A cerebellar internal model calibrates a feedback controller involved in sensorimotor control

Animals must adapt their behavior to survive in a changing environment. Behavioral adaptations can be evoked by two mechanisms: feedback control and internal-model-based control. Feedback controllers can maintain the sensory state of the animal at a desired level under different environmental conditions. In contrast, internal models learn the relationship between the motor output and its sensory consequences and can be used to recalibrate behaviors. Here, we present multiple unpredictable perturbations in visual feedback to larval zebrafish performing the optomotor response and show that they react to these perturbations through a feedback control mechanism. In contrast, if a perturbation is long-lasting, fish adapt their behavior by updating a cerebellum-dependent internal model. We use modelling and functional imaging to show that the neuronal requirements for these mechanisms are met in the larval zebrafish brain. Our results illustrate the role of the cerebellum in encoding internal models and how these can calibrate neuronal circuits involved in reactive behaviors depending on the interactions between animal and environment.

Minimal mindfulness of the world as an active control for a full mindfulness of mental states intervention: A Registered Report and Pilot study

Mindfulness is a continual renewal of non-elaborative attention on an object of focus, without clinging or aversion, and with equanimity. As this requires the capacity to monitor and control the extent to which one is on task, it is a metacognitive exercise. Mindfulness is especially metacognitive when directed towards mental states themselves, which is how the practice was conceived in the original Buddhist scriptures. Alternatively, mindfulness could be directed towards the world around oneself in a less metacognitive fashion. Notably, whilst mindfulness of the world is directed towards the referents of sensory states (e.g. “the sky is blue”), mindfulness of mental states includes a higher-order awareness of the experience of a sensory state as a mental state in and of itself (e.g. “I see the sky is blue”) – as a sensation.We test the centrality of metacognition in mindfulness practice by contrasting a full Mindfulness of Mental States intervention against a minimal Mindfulness of the World intervention, to act as a potential active control for non-specific effects. We also used the standard Waitlist control. Survey measures of mindfulness directed at the world and mental states separately, along with depression and anxiety measures, will be administered, along with participant expectations for each of these outcomes. Bayesian contrasts between the two mindfulness interventions will be the primary analysis to test for the first time the effects of mindfulness against a true active control (if it should turn out to be one). Pilot data (available online, above) presented in the first section below show some promising initial results. Between the Mental States and World focused conditions, evidence in the hypothesised direction was discovered on the Observe facet of the 24-item FFMQ-sf (other facets were insensitive), and on the PHQ-4 measure of depression and anxiety. Bar one single-item measure, evidence for the null was relegated to comparisons between the World and Waitlist groups, indicating its function as a placebo.

ASSESSMENT OF THE FUNCTIONAL STATE OF THE VISUAL SYSTEM OF HIGHER SCHOOL STUDENTS

The functional state of the visual system of higher school students in conditions of stable intensification (technical, informational, social) is advisable, provided that its effectiveness is achieved. It reflects not so much the efficiency of the functional system of the organism, which characterizes the achievement of the consequence, expressed in a specific result, as the property of the system itself to fulfill the set goal under the given conditions with the required quality. The problem of the state of the visual system of students as a common resource of the visual analyzer is transferred to the field of psychophysiology and pedagogy. Indicators of the effectiveness of the state of the visual system of students characterize the degree of adaptability of the system to the performance of the assigned tasks and are generalizing indicators of the optimal functioning of the visual system. In psychophysiological research of an applied nature, such indicators are considered to be the functional level of the system, the stability of the reaction and the level of its functional capabilities as predictors of the sensory state. A particularly productive area of psychophysiological research of vision in this regard can be the study of the distribution physiological conditions of the visual system. In general, scientific research of the visual system as a resource for information processing is developing similarly to the research of the visual analyzer. In the models of the selection education system, the concept of the visual process as a filtering mechanism for the selection of information has not been sufficiently studied. In resource models, the theories of the resources of the visual system as sensory perception have come to replace the common nonspecific resources.

Perception in Augustine’s De Trinitate 11

In this paper, I explore Augustine’s account of sense cognition in book 11 of De Trinitate. His discussion in this context focuses on two types of sensory state—what he calls ‘outer vision’ and ‘inner vision,’ respectively. His analysis of both types of state is designed to show that cognitive acts involving external and internal sense faculties are susceptible of a kind of trinitarian analysis. A common way to read De Trin. 11, is to interpret Augustine’s account of ‘outer’ vision as an analysis of sense perception and his account of ‘inner’ vision as an analysis of occurrent sensory memory and imagination. I argue against such a reading of De Trin. 11. Insofar as we take perception to be a phenomenally conscious mode of sensory awareness, outer vision cannot, I claim, be the equivalent of ordinary sense perception. For, on Augustine’s view, the deliverances of outer vision only reach the threshold of consciousness, when outer vision occurs in conjunction with inner vision. Hence, on my analysis, sense perception turns out to be a complex, hybrid state—one that involves both outer and inner vision. If I am right, acts of sense perception turn out not to be directly susceptible to trinitarian analysis. Even so, the account is interesting and nuanced for all that.

A cerebellar internal model calibrates a feedback controller involved in sensorimotor control

Animals must adapt their behavior to survive in a changing environment. Behavioral adaptations can be evoked by two mechanisms: feedback control and internal-model-based control. Feedback controllers can maintain the sensory state of the animal at a desired level under different environmental conditions. In turn, internal models learn the relationship between behavior and resulting sensory consequences in order to modify the behavior when this relationship changes. Here, we present multiple perturbations in visual feedback to larval zebrafish performing the optomotor response and show that they react to these perturbations through a feedback control mechanism. In contrast, if a perturbation is long-lasting, fish adapt their behavior by updating a cerebellum-dependent internal model. We use modelling and functional imaging to show that neuronal requirements for these mechanisms are met in the larval zebrafish brain. Our results illustrate the role of the cerebellum in encoding internal models and how these can calibrate neuronal circuits involved in reactive behaviors depending on the interactions between animal and environment.HighlightsBehavioral reactions to unexpected changes in visual feedback are implemented by a feedback control mechanismA long-lasting change in visual feedback updates the state of the neuronal controllerThe cerebellar internal model mediates this recalibration

Influence of Pairing Startling Acoustic Stimuli with Postural Responses Induced by Light Touch Displacement

The first exposure to an unexpected, rapid displacement of a light touch reference induces a balance reaction in naïve participants, whereas an arm-tracking behaviour emerges with subsequent exposures. The sudden behaviour change suggests the first trial balance reaction arises from the startling nature of the unexpected stimulus. We investigated how touch-induced balance reactions interact with startling acoustic stimuli. Responses to light touch displacements were tested in 48 participants across six distinct combinations of touch displacement (DISPLACEMENT), acoustic startle (STARTLE), or combined (COMBINED) stimuli. The effect of COMBINED depended, in part, on the history of the preceding stimuli. Participants who received 10 DISPLACEMENT initially, produced facilitated arm-tracking responses with subsequent COMBINED. Participants who received 10 COMBINED initially, produced facilitated balance reactions, with arm-tracking failing to emerge until the acoustic stimuli were discontinued. Participants who received five DISPLACEMENT, after initially habituating to 10 STARTLE, demonstrated re-emergence of the balance reaction with the subsequent COMBINED. Responses evoked by light touch displacements are influenced by the startling nature of the stimulus, suggesting that the selection of a balance reaction to a threatening stimulus is labile and dependent, in part, on the context and sensory state at the time of the disturbance.

Reliability of an interneuron response depends on an integrated sensory state

The central nervous system transforms sensory information into representations that are salient to the animal. Here we define the logic of this transformation in a Caenorhabditis elegans integrating interneuron. AIA interneurons receive input from multiple chemosensory neurons that detect attractive odors. We show that reliable AIA responses require the coincidence of two sensory inputs: activation of AWA olfactory neurons that are activated by attractive odors, and inhibition of one or more chemosensory neurons that are inhibited by attractive odors. AWA activates AIA through an electrical synapse, while the disinhibitory pathway acts through glutamatergic chemical synapses. AIA interneurons have bistable electrophysiological properties consistent with their calcium dynamics, suggesting that AIA activation is a stereotyped response to an integrated stimulus. Our results indicate that AIA interneurons combine sensory information using AND-gate logic, requiring coordinated activity from multiple chemosensory neurons. We propose that AIA encodes positive valence based on an integrated sensory state.

Reliability of an interneuron response depends on an integrated sensory state

ABSTRACTThe central nervous system transforms sensory information into representations that are salient to the animal. Here we define the logic of this transformation in a Caenorhabditis elegans integrating interneuron. AIA interneurons receive input from multiple chemosensory neurons that detect attractive odors. We show that reliable AIA responses require the coincidence of two sensory inputs: activation of AWA olfactory neurons that are activated by attractive odors, and inhibition of one or more chemosensory neurons that are inhibited by attractive odors. AWA activates AIA through an electrical synapse, while the disinhibitory pathway acts through glutamatergic chemical synapses. The resulting AIA interneuron responses have uniform magnitude and dynamics, suggesting that AIA activation is a stereotyped response to an integrated stimulus. Our results indicate that AIA interneurons combine sensory information using AND-gate logic, requiring coordinated activity from multiple chemosensory neurons. We propose that AIA encodes positive odor valence based on an integrated sensory state.