Children’s agency

Author(s):  
Allyn Fives

Even when parents exercise their power in a paternalistic fashion so as to make up for children’s deficits, parents can be faced with moral dilemmas, conflicts which call into question the legitimacy of parents’ exercise of power even in these instances. This is the case, I shall argue in this chapter, because a number of different moral considerations are relevant when we consider children’s agency, and they can pull in different directions and make incompatible demands when we evaluate parents’ power. In particular, we address the following question: how do we evaluate situations where, while promoting children’s positive freedom, parents violate the rights that protect children’s negative freedom?

Author(s):  
Rita Dirks

In Miriam Toews’s A Complicated Kindness (2004; Giller Prize finalist; winner of Canada's Governor General's Award) Nomi Nickel, a sixteen-year-old Mennonite girl from southern Manitoba, Canada, tells the story of her short life before her excommunication from the closed community of the fictional East Village. East Village is based on a real town in southern Manitoba called Steinbach (where Toews was born), where Mennonite culture remains segregated from the rest of the world to protect its distinctive Anabaptist Protestantism and to keep its language, Mennonite Low German or Plattdeutsch, a living language, one which is both linguistically demotic yet ethnically hieratic because of its role in Mennonite faith. Since the Reformation, and more precisely the work of Menno Simons after whom this ethno-religious group was christened, Mennonites have used their particular brand of Low German to separate themselves from the rest of humankind. Toews constructs her novel as a multilingual narrative, to represent the cultural and religious tensions within. Set in the early 1980s, A Complicated Kindness details the events that lead up to Nomi’s excommunication, or shunning; Nomi’s exclusion is partly due to her embracing of the “English” culture through popular, mostly 1970s, music and books such as J.D. Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye. Insofar as Toews’s novel presents the conflict between the teenaged narrator and the patriarchal, conservative Mennonite culture, the books stands at the crossroads of negative and positive freedom. Put succinctly, since the beginnings of the Protestant Reformation, Mennonites have sought negative freedom, or freedom from persecution, yet its own tenets foreclose on the positive freedom of its individual members. This problem reaches its most intense expression in contemporary Mennonitism, both in Canada and in the EU, for Mennonite culture returns constantly to its founding precepts, even through the passage of time, coupled with diasporic history. Toews presents this conflict between this early modern religious subculture and postmodern liberal democracy through the eyes of a sarcastic, satirical Nomi, who, in this Bildungsroman, must solve the dialectic of her very identity: literally, the negative freedom of No Me or positive freedom of Know Me. As Mennonite writing in Canada is a relatively new phenomenon, about 50 years old, the question for those who call themselves Mennonite writers arises in terms of deciding between new, migrant, separate-group writing and writing as English-speaking Canadians.


2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ewa Sapiezynska

Two narratives dominate the literature about the state of freedom of expression in postliberal Venezuela, and they have few points in common, since they depend on different conceptualizations of the notion of freedom of expression. While the traditional liberal narrative focuses on the negative freedom that prohibits state interference, the postliberal narrative is based on positive freedom that encompasses the collective right of self-realization, particularly for the previously marginalized. During the government of Hugo Chávez, the discourse of freedom of expression was renewed, placing it in the context of power relations, accentuating positive freedom, and emphasizing the role of the public and community media. The establishment of the international public channel TeleSUR has revived the 1970s debate about the right to communication and contributed to the creation of a new Latin American-ness. En la literatura predominan dos narrativas acerca del estado de la libertad de expresión en la Venezuela posliberal las que tienen pocos puntos en común porque parten de visiones distintas del concepto de la libertad de expresión. Mientras la narrativa liberal tradicional enfoca sólo en la libertad negativa que previene la injerencia estatal, la narrativa posliberal se centra en la libertad positiva que abarca la autorrealización del derecho colectivo, también de los previamente marginalizados. Durante el gobierno de Hugo Chávez el discurso acerca de la libertad de expresión se renueva, insertando el concepto en el contexto de las relaciones de poder, acentuando la libertad positiva y enfatizando el rol de los medios públicos y comunitarios. El establecimiento del medio público internacional TeleSUR revive los debates sobre el derecho a la comunicación de la década de los 70 y aporta a la creación de una nueva Latinoamericanidad.


2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naomi T. Campa

Abstract Freedom in democratic Athens is often understood as consisting of positive freedom in the public sphere in the form of political participation and negative freedom in the private sphere in the form of citizens doing ‘whatever they wish’. The original meaning of positive freedom, though, is more akin to self-mastery than political participation. By looking at phrases describing Athenians’ ability to do ‘whatever they wish’ from Herodotus to Aristotle, this article argues that the phrases instead express individual positive freedom in both private and public spheres. The democratic citizen is free because he is the author of his own actions. Individual autonomy stands in contrast to Spartan and Persian definitions of freedom, which focus on the external, negative freedom of the state. In addition to an ideological distinction, positive freedom also gives rise to the principle of voluntarism.


Author(s):  
Вера Павловна Потамская

Рассматривается трактовка И. Берлином концепта «свободы». Берлин сосредотачивается на дифференциации негативной и позитивной свободы, поддерживая негативную свободу, восходящую к классической английской политической философии. Понятие позитивной свободы связывается Берлином с континентальной мыслью - воззрениями Г.В.Ф. Гегеля, Ж.Ж. Руссо, И. Гердера и К. Маркса. Он указывает, что позитивная свобода может переродиться в свою противоположность - деспотизм. Негативная свобода, в свою очередь, не претерпевает превращения во что-то настолько далекое от ее изначального значения. The article is devoted to I. Berlin's interpretation of the concept of «freedom». Berlin focuses on the differentiation of negative and positive freedom, supporting negative freedom that goes back to classical English political philosophy. Berlin connects the concept of positive freedom with continental thought - the views of G.V.F. Hegel, J.J. Rousseau, I. Herder and K. Marx. Berlin points out that positive freedom can be reborn into its opposite - despotism. Negative freedom, in turn, doesn’t turn into something so far from its original meaning.


2012 ◽  
Vol 39 (5) ◽  
pp. 69-92
Author(s):  
Tao Jiang

Isaiah Berlin is known for articulating two competing notions of freedom operative within the modern Western political philosophy, negative and positive. He provides a powerful defense of modern liberal tradition that elevates negative freedom in its attempt to preserve personal space for one’s actions and choices while regarding positive freedom as suppressive due to its potentially collective orientation. This article uses Berlin as an interlocutor to challenge Zhuangzi, known for his portrayal of spiritual freedom in the Chinese tradition, prodding modern Zhuangzians to bring the Zhuangzian spiritual freedom into the sociopolitical arena by reimagining new possibilities about politics.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (02) ◽  
pp. 380-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lebow

Guided by the thesis that fascism was the outcome of a dialectic of instrumental reason, I argue that Trumpism is the result of a dialectic of neoliberal reason. The 2008 crisis revealed that widely distributed consumption could no longer be sustained through escalating debt, as it had been since neoliberalizing reforms in the 1970s. Economic crisis has been interpreted through a culture market in which pseudo-individual consumers choose what hyperreal public they prefer and participate in pseudo-activity through social media. Retreat into insular hyperrealities and hostility to dissonant alternatives reinforce each other in an escalating logic generating partisan incivility and fake news. The de-democratization of the state through subservience to private interests and political dysfunction has combined with the consumer’s uncompromising mentality as a dissatisfied customer to channel politicization into populism. It aggregates negatively through shared dissatisfaction, driving escalating antagonism between technocratic responsibility and populist responsiveness. These escalating economic, cultural, and political contradictions heighten negative “freedom from” restraints while subverting positive “freedom to” relate meaningfully to the world. This intensifies anxieties and receptivity to authoritarianism as a self-defeating escape from neoliberal freedom. Trumpism exploits precarity, corrupts democratic norms, and licenses misdirected aggression. This neoliberal authoritarianism is inverted fascism. Trump’s presidency is more effect than cause.


Author(s):  
Marcos Antônio Striquer Soares ◽  
Tiago Brene

Resumo:Revisita a teoria política de Isaiah Berlin, em especial a partir do ensaio Dois Conceitos de Liberdade. Expõe as principais características e distinções entre liberdade negativa e liberdade positiva segundo o entendimento de Berlin. Posteriormente, ressalta a diferença que o autor faz entre liberdades negativas e positivas com o conceito de Condição de Liberdade. Analisa a Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil – CRFB-88, à luz da teoria política de Berlin em dois pontos: (i) os objetivos da CRFB-88 revelam valores de liberdades negativa e positiva; (ii) Direito sociais podem ser interpretados à luz da teoria de Berlin como sendo Condição de Liberdade. Problematiza a teoria berliana em face da CRFB-88, ponderando sobre os riscos de ser interpretar os Direitos Sociais como sendo os próprios objetivos do Estado. Por fim, expõe a preocupação de Isaiah Berlin de que valores éticos de justiça e solidariedade, correlatos da Liberdade Positiva, enquanto fonte de justificação política, se corrompam em ideologias despóticas, seja por postura paternalista, seja pela tirania.Palavras-chave: Isaiah Berlin; Liberdade Negativa; Liberdade Positiva; Constituição Federal. Abstract:Revisit the political theory of Isaiah Berlin, especially from the essay Two Concepts of Liberty. Explain the main characteristic and differences between negative freedom and positive freedom according to the understanding of Berlin. Subsequently rebound the difference that the author makes between positive and negative liberties with the concept of Freedom of Condition. Analyzes the Constitution of Federative Republic of Brazil - CRFB-88 in light of the political theory of Berlin in two points: (i) the objectives of CRFB-88 reveal virtue of negative and positive freedoms, (ii) social rights can be interpreted to light of the theory of Berlin as Condition of Freedom. Discusses the theory in the face of berliana CRFB-88, pondering the risks to be interpreting social rights as the state's own goals. Finally exposes the concern of Isaiah Berlin that ethical virtues of justice and solidarity, correlates of Positive Freedom, as a source of political justification, if corrupt despotic ideologies, whether by paternalistic stance, is tyranny.Keywords: Isaiah Berlin; Negative Freedom; Positive Freedom; Federal Constitution.


Philosophy ◽  
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Carter

The definition of “liberty” (or “freedom”—most political and social philosophers use these terms interchangeably) is a highly contested matter. Under what conditions is a person free to do something? What kinds of obstacles would make a person unfree to leave the country or to attend church or to get a job? Is liberty simply a matter of having the opportunity to do something, or is it achieved only through effective action of certain kinds? Is liberty a property of individuals, or can it also be applied to collectivities? Under what conditions can an individual’s overall level of freedom be said to “increase”? The starting point for much of the discussion about the nature of freedom is usually the distinction, made famous by Isaiah Berlin, between “negative” and “positive” freedom. Theorists of negative freedom, who tend to be political liberals, hold freedom to be the absence of obstacles of various kinds, and they often limit their attention to obstacles that they hold to be “external” to the agent, or, more commonly, to obstacles that are created by other human agents. Theorists of positive freedom, on the other hand, see constraints on freedom where negative theorists deny their existence—for example, in the presence of internal factors that damage the agent’s capacity to be autonomous. For them, freedom is a matter of being in control of one’s life and determining one’s own fate. Only when such agential limitations are overcome, they hold, can an agent achieve self-mastery or self-realization. Also important for theorists of liberty is the relation between the freedom of one person and the power of another. Is the power of agent A over agent B only contingently related to the unfreedom of agent B? Or should freedom itself be defined as the absence of subjection to the power of others? The latter response is given by republican theorists of freedom, who claim to have traced a third way between negative and positive conceptions of liberty. A number of liberal theorists of freedom, who instead see freedom and power as contingently related, have resisted this republican claim and have continued to uphold the negative conception. Understanding the nature of liberty, and of its relation to coercive or dominating power, is also important for debates about distributive justice: Is liberty best guaranteed, or most fairly distributed, where the state limits its activities to the enforcement of private property rights and freedom of contract? Or is there a sense in which a government’s redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor enhances the freedom of the poor? Must egalitarians appeal to a positive notion of freedom in support of such enforced redistribution, or might the libertarians be mistaken in seeing egalitarianism and negative liberty as incompatible ideals? Yet another important area of enquiry concerns the measurement of freedom—whether of an individual or of a group. How, if at all, can the various single freedoms of individuals be aggregated, so as to produce overall comparisons of freedom, to the effect that one individual or group is “freer” than another?


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 10
Author(s):  
Vigdis Ahnfelt

The present study examines the spiritual development of the main characters in the novel The Discreet Hero (2013) by Mario Vargas Llosa, and the aim is to show how irony provides the reader with reflections upon the meaning of individual freedom. The hypothesis suggests that the characters, representing different social and cultural groups of today’s Peruvian society, try to free themselves from surrounding threats and thereby obtain what Isaiah Berlin (1971) terms negative or positive freedom. The analysis focuses on narrative irony, which operates on three levels of the text: firstly, what it linguistically hides by telling something different, secondly, the discrepancy that emerges between narration and what lies underneath and thirdly, the dialectic ideas that impregnate the text and transmit the ambiguity of the work (Tittler 1984). Ethical irony, according to which the characters of narrative are incoherent figures that pursue coherence (Handwerk 1985), is also included. The study shows that irony problematizes in what ways the characters perceive individual freedom. All of them experience negative freedom, which emerges when authorities fail in their support and protection of the citizens despite political and economic freedom. In order to obtain positive freedom, individual ethical and social responsibility, knowledge of self and cultural refinement are essential. Through irony, it becomes clear that positive freedom depends on a democratic society and individual values.


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