Political Information Use and Its Relationship to Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories Among the German Public

This study investigates how exposure to different news sources, propensity to vote (PTV) for a party and demographics are related to belief in conspiracy theories drawing on three repeated cross-sectional surveys in Germany 2017–2019. Results show that frequent exposure to alternative news sites and video-sharing platforms increased conspiratorial beliefs. Frequency of exposure to the quality press, public service TV news, and news aggregators diminished beliefs in conspiracy theories. Exposure to TV news, legacy media online, tabloids, social media, and user comments was unrelated to such beliefs. PTV for far left and right parties increased conspiratorial beliefs, moderate party preference reduced them.

Lost in Translation: Narrative Salience of Fear > Hope in Prevention of COVID-19

Using short, policy-image-like narratives, we explore the relationship between narrative agreement and narrative impacts in the case of COVID-19 in the US. Building upon previous research which identified attention narratives focusing on problems “stories of fear” and those focusing on solutions “stories of hope,” we use a narrative survey experiment of the general public (n=1000) to test the salience of problem and solution narratives and if they impact agreement with Center for Disease Control (CDC) prevention guidelines. Our findings are 1) fear story agreement is partisan but hope story agreement is not 2) fear story is the more salient of the two, 3) narrative agreement for both fear and hope were related to CDC safety guideline agreement, but were partisan, and 4) exposure to neither narrative impacted likelihood to agree with the guidelines as compared to a control group. Our findings are consistent with previous work indicating a Democratic party preference for stories of fear, where Democrats were more likely to support policy action. While we find that agreement with our narratives and guidelines is related, neither narrative treatment successfully altered support for CDC guidelines, suggesting a potential limit for the influence of narratives to either change or reorder existing preferences in highly salient and partisan issue areas like COVID-19 and suggesting a need for more research into the dynamics of narrative attention.

Combined Effects of Cultural-Linguistic Proximity and Naturalization on Political Integration of First-Generation Immigrants

Although the under-participation of ethnic minorities in the electoral field is frequently observed, the nuances of their political engagement remain relatively unexplored by scholars. Particularly, little empirical analysis has attempted to identify the barriers faced by first-generation immigrants to adopt a party preference in their host country. Drawing on a unique survey data with a large sample of first-generation immigrants (N= 2,648) in a new migration country (Spain), this article explores the relevance of different set of factors (cultural proximity vs immigration status) in explaining the acquisition of a party preference among this minority population. We find that cultural proximity (as defined by the country of origin: Latin-American vs the rest) is a strong predictor for the acquisition of a party preference. Additionally, our results suggest that the predictive strength of this factor is reinforced through a naturalization regime that facilitates full political rights to culturally closer immigrants, thus reinforcing their a priori better conditions for political integration. Finally, the results also suggest that permissive (rather than restrictive) naturalization policies might work better to secure the political integration of migrant minorities.

Low support for nudging among Swedes in a population-representative sample

Recent surveys in China, South Korea, Brazil, South Africa, Russia, Australia, Italy, the UK, Canada, France, Germany, the USA, Japan, Hungary, and Denmark indicate that citizens generally are positive toward state nudging. However, less is known about differences in the support for nudging across socio-demographics and political party preferences, a research gap recently identified in the literature. This article investigates the relationship between the support for nudging and trust in public institutions through a population-representative survey in Sweden. It also analyzes differences in the support for nudging across political party preferences in two ideological dimensions: the economic left-right and cultural GAL-TAN spectra. Data were collected in December 2017 through a custom web survey, using Reisch and Sunstein's (2016) questionnaire. The respondents (N = 1032) were representative of the adult population with regard to gender, age, education, job sector, household income, living region, and political party preference. Sweden was found to belong to the cautiously pronudge nations (along with Japan, Hungary, and Denmark), contrary to hypotheses in previous research. Differences in the support for nudging were found along the economic left-right and GAL-TAN spectra. Individual nudges’ variation in support, polarization, and politicization are analyzed and discussed.

Surveying support for child and youth political participation in Australia and New Zealand

© 2019, © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Recent decades have witnessed increased empirical and policy interest in children’s citizenship, particularly since the ratification of the United Nations Declaration of Children’s Rights. However, support for children’s active citizenship is often hindered by the pervasiveness of discourses that characterise children as innocent, developing, and free from responsibility. Public and governmental decision-making largely excludes children’s consultation and contributions, often determined by age alone. To quantifiably assess the amount of public support for children’s political participation, we commissioned a Likert scale survey question on degrees of support for children and youth (across four age groups between 3 and 18 year olds) having the opportunity to influence government decisions, in the Australian and New Zealand 2016 versions of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). Analysis of responses to this question in relation to demographic survey data indicate variation in preferences for different age groups, and that age, gender, and political party preference of respondents were variables of significance for both nations. These variables point to potential predictors of attitudes toward political participation of children and youth which have relevance for policymakers and educators in relation to provision of programmes that will increase the engagement of children and youth in government decision-making.

Surveying support for child and youth political participation in Australia and New Zealand

© 2019, © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Recent decades have witnessed increased empirical and policy interest in children’s citizenship, particularly since the ratification of the United Nations Declaration of Children’s Rights. However, support for children’s active citizenship is often hindered by the pervasiveness of discourses that characterise children as innocent, developing, and free from responsibility. Public and governmental decision-making largely excludes children’s consultation and contributions, often determined by age alone. To quantifiably assess the amount of public support for children’s political participation, we commissioned a Likert scale survey question on degrees of support for children and youth (across four age groups between 3 and 18 year olds) having the opportunity to influence government decisions, in the Australian and New Zealand 2016 versions of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). Analysis of responses to this question in relation to demographic survey data indicate variation in preferences for different age groups, and that age, gender, and political party preference of respondents were variables of significance for both nations. These variables point to potential predictors of attitudes toward political participation of children and youth which have relevance for policymakers and educators in relation to provision of programmes that will increase the engagement of children and youth in government decision-making.

Sympathy, Blame, and Just Allocation of Health Costs Entailed by Risky Conventional Lifestyles

How does the general public feel about people suffering from lifestyle related conditions, and what do they see as a socially just division health costs for these conditions? Using data from random, nationwide surveys of Australians, 1989-2001 (n=8031) my structural equation model with multiple-item measurement and corrections for attenuation due to random measurement error predicts respondents’ ideal division of medical payment responsibility. The only significant sociodemographic influence is education, which inclines people towards governmental financial responsibility. Cultural and social-psychological factors have large effects. A net time trend favors individual responsibility. Blaming sufferers is strongly associated with favoring individual responsibility. By contrast, people who sympathize with the sufferers tend to favor government payments. Political party preference also matters: Partisans of the main conservative party tend to support individual responsibility. There are clear implications for the current COVID-19 epidemic, especially with regards to “social distancing” behavior.

Politics of Nostalgia and Populism: Evidence from Turkey

This article scrutinizes the relationship between collective nostalgia and populism. Different populist figures utilize nostalgia by referring to their country's ‘good old’ glorious days and exploiting resentment of the elites and establishment. Populists instrumentalize nostalgia in order to create their populist heartland, which is a retrospectively constructed utopia based on an abandoned but undead past. Using two original datasets from Turkey, this study first analyzes whether collective nostalgia characterizes populist attitudes of the electorate. The results illustrate that collective nostalgia has a significantly positive relationship with populist attitudes even after controlling for various independent variables, including religiosity, partisanship, satisfaction with life and Euroscepticism. Secondly, the study tests whether nostalgic messages affect populist attitudes using an online survey experiment. The results indicate that Ottoman nostalgia helps increase populist attitudes. Kemalist nostalgia, however, has a weak direct effect on populist attitudes that disappears after controlling for party preference.