal law and penal police, that run through Western legal-political history, one rooted in autonomy, equality, and interpersonal respect, and the other in heteronomy, hierarchy, and patriarchal power. Dual penal state analysis illuminates how this distinction manifests itself in the history of the present of various penal systems, from the malign neglect of the American war on crime to the ahistorical self-satisfaction of German criminal law science.

The reasons of the unreasonable: Is political liberalism still an option?

2021 ◽  
pp. 019145372110405
Author(s):  
Benedetta Giovanola ◽  
Roberta Sala
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Social Solidarity ◽  
Strict Sense ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Respect For Persons ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Liberal Societies ◽  
Harsh Criticism ◽  
Sense Of Justice

In this study, we claim that political liberalism, despite harsh criticism, is still the best option available for providing a just and stable society. However, we maintain that political liberalism needs to be revised so as to be justifiable from the perspective of not only the “reasonable” in a Rawlsian sense (that we define as “fully” reasonable) but also the ones whom Rawls labels as “unreasonable.” To support our claim, going beyond Rawls’s original account, we unpack the concept of unreasonableness and identify three different subsets that we label as the “partially reasonable,” the “non-reasonable,” and the “unreasonable.” We argue that both the “fully” reasonable and the “partially reasonable” would be included into the constituency of public justification; more specifically, we claim that the latter would support liberal institutions out of their reasons: we define these reasons as mutually intelligible reasons and claim that they allow to acknowledge the importance of a convergence approach to public justification. As for the “non-reasonable” and “unreasonable,” we claim that they cannot be included in the constituency of public justification, but they nonetheless could be compliant with liberal institutions if political liberalism offers them some reasons to comply: here, we claim that political liberalism should include them through engagement and propose reasoning from conjecture as an effecting way of offering reasons for compliance. In particular, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, the “non-reasonable” could find conciliatory reasons to comply with liberal institutions on a stable base. With regard to the “unreasonable” in the strict sense, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, their unreasonableness could be contained and they could find reasons—even if just self-interested—for complying with liberal institutions rather than defying them. In our discussion, we consider the different subsets not as “frozen” but as dynamic and open to change, and we aim to propose a more complex and multilayered approach to inclusion that would be able to include a wider set of people. To strengthen our argument, we show that the need for a wider public justification and for broader inclusion in liberal societies is grounded in respect for persons both as equal persons and as particular individuals. In particular, we claim that individuals’ values, ends, commitments, and affiliations activate demands of respect and can strengthen the commitment to the liberal–democratic order. Through a reformulation of the role of respect in liberal societies, we also show a kind of social and communitarian dimension that, we claim, is fully compatible with political liberalism and opens it up to “civic friendship” and “social solidarity,” which are constitutive elements for the development of a sense of justice and for the realization of a just and stable society.

scholarly journals An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis of the Barriers to the Use of Humour in the Teaching of Childhood Studies

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-120
Author(s):  
Edward John Noon
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis ◽  
Compulsory Education ◽  
Teaching Experience ◽  
Phenomenological Analysis ◽  
Childhood Studies ◽  
Structured Interviews ◽  
Professional Career ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Years Of Teaching Experience

This is a revised article First published: Noon, J. E. (2017). An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis of the Barriers to the Use of Humour in the Teaching of Childhood Studies, Journal of Perspectives in Applied Academic Practice, 5(3), pp. 45-52. doi: https://doi.org/10.14297/jpaap.v5i3.255 The above article was first published online on May 10, 2017. The methodology section has been corrected to accurately reflect the sampling technique employed in this study. The revised version is published in this issue. In the original publication, it was noted that the sample was determined by certain criteria, including gender, years of teaching experience, and previous professional career.  However, having reflected back on the process, this was not the case. Whilst it was ensured that participants had at least six years of teaching experience in higher education, the fact that the sample was dominated by female academics from a wide range of backgrounds was inevitable given the ‘make-up’ of the population under investigation, and was not something that was specifically planned for. Abstract Whilst pedagogical humour is a common teaching strategy employed by educators across compulsory education systems, a review of the extant literature expounds that it is a tool largely neglected by instructors throughout higher education. As such, this study sought to discern the perspectives of educators concerning the barriers to the use of humour in the teaching of Childhood Studies. Semi-structured interviews were carried out with five educators on the BA (Hons) Childhood Studies programme at a Yorkshire-based post-1992 university. Verbatim transcripts of the interviews were analysed using interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA). Respondents believed that an academic’s personality held a significant bearing upon their pedagogy, and therefore their use of classroom jocularity. Educators claimed that whilst pedagogical humour did have its benefits, it was also capable of causing offence, distracting from course content, and making students feel uncomfortable. Consequently, educators generated situated understandings of when and where they were permitted to employ pedagogical humour, and what form said humour should take; they were cautious not to overuse humour, and were also less likely to draw upon it when teaching emotive or distressing content, and when teaching groups of students they were less familiar with. Educators also noted that they were less likely to draw upon pedagogical humour in the lecture theatre, despite university-wide pressure for instructors to produce more interactive lectures.

The non-cognitive challenge to a liberal egalitarian education

2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 233-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer M. Morton
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Educational Institutions ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Primary Goods ◽  
Cognitive Challenge ◽  
Conception Of The Good

Political liberalism, conceived of as a response to the diversity of conceptions of the good in multicultural societies, aims to put forward a proposal for how to organize political institutions that is acceptable to a wide range of citizens. It does so by remaining neutral between reasonable conceptions of the good while giving all citizens a fair opportunity to access the offices and positions which enable them to pursue their own conception of the good. Public educational institutions are at the center of the state’s attempt to foster both of these commitments. I argue that recent empirical research on the role that non-cognitive dispositions (such as assertiveness) play in enabling students to have access to two important primary goods – opportunities for higher education and desirable jobs – creates a distinctive challenge for a liberal egalitarian education in remaining neutral with respect to conceptions of the good while promoting equal opportunity.

Toleration, Political Liberalism, and Peaceful Coexistence in the Muslim World

2007 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Bican Sahin
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Ethnic Diversity ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Muslim World ◽  
Cultural Groups ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
Peaceful Coexistence ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Democratic Regimes

How can Muslim societies marked by religious, cultural, and ethnic diversity secure peace and stability? I argue that the principle of toleration provides the most appropriate environment for the peaceful coexistence of these differences, for individuals living in a polity can adopt different moral views and experience their cultural, ethnic, and other differences peacefully. Toleration is mainly a characteristic of liberal democratic regimes. However, different traditions of liberalism lead to different versions of liberal democracy. Also, not all versions of liberalism value toleration to the same degree. I argue that a liberal democracy based on “political” rather than “comprehensive” liberalism provides the broadest space for the existence of differences, for it does not present a shared way of life, but only a political framework within which individuals and groups with different worldviews can solve their common political problems. However, a liberal democracy based on comprehensive liberalism requires cultural groups and/or individuals to subscribe to fundamental liberal values (e.g., autonomy), and this stance limits its room for toleration. Thus, if liberal democracy is going to be introduced into the Muslim world to bring about peace and stability, it must be a liberal democracy based on political, rather than comprehensive, liberalism.

Educational Choices, Family Background, and Social Mobility

2019 ◽  
pp. 128-146
Author(s):  
Maria da Conceição Rego ◽  
Carlos Vieira ◽  
Isabel Vieira
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Social Mobility ◽  
Family Background ◽  
Economic Status ◽  
Current Data ◽  
Educational Choices ◽  
Access To Higher Education ◽  
Job Market ◽  
Socio Economic Status ◽  
Policy Measures

Education is generally considered a valuable tool to improve individual socio-economic status. In European peripheral countries, up to the late 1970s, only a small elite had access to higher education and such privilege guaranteed a comfortable socio-economic position, not only via the job market, but also by allowing the sustainability of pre-existing social links. From then on, democratization of access to higher education should have prompted a decrease in social and economic inequalities within and across countries. However, current data still reflects that, despite gained access to social uplifting tools, individuals from less favored backgrounds appear to not have been able to close the various gaps separating them from the more privileged ones. In this chapter, the authors analyze recent data to characterize higher education attendance in Portugal, highlighting some factors that may still block the socio-economic improvement of the less favored students and suggesting policy measures to overcome them.

What Should the Right to Higher Education Look Like?

2021 ◽  
pp. 187-218
Author(s):  
Christopher Martin
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Public Policy ◽  
Higher Education Policy ◽  
Growth And Development ◽  
Compulsory Education ◽  
Human Welfare ◽  
Institutional Practice ◽  
Higher Education Systems ◽  
The Right

This chapter addresses some key objections to the right to higher education and provides a fuller picture of what this right can look like at the level of public policy and institutional practice. First, the chapter revisits the broader rationale for the argument in order to show how a rights-based conception of can better inform public debate about the justice, fairness, and purposes of higher education. Second, it applies this account to Martin Trow’s famous conceptualization of higher education systems into “elite,” “mass,” and “universal” stages of growth and development in order to demonstrate how the right to higher education can inform higher education policy. Finally, it addresses the worry that the right to higher education overstates the importance of post-compulsory education for a liberal society. Here the chapter engages with issues about the role of higher education in the promotion of human welfare and the level of “idealization” built into the argument.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document