scholarly journals Les politiques ouest-européennes et le dollar : Dépendance nationale ou autonomie régionale

2005 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 683-744 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Story
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
State Policy ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
State Action ◽  
The World ◽  
Western European

The lack of autonomy of Western European states, that is, the limitations which they confront in terms of translating their policy preferences into authoritative actions, cannot be considered solely in terms of idiosyncratic domestic political institutions and cultures, or as the result of greater sensibility and vulnerability to interdependence through the flow of goods, capital and technology. The argument develops around the generalisation that during the period of "détente" from 1965 to 1979, the United States, as the world central bank, inflated the world political economy ; thereafter, the questioning of détente accompanied a United States-led policy of world deflation. European politics, in a variety of intricate ways, followed the rythm set by the United States, with a period of state policy activism in the late 1960s to mid-1970s followed by more sceptical attitudes by public officials, supported by conservative or liberal parties, on the limitations of state action. But while it could be argued that the autonomy of OECD European states was strictly limited in economic policy by the integration of national into European and world markets, it is also demonstratable that the most sensitive of these markets - the world financial markets - are most susceptible to state policy, particularly that of the United States. In turn, the influence exerted on government preferences by world financial markets has grown to such an extent that by 1983, Western European governments are all aligning priorities on what are taken to be market criteria. If fact, they are aligning their priorities on the preferences of the great powers in a period of heightened international tension. Thus, the lack of autonomy of Western European states is of political origin: their subordination through lack of continued regional autonomy in defense and finance. Implicitly, this article suggests a move in Western Europe to a confederal armed force and a European Reserve Bank, as the precondition for a revitalised Atlantic alliance.

THE SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIO-POLITICAL DOCTRINE OF LIBERALISM IN THE WESTERN EUROPEAN, AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN TRADITIONS IN THE 18TH AND 19TH CENTURIES: COMMON AND SPECIAL

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 54-62
Author(s):  
VADIM ZUBOV ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Synthetic Methods ◽  
European American ◽  
The Past ◽  
The World ◽  
Western European ◽  
The Right

The article strives to conceptualize the basic ideas of liberalism, free from political sensitivities, emotional judgments and naive simplifications based on different methods and techniques of political and historical science, as well as general scientific approaches - a comparative historical method, a normative approach, an institutional approach, and analytical and synthetic methods. Defects of the interpretation of liberalism in Russia - opposition of “liberals” and “patriots”, domestic perceptions of liberalism as freedom in family, sexual and gender life, reduction of liberalism to the specific historical direction of post-Soviet liberalism are revealed in the paper. Furthermore, the author draws attention to the misunderstanding of liberalism in the United States: one of them refers liberalism to the social democracy, the other equates liberalism with the totalitarian teachings. In the light of the incorrect perception of liberalism in the world, the author formulates the purpose of the work as overcoming the misjudgement of liberalism by overcoming the false appreciation of liberalism by forming a concentrated view of the fundamentals of liberal socio-political teachings based on the views of leading thinkers in Western Europe, the United States of America and Russia in the 18th and 19th centuries. Which contributed significantly to the development of the fundamentals of liberalism. Predicated on the analysis of the ideas of Western European, American, and Russian liberal thinkers of the past, the author identifies common and special features of the interpretation of liberalism in different parts of the world over two centuries. Finally, the author concludes that the main features of the original liberalism are the basic points of the classical liberalism of the past centuries are the following points: 1) intelligent people should have unconditional personal, political and economic rights independent of the state; 2) there must be a system in the state that promotes justice and limits the state itself; 3) all people have the right to form a state and influences it.

scholarly journals European Direct Investment in Brazil, 1860 to the Present

2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sérgio de Oliveira Birchal ◽  
Âmara Fuccio de Fraga e Silva
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
20Th Century ◽  
Direct Investment ◽  
World Economy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Geographical Proximity ◽  
Japanese Firms ◽  
The World ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Western European

European direct investment in Brazil dates back to the discovery of the country and has been since then either hegemonic or more important than a superficial observation can grasp, as this work aims at showing. During the 20th century, the United States has replaced Britain as the worlds economic superpower and the largest direct investor. US dominance in the world economy and geographical proximity to Brazil would suggest that US investments were by far the largest in the country during that century. Furthermore, as Japan had become the second largest economy in the world in the 1980s, we would expect that this would be reflected in the data of the largest multinationals in Brazil. However, as our investigation suggests, Western European direct investment has been as large (and in many occasions even larger) as that of the USA and Japanese firms have never had a prominent presence among the largest firms in Brazil, at least until the late 1990s.

Liberalism since the Cold War: an enemy to itself?

1999 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 145-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
GEOFFREY HAWTHORN
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Markets ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
The World ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Regional Development Banks

Many expected that after the Cold War, there would be peace, order, increasing prosperity in expanding markets and the extension and eventual consolidation of civil and political rights. There would be a new world order, and it would in these ways be liberal. In international politics, the United States would be supreme. It would through security treaties command the peace in western Europe and east Asia; through its economic power command it in eastern Europe and Russia; through clients and its own domination command it in the Middle East; through tacit understanding command it in Latin America; and, in so far as any state could, command it in Africa also. It could choose whether to cooperate in the United Nations, and if it did not wish to do so, be confident that it would not be disablingly opposed by illiberal states. In the international markets, it would be able to maintain holdings of its bonds. In the international financial institutions, it would continue to be decisive in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; it would be an important influence in the regional development banks; and it would be powerful in what it was to insist in 1994 should be called the World (rather than Multinational) Trade Organisation. Other transactions in the markets, it is true, would be beyond the control of any state. But they would not be likely to conflict with the interests of the United States (and western Europe) in finance, investment and trade, and would discipline other governments.

Immigrant Religion

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Alba ◽  
Nancy Foner
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
Common Source ◽  
Lower Socioeconomic ◽  
Socioeconomic Profile ◽  
Western European ◽  
Social Divide ◽  
Immigrant Religion

This chapter describes how immigrant religion generally has become a more significant social divide, a greater challenge to integration, and a more common source of conflict with mainstream institutions and practices in Western Europe than in the United States. There are three main reasons for this. Of paramount importance are basic demographic facts. The religious backgrounds of immigrants in Western Europe and the United States are different, mostly Christian in the United States as compared to Western Europe, where a large proportion is Muslim. Muslims of immigrant origin in Western Europe also have a lower socioeconomic profile than those in the United States. Moreover, Western European native majorities have more trouble recognizing claims based on religion because they are more secular than religiously involved Americans.

Separated at Birth?

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Baldwin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
Unexpected Death ◽  
The World ◽  
Exit Option ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Fathers And Sons

To Return To The Bulk of our material in this book, what absolute differences separate the United States from Europe? The United States is a nation where proportionately more people are murdered each year, more are jailed, and more own guns than anywhere in Europe. The death penalty is still law. Religious belief is more fervent and widespread. A smaller percentage of citizens vote. Collective bargaining covers relatively fewer workers, and the state’s tax take is lower. Inequality is somewhat more pronounced. That is about it. In almost every other respect, differences are ones of degree, rather than kind. Oft en, they do not exist, or if they do, no more so than the same disparities hold true within Western Europe itself. At the very least, this suggests that farreaching claims to radical differences across the Atlantic have been overstated. Even on violence—a salient difference that leaps unprompted from the evidence, both statistical and anecdotal—the contrast depends on how it is framed. Without question, murder rates are dramatically different across the Atlantic. And, of course, murder is the most shocking form of sudden, unexpected death, unsettling communities, leaving survivors bereaved and mourning. But consider a wider definition of unanticipated, immediate, and profoundly disrupting death. Suicide is oft en thought of as the exit option for old, sick men anticipating the inevitable, and therefore not something that changes the world around them. But, in fact, the distribution of suicide over the lifespan is broadly uniform. In Iceland, Ireland, the UK, and the United States, more young men (below forty-five) than old do themselves in. In Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway, the figures are almost equal. Elsewhere, the older have a slight edge. But overall, the ratio between young and old suicides approximates 1:1. Broadly speaking, and sticking with the sex that most oft en kills itself, men do away with themselves as oft en when they are younger and possibly still husbands, fathers, and sons as they do when they are older and when their actions are perhaps fraught with less consequence for others. Suicide is as unsettling, and oft en even more so, for survivors as murder.

Politics

2020 ◽  
pp. 84-121
Author(s):  
David Damrosch
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
United States ◽  
Comparative Literature ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
Rapid Expansion ◽  
Institutional Politics ◽  
The World ◽  
International Comparative ◽  
Political Scene

This chapter discusses the comparatists who reshaped the comparative literature in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s. It mentions Anna Balakian, who became a leading figure in both the American and International Comparative Literature Associations. It also describes Anna and her family's emigration in 1921 from Turkey to western Europe and eventually to the United States. The chapter analyzes how comparatists sought to change the world in the postwar years, a time of rapid expansion in higher education and optimism about America's role in fostering international cooperation and understanding. It also focuses on the need of politics of comparative studies to have a dual focus on institutional politics, a wider political scene, and a postcolonial perspective.

The Unity of the West and Free Trade: A Report From Washington

Worldview ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 14-16
Author(s):  
Lionel Gelber
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
Common Market ◽  
The West ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Common ◽  
De Gaulle

When the United States fostered the recovery and underwrote the security of Western Europe she had more than sentiment to impel her. That salient zone is a pivotal sector of the world balance, and while she may station fewer of her own troops upon its soil, she can entertain no total disengagement from it. But there is another West European item, the future of the Common Market, which calls for a fresh American scrutiny. The West will be better off if Western Europe acquires more of an ability to stand on its own feet. Gaullism, however, revealed a less modest goal, one that was not confined to France and did not vanish with the departure of General de Gaulle. On the contrary, it may have gained new leverage from his downfall.

Industrialization, Hubs, and Catch-up

2020 ◽  
pp. 145-161
Author(s):  
Deepak Nayyar
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
Industrial Revolution ◽  
The United States ◽  
First Century ◽  
Rapid Decline ◽  
The Past ◽  
Early Twenty ◽  
The World ◽  
Catch Up

This chapter analyses the striking changes in the geographical distribution of manufacturing production amongst countries and across continents since 1750, a period that spans more than two-and-a-half centuries, which could be described as the movement of industrial hubs in the world economy over time. Until around 1820, world manufacturing production was concentrated in China and India. The Industrial Revolution, followed by the advent of colonialism, led to deindustrialization in Asia and, by 1880, Britain became the world industrial hub that extended to northwestern Europe. The United States surpassed Britain in 1900, and was the dominant industrial hub in the world until 2000. During 1950 to 2000, the relative, though not absolute, importance of Western Europe diminished, and Japan emerged as a significant industrial hub, while the other new industrial hub, the USSR and Eastern Europe, was short lived. The early twenty-first century, 2000–2017, witnessed a rapid decline of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan as industrial hubs, to be replaced largely by Asia, particularly China. This process of shifting hubs, associated with industrialization in some countries and deindustrialization in other countries in the past, might be associated with premature deindustrialization in yet other countries in the future.

Chapter II. The World Economy

1971 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
pp. 22-35
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North America ◽  
World Economy ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
Oecd Countries ◽  
Industrial Countries ◽  
Slowing Down ◽  
The World ◽  
Real Growth

Developments in the world economy have on the whole been much as we predicted in February. It is becoming increasingly clear that renewed expansion is under way in the United States at a pace which, even if it falls short of the Administration's hopes, is more than compensating for the slowing down in industrial countries outside North America. This deceleration has become quite marked in Japan as well as Western Europe, but we expect a faster pace to be resumed before the end of the year. We still put real growth in OECD countries at around 4 per cent in 1971, unless there is a prolonged steel strike in the United States. This compares with about 2½ per cent last year, and we expect the rising trend to continue into 1972.

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